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I.  Introduction
Our information-intensive society, with the increasing 
popularity of various devices such as mobile phones, is a 
society that allows everyone to be a designer of communica-
tion in some sense. But, in this milieu, rather than improving 
the user-friendliness of different communication devices, it is 
more important for us to pay attention to the possibilities of 
designing the bodies of human beings – those who actually 
live and act in the community in a state of symbiosis with 
technological devices. What constitutes our bodily senses? 
How plastic are they? How can we transform them? We need 
to discuss these questions. We need body aesthetics dealing 
with design of our bodily senses. But is such an aesthetics 
possible?
Our claim is that aesthetics of bodily senses is possible 
if it can be a “sociable” aesthetics of bodily senses. “Sociable” 
means “collaborative with others.” This includes the sciences 
as the “Other” of aesthetics. We would also claim that it 
inevitably requires the support of actual body workshops. 
Later in section V we examine the “haptica” projects as an ex-
ample of these body workshops. These particular workshops, 
organized since the year 2000 by Prof. Suzuki, a researcher in 
the field of computer science and complex system theories, 
and Rieko Suzuki, an artist and aesthetician, have been ex-
ploring the possibilities of design related to the haptic sense 
– the sense of touch.1 [Fig. 1]
However, our claim of sociable aesthetics of bodily sens-
es would cause at least the following objections: (1) granting 
the importance of the body, the claim of “sociable” aesthetics 
of the bodily senses – that is, the claim of body aesthetics 
collaborative with sciences – ignores the reason we once 
had paid the attention to the body. The body once had been 
introduced in order to criticize scientific approach, for ex-
ample, strong AI program; (2) contrary to our expectations, 
science itself may not receive our proposal of collaboration 
with nonscientific fields such as aesthetics; (3) Bodily senses 
are inner sensibilities. They remain only private. Therefore 
even if such “sociable” aesthetics of bodily senses were pos-
sible, we could not discuss such inner sensibilities. 
1 About the details of these projects see section IV.
In the following sections, we argue that each objection 
is not correct and that we can propose the possibility of 
sociable aesthetics of bodily senses and the necessity of the 
body workshops like “haptica” projects. Sociable aesthetics 
of bodily senses inevitably requires body workshops.
II.  Does the claim of “sociable” aesthetics 
of the bodily senses ignore the reason why we 
once paid attention to the body? 
In this section, we would like to reconfirm how the body 
came into focus and why this does not prohibit discussions 
about the bodily senses.
1. How the body came into focus
Let us briefly review how the concept of the body came 
into focus in the late 1970s, when the body again2 came to 
be the subject of theoretical inquiry. In the late 1970s, the 
body was highlighted in terms of two broad critical trends, 
criticism of linguistic relativism and criticisms of strong AI [ 
= Artificial Intelligence] programs [that is to say, criticisms of 
language-centered approaches].
Criticisms of linguistic relativism: some believed that 
the body could be a key to overcoming the relativity of our 
2 Of course, we have so many preceding theoretical inquiries about the body. 
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Fig. 1: the “haptica” project
SOCIABLE AESTHETICS OF BODILY SENSES  
AND THE “HAPTICA” PROJECTS
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perception of the world limited by language. In contrast to 
the diversity of languages we speak and the private nature 
of our linguistic interpretations, our bodies are more or less 
the same. In this line of reasoning, some believed that the 
commonality of our bodily experience could offer a more 
universal understanding of the world than that provided by 
our more limited linguistic experiences.3
Criticisms of strong AI program4: this issue is best ex-
plained by what is known as the “frame problem.”
Even when a robot has been supplied with all of the 
necessary, discrete propositions about the world [linguisti-
cally prescribed model of the world], it is still difficult for 
the robot to make correct judgments about contexts and 
situations [backgrounds]. Since it cannot judge correctly, 
it cannot act appropriately. Our bodies, however, can 
perceive backgrounds in their own unique way, prompt-
ing us to take appropriate actions. Our bodies understand 
something more than the sum total of all the discrete and 
elemental pieces of knowledge that we prescribe to the 
robot. Our bodies are aware of the whole that is larger than 
the sum total of its elements. We may call it an “organic 
whole.”
2. We need to discuss our bodily senses.
As we have seen, the body was utilized in the contexts 
of criticisms of linguistic-relativism and the strong AI pro-
gram. Especially we paid attention to the body in order to 
criticize the latter – that is, the idea that we could perfectly 
control the body by linguistic prescriptions. But it never 
means that we must prohibit any necessary scientific discus-
sions about the bodily senses. 
However, the body became an “all-encompassing” 
presence inclusive of our faculties of senses, emotions, back-
ground understanding, and judgment. It became something 
beyond our discussion.
From this point of view, this glorification of the body 
as such a presence appears as a nonproductive attitude that 
could culminate in a refusal of any attempts to discuss and 
theorize the body. That is to say, we may end up repeating 
the word “body” like a mantra without daring to discuss it 
any further.
Arguments asserting the commonality of our bod-
ies also became obstacles to researchers. Even though 
the body’s commonality played an important role in the 
context of criticisms of linguistic relativism and of language-
centered approach, such arguments will not be applicable to 
discussions of the plasticity of the bodily senses as long as 
they assume that the body is a unified entity unaffected by 
contacts with externals. Making these arguments seems to 
assert that the body is a private entity.
Since these theories of the body are exclusive [not “so-
ciable”], there is no potential for further development. This 
is no better than the strong AI program. We need to discuss 
the bodily senses.
3 Richard Shusterman is so often misunderstood as an advocate of universality of 
the body. However, if you read his article carefully, you can easily understand 
that he insists the ambiguity of the body – commonality and difference, iden-
tity and transformability. See his article “Thinking Through the Body, Educat-
ing for the Humanities: A Plea for Somaesthetics,” Journal of Aesthetic Education, 
Vol.40, No1 (Spring 2006): pp.3–21.
4 For example, Hubert L. Dreyfus, What Computers Can’t Do: The Limits of 
Artificial Intelligence, Harper & Row, 1979, especially ch. 7.
III.  Does science refuse to collaborate with 
body aesthetics? : A proposal from “control” 
to “guide”
In this section, by showing a recent shift in scientific 
thought, which we characterize as the shift from “control” 
to “guide,” we argue that science itself is ready to collaborate 
with body aesthetics.
By the early 1990s, if not sooner, rather than a top-
down approach attempting to control the body by linguisti-
cally prescribed knowledge about the world, some attempts 
of a bottom-up approach were undertaken. They involved 
the engineering of various types of robots simulating vari-
ous types of bodies [the human body, insect bodies and so 
on]. Among them, Rodney A. Brook’s artificial insect and 
its “subsumption architecture” is the most famous example.5 
In contrast to strong AI program, the robot produced “ap-
propriate” behavior through interaction with the environ-
ment without any prescribed, representational model of 
the world and any central system. Here we can see a shift 
in scientific thought. In fact, we must say that the robot did 
not produce the behaviors by itself but it was “guided” to 
produce such behaviors under the guidance of the envi-
ronment. We characterize it as the shift from “control” to 
“guide.”
The need of this shift is supported in different way by 
a fact known as “uncontrollability” of the brain. We can ex-
plain it as follows. 
The brain as an intelligent system, like an operating 
system of a computer, can never stop. If it stops running, we 
receive fatal damage. Therefore, it must continue to move 
and process multimodal tasks constantly even during sleep. 
In case of vision, for instance, the brain processes multi-
modal and mutually dependent tasks at one time. It pro-
cesses lower motion systems such as the vestibular-ocular-
response,6 it projects visual information onto the visual area 
while filtering superfluous information, it controls7 ocular 
motional movements and our behaviors through the cerebral 
neo-cortex, it feedbacks visual information to the language 
area, conversely it feedbacks linguistic information to the 
visual area and so on.
According to the fact, we can never believe that our 
vision is a simple output which results only from visual 
stimulation as an input. In case of vision, we can not decide 
exactly which results from which. Furthermore, we can never 
define the fixed boundary that contains all the necessities 
in order to calculate the vision. Usually in order to control 
a system we need at least three conditions: the boundary of 
the system, input and output. Take a bathtub as example. A 
bathtub corresponds to the boundary of the system, heat to 
input and temperature to output. By contrast, we can not 
determine any prerequisites for controlling the brain as an 
intelligent system. Therefore, we must say we can not control 
our brain and our senses.
5 Andy Clark and Josefa Toribio, “Doing without Representaion?” Synthese, Vol. 
101, No. 3 (December 1994): pp. 401–31.
6 For examples, compensatory ocular movements and ocular movements during 
REM sleep.
7 We use the word “control,” but, of course, it never means that an area of the 
brain can control our behavior as a central system which has a linguistically 
prescribed perfect model of the world.
9
Imaginacija, čutnost in umetnost / Zbornik referatov III. sredozemskega kongresa za estetiko
Fuminori AKIBA, Yasuhiro SUZUKI, Kiyofumi MOTOYAMA: SOCIABLE AESTHETICS OF BODILY SENSES AND THE “HAPTICA” PROJECTS, 7-10
The same thing is true of our bodily senses. It is difficult 
for us to determine the boundary of the bodily senses.8 We 
can not research and develop their plasticity by controlling 
them. So what should we do? 
At this point, science seems to come closer to aesthetics. 
It has already been searching for the way to grasp obscure 
senses as such without any prescribed rules. It is ready to 
collaborate with aesthetics.
Let us remember the shift we proposed above, the shift 
from “control” to “guide,” in order to open possibilities to 
discuss our bodily senses. Instead of controlling our bodily 
senses, we can develop their plasticity through interaction 
with the environment. Just as the artificial insect is “guided” 
to produce appropriate behaviors through interaction with 
the environment without any prescribed model of the world 
and any central system, so we can research the plasticity and 
transformability of our bodily senses under the guidance of 
the environment.
IV.  How can we discuss about bodily 
senses?
Bodily senses, as inner sensibilities, remain only private. 
Therefore, even if sociable aesthetics of bodily senses is 
possible, we can not discuss such inner sensibilities. Is it cor-
rect? The question here is how we may be able to facilitate 
discussions of bodily senses by a method other than linguis-
tic prescription. In addition, we also ask what bodily senses 
are worthy of discussion. These are the issues of this section.
1. Making use of the interdependency 
between different senses
In connection with this question, we must pay attention 
to the interdependency between proprioception, the most 
basic of our bodily senses, and our sense of vision pointed 
out by Barbara Montero.9
Proprioception is “the sense by which we acquire infor-
mation about the positions and movements of our own bod-
ies, via receptors in the joints, tendons, ligaments, muscles, 
and skin.”10 It is the private sensing of one’s own body alone, 
which is independent of the sensing of any external object. 
Therefore, discussions about proprioception appear to be 
nearly impossible.
Montero admits that proprioception is private in nature, 
but asserts that this privacy does not preclude discussions 
about it. Montero tries to persuade us by presenting an ex-
ample:
“A dancer might proprioceive only his or her own move-
ments, but by talking to others and watching others, dancers 
can judge whether they are moving, more or less, in the same 
way.”11 
8 Cf. Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch, The Embodied 
Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience, The MIT Press, 1991, especially 
ch. 8. In the area of cognitive science also, Mark Johnson had proposed motor-
sensory “image schema” that had logical structures even though they were 
irreducible to sentences or propositions in his classical work, The Body in the 
Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination and Reason, the University of 
Chicago Press, 1987.
9 Barbara Montero, Proprioception as an Aesthetic Sense, The Journal of Aesthet-
ics and Art Criticism, Vol.64, No.2 (Spring 2006): pp. 231–243.
10 Montero, p. 231.
11 Montero, p. 234.
Our proprioception is in an interdependent relation-
ship with our visual perception of the trajectories of other 
persons’ movements. By referring to such visual perception, 
we can discuss with others even about our own propriocep-
tion, the private sensing of ourselves. That is to say, given a 
condition in which we can observe the movements of other 
persons’ bodies while together performing the same physical 
movements, we are able to discuss our bodily senses.12
Hence, we affirm the following: we will be able to dis-
cuss bodily senses by creating a situation in which a number 
of persons together perform the same physical movements, 
and having them give expression to the bodily senses pro-
duced by the movements in terms of visual perception. 
Sociable aesthetics of bodily senses inevitably requires 
such a body workshop to facilitate discussions about bodily 
senses. And it offers us an opportunity to research the 
plasticity and transformability of our bodily senses under 
the guidance of environment, under the guidance of other 
participants.
At this point we believe we can reject three objections to 
the possibility of sociable aesthetics of bodily senses and the 
necessity of body workshop which supports it.
2. Designing the haptic sense
Among the variety of bodily senses experienced by us as 
we live in a community, what could be the one that is most 
worthy of discussion? We believe that it is the haptic sense, 
the sense of touch.
Firstly, haptic sensing is an experience available to com-
mon men and women without the need for special training. 
We may revive the memory of how we used our hands or 
bodies in various ways when we were infants. To have this 
experience, one does not need any special tools. Neverthe-
less, the more we explore it, we find that the experience of 
haptic sensing is profound and complex.
Secondly, the haptic sense is believed to be the most 
basic of our bodily senses. It is closely related to propriocep-
tion. It is directly related also to our experiencing of pleasure 
and displeasure.
Thirdly, the haptic sense is a door of perception open 
to one’s own body as well as to external objects in the world. 
Interestingly, this produces the double perceptions of touch-
ing something and of oneself being touched. 
In a number of contexts like these, the haptic sense is a 
bodily sense worthy of discussion.
V.  “Haptica” projects
In the last section, we introduce the purpose and pro-
gram of the “haptica” projects13 and try to explain the reason 
why we need such body workshops to promote our sociable 
12 Alternatively, a public discussion about bodily senses could be based on what 
is called “synesthesia.” Even though a person may not be able to experience 
perfect synesthesia, he or she may at least give expression to a bodily sense 
in terms of perception by another sense, such as visual perception, instead of 
describing it in words.
13 Body workshops called “haptica”: 1st,TFT Salon, Tokyo; 2nd, 3rd, Hohnen-in 
Temple, Kyoto; 4th, at 1st International Symposium On Multi-Sensory Design, 
Nagoya Univ. 2005.(invited workshop); 5th, at 2nd International Symposium 
On Multi-Sensory Design, Nagoya Univ. 2006 (invited workshop). In addi-
tion, they make products that evoke our sense of touching. They are ”Haptica 
haptico” (collaborate with handicappers).
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aesthetics of bodily senses in connection with the points we 
have made above.
The purpose of the “haptica” projects, as we wrote 
above, is to explore the possibilities of design related to the 
haptic sense, the sense of touch. It adopts a following pro-
gram: participants 
are asked to (1) 
make a pair; (2) 
massage their part-
ner’s face with oil; 
(3) continue to 
express their emo-
tion during massage. 
After finishing mas-
sage they also asked 
to (4) express their 
emotion by paint-
ing, sculpture and 
so on; (5) make a 
score about their 
way of massaging 
[score of touching, 
Fig. 2]; (6) exchange 
the score and do 
massage according 
to their partner’s 
score. Despite the simplicity of its appearance, this program 
satisfies several conditions we mentioned above. So we can 
easily explain the reason why we need these projects for our 
aesthetics.
Firstly, they make use of the interdependency between 
the haptic sense and the visual. Second, they take a form of 
group work. These are the points which contribute to turn 
the private character of bodily senses into the discussible one 
[see section II, IV]. Third, exchanging the score and mas-
saging his/her partner’s face according to the partner’s score 
is to expand his/her bodily senses beyond one’s limitation 
and transform them. In order to massage the partner’s face 
according to the score, he/she must imagine the way the 
partner massaged his/her face. Therefore, he/she is guided 
to produce his/her behavior under the guidance of the 
partner, through interaction with the other participants. It 
brings quite different result from when we use instructions 
prescribed by language. Furthermore, these accumulated 
scores will be the data of scientific analysis in the future. As 
the visualized bodily senses, they will be the basis for future 
collaboration of aesthetics with science [see section II, III]. 
In short, the “haptica” projects, with attempts to ex-
press the experience of haptic sensing by common men and 
women like us in terms of visual perception rather than by 
language, open our bodily senses to discussion, and make it 
possible for us to transform our bodily senses, opening up 
the possibility for us to design a community in which we are 
connected through our bodily senses.
Conclusion:
A human community emerges from complex interac-
tions between human bodies and the environment. In the 
depth of such interactions is the phenomenon of haptic sens-
ing, which in itself is a product of complex interactions. Our 
explorations through the “haptica” projects of the possibili-
ties for design related to the haptic sense represent a natural 
outgrowth of the new theory of the aesthetics of the bodily 
senses which emerged after a paradigm shift, the shift from 
“control” to “guide,” in science.14
14 As we wrote above in section III, the brain is an “uncontrollable” entity. No 
prescribed rule can control him/her. So he/she needs a teacher who can 
“guide” him/her and teach him/her how to tell good from bad, how to tell 
what belongs to him/her from what does not through practical trainings in 
his/her infancy. One candidate of the teachers is our feelings of pleasure and 
displeasure. We can feel pleasure/displeasure through touching something. 
If the brain feels pleasure, the thing it touches is registered as good or as the 
thing which belongs to him/her. On the contrary, if the brain feels displeasure, 
it is registered as bad or as the thing which does not belong to him/her. The 
formation of his/her criteria through our feelings pleasure/displeasure, as 
well as the formation of his/her boundary through them, is quite important 
because it demarcates him/her from the environment and thus defends him/
herself against attack from the environment. If someone could not form these 
criteria through touching in his/her infancy, he/she is distressed by everything 
in the world. He/She is terribly vulnerable to attack. It is quite dangerous. 
The traditional and central issue of aesthetics – that is, the occasional forma-
tion of criteria through our feelings of pleasure/displeasure, which oppose to 
prescribed rules, still retains its importance. We must continue to explore the 
possibilities of collaboration with various fields of science.
Fig. 2: Score of touching
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THE MIRROR IS LEFT EMPTY!
LOOKING IN A DETAIL FROM BLACAS EWER
Introduction:
The relationship between the human being and the mir-
ror, any surface can reflect her/his own image, is an old one. 
This relationship was developed through the ages in conjunc-
tion with human’s knowledge of the self and the environment. 
The mirror was first made of any material that is capable of 
reflecting images. They could started to be made out of stone 
then of metal and in the Renaissance, in Venice, they were 
made of glass covered with silver composite fused with paint. 
And by this development the mirror reflects clearer images and 
becomes lighter in weight, which makes it easier to hold and to 
transport. The glass mirror reflects resemblance to the person’s 
image closely enough to the one that might be seen by others. 
And some people claims that the mirror changed the person’s 
image of her/himself entirely.1 There is an intimate relation-
ship between women and mirror since ancient cultures. The 
Etruscans, for example, buried thousands of mirrors with their 
deads especially women and this could allude to the impor-
tance of mirrors as personal belongings.2 
It is pointed out that the eye-bull is the first mirror that 
the human saw her/himself reflected on but others claim that 
the surface of water is the first natural mirror noticed by hu-
mans and it gives a wider image than the one reflected on the 
eye-bull.3 This article will limit itself to a scene presented on an 
Islamic inlaid copper ewer in its artistic, social and economic 
context. This scene includes a mirror which plays an important 
role in its content.
The Blacas Ewer and its scenes:
This ewer, found today in the British Museum, is made 
of copper and zinc and inlaid with silver and brass. It was 
produced in the city of Mosul found today in northern 
Iraq and signed by Shuja’ bin Mina’h al-Mosuli in AH 629 
(1232).4 This city was renowned for its excellent produc-
tion of metal vessels under the rule of Bani al-Artaq because 
of the brilliant metalworkers from Khurasan who had fled 
before the sweep of the Moguls and settled in the city. The 
rulers of Mosul, Bader ad-Din Lu’lu’ for example, were en-
thusiastic about metal works and they used to give them as 
presents to the high ranking locals or to the rulers of neigh-
boring lands.5
This ewer has several scenes inlaid and all of them are 
figurative and narrative. Some of these scenes are of horsemen 
hunting, and one of them presents Bahramqor hunting and 
his beloved Azada riding her camel. This one is narrated in the 
Shahnama of Firdausi. Another one shows a lady chastened 
in her camel-litter, we know that the contemporary historians 
complained of the elite ladies who were jamming the narrow 
paths of the city with their large camel-litters and making 
noises because of the golden accessories hanged on them.6 
Another scene, the subject of this article, shows a seated lady 
holding a mirror attended by her maid holding a casket filled 
with jewelry.7 The subject is uncommon not only in Islamic 
art but also in most of Ancient and Medieval arts because 
the craftsmen were unfamiliar with the inner seclusion of the 
harems especially of their private lives such as dressing and 
making up.
The lady is dressing up:
From the first glance we noticed that the lady in the scene 
is the seated one because of her size. The lady occupies more 
space than her maid although the maid is standing. Enlarging 
the person in a given scene is a well known tactic in show-
ing her/his significance especially in ancient arts such as the 
ancient Egyptian. And this phenomena is also known in chil-
dren’s drawings as for example when they draw the class room 
they made their teacher bigger in size than themselves. But in 
our picture it seems that it is intended by the artist to show 
the heroin of the story. We can also differentiate between the 
women since the lady is seated and the maid is standing, set-
ting while others are standing give you seniority. Both women 
are dressed almost the same which could be resulted of the 
teachings of Islam in this matter but I believe it is more show-
ing off element since the lady considers the dress of her maid 
as part of her prestigious status.8 Still the rendering of the lady 
is more eloquent than her maid, we see her full face while we 
only see the maid’s profile. We notice all the charmed features 
of the lady’s face but only one side of the maid’s. This could be 
some sort of convincing tactic on the part of the artist toward 
the buyer of the ewer or made upon her request. It is clear 
from the narratives pictured on the ewer – some mentioned 
above and mostly related to women – that it is made for a 
woman. And while the maid covered her hair, the lady lefts 
12
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part of her hair to be seen 
and this alludes to the impor-
tance of the hair for women’s 
look. She adds a large dia-
mond fixed on the front top 
of a band around her head. 
Beside all that, there is a 
wider hallo behind her head 
than that of the maid. 
Concerning the effort 
each person involved with, 
we find the lady seated and 
busy in dressing up while the 
maid is standing up holding 
in front of her chest an open 
3-D rectangle casket. The maid is ready for orders, looking at 
her lady and possibly she is thinking of some thing else and 
we will return to this idea later on in this article. The lady is 
holding a metal mirror in her left hand, while the other hand 
is raised up to the level of her chest to take a piece of jewelry 
from the casket. It seems that the casket, because of its color, 
is made of ivory or silver since the ladies from Islamic world 
from that period until late in the nineteenth century used to 
have caskets made of metal or ivory to store their valuable 
belongings such as jewelry and cosmetics.
For the purpose of explaining the function of the casket 
we can mention a real one from Andalusia. It is an ivory one 
made upon request of an important personality who is Aurora 
from the Bask.9 She was concubine of al-Hakam II known as 
al-Mustansir bil-Lah who translated her name into Arabic to 
become Subh al-Bashkansiyah. He married her and she gave 
birth for two sons. The youngest of them became caliph after 
his father when he was only twelve years old.10 Both casket 
and its owner’s biography may shed some light on the role of 
the mirror in our picture but first let us turn to the relation 
between the mirror and the two persons.
 The image of the mirror:
We find in the upper part of our studied scene three cir-
cles: the mirror in the middle and two halos behind the heads. 
All these circles are inlaid with yellow brass and framed with 
silver. Their unified color, different diameters, and order en-
courage us to elaborate on them. We know that the halo is an 
old symbol used first in the Ancient Chinese art then appeared 
in Christian art and it is always associated with the important 
or venerated persons as symbols of the whole light. Afterward 
the halo appeared in Islamic art without any religious significa-
tion. It works as an open window behind the figures and be-
comes a source of light by itself. The mirror too is considered 
to be the disc of the sun in ancient civilizations like ancient 
Egyptian. This could lead us to see this golden mirror as a valu-
able piece of the lady’s jewelry. Moreover the mirror because 
of its circular shape which associates it with the halos is by 
itself an important symbol for the lady’s presence. 
In terms of the sizes of the circles we find the biggest one 
is the lady’s halo then the maid’s and the last one is the mir-
ror. The first is bigger than the head, the second is almost the 
same size of the head, and the smallest is the mirror which has 
been left empty. Here we can put forward several questions 
such as: was it possible to fill it of something? Why? And of 
what? We may speculate that it could reflect the face of one of 
either woman, but which one? Although the lady captures the 
mirror’s handle correctly it is directed toward us and by this it 
could not reflect any of them. We can conclude for this point 
that the mirror is put for another purpose which is to baffle 
us including the viewer and both women. Moreover, what 
dramatizes the scene is the position of the mirror between two 
women of different ranks and its relation to other elements in 
the scene.
Are we really baffled when looking in this mirror? Al-
though it is a tiny element in a picture, it is a real mirror which 
can reflect your face or at least your eye. But because it is 
found in between two women you can imagine your embar-
rassment whether you are a male or a female. If you are a male 
you will be unlucky to sneeze your nose between two women, 
and if you are a female, it would be difficult to decide where to 
stand. The lady is attractive because of here qualifications both 
materialistic and personal. But the maid is also appealing since 
she holds a plenty of jewelry and because of her status, she will 
get your passion. And the mirror is directed toward us which 
is the only empty circle and ready to perceive us and frame us 
inside. We realize that this mirror is put there really to tease us; 
is this the intention of the artist? Did he predict this situation? 
And why? Such questions will stay suspended exactly like our 
images in the mirror. This state of confusion is not limited to 
us but involves the women in the scene too. The experience 
with the mirror is a complex human one because it includes 
two relations; the first is between the self and the other, and 
the second is between the inner and the outer sides.11 If we 
reconsider the story of Aurora and her casket and relate it to 
what we have reached we may uncover the maid’s daydream to 
be a lady and the memories of the lady, possibly, when she was 
a maid which should have been forgotten. The phenomenon 
of mamluks whether men or women was wide spread at that 
period. The Atabekah themselves were male slaves for the 
Saljuks then they became rulers, and by the same token some 
female slaves had the chance to become ladies. Nevertheless 
13
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it is all right for the maid to dream of being a lady and own-
ing this jewelry instead of holding them for her lady or like 
Aurora and her ivory box. It could not be an exaggeration to 
say that the mirror is a reflection of its period or at least of the 
social aspects of that culture especially the status of women. 
And we should not forget the sympathized artist with the 
maid because he was not far from her rank, in spite of his self 
confidence as craftsman uncovered by his signature. He let her 
dream, at least in his rendering, to come true.
The other thing we realize that there are three ewers in the 
picture, two of them look like dishes on high bases. They are 
resided on the virtual vertical line in the middle of the picture, 
one at the top near the lady’s head, and the other down in front 
of her. These ewers were used as perfume keepers. The third 
one looks like our ewer. It is found in the middle, between the 
two women and under the mirror. It is possible for this ewer 
to be a base for the mirror because of their golden color and its 
neck which is long enough to have the mirror’s handle fixed in. 
The artist did not let the mirror rest in this ewer. This act adds 
more life to the dynamics of the scene which heighten our 
perception of it. And there are three branches: one is behind 
the lady’s head, and the others spring from the disc of the 
mirror on both sides. With little imagination, if we combine 
the ewer with a high neck, the mirror and the two branches 
it will become some form of the Tree of Life which is well 
known in pan-Mediterranean cultures since ancient times. If 
we consider this idea, it will be the first time for the mirror to 
be a constituting part of this symbol. This tree is considered as 
the cause for the Expulsion of Adam and Eve from Paradise, 
so it is called the Prohibited Tree. It is tempting to say that the 
mirror in the context of our scene is related to the prohibited 
fruits of this tree and the two females with temptation. And 
by this relation the scene is transformed into personification 
of temptation mixed with wanting, readiness, and hunting 
sharpened with beauty, wealth, and the atmosphere filled with 
perfumes and aroma.
We reach to the point that what is presented by Shuja’ in 
this tiny scene is not less complicated than what offered by 
other artists much more renown than him who use mirrors 
in their art works. I imagine him exposing the mirror in front 
of our faces saying that the picture is a virtual reality as our 
ephemeral dreams or as our images in mirrors. In this visual 
comment he is not far from Las Meninas of Velazquez where 
his presence in it explains his willingness to present complete 
realism in untraditional way of rendering.12 The composition 
of the work with its elements especially the mirror in the back-
ground alludes to that the 
painting is about painting 
and it was possible with the 
aid of the mirror. But Shuja’ 
does not represent himself 
or any other person in the 
mirror and instead he left it 
for the illusion of the two 
women and for the person 
who will look at them.
We notice that the pre-
sentation of the mirror in our 
picture shows on the surface 
the subject of a woman who 
is dressing herself up but in 
depth complicates the work to a degree which makes it full of 
meanings. This relationship between women and dressing up 
appears in artworks of contemporary female artists. The mir-
ror plays crucial role in works made by artists such as Rachel 
Ynodelman and Nancy Angelo. They build on Lccan’s mirror 
stage which alludes to the female independence toward herself 
against the attitude of society toward women in general and 
at the same time we sense the contradictions of presence and 
absence.13
She is a woman who faces us with her mirror and this 
relationship is seen in Manet’s A Bar at Folies-Berger where 
the woman plays a decisive role in the idea of the painting 
and its subject. The self conscious of painting is different of 
self criticism since there are examples through the ages of it 
but the criticism of the nature of painting appeared with the 
advancement of modernity. In Manet’s painting because of 
the woman, the mirror filing most of the painting, and the 
customer’s tilted reflection we are put in confusion and driven 
on the questions: what are we really looking at? Is it a real 
image or a painted canvas? Are they no longer the same?14 The 
reflected image on the mirror is a moving window and it seems 
that we are looking into a virtual world. Each picture in a mir-
ror is unreal but has an original one and this unrealistic picture 
has its “realism” which should be connected in principle to a 
real holder. But it seems for Shuja’ that the dreams have been 
kept as dreams. We can not cross the threshold of the world 
of reflected images in mirrors because we can only look at and 
not to put feet in.15 By this, we understand both the intentions 
of Manet when he filled his painting with a mirror reflecting 
the whole scene in front of it, and those which made Shuja’ left 
his tiny mirror empty. 
(Endnotes)
1 Mumford sees that the glass mirror coincided with the spring of self 
biographies and self portraits, see Mahmood Rajab, Al-mirah wa El-
falsafah (The Mirror and Philosophy), Collage of Literature, Kuwait 
University, 2nd. Vol., 1981, PP. 30-1. 
2 See the Bronze mirror showing Herekele and Mlacuch in the site of 
British Museum http://www.thebritishmuseum.ac.uk/compass/
ixbin/hixclient.exe
3 Rajab, ibid, P. 13.
4 Duc Blacas was the original owner of the ewer, it is 30.4cm., See The 
Blacas Ewer in the site of The British Museum. 
5 Barbara Brend, Islamic Art, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
1991, P. 106.
6 The Blacas Ewer in the site of The British Museum, ibid.
7 Barbara Brend, ibid, Pl. 70.
8 One of the saying s of the prophet insists on eating and dressing 
the same for the patrons and their mamluks or servants, see 
20/08/2005 http://hadith.al-islam.com/Display.Disnpay.
asn?Doc=6&ID=39047&Search.Text
9 Barbara Brend, ibid, P. 60, pl. 33.
10 See for Subh 20/08/2005 http://history.al-islam.com/names.
asn?year=390 and for the Muslims in Andalusia see 20/08/2005 
http://history.com/Disply.asn?f=sub00111htm 
11 Mahmood Rajab, ibid, P. 14.
12 Oil on canvas, 318X276cm., Prado Museu, 1656-7. 
13 Lucy R. Lippard, The Pink Glass-Selected Essays on Feminist Art, 
The New Press, New York, 1995, P. 23. 
14 Tony Godfrey, Conceptual Art, Phaidon, London, 1998, PP. 19-20.
15 Mahmood Rajab, ibid, PP. 31-4, 39.
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THE DIALECTICS OF SPACE AND THE UNITY OF THE ARTS. 
ON COSTAS TSOCLIS’ “SAINT GEORGE”
Georgia APOSTOlOPOUlOU
Philosophy Department, University of Ioannina, Ioannina, Greece
1.  Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to bring into dialogue Costas 
Tsoclis’ installation entitled “Saint George” (No 1) and Hegel’s 
“dialectics of space”, in order to analyze the semantic polyva-
lence of Tsoclis’ artwork.1 Hegel argues that the elaboration of 
space in art corresponds to the progress of the absolute spirit 
towards its own self-consciousness. When the elaboration of 
space has achieved its highest level, the end of art is brought 
about. My position is that Tsoclis’ artwork cancels the nihilistic 
consequences of this dialectics of space, since it resituates the 
real dimensions of the artistic space and claims the unity of 
the arts. Furthermore, the semantics of Tsoclis’ artwork goes 
beyond art history and poses questions pertaining to aesthetics 
and philosophy of culture.
2.  Hegel: Art and space
Hegel develops his dialectics of space in contrast to Kant’s 
transcendental aesthetics of space. In the latter case, aesthetics 
concerns sensation as the first of the two cognitive faculties and 
does not refer to art and artworks. While Kant considers space 
as an a priori form of pure intuition, which contributes to the 
knowledge of objects, Hegel, in his aesthetics, presents space in 
terms of historicity and art. For, Hegel maintains that the artistic 
space is not given from the very beginning, but it becomes what 
it is, while its formation goes together with the development of 
the self-consciousness of the absolute spirit. 
According to Hegel, the problem of space and time refers 
to the adventure of the absolute, which has been externalized in 
nature and spirit. Art, as well as religion and philosophy, is a form 
of the self-consciousness of the absolute spirit. Through these 
activities, the absolute spirit achieves the highest level of its self-
consciousness, that is the consciousness of being free, self-deter-
mined and reconciled with its opposite. As a matter of fact, Hegel’s 
aesthetics has a metaphysical and logical foundation. No doubt, 
our understanding of ourselves and of the world is far away from 
Hegel’s strong metaphysical demands. His aesthetics, however, in-
1 The “dialectics of space” in art is Hegel’s terminology. Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, 
Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Kunst. Herausgegeben von Annemarie 
Gethmann-Siefert. Hamburg: Meiner 2003, p. 43.
cludes important aspects of the relationship between art and space 
that can also be relevant in considering the art of our days. 
Hegel argues that the elaboration of space by the arts is 
accompanied by a variety of forms and expressions. Since art 
elevates the form of the human over the form of the animals, 
the artwork is transformed to a pictorial statement of the rec-
ognition of human dignity and freedom. Hegel explains the 
elaboration of space as the successive negation of spatial dimen-
sions through artistic creativity. The whole procedure reminds 
the “via negationis”, or the subtraction of the dimensions of 
the geometric shape. In the Platonic tradition, the movement 
from the shape to the surface and further to the line leads to the 
simple point, which is beyond every dimension and symbolizes 
the Ultimate One, the Divine.2 This connection of geometry and 
2 Hegel o. c. 42-43. About the Platonic and Neo-Platonic process of abstraction 
cf. H. J. Krämer, Der Urspung der Geistmetaphysik. Amsterdam: Grüner. 19672, 
pp. 105 ff.
No. 1. C. Tsoclis’ “Saint George”, 1990, painting  
(265 X 20 cm.), lance, sculpture (18m.) two 
monitors. Collection of the artist. Cf. Br. Corà,  
C. Tsoclis. Athens: Adam 2005 (in Greek), p. 133.
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metaphysics includes a mystic element justifying the slight dis-
continuity between spirit and nature, between seen and unseen, 
between limited and unlimited. 
Hegel preserves this mystical element in two cases. First, he 
underlines that the point, which emerges after the subtraction 
of the dimensions in the arts, is the free subjectivity. Second, he 
maintains that nature is the object in itself, because the catego-
ries of reason cannot absorb and rationalize nature in an exhaus-
tive way. Nevertheless, the spirit through its activity brings 
nature to the fore as the other of spirit itself, as the familiar space 
of its presence, of its own world. This recognition of the other 
as the equal of the same constitutes reconciliation. As Hegel 
argues, art is the only reconciling activity of the spirit that devel-
ops an immediate relationship with nature and matter. It corre-
sponds to the need of the spirit to express its highest meaning in 
a dialectic way. Therefore, in the artwork, the spiritual becomes 
sensuous and the sensuous becomes spiritual.
According to Hegel’s theory, the elaboration of space pro-
ceeds as the subtraction of the dimensions and as the creation of 
forms, as well. Its purpose is to elaborate an exterior indicating 
the interior. The process starts in and with architecture, which 
creates the laboratory for the work of the other arts. Architecture 
elaborates the three –dimensional space, since it builds up the 
temple, but it remains in the exterior.3 Sculpture elaborates full 
spatiality, since the human form presented in the statue indicates 
the exterior and the interior of the spirit and utilises all three 
dimensions of space.4 
The progress leads to the priority of painting. This art elabo-
rates the two dimensions, the surface, through lines and points.5 
Further, painting withdraws from the total spatiality elabo-
rated by sculpture and turns to the uncertainty of the interior. 
Therefore, painting takes the decisive turn from objectivity to 
3 Hegel op. cit. p. 208.
4 op. cit. pp. 229-230.
5 op. cit. p. 250.
subjectivity.6 According to Hegel’s theory, music stays at the limit 
between exterior and interior. While mood belongs to the inte-
rior, musical instruments preserve the two dimensions of surface. 
Hegel considers architecture to be the primordial art that liberates 
the other arts towards their task and destination, but also to their 
full differentiation and separation. When the elaboration of space 
is realised in and through the arts, the spirit goes beyond art, since 
the possibilities of art to express the spirit have been exhausted. 
Besides, the spirit has discovered that its intrinsic determination 
lies beyond the realm of sensation and perception. Therefore, art 
achieves its end as the absolute expression of the spirit.
In elaborating space and creating the variety of the forms, 
art also creates the world of the artworks. Hegel points out that 
every artwork is defined in terms of quality and meaning, even 
though it is a thing because of its material substrate. It is rather 
a knot in a dynamic context, since it is the result of the spirit’s 
activity and indicates the whole process of artistic signification. 
This world of the artworks is not separated from the cultural and 
social world. On the contrary, it partially overlaps with the latter 
and partially constitutes it. Art expresses the pain and the joy, 
the hopes and the expectations of humans in concrete historical 
situations, and promotes the universality of freedom, recogni-
tion, and reconciliation.
3.  Tsoclis’ “Saint George” and the unity  
of the arts
Tsoclis’ “Saint George” recalls a familiar theme in Chris-
tian-Orthodox iconography, namely Saint George slaying the 
dragon. Nevertheless, Tsoclis has enlarged the space of the 
artistic presentation, because he has transformed the original 
theme into a project demanding the creative cooperation of 
more visual arts, other than painting. In this impressive artwork, 
painting is realized as the source uniting the visual arts towards 
a common activity. Tsoclis created this artwork 1990 and pre-
sented it for the first time in the Arco di Rab gallery in Rome.7 
The installation combines a painting and a sculpture. (No. 
1). The painting shows Saint George on horseback, while the 
sculpture is about 18 meters in length and has the shape of a ser-
pent. The almost “invisible” figure of Saint George emerges from 
the dark background of the painting. We see only his painted 
hand holding a real iron lance, and we see the horse; both are in 
hesitant gray and white colours. The iron lance extends outside 
the painting. The horse has turned its head to the direction of the 
sculpture-serpent and gives the viewer the impression that it is 
moving against the monster lying on the ground. The rectangular 
frame of the painting indicates, almost in a suprematist style, the 
metaphysical power of the frame of a sacred icon. It is the strong 
hand of the painted Saint George that initiates the miracle of the 
dynamic unification of visual arts. Surely, it does not initiate only 
the artistic miracle, as I shall explain later in this paper. 
The sculpture-serpent is constructed of aluminum scales, 
while two monitors in function replace the eyes and continuous-
ly show pictures of human violence and of natural disasters. The 
iron lance setting off from the hand of the painted Saint George 
perforates the sculpture-serpent and in this way unites painting 
with sculpture.8 Further, it unites painting and sculpture with the 
6 op. cit. p. 248.
7 Cf. Br. Corà, C. Tsoclis. Athens: Adam 2005 (in Greek), p. 132.
8 Cf. Corà, o. c. p. 132. 
No. 2. C. Tsoclis’ “Saint George”, the sculpture as it 
was exhibited under the Acropolis in the exhibition 
“Athens by Art” on the occasion of the Olympic 
Games in Athens 2004. Cf. Corà, C. Tsoclis.  
Athens: Adam 2005 (in Greek), p. 132.
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video art, namely with a novel possibility of pictorial presenta-
tion. The sculpture-serpent is not constructed as an integrated 
whole through the elaboration of only one piece of material. 
Since the scales of the sculpture-serpent are constructed one by 
one, the artist has to screw them together, in order to “build up” 
the final shape. This process indicates the “tectonic” element of 
the artwork, remaining in the service of sculpture. Furthermore, 
the evident tectonic element of the installation results from the 
combination of the vertical represented by the iron lance with 
the horizontal represented by the serpent lying on the ground.9 
Therefore, Tsoclis’ “Saint George” not only supersedes the “static 
painting”, but it also presents the artwork as the dynamic, still 
open unity of the pictorial, plastic and tectonic elements.10 
Comparing the semantic power of this artwork with Hegel’s 
model of the dialectics of space in the arts, we ascertain a rever-
sal. Hegel considered that the elaboration of space by the arts has 
already led to their separation. On the contrary, Tsoclis’ “Saint 
George” declares the unity of the arts and their novel vindication 
of space. This artwork reconstitutes artistic space. While Hegel 
identified the beginning of the dialectics of space with architec-
ture, Tsoclis’ artwork brings painting to the fore as the fulfillment 
of this dialectics.
The installation belongs to the artist’s collection and has 
been exhibited in different towns, museums, and galleries. Dur-
ing the 2004 Athens Olympic Games, it was exhibited without 
the painting in the Dionysios Areopagites pedestrianized street 
under Parthenon. (No. 2). 
4.  Cultural remembrance and artistic 
innovation
Since the title “Saint George” of Tsoclis’ installation is the 
abbreviation of a religious narrative, we may point out that this 
artwork also connects the arts and literature, picture and word. 
So, the pictorial language of this artwork corresponds to the 
language of those narratives, myths, and symbols that have the 
archetypal core of a concrete cultural identity. Saint George on 
horseback slaying the dragon indirectly recalls the young hero on 
horseback, who is fighting against the monster. In both cases, the 
archetypal core is the perennial struggle of Good against Evil.
The representation of Saint George on horseback, slaying 
the dragon is only one of the iconographic types that have ap-
peared since the ninth century A. D. The earlier type, which has 
also been preserved through the centuries, shows Saint George 
as a standing man having on the martyr’s dress and holding 
the cross.11 The later iconographic type of Saint George on 
horseback spread broadly in the Christian-Orthodox tradition 
after the thirteenth century. It can also be found in many Greek 
churches built up during the post-Byzantine era. 
An icon of this type exists in the Byzantine Museum of 
Athens (No.3). It comes from Saint George’s church in the 
9 Cf. Η. Wölfflin, Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Das Problem der Stilentwicklung 
in der neueren Kunst. Sechzehnte, unveränderte Auflage mit 123. Abbildungen. 
Basel Stuttgart: Schwabe 1979, p. 149.
10 Corà op. cit. p. 123 is right in talking about the “static painting”. However, I 
think that the “Saint George” has a broader meaning. Cf. K. Koskina, “Costas 
Tsoclis, the Wayfarer”. Tsoclis. A Retrospective. Curator K. Koskina. Athens: 
National Museum of Contemporary Art 2002, pp. 35-47, here p. 45.
11 There is also an iconographic type of Saint George on horseback that does not 
include the slaying of the dragon. Cf. N. Chatzidakis, “Saint George on Horse-
back ‘in Parade’. A Fifteenth Century Icon in the Benaki Museum”. Thymiama in 
the memory of Laskarina Boura. Athens: The Benaki Museum. 1994, pp. 61-65, 
with illustrations and bibliography.
village Tzanata on the island of Cephallonia and is supposed to 
be a work of the early eighteenth century, painted by the deacon 
Andreas Karantinos from Cephallonia.12 Scenes from his mar-
tyrdom encircle the central representation of Saint George. The 
figure of Saint George on horseback is elaborated in the details 
of the military dress, while the strong colours of golden, red 
and black give a majestic sign of victory, since Saint George has 
already perforated the neck of the dragon with his lance. Never-
theless, the melancholic face of the Saint points to his martyr-
dom. The waving red mantle, the painted Saint George holding 
the lance with both hands, the scared white horse raising his 
front legs and turning its head backwards, the blood from the 
neck of the defeated dragon indicate that the painter has grasped 
the “fruitful moment” of the action. 
It seems that one of the reasons for the appearance of this 
iconographic type in the ninth century is the interest in Greek 
myths under the influence of the first Byzantine humanism. The 
narrative of Saint George’s life was compared to the Greek myth 
of Bellerophon and, in this way, the pictorial representation of 
Saint George was enriched. According to Greek mythology, 
Bellerophon succeeded in taming the winged horse Pegasus, to 
ride it and to slay the fire-breathing monster of Chimera. Bel-
lerophon’s fighting is represented on an Attic red-figured pottery 
(epinètron) dating from about 430 B. C. (No. 4), that exists at the 
National Archeological Museum in Athens.13 While art elabo-
rates a novel form of representation within the Christian world, 
it serves as a strategy of cultural remembrance under changed 
circumstances. Furthermore, it preserves the continuity of cul-
ture and opens new possibilities of human creativity.
In spite of the argument of secularization, the image of Saint 
George slaying the dragon and liberating the princess from dan-
ger has been important for the spirit of the avant-garde during 
the first decades of the last century. Kandisnky interpreted this 
image as the symbol of spiritual freedom and artistic renewal. 
He painted “The Blue Rider”, the picture on the cover of the 
Almanac, after he had created a series of paintings that have Saint 
George as their theme. The Blue Rider is Saint George devoted 
to the spirit of the avant-garde. (No. 5). Saint George protects 
the avant-garde presented as the princess at the right side of the 
picture. The dragon has disappeared, since the glorious victory of 
the avant-garde has been achieved. This picture symbolizes the 
victory of the avant-garde over the artistic traditionalism insist-
ing on the representation of objects.14 Following the path of the 
higher truth existing beyond appearances, Kandinsky introduces 
a metaphysical theory of reality in terms of artistic vision. He 
points out that the novel spirit of painting corresponds to the 
new spiritual realm, which is in the process of its novel forma-
tion. The new painting elevates the spirit beyond matter.15
Tsoclis’ “Saint George” symbolizes the spirit of renewal in 
art in a different way. For, Saint George liberates painting from 
inertia and introduces vividness and movement into art. Tsoclis 
12 See the description by Chr. Baltogianni, “Andreas Karantinos: The Saint George”. 
Byzantne Museum. The New Acquisitions (1986-1996). Athens: The Byzantine 
Museum. 1997, p. 114 (in Greek).
13 N. Yalouris, Pegasus: Ein Mythos in der Kunst. Ins Deutsche übetragen von A. L. 
Brakemaier: s. l.: Mobil Oil 1976 p. 30.
14 G. Brucher, Wassily Kandinsky. Wege zur Abstraktion. München-London-New 
York: Prestel 1969, p. 379. 
15 W. Kandinsky, Über das Geistige in der Kunst. 10. Auflage mit einem Vorwort 
von M. Bill. Bern: Benteli 1973, p. 143.
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takes a path back to the things. His symbolic realism intends to 
save the intrinsic truth of things, as well as the things themselves. 
Furthermore, he considers things as the elements of our context 
of life, and he indicates in his art their forgotten truth, which we 
have before our eyes and do not see. In this way, art does refer to 
the world, to nature and to society, and it is brought before both 
our sensual and our spiritual eye.
5.   The uncertain reconciliation
It has been mentioned above that Tsoclis’ “Saint George” 
resituates artistic space. We have to modify this statement, 
because the spatial locus of this artwork cannot be determined 
in a definitive way. The semantic polyvalence of this artwork 
corresponds to the “overlapping” of different spaces, while the 
artistic space remains prevalent. While art creates spatialization, 
it manifests the plurality of spaces and opens up localities for 
dwelling. Heidegger has emphasized that there is not only space, 
No. 5. W. Kandinsky, Almanach Der Blaue Reiter, 
1911, coloured wood cut 32,5X 24 cm. private 
collection. 8863 Verlag Ilse Holzinger München 
©VG Bild-Kunst, Bonn, 2003.
but there are spaces.16 Tsoclis’ “Saint George” implies a step from 
the religious to the secular space. One could reverse this state-
ment. The incommensurability between the sculpture-serpent 
and the painting is in favour of the frightening magnitude of the 
serpent. Nevertheless, the hidden figure of Saint George and the 
dark background of the painting intimate the dialectics of the 
visible and the invisible, of limited and the unlimited. There is 
a mystical element concerning the common source of religion 
and art located between the light and the darkness on the paint-
ing, since the illuminated, emerging hand of the invisible Saint 
George initiates the miracle of art.
It is surprising at first sight that the artwork is entitled “Saint 
George” but it does not represent the figure of Saint George. Fur-
ther, the pictures of violence and disaster, which are shown on the 
two monitors, enlarge the meaning of the artwork. The sculpture-
serpent indicates the dangers of contemporary life. The monster 
does not belong to mythology or to the religious narrative. It is a 
reality in contemporary society. Tsoclis once wrote that art should 
be interested in common problems.17 While art presents the con-
flict among humans and against nature, it indicates the question 
about the possibility of reconciliation. Moreover, it points to the 
inevitability of human dwelling in face of the contradictions of our 
times. The artist, however, questions this inevitability and in his 
work he holds a mirror up to society, in which the viewer can see 
herself or himself and conceive her or his ambiguous situation in 
which one can see oneself and conceive one’s ambiguous situation. 
In this way, the artwork vindicates its own place within the human 
world and points to human problems beyond art.
16 M. Heidegger, Kunst und Raum. L’ art et l’ espace. St. Gallen: Erker 1969, pp. 6-7. 
17 Cf. Corà op. cit. p. 5.
No. 3, Saint George, icon (95 X 74 cm.), 18th 
century, Byzantine Museum of Athens. Byzantne 
Museum. The New Acquisitions (1986-1996). 
Athens:  Byzantine Museum 1997 (in Greek), p. 115.
No. 4. Bellerophon 
killing Chimaira. 
Red-painted 
pottery, c. 440 B. C. 
Cf. N. Yalouris, 
Pegasus: Ein 
Mythos in der 
Kunst. Ins Deutsche 
übetragen von  
A. L. Brakemaier: 
s. l., Mobil Oil  
1976 p. 30
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L’ART ET L’éROTISME  
COMME ESPRIT DE L’OEUVRE
1. Ce papillon, cette fleur, ce parfum et cette couleur de cette rose, cette chaise, ce broc, ce paysage…Aucune reproduction, aucun dessin, aucune représentation, aucune photo ou des-cription peut leur équivaloir dans l’expérience. 
Dans l’expérience chaque impression/sensation immédiate 
est pareille à soi-même, unique et irremplaçable, indicible et 
incommunicable. À chacun ses impressions/sensations. Nous 
ne toucherons pas en outre la question selon laquelle chaque 
sensation n’est jamais atomistiquement séparée, individuelle 
et abstraite, mais elle est le concours d’une multiplicité de 
facteurs, du donné objectif sensible à la mémoire de tout le 
passé qui presse sur le présent sollicité par la sensation même. 
D’autre part, déjà dans la perception comme conscience de la 
sensation, celle-ci n’est plus pareille; sentir c’est différent du 
percevoir, c’est-à-dire sentir de sentir, se rendre compte de la 
sensation et donc réfléchir sur elle. Rien équivaut ou repro-
duit la réalité du hit et nunc de l’expérience. On ne peut pas 
passer sous silence en outre que même l’indication que nous 
en donnons dans la forme du hic et nunc entraîne la référence 
aux catégories de l’espace et du temps (qui sont les conditions 
apriori de la connaissance sensible selon Kant), qui consti-
tuent la réalité de ce papillon, de cette fleur, de cette chaise et 
ainsi de suite, seulement dans la réflexion. 
Savoir est saveur, disait Tommaso Campanella (Del senso 
delle cose, II,30): il n’y a rien dans l’intellect qui n’a pas été 
d’abord dans le sens (Metaphysica, I, 1). Savant est celui pour 
lequel les choses ont du goût (sapiunt), aussi comme elles 
sont, et la science ne consiste pas dans la connaissance des 
universaux (Del senso delle cose, II, 25). Le procédé abstractif 
nous éloigne de la certitude du sens. Mémoire, intellect, 
raisonnement sont vérifiés et corrigés par le sens (ibid., II, 
30). La sensation est toujours vraie, l’on peut dire, même 
lorsqu’elle est fausse. On peut penser à Magritte: “Ceci n’est 
pas une pipe”. Mais considérons le cas du mirage: aucun doute 
à propos de sa vérité. Seulement au moment de la réflexion 
suivante la sensation nous nous apercevons que l’objet du 
mirage, pas le mirage que néanmoins nous avons eu, n’était pas 
réel. Mais la réflexion ou la conscience d’elle n’appartient plus 
à l’expérience immédiate du réel.
Pour la certitude sensible l’immédiateté est essentielle, 
souligne Hegel (Phénoménologie, A, I,), mais comment est-il 
constitué cet immédiat qui nous vient d’être indiqué? “Mainte-
nant; comme il est montré, il a déjà cessé d’être. Le maintenant 
qui est, c’est différent de celui qui est montré, et nous voyons 
que le maintenant est proprement ceci: de n’être plus pendant 
qu’il est; le maintenant, comme il nous est montré, c’est un 
déjà été; et ceci est sa vérité; il n’a pas la vérité de l’être.” (ibid.) 
Le ceci sensible “est inaccessible au langage, qui appartient à la 
conscience, à ce qui est en soi universel.” (ibid.) 
Mais vis-à-vis de l’unique connaissance possible, l’im-
médiateté sensible, on perd vraiment la possibilité de toute 
connaissance. On peut rappeler déjà la critique de Campanella 
à son sensualisme même: “Dans la sensation nous sommes 
aliénés de nous mêmes et transformés en quelque autre chose, 
nous devenons une autre chose.” (Metaph., I, 1) Nous ne 
voulons pas conclure par suite avec la reconnaissance de notre 
existence (Augustin, Campanella), ou de la substance du co-
gito (Descartes) ou du mouvement de l’Absolu (Hegel). Nous 
disons seulement que la multiplicité du particulier sensible, du 
hic et nunc, tend à dépasser sa limite et à chercher une unifica-
tion ou un sens ou une vérité dans laquelle se retrouver ou se 
représenter. 
Dans cette problématique un rôle important est joué 
par la faculté de l’imagination, comme faculté gnoséologique 
médiatrice entre la multiplicité particulière de la sensation et 
l’universel de l’intellect. Aristote définit, entre autre, l’imagi-
nation comme ce au moyen duquel nous disons que se produit 
en nous une “apparence” (fÉntasma) (De anima, III, 3, 428a 
1-2) et comme une faculté avec laquelle nous jugeons et som-
mes dans le vrai ou le faux; elle est un mouvement ressortant 
des sensations en acte (ibid., 429a 1-2), mais elle n’est ni 
science ni intellect. (ibid., 428a 17-18) On ne comprend pas 
toutefois le procédé qui des particuliers conduit à l’universel, 
selon la définition de l’induction que donne Aristote même. 
(Top., I, 12, 105a 11) Cette difficulté n’est pas résolue, aussi 
que l’on connaît bien, par Kant non plus, dont la proposition 
s’est révélée insatisfaisante, liée à la difficulté de déduction des 
catégories de l’intellect d’une part et à celle du fonctionne-
ment du schématisme comme application des catégories à la 
multiplicité phénoménique de l’expérience, de l’autre. 
L’idéal de la construction d’une connaissance scientifique 
valable pour toute expérience possible demeure un projet in 
fieri à cause de la découverte manquée d’une loi universelle 
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et nécessaire de subsomption/inférence du particulier; même 
si ce ne signifie pas que l’induction est un procès sauvage et 
arbitraire. La proposition dialectique, pas apodictique, de 
Ch.Sanders Peirce du procédé de l’abduction, c’est-à-dire de 
l’explication comme assomption d’une hypothèse, comme in-
vention d’hypothèses explicatives, est à notre avis la plus digne 
de foi. Peirce met l’accent sur le caractère créatif et novateur 
de l’abduction, souligne M.Bonfantini: en elle s’exerce toute 
l’imagination crèatrice du chercheur. Mais l’unique universel 
qui peut constituer une science absolue, qui selon Hegel ne 
peut pas être que l’universel concret, bien différent de l’uni-
versel abstrait de la logique formelle, demeure un problème 
ouvert, sinon d’utopique impossible solution. 
D’autre part le procédé de recherche du sens, ou de la 
vérité si l’on veut, de l’expérience, de la réalité, du monde, de la 
vie, ne se déroule pas seulement dans la direction philosophi-
que et scientifique, mais aussi dans celle de l’activité artistique. 
En fait l’imagination, considérée le plus souvent comme facul-
té reproductive, comme mémoire persistente de la sensation, 
même si lentement s’évanouissante, est conçue aussi comme 
activité productive, facultas fingendi, capable de combiner les 
données de l’expérience sensible, et comme fantaisie créatrice 
éminemment par les Romantiques. Déjà Vico avait indiqué les 
universaux fantastiques (qui ne sont pas les concepts logiques 
de l’intellect et de la science) comme création de la fantaisie à 
l’âge poétique de l’humanité. 
Mais la fantaisie, aussi bien lorsqu’elle bâtit des mondes 
pas existants dans l’expérience et pour cela même qui sont lui 
alternatifs, comme des utopies ou des chemins à poursuivre 
pour adresser l’action à la constitution de sens nouveaux du 
monde,de la réalité, de l’expérience; même la fantaisie créatrice 
artistique (qui n’est jamais créatrice ex nihilo mais toujours 
d’éléments et données de l’expérience sensible) qui opère 
librement en fonction d’une nouvelle interpretation et de la 
recherche d’un sens nouveau dans le monde, n’opère qu’une 
synthèse probable et hypothétique, pour proposer une condui-
te et un comportement de vie, et ne prétend pas d’atteindre 
une solution définitive. 
Même si les procédés de l’art sont différents de ceux 
du savoir (gnoséologie, logique, théorie) et l’argumentation 
rhétorique (forme, métaphore, symbole et d’autres figures – et 
pourquoi pas dialectique?) caractérise, si l’on peut dire ainsi, 
plus proprement l’activité artistique; et même si différents 
sont les buts, le but cognitif-théoretique du savoir, et le but 
pratique, pour agir dans l’êthos, de l’art: une parfaite induction 
n’est pas atteinte par l’art non plus. Les deux activités dévelop-
pent une fonction régulatrice et non costitutive vis-à-vis de 
l’expérience et de notre condition/situation d’hommes dans le 
monde de la vie. 
2. Nous avons jugé nécessaires ces mises au point préalables avant d’aborder le discours plus spécifique de la sensualité et de l’art. Il vaut néanmoins essayer aussi d’éclaircir à grands traits certains concepts, dont la définition est 
nécessaire pour une orientation plus précise et plus correcte 
afin de l’illustration de notre thèse. 
 Je crois que l’on peut dire que la sexualité c’est une fonc-
tion élémentaire essentielle de l’être vivant aussi que respirer, 
se nourrir et dormir, et donc qu’elle ne peut pas être éliminée. 
Faire semblant d’ignorer l’existence de cette fonction est im-
possible: cacher, empêcher ou contraindre la satisfaction d’un 
de ces besoins élémentaires signifie empêcher la vie même à 
son origine. Il est juste alors que nous rappelons que Freud 
non seulement souligna l’importance de la libido comme 
manifestation pulsionnelle, mais qu’il avertit aussi la difficulté 
d’éviter les conséquences mauvaises de cette pulsion (Das Un-
behagen in der Kultur, 1929). Simplifiant, la vie en communau-
té entre les hommes eut un double fondement: la coercition 
au travail, créée par la nécessité extérieure, et la puissance de 
l’amour. Mais la corrélation entre l’amour et la civilisation au 
cours de l’évolution cesse d’être univoque: d’une part l’amour 
s’oppose aux intérêts de la civilisation, de l’autre la civilisation 
menace l’amour avec des lourdes restrictions. La civilisation 
impose des grands sacrifices (constitution du sur-moi et 
sentiment de culpabilité) à la sexualité et à l’agressivité innée 
de l’homme, lequel a de la peine donc à trouver en elle son 
bonheur. En effet, si une tendance pulsionnelle est soumise au 
refoulement, ses parties libidinales se transforment en symp-
tômes, ses composantes agressives en sentiment de culpabilité. 
Toute l’évolution civile se configure alors, par analogie avec 
les névroses individuelles, comme la lutte entre éros et Mort, 
entre pulsion de vie et pulsion de destruction. 
C’est pourquoi que selon Freud la pulsion libidinale 
doit être modérée si l’on veut que se constitue la vie civilisée, 
l’organisation de la civilisation sans laquelle toute survie est 
impossible. Le problème fondamental est selon Freud si éros 
pourra s’imposer dans la lutte avec son adversaire pareillement 
immortel: le destin de l’espèce humaine de fait demeure un 
problème ouvert, à propos duquel on ne peut pas se pronon-
cer.
Selon G.Bataille le risque de toute institution, et pas 
seulement le risque, est sa transformation en un pouvoir 
dictatorial, contre lequel il revendique la reconquête de la 
liberté du négatif. On sait que selon Bataille l’humanité se 
constitue comme telle au-delà de l’animalité, lorsque la sexua-
lité, comme fonction reproductive, se constitue en érotisme, 
comme recherche psychologique indépendante du but naturel 
de la reproduction. La découverte du travail, c’est-à-dire la 
fabrication d’outils pour pourvoir à la subsistance, freudien-
nement argumente Bataille, entraîne l’institution positive 
d’interdictions qui bloquent la sexualité et contre lesquelles 
agit la transgression pour la libération du négatif, raison pour 
laquelle l’érotisme parâit comme violence et comme mort. 
Même si Bataille implique, contrairement à ses prémisses de 
lutte contre tout positif, une conception absolutiste du négatif, 
je tiens à souligner sa condamnation explicite soit de la cruauté 
soit de la négation de toute forme d’interdiction, sans laquelle 
serait impossible la survivance même de l’homme et il y aurait 
sa négation absolue. La transgression confirme l’importance 
de l’interdiction pour la constitution de la société, même si de-
meure ouverte la question si l’homme porte en soi d’une façon 
irréductible la négation de ce qui a fondé l’humanité même. 
Nous croyons aussi bien que la nomadologie de Deleuze 
et Guattari a une valeur seulement polémique vis-à-vis des 
systèmes coercitifs et dictatoriaux, les “systèmes arbores-
cents”, et que le rhizome, à travers lequel le désir rayonne et 
produit, constitue l’alternative à la fossilisation structurelle et 
à l’abstraction dogmatique, alternative à laquelle on doit se 
référer continuellement pour fonder à nouveau notre action 
dans le monde, dans le centre vivant de l’expérience in fieri. 
Mais une chose c’est dire que nous sommes dans un monde 
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que nous ne connaissons pas et que nous nous trouvons face 
à la précarité de l’expérience, dont nous cherchons une or-
ganisation qui oriente notre action pratique; autre chose est, 
métaphysiquement, donc positivement et pas négativement, 
au-delà des intentions des deux auteurs, affirmer que la réalité 
est désir-rhizome d’où tout prend son origine, à laquelle on 
doit sans cesse se référer et dans laquelle on doit continuelle-
ment vivre. On risque encore une absolutisation. Le rhizome 
est comme l’herbe, disent les auteurs, qui ne se plie pas aux 
lois de la culture. Pareillement la sexualité libérée du rhizome 
n’est pas soumise à la reproduction, dans les vicissitudes des 
agencements qui constituent les mille plateaux de la réalité. 
(Mille plateaux. Capitalisme et schizophrénie, 1980) Il parâit 
que cette, en vérité mythique, origine de la rèalité et du monde 
opère une satisfaisante toujours se rénovante manifestation 
du désir. Il semble que l’appel au rhizome évite toute violence 
aggressive désormais sans aucun risque de pulsions destruc-
tives et entraîne le règne d’une liberté heureuse. Mais il n’est 
pas clair pourquoi il y a dans le monde l’arbre et le système 
arborescent, hiérarchique, bureaucratique, si racines et arbres 
mêmes pour leur origine doivent être ramenés au rhizome 
d’où ils pareillement découlent. La difficulté de la réalisation, 
sans contradictions, du désir, ne peut pas être niée. Toute-
fois, d’autre part, c’est important de rappeler que, dans un 
entretien, Guattari déclare nettement de n’être pas partisan 
“de la pure spontanéité, de l’anarchie, du désordre, de la libre 
expression des passions dans leurs formes les plus violentes et 
brutales.” (Intervista, 1977) 
Nous croyons qu’on peut alors conclure ce deuxième 
paragraphe avec le souhait d’une culture et d’une civilisation 
comme rationalité régulatrice, toujours se renouvelante, et de 
sa fonction médiatrice entre arbitraire et interdiction dogmati-
que, entre instinctivité et contrainte imposée par tout pouvoir. 
Vis-à-vis de la sexualité originaire, d’autre part, on peut conce-
voir sensualité et érotisme comme équilbre et liberté éclairée, 
comme un domaine qui se place entre l’extrême contradictoire 
réalisation immédiate des impulsions, la desctructive sponta-
néité absolue, et leur répression ou négation la plus restrictive 
3. Mais, qu’est-ce que l’art a affaire à tout ça? L’art, à mon avis, “joue” un rôle ironique entre la sexualité sans frein et la contrainte de la société, désignant une règle possible de comportement; prenant ses distances soit vis-à-vis de la pulsion 
immédiate, d’une part, soit du raidissement dictatorial dogma-
tique et coercitif des institutions sociales, de l’autre. Toujours 
ayant l’oeil au contexte historique dans le domaine duquel il 
se place, et sur la base duquel doit être considéré, jamais jugé 
abstraitement. 
De ce point de vue on peut lire L’âne d’or d’Apulée com-
me une défense de la sensualité érotique, ou mieux comme 
son élevée idéalisation (pensons aux amours de Lucius et 
de Photis, ou mieux encore à ceux de la belle matrone avec 
l’âne-Lucius lui-même), contrairement à la sexualité vulgaire 
et élémentaire (les vicissitudes de Socrate et des magicien-
nes, les prêtres Corybantes) ou à la violence des passions qui 
emportent les gens jusqu’au crime (les femmes assassines). 
On peut lire Apulée comme une confirmation du malaise de 
la civilisation, mais racheté selon l’êthos de son époque dans 
une perspective religieuse, celle du culte libérateur d’Isis. Cette 
perspective néo-platonicienne atteint son expression la plus 
haute dans le conte d’Amour et Psyché, qui de la beauté du 
corps s’élève jusqu’à la beauté de la conquise liberté de l’âme. 
Une fable dans laquelle l’amour se présente comme sensualité 
érotique et comme équilibre harmonieux au-delà de l’erreur 
de la passion (Psyché ne résiste pas au désir d’admirer le dieu), 
d’une part, et libéré de l’oppression des interdictions des dieux 
(les avatars de Psyché pour retrouver le dieu), de l’autre. On 
ne doit pas oublier en outre que de Psyché et Cupidon naît 
la Volupté, le plaisir comme reconnaissance à juste titre de la 
sexualité sublimée dans l’êthos de la civilisation. Du profane à 
la reconnaissance du sacré, on pourrait dire. C’est-à-dire de la 
condition originaire, dans laquelle on subit violence et on est 
des victimes, à la condition de celui qui ne s’oppose pas mais 
se pose dans le sacré, reconnaissant la nécessité d’une règle de 
coutume à suivre en fonction du bonheur de la vie individuelle 
et sociale. 
On peut voir cette défense de la sexualité reconnue et 
sublimée dans un contexte social, contre toute répression 
et oppression, dans le Décaméron de Boccace, à une époque 
dans laquelle, avec la dernière transformation du Moyen-Âge, 
surgit et croît une nouvelle société moderne, avec l’exigence 
de trouver un nouvel êthos global. Prend forme à cette époque 
même l’opposition à la fausseté de la négation du sexe et la 
défense d’un amour sensuel utopiquement idéalisé comme 
première réalisation du bonheur humain. Avec un aimable 
sourire et une delicate ironie Boccace accompagne ses person-
nages à la sereine joie de l’amour: Catherine désire entendre 
chanter le rossignol c’est-à-dire désire coucher toute seule 
sur la terrasse où fait monter en cachette son amoureux, Ma-
setto simulant d’être muet est aimé par toutes les soeurs et le 
couvent se transforme en peu de temps en une pouponnière, 
le moine Rustico apprend à mettre le diable dans l’enfer à la 
belle Alibech, qui l’aime beaucoup et qui ne voudrait jamais 
cesser; Nastagio degli Onesti est témoin des conséquences 
tragiques pour qui ne seconde pas le sentiment de l’amour 
érotique. Les équivoques et l’imprévu sont la farce de l’amour: 
pensons à l’arbre des hallucinations, à l’échange des lits entre 
les deux amis et les femmes du patron à l’auberge du Mugnon, 
aux culottes du prêtre à la place du voile sur la tête de l’ab-
besse, à l’étonnant enchantement de la jument, aux femmes 
qui se jouent des maris. D’autre part les difficultés de la vie 
quotidienne ne sont même pas oubliées (les neuf maris de la 
fille du Soudan) et le sens attentif des réalités connaît aussi les 
amours avec une fin malheureuse (l’histoire des trois soeurs 
marseillaises, celle tragique d’Isabette). Mais nous ne pouvons 
pas oublier que les choses du Décaméron arrivent dans le 
contexte de la terribile peste de l’an 1348, dont la description 
constitue l’arrière-plan ineffaçable où acquiert sens tout son 
monde. Enfin, c’est la confirmation de ce que nous avons dit, 
voilà dans la conclusion la défense de l’auteur, contre l’accusa-
tion de “troppo licenzia usata” (trop de licence): ce qui est dit 
honnêtement ne messied à personne; toute chose est bonne 
en soi, mais nuisante si mal employée. 
La même condamnation de la répression sexuelle nous 
trouvons dans le Roland Furieux: la condamnation de la phal-
locratie antiféministe du tyran Marganor et celle du féminisme 
anti-phallocrate de Orontée et des femmes devenues homici-
des pour se défendre contre le sexe masculin. On peut lire la 
défense de la libre expression de la sexualité désormais recon-
nue dans le conte de Fiammetta, qui trompe avec un troisième 
amoureux, dans le même lit, Joconde et le roi Astolphe, des-
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quels elle est maîtresse, ou dans les étreintes de la reine et du 
nain. Mais la passion est classiquement condamnée lorsqu’elle 
confond la liberté avec l’arbitraire et change l’homme en un 
être sans raison, le réduisant à l’état animal: c’est l’île enchan-
tée et la tromperie d’Alcine. 
Toutefois une nouvelle réalité historique et sociale, un 
nouveau coutume, un nouvel êthos, montrent que les choses 
ne vont pas exactement aussi que nous pensons et désirons. 
L’attention réalistique à la vie quotidienne c’est un aspect im-
portant de l’imagination artistique même avec l’Arioste: coups 
de théâtre et imprévu pointent les amours et les vicissitudes de 
Guenièvre et Ariodant, Isabelle et Zerbin, Olympe et Biren, 
Fleur-de-Lys et Brandimart, Richardet et Fleur-d’Epine. Et la 
passion et la luxure pressent jusqu’à la méchanceté, aussi que 
l’on peut voir dans les vicissitudes de Guenièvre, et au meutre, 
aussi que témoigne l’histoire de Gabrina, et oublient tout 
respect de la vie civilisée. Singulier est d’autre part le triomphe 
de l’avarice, du désir d’argent, sur la pulsion sexuelle même, 
comme dans les contes du chevalier de la coupe et d’Argie et 
Adonio. Et si fondamentalement le Roland Furieux c’est un 
chant à la beauté, à la jeunesse, à la sensualité et à l’amour, à la 
joie de la vie, c’est même le chant d’une idéalisation reportée 
à plus juste mesure: l’amour est aussi folie (Roland) et superfi-
cielle banalité (l’apparition d’Angélique est suffisante pour que 
les preux chevaliers, paladins chrétiens et sarrasins, perdent 
la tête). Angélique d’ailleurs se conduit comme une belle oie, 
coquette superficielle et narcissique, dans un monde où elle 
paraît comme un inconsistant et fuyant mirage. 
La nouvelle époque humaniste est parvenue à son plein 
développement et avec la pleine Renaissance montre désor-
mais ses limites. C’est l’âge de Machiavelli: vertu et fortune, la 
vertu de l’homme ne suffit plus à construire son destin, mais 
il a besoin aussi de la fortune, très réalistiquement reconnaît 
le Sécretaire florentin. Avec le développement de l’époque 
moderne et contemporaine la lutte pour le monopole religieux 
et politique de la sexualité s’articule et s’alourdit, et, par contre, 
la lutte pour la libération sexuelle va risquer le dogmatisme 
et l’arbitraire. La littérature érotique s’articule de plus en plus 
dans une polémique serrée dont la portée n’engage pas seu-
lement la simple opinion, les idées générales répandues, mais 
surtout le sens de la vie et de l’organisation sociale. 
Dans cette perspective on pourrait faire justement une 
distinction entre la littérature comme description ou argumen-
tation et intention manifestement polémique, et l’art comme 
intentionnalité précatégorielle vouée à la recherche d’une 
reconnaissance équilibrée de la réalité positive de la sexualité 
et de ses manifestations même les plus immédiates. De ce 
point de vue il nous paraît que toute l’oeuvre de D.H.Lawrence 
a été une bataille contre l’ignorance et la répression et une 
recherche continue d’un idéal partagé système de vie, qui 
détourne les excès extrêmes de l’arbitraire et de la négation. 
Même si ça n’enlève rien à la validité et au signifié de la bataille 
de Lawrence, il nous paraît néanmoins que son oeuvre, et donc 
aussi son couronnement Lady Chatterley’s Lover, se dispose 
sur le plan de la recherche et de l’intention consciente, plutôt 
que sur celui d’une complexe problématique intentionnalité 
précatégorielle qui agit en amont de la création artistique, 
comme par exemple chez Joyce ou Proust. Lady Chatterley 
paraît, dans toutes ses rédactions, plutôt comme un roman 
pédagogique voué à soutenir une thèse morale, ou mieux à la 
recherche et à la poursuite d’un coutume et d’un êthos idéals. 
Malgré l’attention critique à la réalité pratique du contexte 
social et la condamnation des aspects négatifs de la société 
industrielle, toute perdue dans la course à l’argent, Lawrence 
semble absolutiser certaines situations idéales de la rencontre 
érotique jusqu’à l’utopie (il parle de tendresse et de sensualité) 
et ses personnages paraissent, abstraitement, plutôt comme 
des types, sinon des stéréotypes, d’un certain comportement 
utopique, que comme symboles d’une complexe réalité pro-
blématique en acte, où la question érotique se place comme 
dans son terrain le plus propre. 
Entre la satisfaction brutale et la répression sexuelle, entre 
le déchaînement de l’arbitraire et l’oubli qui cache le sexe, en-
tre la réactivité immédiate et la phobie-du-sexe, toutefois l’art 
paraît poursuivre la recherche d’un chemin de l’amour comme 
sensualité érotique sereinement reconnue et veçue et comme 
équilibre, facteur de bonheur individuel et d’harmonie sociale. 
Cette intentionnalité précatégorielle, qui ne doit pas être 
confondue avec une intention consciente, accompagne toute 
création artistique et toute oeuvre d’art comme engagement 
voué à l’action pratique, à changer le monde, d’abord et au-
delà de toute défense ou formulation idéologique préétablie, et 
au-delà de toute vision du monde plus ou moins personnelle 
et subjective. Avec l’ironie qui lui empêche d’être impliqué, 
l’art développe un discours d’ensemble dans la précarité de 
l’expérience et avance une proposition d’action dans la tota-
lité du contexte humain et social de l’êthos contemporain et 
actuel. 
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ART AS DEREALIZATION1
1.  Introduction1
In The Art Question2 Nigel Warburton defends the view 
that all the answers given to the question ‘What is art?’ by 
XXth Century art theories, that developed aesthetical, proce-
dural, institutional, historical, functionalist, representational 
arguments, failed. Warburton argues, therefore, that a general 
theory of art is impossible. By general theory he meant a 
theory that could give us a classificatory definition of art, i.e., a 
definition, which excludes evaluative elements and which tells 
us the way to distinguish, without any possibility of failure, an 
art object or event from other objects and events in the world. 
So, concludes Warburton, the only possible solution is to 
empirically judge each time the individual cases.
I am not happy with this alleged solution. Or, better to 
say, it does not seem to me a solution at all, but a mere reitera-
tion of the problem. Indeed, if you do not have a criterion, 
thatcriterion that makes it possible to judge the individual 
case,cases, I do not see how could it could be possible to con-
sider something as an artwork.
Hence, we face the following dilemma: from one side it 
seems, that every theory of art, which aims at to givinge a clas-
sificatory definition of art – i.e., a kind of definition, that spro-
vides the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to 
be an art work –, fails (as Warburton properly showed); but 
from the other side, to consider an object or event as art or not 
is completely arbitrary without a general criterion. Ho can we 
get out from this impasse?
My proposal is as follows: to find a criterion, which per-
mits us to say that something is an artwork, without demand-
ing that the criterion gives necessary and sufficient conditions 
to define something as art in the classificatory way.
1 This paper is part of the project «Derealización»: para una teoría de los fenóme-
nos artísticos, I develope in the Universidad de Murcia, thanks a grant offered 
by the Secretaría de Estado de Universidades e Investigación del Ministerio de 
Educación y Ciencia (Spain), Programa Nacional de ayudas para la movilidad 
de profesores de universidad e investigadores españoles y extranjeros (ref.: 
SB2004-0101). My participation at the II Mediterranean Congress of Aesthetic 
could be possible thanks the finantiation of the CIRM of the University of 
Udine (Italy).
2 N. Warburton, The Art Question, Cambridge 2003. For a first introduction in 
contemporary (analitical philosophy of art, see N. Carroll (ed.), Theories of Art 
Today, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 2000.
2.  Derealization in phenomenological 
aesthetics
YTou can find this criterion, for instance, in the pPhe-
nomenological aesthetics of 20th century. Philosophers like 
Sartre, Hartmann, Ingarden, Dufrenne and others considered 
art under the idea of “derealization”3: according to them, the 
experience of art makes us free from the “real world” through 
an act of derealization that leads to the establishment of worlds 
that are different from the one we live in. As a consequence, 
artworks are primarly imaginary, unreal objects, and not ob-
jects of the real world.
Roman Ingarden writes for example:
“We are then almost inclined to believe in their reality 
[the reality of artworks], and yet, due to the aesthetic 
attitude, we never believe this with complete seriousness. 
It is precisely this disposition for a reality acceptance that 
never reaches serious consummation, that is always held 
back at the last moment, as it were, that forms the special 
nature of aesthetic attitude and carries with its unique 
simulaton we get from dealing with works of art in general 
and with literary works in particular. ‘Real’, yet not real  
in earnest; breathtaking, but never as painfully so as  
in the real world: ‘true’, and yet only ‘imagination’.”4
Hence, the reality of artworks is not the reality of the 
ordinary objects of the real world. It is an imaginary, fictional 
reality. According to Hartmann, the artwork (as aesthetical ob-
ject) is the “Erscheinung für die Erscheinung”, the appearance 
for the appearance. In other words, the artwork provides an 
experience, which we use to call “aesthetic experience”, which 
rises through the ‘putting in brackets’ the natural belief in the 
reality of the world. As Husserl, the father of phenomenology, 
wrote in a letter to Hugo von Hofmannsthal5, aesthetic experi-
ence is then a kind of non-philosophical application of the 
3 Hartmann introduced in his work the notion of “Entwirklichung” in order to 
explain the ontological dimension of the artwork, that should be free from the 
laws of the reality. S. N. Hartmann, Aesthetik, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1953. 
4 R. Ingarden, The Literary Work of Art (1931), tr. eng. George G. Grabowicz, 
Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1973, p. 342.
5 E. Husserl, (1906) Brief an Hofmannsthal, in: Sprache und Politik, Festgabe für 
Dolf Sternberger, Hrsg. von C.J. Friedrich, Heidelberg, 1968.
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phenomenological method, which proceeds putting offside 
the existential atctitude towards the things, in order to capture 
their essence.
This view, -first appeared at the beginning of the XX 
century-, never really disappeared from the philosophical 
scene and recovered new force in the last decades of the XX 
Century -. As in Arthur Danto’s characterization of art in terms 
of the “bracketting effect”6. According to Danto, an artwork 
requires a response that is different from the one deserved 
by real things; towards an artwork we do not act in the same 
way as we act towards a real thing; for example, in front of an 
artwork we do feel emotions, but the emotions felt let us react 
in a different way from the way we act when these emotions 
are felt in ‘real’ situations. If, for instance, you are in a cinema 
hall, watching to a murder scene, you do not run away from 
the hall, you do not go out shouting for help,help; you do not 
call the police. Rather, yYou remain rather seated, entangled in 
the drama illusion, and maybe you start eating your popcorns 
in a more compulsive and voracious way. On the contrary, at 
the beginnings of the cinema era, people sitting in the halls run 
away like crazy, when they saw a train running against them at 
full speed, in order to not be knocked down by it: they did not 
awknowledge the image as such, they saw it as something real, 
and reacted in the corresponding way. To put it differently, 
the audience did not have an aesthetic experience and did not 
aknowledge an artwork as artwork, just because the derealiza-
tion effect was not generated7.
Hence, the question I would like to deal with is the fol-
lowing: is this idea of derealization understood in terms of 
the “bracketting effect” a good way to understand art? Does it 
really capture our experience of art? Can it help us to define 
art? I think that the idea of derealization does help us to un-
derstand our art’s experience, but it can not be used to define 
art in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. This means 
that it cannot be considered neither as a condition, -which 
every object or event must satisfy in order to be artworks-,, 
nor as a condition that grants that what satisfies it, is an art-
work8. It is not neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition 
for something to be an artwork, but only a way to understand 
what happens to us and with things, when we experience 
things and talk about them in terms of artworks. It is not a suf-
ficient condition, because there can be other phenomena, not 
being artworks, having this derealizing feature or quality. It is 
not a necessary condition – although somebody could thinks 
that I am indeed trying to interpret the notion of derealization 
a necessary condition of art –, because, if you want to argue in 
terms of necessary conditions, you will certainly get enmeshed 
in a circular sequence of definitions. For once the definition 
“something is an artwork, if it is connected with an experience 
of derealization” is produced, you should define “derealiza-
tion”; but you could define “derealization” in a productive way, 
6 See A. Danto, The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art, New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1986; A. Danto, Beyond the Brillo Box. The Visual Arts in Post-
Historical Perspective, University of Californa Press, 1992.
7 This means, that they did not assume the ‘correct’ attitude towards the picture. 
I agree with J. Searle and J.-M. Schaeffer: the difference between a fictional and 
a real representation is pragmatic, rather than semantic. See J.-M. Schaeffer, 
Pourquoi la fiction?, Paris, Seuil, 1999, Chapter III, § 5.
8 Cf. S. Davies, The Philosophy of Art, Oxford, Blackwell, 2006, pp. 26-28. A wit-
tgensteinian criticism to the idea that art can be defined in terms of necessary 
and sufficient conditions is offered by Tilghman, in his But is it Art? The Value of 
Art and the Temptation of Theory, Oxford, Blackwell, 1984.
only by presupposing what an artwork is. –¿por qué? ¿No es 
possible que de una definición de desrealización que no con-
tenga el término “obra de arte”? si puedes definir asi el término 
desrealización, no hay ningún problema de circularidad For 
instance in the following way: “The experience of derealization 
is the experience of reality as appearance. This is an experi-
ence you have when you consider it aesthetically, i.e. with 
distance or disenterestedness. It is the experience in which 
you suspend your everyday judgements about the world”. 
Untill to this point everything is right. But if you would like to 
know better in which factual conditions you customarily make 
this experience, in order to explain it more precisely, you will 
probably answer: “It is the experience provided by objects or 
events (intentionally or not) produced or performed in order 
to raise such a derealizing effect. Those objects or events are 
artworks or they are events and objects that, in your apprecia-
tion of them, you consider as if they were artworks”. Therefore 
something is an artwork, if it is somehow connected with an 
experience of derealization and an experience of derealization 
is the kind of experience that is somehow raised or produced 
by artworks or by events or objects considered as artworks. 
Not aA not big result indeed. If you would think to use the no-
tion of derealization as a necessary condition of the defintion 
of something as artwork, you would be envolved in an evident 
petitio principii. (esto no es verdad, esta claro que si defines 
desrealización asi están incurriendo en una petitio principii 
pero ¿por qué la defines así? Defínela como, por ejemplo, “una 
experiencia de desrealización es una en la que suspendemos 
nuestros juicios habituales acerca de….” O lo que sea, in 
necesidad de meter el término arte por ningún lado!!!! Es un 
petitio principii solo porque tú lo defines ya introduciendo el 
término obra de arte.
It is therefore now necessary to explain what does the 
term ‘derealization’ means. A possible argument to explain 
this feature could be provided by someone who claims that 
artworks have a deficient ontological status. Let’s call it the 
naive platonic argument. However, this argument is not valid 
in general. Indeed in experiencing an artwork, you experience 
an improvement of reality. Through the experience of artworks 
we understand better the world we live in better; we discover 
aspects of things that are otherwise hidden or blurred. We see 
(or hear, or touch) the reality in a different way. And we expe-
rience emotions in a way that let us know better a particular 
kind of emotion. Perhaps because an artwork faces us with a 
particular emotion in a clear way we never experience in real 
life. Nonetheless, we somehow know that this emotion is cer-
tainly a real one, but, maybe precisely because of the way it is 
expressed, it is different from the emotions we have in ‘normal’, 
‘real’ life. Therefore, we may say that we experience a different 
reality, often a surplus of reality9.
Analogously, if we consider not the experience of artworks, 
but the being of artworks as objects, we cannot deny that 
artworks are real objects in the world (for the obvious, trivial 
reason that there is only one reality and – pace Beatles’s song 
Strawberry Fields Forever, which states that “nothing is real”! – ev-
9 A further reason why the näif platonic argument is not valid is that is not clear 
at all that the ‘thing’ Plato called can be indeed identified or not with what we 
call art. See L. Wiesing, “Platons Mimesis-Begriff und sein verborgener Kanon”, 
in L. Wiesing, Artifizielle Präsenz. Studien zur Philosophie des Bildes, Frankfurt 
a.M, Suhrkamp, 2005, pp. 125-148. For a criticism of Plato’s art censure, see 
also J.-M. Schaeffer, 1999, Chapter I, §§ 2 & 3.
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erything, in a very trivial sense, is real. Everything in the world, 
everything that happens, is real: hence, in this very trivial sense, 
also illusions and appereances are real. If the whole reality were 
an illusion, a dream, it would nonetheless be real: a real illusion). 
But what real objects and events like artworks express, repre-
sentrepresent, present, mean or do has the mark of irreality10. 
What is happening through the arwork is not really happening: 
it is happening only as represented, as expressed, i.e. it is only 
appearing. In other words, the way it is happening is its appear-
ing, and this makes the big difference between any ‘real’ object 
or event and an object or event as artwork. The derealization is 
therefore the effect of the artwork as artwork11.
According to the advocates of phenomenological aesthet-
ics, artworks are intentional objects, which could not exist 
– as artworks – without the relation with percipient subjects. 
Indeed an artwork is only appearance: its being ist only the 
way it appears to a spectator, a reader, a listener. It is an object 
constructed or an event performed only for the sake of its 
appearance. The appearance, that is the ontological status of 
the artwork, should not be understood as a perceptual illusion: 
it is neither private nor idiosincratic; on the contrary it can be 
and it is intersubjectively shared12. Therefore the derealization 
provided by the artwork can be distinguished from – say – the 
irreality-effects of drugs13.
3.  Distance, disinterestedness and 
liberation: a transcendental approach
The strategy I am trying to put forward, with the help 
of the notion of derealization, is to explain what an artwork 
is, through the particular kind of experience it arouses. It is 
a traditional move: traditionally art has been defined by the 
aesthetic experience it provides.
An artwork is then, as G. Genette claimed14, an object with 
aesthetic function, i.e., an object or an event, which is made or 
performed just in order to provide an aesthetic experience15. 
And aesthetic experience is precisely what I am trying to capture 
with the notion of derealization. Nevertheless there is a big 
discussion among philosophers about the notion of aesthetic 
experience. There are many different interpretations of the very 
concept of aesthetic experience. For example, the one of John 
10 Cf. J. Mitscherling, The aesthetic experience and the ‘truth of art’, in “The British 
Journal of Aesthetics”, 28, 1988, pp. 28-39.
11 I take the expression “as artwork” in Nelson Goodman’s sense (cf. N. Good-
man, “When is Art?”, in N. Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis, Ha-
ckett Publishing, 1978, pp. 57-70). For example a picture is an artifact, which 
can be enjoyed as artwork, but it can also be used, for instance, as a table, as a 
blanket, or… as ironing board. I will return on this possible use of an artwork 
at the end of present paper.
12 Cf. M. Seel, Ästhetik des Erscheinens, Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp, 2006, p. 11.
13 This is an objection that can be made against J. -P. Sartre’s theory of art. 
According to J. -P. Sartre, the proper artwork is not the real thing we use to 
indicate as artwork, but the “image” of it in the mind of the percipient subject. 
Such a theory has lot of inconveniences we need to avoid. In particular, it 
would be impossibile to refere to the same thing as an artwork. Each individual 
would make her own artworks (not her own interpretation of the unique art-
work) in her mind, and at the end the experience of art would be an unsharable 
solipsistic and incommunicable experience. Art would be only the doorway to 
idiosincratic paranoid visions (sometimes it is really that, but fortunately not 
always!). Cf. J.-P. Sartre, L’Imagination (1936),  Paris,  PUF, 19893.
14 G. Genette, L’Œuvre de l’art. I. Immanence et transcendence, Paris, Seuil, 1994, p 
10. 
15 For a discussion about the notion of the aesthetic experience see Bohdann 
Dziemidok, Controversy about the aesthetic nature of art, in “The British Journal 
of Aesthetics”, vol. 28, 1988, pp. 1-18.
Dewey: according to Dewey every succesful experience is an 
aesthetic one. TOro put another example, Monroe Beardsley’s 
account of aesthetic experience in terms of unity, complexity 
and intensity16. IOn my opionion, is nontheless much more 
interesting and productive to understand aesthetic experience 
through the concepts of distance and disinterestedness, as a very 
large number of theorists ( Jerome Stolnitz, Edward Bullough, 
but also Genette, and others17) did or do, renewing ideas of 
great thinkers of the past like Addison, Shaftesbury and espe-
cially Kant. If we can understand those concepts, then we will be 
able to clarify the notion of aesthetic experience in a satisfactory 
way. And if we will clarify this notion, we will get a good crite-
rion to understand objects and events as artworks. 
Nonetheless, nowadays critics of the notion of aesthetic 
experience seem to prevail. It is well known – for instance 
– that George Dickie considered the concept of aethetic ex-
perience as a “myth”, i.e., as an invention produced by some 
philosophers, that lacks rational justifications and sharable 
empiric grounds18. Dickie’s criticism is based precisly upon 
the refusal of the notion of disinterestedness. According to 
Dickie, the notion of disinterestedness can not explain our 
art’s experience, because we are indeed very interested in the 
art-object. Of course, Gerard Genette has already shown, that 
Dickie’s criticism of the notion of disinterestedness depends 
upon certain a confusionconfusion analytical aesthetics does 
between the job of the critic of art and the common people ap-
preciation of art19. On the other hand, Dickie has a strategical 
reason to make his move: he needs to judge the aesthetic expe-
rience based upon the notion of disinterestedness as a myth, in 
order to support his institutional approach20. Dickie’s criticism 
of the idea of disinterestdness has nevertheless a point in com-
mon with other criticism to this concept. Thus, together with 
Dickie, Arnold Berleant and Noel Carroll regard this notion in 
psychological terms.
16 Cf. J. Dewey, Art as Experience, New York, Perigee Books (1934); now in: The 
Collected Works of John Dewey, ed. by J.A. Boydston, 37 voll. (Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1967-1991). Cf. M. Beardsley, Aesthetics: 
Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism (1958), 2nd ed. Indianapolis, Hackett 
Publishing Company, Inc., 1981; M. Beardsley, The Aesthetic Point of View, 
Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1982.
17 Cf. E. Bullough, Psychical ‘Distance’ as a Factor in Art and as an Aesthetic Principle, 
in: “British Journal of Psychology” Vol. 5, 1912, pp. 87-98 and 108-117. Cf. J. 
Stolnitz, “The Aesthetic Attitude”, in J. Stolnitz, Aesthetics and the Philosophy of 
Art Criticism (New York, Houghton Miffin, 1960, pp. 32-42); J. Stolnitz, On the 
Origin of ‘Aesthetic Disinterestedness’, in “Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism”, 
Vol. 20, 1961, pp. 131-144 (the three articles are reprinted in G. Dickie & R. 
Sclafani (eds.) Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 
1977).
18 G. Dickie, The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude”, in “American Philosophical 
Quarterly”, Vol. 1. 1964, pp. 56-65 (reprinted in G.. Dickie & R. Sclafani (eds.) 
Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology (New York, St Martin’s Press, 1977). Cf. http://
users.ox.ac.uk/~scat2183/Unkantian.PDF#search=%22george%20dickie%20
myth%20aesthetic%22.
19 G. Genette, L’Œuvre de l’art. II . La relation esthétique, Paris, Seuil, 1997, pp. 
39-40.
20 It is well known, that the criterion of Dickie’s art definition is the ‘artworld’. 
The last version of Dickie’s “institutional theory of art” offers the following 
circular definition: “A work of art is an artifact of a kind created to be presented 
to an artworld.” “A public is a set of persons the members of which are prepared 
in some degree to understand an object which is presented to them”. “An artist 
is a person who participates with understanding in the making of a work of art.” 
“The artworld is the totality of all artworld systems,” und “An artworld system 
is a framework for the presentation of a work of art by an artist to an artworld 
public.” (G. Dickie, Introduction to Aesthetics: An Analytic Approach. New York 
1997, S. 92). I have criticised the ideological nature of Dickie’s art theory in the 
paper: Anerkennung der Kunst – Anerkennung durch Kunst, in C. Asmut (Hrsg.), 
Leiblichkeit, Interpersonalität, Anerkennung. Transzendentalphilosophie und Person, 
Bielefeld, Transcript, 2007. 
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I summarise the argument of Dickie, Berleant and 
Carroll. The notions of distance and disinterestedness are 
“impediment[s] to aesthetic understanding”, because the very 
intense perceptual attention required by the appreciation of 
art, “does not [...] require separating and isolating the art ob-
ject or excluding our purposes and goals [...]”: there are indeed 
“elements of function and consequence in every artistic occa-
sion” 21. According to Berleant, disinterestedness and distance 
are deceptive ways to describe our art’s experience, because 
they reduce the aesthetic situation to the psychologic dualism 
of perceiver and object, a wrong solution that excludes the 
social dimension of art in order to acquire anan universality, 
which is impossible, becausewhy it is abstract and it has noth-
ing to do with real life22.
In my opinion, at the basis of this criticism against the 
notion of disinterestedness lies a fundamental misunderstand-
ing. The way Dickie, Berleant, and Carroll explain the notion of 
disinterestedness shows that they do not capture the Kantian 
meaning of disinterestedness, which is not psychological, but 
transcendental. That is, it has to do with the conditions of pos-
sibility of the aesthetic experience, not with a particular kind of 
psychological experience. Kant uses the notion of disinterest-
edness to explain that having an aesthetic experience does not 
mean to be interested in the existence of the object, but only in 
the way it appears, or, to put it in another way, we are interested 
in the object (or in the performance) only as representation, as 
image. As Nick Zangwill noted “Kant’s idea is that the pleasure 
is disinterested [and therefore aesthetic] when its existence is 
in no way bound up with desire (that is, a concern with real 
existence). We might put the point in more contemporary 
language by saying that disinterested pleasure has a desire-free 
‘’causal-functional’ role.” Therefore “Kantian disinterestedness 
has nothing to do with the conscious mental state of being inter-
ested or of finding something interesting which is opposed to being 
bored or finding something boring” 23. Kant wrote indeed24: 
21 A. Berleant, Beyond Disinterestedness, in “The British Journal of Aesthetics”, Vol. 
34, 1994, pp. 242-254: here pp. 243, 248, 249.
22 Cf. also N. Carroll, Aesthetic Experience revisited, in “The British Journal of 
Aesthetics” Vol. 42, 2002, pp. 145-168. Carroll tries to determine what is the 
aesthetic experience is, without refusing the concept as a myth, like Dickie. 
He analyses the ways aesthetic experience is been traditionally understood 
and finds three principal approaches to it: “affectively oriented approaches”, 
“axiological approaches”, and “content-oriented approaches”. The typical axi-
ological approach understands the aesthetic experience in terms of experience 
of something having intrinsic value or value for its own sake. The content-
approach tries to distinguish the specific object of aesthetic experience. The 
affectively-oriented approach is based on the concept of disinterestedness. 
Carroll is favourable to the content-approach, thatapproach that considers the 
formal features of something as the object of aesthetic experience. He refuses 
the axiological approach, because according to him aesthetic experience has a 
function in our evolution; and he refuses also affectively-oriented approach, 
because, according to him, it reduces the aesthetic experience to the experience 
of the beauty based on the notion of disinterestedness: according Carroll this 
notion can be useful to explain the aesthetic judgement, that should be impartial 
and impersonal, but not the aesthetic experience which is based on feelings. The 
reasons of Carrolls refusal of the notion of disinterestedness are the sames of 
Berleant: “[...] most art, along with its accompanying aesthetic experiences, in 
most cultures is scarcely disinterested, nor is meant to engender a disinterested 
response, in the Kantian sense, but rather is in the service of religious, political, 
moral, and otherwise social enterprise” (N. Carroll, 2002, p. 151). A criticism 
of Carroll’s paper is offered by Robert Stecker (Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic 
Value, in “Philosophy Compass” 1, 2006, pp. 1–10), which defends an aesthetic 
theory of art according to which art is something valuable for its own sake.
23 N. Zangwill, Unkantian Notions Of Disinterest, in “British Journal of Aesthetics”, 
Vol. 32, 1992, pp. 149-152; Reprinted in Paul Guyer (ed.) Essays on Kant’s 
Critique of Judgement (URL: http://users.ox.ac.uk/~scat2183/Unkantian.
PDF#search=%22george%20dickie%20myth%20aesthetic%22)
24 I. Kant, Critique of Judgement (1990), Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1928, p. 43.
“All one wants to know is whether the mere 
representation of the object is to my liking,  
no matter how indifferent I may be to the real  
existence of the object of this representation”.
In my opinion, the link between Kant’s notion of disin-
terestedness and the phenomenological idea of derealization 
is clear enough. Surely an aesthetic experience can have, and 
usualy has, cognitive, moral, social, psychological import, 
function or connection. But, as aesthetic experience, it is dis-
interested in Kantian sense: we do not mind whether it what is 
represented, expressed, presented or performed is real or not, 
we only care about its appearing25.
When we define art through this concept of aesthetic 
experience we do not deny that art has social, moral, cognitive, 
or psychological functions at all. Art has those functionthose 
functions only if it is considered in the proper way and the 
proper way is aesthetic, i.e., with distance. This distance is not 
psychological, but semantic26. As Richard Lind suggested, we 
must therefore distinguish between “significant meaning” and 
“informative meaning”. For this second kind of meaning con-
cerns only the informational character, the fact that a novel, a 
representation, or whatever is about something, that inhibits 
the artistic-aesthetic functions in order to satisfy non-artistics 
functions. The significant meaning is on the contrary bounded 
to the formal and aspectual properties of what we experience 
and has a distancing effect27. This is not to say, that the experi-
ence we are dealing with has nothing to do with knowledge 
or with some kind of contents. This means solely that it is not 
caused by contents or knowledge. It is maybe useful to clarify 
this point with an example. What you are interested in about 
television news or newspaper is that they inform you about the 
world. What matters is that they tell you how are the events, 
the facts, although, certainly, every television programm or 
newspaper tell the facts from the politic, economic, social 
point of view of the publishing concern, and chooses the facts 
that should be communicated on the basis of that point of 
view. The aestetic aspects of the ways the news are presented 
are normally less important, altough it is evident that you can 
reflect on the way certain aesthetic devices are used in a more 
or less subliminal manner in order to defend a certain interpre-
tation of the events. On the contrary, in reading a novel, also 
a realist one, it does not matter – in the first instance – , that 
the related events really happened or not. What matters, is the 
25 Also the content-approach to aesthetic experience, that according to Carroll is the 
only valid one, does not work, if you forget this phenomenological and kantian 
transcendental dimension of disinterestedness and derealization. Carroll’s view is 
that the properties we have to consider in order to appreciate an object aestheti-
cally are “Gestalt” properties, such as simmetry. These properties, are, according 
to him, “response dependent, because their existence depends on creatures like us 
with our sensibilities and imaginative powers”. He utilises the concept of superve-
nience to explain what are those properties: “They supervene on the primary and 
secondary properties of object attention, as well as upon certain relational proper-
ties, including art-historical ones [...] (Carroll, 2002, p. 166). In other therms 
Kant’s notion of disinterestedness Carroll threw out of the door, comes back 
through the window. The supervenient properties Carroll has in mind to describe 
the aesthetic experience are indeed aspectual properties, properties that has to 
do not with the existence and the reality of the object, but with their relationship 
with subject. They are phenomena. See also R. Stecker, 2006.
26 Even if the origin of the difference between significant and informative mean-
ing is pragmatic, i.e. it depends on an actitude we assume toward the semantic 
content.
27 R. Lind, The Aesthetic Essence of Art, in “The Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism”, Vol. 50, No. 2, 1992, pp. 117-129, here p. 126.
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narration of the events, are the related events, the events in the 
narration and the way the events are told. And the fact that 
something happened it is important only in the case it plays a 
role in the whole artwork. You can obviously search, in a given 
novel, information about the world: for exaample you can use 
it as a document of an historical age. But in this way you do not 
see it as a work of art, but as a source of information. Analo-
gously, the cognitive elements help you to enjoy the artwork in 
a more satisfactory way, but you do not encounter an artwork 
in order to get information about those cognitive elements. 
You rather experience the artwork in order to enjoy it, includ-
ing its cognitive elements, aesthetically. In other words, there 
is an aesthetic intentionality in the experience of an artwork, 
which is demanded – so to say – by the artwork itself.
Hence, there is no contradiction in considering the 
aesthetic experience as simultaneously disinterested and sym-
pathetic, as Carroll claims28. The disinterestedness does not 
exclude – on the contrary it implies – the psychological atten-
tion to the aesthetic-aspectual properties, i.e. properties that 
the art-object (or event) has only in relationship with an ex-
periencing subject living in an intersubjective frame. And the 
intentional production of the art-object or art-performance 
presupposes that the object is only to be shown.
I can offer another example to explain what I mean. A 
Ducati motorbike has a lot of features: some of them are aes-
thetic. If you consider only the aesthetic features, that is, only 
features that concern its appearance in order to be appreciated, 
then you consider it as artwork, and we can judge it artistically. 
But this means to put in brackets some other important quali-
ties and features of the motorbike as existent object, like its 
speedy, its social importance as status symbol, etc., concerning 
its reality as social object, as mean of transport, and so on. If 
you consider it as artwork, you need to isolate its aesthetic 
features. You can do this move putting the motorbike in a mu-
seum or simply regarding it without considering its function 
as transport, etc., but paying attention only to its aspectual, 
phenomenical, features and this means: derealising it in a way 
in which we are not interested in its existence, but only in its 
appearance as “candidate for appreciation”29.
We have, therefore, two de-realizsing ‘movements’. From 
the one side, the art-object is an object which arouses a dereal-
ising effect, transfering us, say, in the dimension of the appear-
ance, of the fiction, of fictional worlds: therefore it drives us 
away from the real life, because it has the mark of derealization 
28 Cf. N. Carroll, Art and the Domain of the Aesthetics, in “British Journal of Aesthe-
tics”, Vol. 40, 2000, pp. 193-208.
29 A motorbike can be regarded as artwork because of its aesthetic properties as 
derealization-makers. Therefore you do not need some kind of institutional 
recognition in order to consider it as an artwork. The Ducati example is proposed 
by Derek Matravers in a paper on proceduralistic theories of art (The Institutional 
Theory: a Protean Creature, in “The British Journal of Aesthetics” Vol. 40, 2000, 
pp. 242-250). The expression “candidate for appreciation” is quoted from G. 
Dickie (Art and the Aesthetic. An Institutional Analysis. Ithaca/London 1974, S. 34), 
but the aim of my use of it is not a defense of Dickie’s institutional theory it, but, 
just on the contrary, a radical criticism of it. Regarding the relationship between 
aesthetic attention and aesthetic appreciation, I agree with G. Genette. Accor-
ding to him “[…] l’attention aspectuelle est une condition, nècessaire mais non 
suffisante, de la relation esthétique, la quelle ne s’établit qu’en la preésence d’une 
autre condition: l’appréciation esthétique – ou peut-être, plus précisément ou 
plus simplement, la question de l’appréciation esthétique. En sorte que l’attention 
estétique serait définie comme une attention aspectuelle anime par, et oriente 
vers, une question d’appreciation – ou, ce qui revient au même, comme une 
question d’appréciation […] posée sur la base d’une attention aspectuelle […].” 
(G. Genette, L’Œuvre de l’art. II . La relation esthétique, Paris, Seuil, 1997, p. 16).
or irrealization: it is only to be shown. From the other side, we 
consider something aesthetically, only if we consider exclu-
sively its appearance, i.e. only if we derealise it, turning it away 
from its function as object in the world and paying attention 
only to its appearance. 
In this sense, because of this derealizing effect, we can say 
with some philosophers like Schopenhauer and Marcuse, that 
art “serve the cause of human liberation”30 because “the work 
is [...] taken off the constant process of reality and assumes a 
a significancesignificance and a truth of its own” 31. Not only 
absolute music (as P. Kivy thinks32) but art as art arouse a 
sense of liberation from reality and the opening of new reality 
dimension, because its essence is to be appearance. Art faces 
us with irreality,unreality; it frees us from reality, openopens 
us fictional worlds33, and creates new forms of communication 
and sociability34. 
4.  Conclusion: Rembrandt or iron board?
In this paper I have tried to recover the phenomenological 
notion of derealization in order to explain art and art-experi-
ence. I have shown that art can be explained as derealization 
because the art-object interests us only for its appearance. 
Therefore, art cannot be understood without the frame of a 
particular kind of experience, thatexperience that we can un-
derstand in terms of distance and disinterestedness. Distance 
and disinterestedness are notions that can still be productive 
to understand why art has a certain power to free us from the 
needs of reality, although through art we do have profound 
views of certain aspects of reality and our life. Through art, as 
derealization, we understand that reality can change, because 
reality is not a thing in itself, but a (conceptual, social, eco-
nomical) construction grounded on interubjectively shared 
beliefs. Because of its derealizing power, art shows that reality 
is constructed. Therefore it help us to enjoy and understand 
30 N. Wolterstorff, Why Philosophy of Art cannot handle Kissing , Touching and 
Crying, in “The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism”, Vol. 61, 2003, pp. 
17-27, here p. 22.
31 H. Marcuse, The Aesthetic Dimension. Toward a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics, 
Boston, Beacon Press, 1978, p. 8. On Marcuse’s and Schiller idea of autonomy 
of art see my paper Arte, experiencia estética y liberación, in « Acta del I Encuen-
tro de filosofía de la fundación Casa Pintada La educación estética: arte moderno 
y democracia », in print.
32 Cf. P. Kivy, Philosophies of Arts: A Study in Differences, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1997. N. Zangwill (Are There Counterexamples to Aesthetic 
Theories of Art?, in “The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism”, Vol. 60, 2002, pp. 
111-137) criticises Kivy’s idea of the differences between the art on the basis of 
a defense of the aesthetic theory of art.
33 In this context I prefere to use the notion of fictional instead the one of possible 
worlds. Kendall Walton distinguishes the two concepts of ‘fictional’ and ‘possible’ 
worlds as follows: a possibile world can be fictional but also real and it needs to 
have some characteristics, that not all fictional; a fictional world can be possible, 
but also impossibile, and it is not real (cf. K. Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe. On 
the Foundations of the Representational Arts, Cambridge (Ma) – London, Harvard 
University Press, 1990). This distinction is also defended by D. Lewis (Truth in 
ficion, in “American filosofical quartely”, XV, 1978, pp. 36-46), L. Dolezel (Mimesis 
and possible worlds, in “Poetics today”, vol. 9, n.3., 1988, pp. 475-496), R. Howell 
(Fictional objects: how they are and how they are not, in “Poetics”, VIII, 1979, pp. 
129-178), and J.-M. Schaeffer (1999, Chapter III, § 5): they argue that fictional 
worlds, unlike possible ones, can be incomplete, semantically not homogeneous 
and can be produced without any formal restriction procedure. Nonetheless this 
distinction can be nevertheless understood as rather blurred. For instance Gerard 
Villar (Las razones del arte, Madrid, La balsa de la medusa, 2005) upholds the irre-
alizing dimension of art, arguing that it has the power to create ‘possible worlds’ 
(like E. Franzini in his: Arte e mondi possibili, Milano, Guerini, 1994).
34 See G. Vattimo, “L’arte dell’oscillazione”, in G. Vattimo, La società trasparente, 
Milano, Garzanti, 1989.
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some (more or less profounds, significant and important) 
aspects of it.
This view of art has in my opinion some significant ad-
vantages:
It offers a way to understand art in general: not only •	
the art included in the so-called “arts-system” – that 
was approximately settled itself approximately from 
during the XVII-XVIII centuries –35; this is to say, 
that it can help you to appreciate and understand 
pre-historical rock graffitis, Chinese and Japanese 
tea ceremony, Indian ragas, as well as Holly- and 
Bollywood cinema, ancient Greek architecture and 
sculpture, Italian Renaissance peinture, XX century 
Jazz, rock and dodecaphonic music, videogames, and 
all that you want... if it can be enjoyed with distance 
and disinterestedness and can raise a derealization 
experience.
Therefore it can also account for the reason why •	
any ordinary object can be regarded as artwork. In 
other words, it offers an account for the readymade 
problem, an account which is in my opinion better 
than the one offered by Dickie’s institutional theory 
and other proceduralistic theories.
It can account also for the questions rised by •	
postmodern thinkers, who argue, that we are living in 
an aesthetization-age, in which every fact and event 
is transformed into show, every object is changed 
into an image, so that the difference between art 
and life is allegedly deleted. According to the thesis 
I have defended, only those practices, that mantain 
or produce a difference, at least a conceptual one, 
between art and life, art and reality, are artistic.
Finally, it give us a way to escape from the assault •	
of artmarkt and avoid the simplifications and 
categorizations of art history, without refusing art 
history and without ingenuously forgetting that 
art has always inevitably been a social product, 
connected with the economical and productive 
relations and structures of the society.
Nonetheless, I have finally to admit that the concept of 
derealization is vague. And explaining a vague, but intuively 
sharable concept like art with the help of a maybe vaguer and 
stranger concept like derealization could appear as a complete-
ly wrong strategy. If my intention would have been to provide 
necessary and sufficient conditions to define art this objection 
would find its target. But I will not provide these conditions 
and I think on the contrary that these can not be provided. 
Indeed I do not think that is possible norneither possible 
nor productive to furnish such a classificatory definition of 
art. To say that something is an artwork means to confer this 
artifact or event a particular status. It means to acknowledge 
its (aesthetic) value. In other terms, the analytical distinc-
tion between classificatory and evaluative definitions can not 
works in the case of objects like artworks, whose being in itself 
dependes upon the value they have for us. This is to say, that to 
understand something as art means to make a reflective, not 
35 See P. O. Kristeller, The Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History of 
Aesthetics, in: “Journal of the History of Ideas”, voll. 12, 1951, pp.. 496-527, and 
13, 1952, pp. 17-46; L. Shiner, The Invention of Art: a Cultural History, Chicago/
London, University of Chicago Press, 2001.
a determinant judgement: it means to reflect upon the feeling 
produced in the subject by the object or the event, insofar as 
for its form, its aspectual properties, its appearance, meet an 
indetermined universal intersubjective purposiveness, which 
is not given, but must be sought in the individual cases. You 
have no universal rule to determine the individual cases, but 
only individual cases, individual objects and events, which are 
judged on the basis of their capacity to give rise to an intersub-
jectively shared experience, that I have decribed in terms of 
derealization and desinterestedness and called “aesthetic expe-
rience”. If those objects and events give rise to such experience 
and this experience, and the intentionality (that can be also 
unconscious) to give rise to this experience is (at least part of) 
the reason why they are produced, they are artworks. There-
fore, we can understand the aesthetic experience as a kind of 
“background condition” of art-experience36. And the notion 
of derealization and its correlates (opening of possible worlds, 
distance, disinterestednessand disinterestedness) seems to me 
to open up a good way to interpret our intuitive understanding 
of the art-experience as an aesthetic experience.
1970 Marcel Duchamp37 forestalled the functionalist 
theory of art developed by Nelson Goodman in Ways of World-
making38 – according to which an artwork is an artwork, only 
if it functions as such39 – and said that to use a Rembrandt’s 
painting as an ironing board would be the reciprocal gesture 
of the exhibition of a pissoir as artwork – a job, in which Du-
champ was an expert. Maybe because I am not very good in 
ironing, I however thinkg that is better to use the Rembrandts 
as artworks, rather thaen as ironing boards, aund this means to 
contemplate them aesthetically, without changing them into 
ironing boards: unless, because of some strange catastrophical 
event, whose terrible violence and dreadful cosmic amplitude 
neither I can nor I want even imagine, Rembrandt’s painting 
becomes the only possible ironing board in the world. Then, 
faced with the dilemma if using the painting as ironing board, 
thus concretely risking to destroy it, or rather going around 
wearing a wrinkled shirt, we would be brave, or arrogant, 
enough to consider – in such a destroyed and desolate world 
– the experience raised by the ironed shirt a more satisfactory 
aesthetic experience than the experience produced by the 
contemplation of the Rembrandt’s painting. That would be 
the very end of art ... But it would not matter a lot: due to the 
circumstancies in which such a world would be, nobody would 
certainly bear more derealization.
36 Cf. R. Schusterman, The End of Aesthetic Experience, in “The Journal of Aesthe-
tics and Art Criticism”, Vol. 55, 1997, pp. 29-42.
37 M. Duchamp, “Ready-Mades”, in H. Richter, DADA: Art and Anti-Art, New 
York and Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1978, p. 89. 
38 See. N. Goodman, “When is Art?”, in N. Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking, 
Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing, 1978, pp. 57-70.
39 Goodman’s thesis is however more complicated. From the one side he argues that 
“[…] a Rembrandt painting may cease to function as a work of art when used to 
replace a broken window or as a blanket.” From the other side, he states that “the 
Rembrandt painting remains a work of art, as it remains a painting, while functio-
ning only as a blanket” (Ways of Worldmaking, pp. 67 and 69). I argue, that if the 
Rembrandt painting functions only as a blanket, it is no more an artwork.
28
Imaginacija, čutnost in umetnost / Zbornik referatov III. sredozemskega kongresa za estetiko
REFLECTIONS ON AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND THE 
NORMATIVE CLAIMS OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT1
Matilde CArraSCO BArranCO
Universidad de Murcia, Spain
1.  Introduction1
The recent increase in the debate about the nature of 
aesthetic experience and the normative claims of aesthetic 
judgement is not independent of the problems defining art, 
and the apparent absence of criteria for artistic value as a result 
of the huge pluralism that exists in our time. This link could be 
explained by the fact that the modern concept of art, seeking 
autonomy and lacking any utility, defines art as aiming for aes-
thetic value.2 But aesthetic value does not seem to be essential 
to make an object a piece of art. Historically art has had, and of 
course still has, other functions than the aesthetic one, such as 
religious, political, moral or entertaiment. Certainly, much of 
the art production in the second half of the twentieth century3 
and many philosophers in the last decades have defended the 
separation between aesthetics and art. However, there are 
also many reasons to relate art and aesthetics, and particu-
larly I would like to point out those which could have caused 
renewed interest in aesthetic value and criteria. The current 
doubts about the definition of art and artistic canons are about 
the value of art itself, and aesthetic value, although based on 
an aesthetic experience and so traditionally related to subjec-
tive appreciation, is about a response caused by an object and 
directed to it. In this paper, I will outline a view of aesthetic 
experience and its relation to aesthetic judgment, on which a 
defense of aesthethic value and its relevance for the evaluation 
of art could be based. 
 
2.  The nature of Aesthetic Properties
Among the reasons to distrust aesthetic value as criteria 
for artistic value I will focus on its apparent subjectivism. 
Aesthetic value derives from experiences of objects whose 
1 This paper has been elaborated inside a Research Project supported by 
the Spanish M.E.C. (HUM2005-02533) and Fundación Séneca (03089/
PHCS/05).
2 See Shiner (2001).
3 Very many of the recent artistic reactions, mainly from the sixties, rise against 
that idea of an autonomous art that justifies itself aesthetically. Very often this 
is due to the association of that conception of art with “disinterest” as proper 
aesthetic attitude. Aesthetic value caused by an aesthetic experience that gener-
ates disinterested pleasure seems to be ideologically detached from any moral 
or political concerns, or simply from life. 
properties cause pleasure or displeasure on the perceivers. 
These experiences are expressed in judgements currently 
called “judgments of taste”. But taste describes a disposition 
to the ability to discern and assess aesthetic properties as well 
as take pleasure in certain objects and works of art. Therefore, 
as happens with food, 4 the exercise of taste involves a mixture 
of perception and pleasure. The concept of taste emphasizes 
the subjectivity of aesthetic reactions. Taste is exercised in a 
direct, inmediate way; it requires a first-hand experience and 
pleasure is necessarily felt by a subject. However, judgements 
of taste are also about objects; they refer to putative qualities 
of objects ( using terms such as “serene”, “powerful”, “graceful”, 
“balanced”, “delicate”, “garish”, and so on) that can be noticed 
and enjoyed by others5. So the “problem of taste” points to 
the difficulties for a subjective judgment to become a critical 
one. As Carolyn Korsmeyer puts it, the “problem of taste” has 
always harboured an uneasy tension between the necessity of 
critical standards for judging art works and the fact that those 
standards rely upon the subjective responses of the individuals 
appreciating art, which are notoriously variable” ( 2001, 193). 
And that was the problem that inspired most of the debate on 
early modern aesthetics.
Nowadays, the discussion about the normative claims 
of aesthetic judgement focuses on the existence and nature 
of aesthetic properties perceived and identified in aesthetic 
experience. This question is central to the so-called “aesthetic 
realism”6. As Benjamin R. Tilghman describes it, “aesthetic 
realism is offered as a way of overcoming aesthetic disagree-
4 Carolyn Korsmeyer (1999) has studied the origins of the “metaphor of taste” that 
translates the literal meaning of taste from food to art. She observes that the close 
connection between taste and pleasure forges the first use of the metaphor. In her 
book she also critically analyses the process that separates literal meaning of taste 
from a more refined pleasure appropriate to aesthetic appreciation.
5 Notice that I focus on such judgements that asses properties, different to those 
that merely express global opinions: “I like it”, “I love it”, “I do not like it”, “I 
hated it”. Aesthetic properties are meant to atribute aesthetic value based on 
the object´s features. Also, from this perspective, “beauty” could be consid-
ered too inespecific as an aesthetic quality, expressing the general response of 
somebody who favorably appreciates the combination of the different aesthetic 
properties in the object. 
6 Frank Sibley´s work on aesthetic properties is considered inspiration for many 
realists although others protest against realist interpretation of Sibley´s posi-
tion (see, Benson (2001) and MacKinnon (2001)). Certainly, the article he 
published in 1959 broke new ground and invigorated the debate about the old 
problem of taste. 
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ment and combating all forms of subjectivism…with its thesis 
that aesthetic qualities really exist and the judgments about 
them are genuine statements of fact”(2004, p. 248). Realists 
usually defend the ontological status of aesthetic properties 
saying that they supervene upon nonaesthetic ones. Super-
venience has became a very controversial issue, a matter of 
intense debate. But my reasons to reject aesthetic realism have 
to do mainly with an important aspect of the realist account of 
aesthetic properties. Realism seems to defend aesthetics prop-
erties as purely descriptive. Realists are aware that the most 
common aesthetic terms have both a descriptive and evalu-
ative component, but they claim that the first is the essential 
one.7 It would be easier to reach an agreement on the descrip-
tive component than it would be on the evaluative component 
that depends on affections. They are probably right on this, but 
the problem I see is that understanding aesthetic properties 
in this neutral way, realists empty them of value. Tilghman 
says that realism is “primarily a matter of recognizing the pres-
ence of properties …just as one can identify various species 
of motor cars without having any particular concern for them 
…without any of what we think of as characteristic aesthetic 
reactions”(2004, 255-6). I agree with him. Realists want to 
reduce aesthetic properties to their objective component and 
treat them as objective properties. But they are not objective. 
I don´t think the problem of taste is solved eliminating one 
of the components of aesthetic responses, any solution would 
have to face the particular relation between them that defines 
the aestethic.
I have explained my objections in a previous paper8, so I 
will not discuss realism here any further. Therefore, my view is 
commited to the nature of aesthetic properties, both descrip-
tive and evaluative, that makes them expression of a particular 
value. 
3.  Aesthetic experience 
Aesthetic properties have an objective component but 
they are not objective; they are relational properties that de-
pend on the response of a subject to the objective properties. 
There are many different theories about what an aesthetic 
experience is, and many sceptical objections to the very idea 
of it as a specific kind of experience, that I cannot pursue here.9 
Instead, I will summarize the views that seem wiser to me. 
I follow Alan Goldman in his description of aesthetic 
experience as that one in which we fully exercise our sensory, 
cognitive and affective capacities in the appreciation of ob-
jects, particularly works of art. That is, aesthetic experience is 
intense and concentrated but its hallmark is “a theme traced 
from Kant through Dewey: the full engagement of all our 
mental capacities”, perceptual, cognitive, and affective, simul-
taneously (2001, 188). When we perceive an object aestheti-
cally our perception is at once cognitive and affective, we feel 
pleasure or displeasure, satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Then the 
experience doesn’t have to be always positive (we can experi-
7 See Levinson (2001). Of course, the ontological thesis of supervenience fol-
lows the same track since supervenient properties depend upon non-aesthetic 
properties, such that objects with the same non-aesthetic properties must have 
the same aesthetic properties.
8 Carrasco (2006).
9 For a summary of contemporary approaches to the issue see Carroll (2006). As 
relevant critics see, Urmson (1957), Dickie (1964), Danto (1981).
ence negative properties as well: ugliness, dullness, and so on). 
It should also be pointed out that aesthetic experience is 
intentional, directed to an object (or certain aspects of it). But 
our attention is guided by what –following Bearsdley- we can 
call the “phenomenal object”10. This is not the psychical object, 
although the physical object is obviously necessary. Aesthetic 
experience is not caused by the physical object but by the 
representation of the object as having aesthetic properties, 
relational properties, and the satisfaction or dissatisfaction we 
feel does come from that representation, not from the object 
itself. And so, our evaluation will depend on the fact that we 
find those properties valuable or not.11 
Aesthetic experience is a specific human experience in 
which we attend to the object as an object of contemplation. 
We have an aesthetic attitude when we are interested in the 
enjoyment of the object itself, no matter which possible con-
cerns there may be in a further use of our practical affairs. This 
attitude is traditionally labelled by the (often argued paradoxi-
cal) concept of “disinterest”. But we do not have to assume 
the formalism usually associated with the concept, because 
when we perceive objects aesthetically we attend not only to 
their sensuous or formal properties, but also to their expres-
sive qualities and symbolic meanings. So we can see them as 
cognitive meaningful objects. In a work of art, medium, form, 
and content all always have aesthetic significance and the value 
of a work of art will depend on them and the way they relate 
to each other (Goldman 2004, pp. 102, 104). Consequently, 
we do not have to understand the pleasure or displeasure 
provided by aesthetic experience in a narrow sense, it provides 
enjoyment, refreshment and enlightenment12, and that makes 
it intrinsically valuable13. 
4.  Aesthetic experience and critical 
judgement
So, aesthetic properties are perceived in an aesthetic expe-
rience, one in which our mental capacities are simultaneously 
and fully engaged by an object. It is then an intentional experi-
ence, directed to an object that we represent in a certain way. 
A realist would say that the properties we focus on when expe-
riencing the object aesthetically supervene upon its physical 
ones, but in order to avoid ontological realistic claims, I rather 
interpret – following Tilghman – these properties as “aspects 
seen” in the objects.14 So, two people’s aesthetic appreciations 
would conflict, when seeing the same object, they don’t see 
the same aspects. Could they reach an agreement? Could one 
make the other see the same aspect one sees and both agree 
that it is the appropriate aspect? According to Tilghman yes, 
we can alter other people’s perception in order to bring one to 
10 Beardsley (1958), ch. 1.
11 See Schaeffer (2000), p. 50. Though I don’t agree with Schaeffer about purely 
affective nature of aesthetic properties.
12 See again Goldman (2001), p. 188.
13 In the way that Malcolm Budd opposes intrinsic value to instrumental value 
(1995, p. 5), not to external value.
14 Tilghman himself follows Wittgenstein. The famous example of the ambiguous 
figure of the duck-rabbit illustrates this notion of perception of aspects. However, 
two observations should be made. First, Wittgenstein thought that aspects were 
not properties of the object but an internal relation between them and other 
objects [Tilghman (2004), p. 254, n. 8; see also (1987) pp. 188-9]. Secondly, 
because of the affection involved in aesthetic appreciation, Tilghman does not 
think that the duck-rabbit is a proper example of the “elusiveness” of the aesthetic 
perception, and of its “imponderable evidence”. Tilghman (2004), pp. 258-9.
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see the thing in a certain way. Although radical changes of taste 
might need a similar “radical readjustment in his view of the 
world” (Tilghman, 2004, p. 257) 
This conclusion points to the fact that aesthetic experi-
ence is informed. Two people can interpret the same object 
differently; in their respective representations, the objects 
could have different aesthetic properties to which these 
people would respond affectively, and consequently they 
could have different evaluations. However, the point is that 
their evaluation is connected “conceptually” (nor physically 
or psychologically) to the interpretation they make. They feel 
satisfaction when grasping, for example, the correct design, and 
vice versa. 15 Now, the representation they make of the object 
could be considered correct or incorrect according to certain 
interpersonal criteria. Although certain natural capacity is 
needed for aesthetic perception16, at least since Hume, knowl-
edge and familiarity with art are accepted17 as conditions to 
improve our aesthetic judgements. In fact, that is how we learn 
aesthetic terms referring to properties which are meant to be 
worthy. Tilghman thinks that these cultural conditions for 
judgement do not work as casual conditions but as “conditions 
of intelligibility”18. Aesthetic properties are relational, partly 
constituted by our responses. But in Goldman’s words: when 
we are fully engaged by the aesthetic object we do not simply 
pay close perceptual attention to it but also bring to bear “one’s 
cognitive grasp of those external and historical relations that 
inform one’s aesthetic experience”(2001, p.191). That knowl-
edge can inform one’s experience of a work and only then is it 
aesthetically relevant (Ibid.). 
In this view, knowledge and familiarity, and –as Hume 
noticed too- practice, make us more receptive to the relevant 
aesthetic qualities that would emerge experiencing a work of 
art. In a humean perspective, Ives Michaud (1998) has shown 
how standards of taste arise from convergent aesthetic ap-
preciations. Inside of what he calls a “community of evaluation 
which is articulated with a community of production” and 
about certain axiologically appreciated objects certain com-
mon culture is developed and it generates criteria that, given 
any aesthetic judgements, will allow to asses them as correct 
or incorrect. Aesthetic values are learnt inside particular – in 
wittgensteinian terms – “language games”; in fact, according 
to Michaud, we could not have the right experience without 
entering in a certain language game. Therefore, we can learn 
to identify and affectively react to certain qualities, which 
are the “objective counterpart” but decided by convention 
(Ibid., pp. 26-7).19 History of art works identifying certain 
artistic qualities, but other practices would work in the same 
way (Michaud’s examples: how to become an expert in Tony 
Cragg’s sculptures, Spanish horses and rap music). Aesthetic 
judgement is at once personal and expressed in a shared 
language, more or less specialized. Our taste is not innate, 
spontaneous, or natural, it is the result of a training process in 
15 As a “conceptual connection” is how Tilghman (1984, pp. 204-205) - follow-
ing Wittgenstein again- describes the relation between our emotions and the 
objects in the aesthetic experience. 
16 And that is why the empiricists postulated the existence of an internal sense, 
that becomes in Kant a sensus comunis.
17 Even by realists, see, for example, Zemach (1997), Levinson (2001), p. 62. 
18 “…for example, only if a person is acquainted with, say, period styles in art is it 
intelligible to say that he sees this painting as closer to mannerist tradition than 
to the baroque” (Tilghman, 2004, p. 255).
19 Here, Michaud follows Wollheim (1968).
different language games that shape it; the “language games 
of evaluation that also are the language games of perception 
and feeling” (Ibid. p.33). David Hume pointed to this double 
process of education and elaboration that involves, and should 
involve, both artistic qualities and aesthetic experience or 
feeling. The process is, of course, very complex and dynamic 
and it will demand practice, comparison, and attention to 
others’ viewpoints. Just as artists learn their skill (Ibid. p. 38). 
Nevertheless, none of this excludes evolution and changes in 
the language games.
So, when judging and claiming the reliability of our 
aesthetic judgments we play the role of qualified critics (Gold-
man, 2004, p. 99). Appealing to the notion of ideal critics, 
Hume captured the normative force of aesthetic evaluations, 
and explained its limits; even competent critics conflict, and 
very often, indeed. Knowledge and familiarity would improve 
our taste meanwhile prejudice (historical and cultural relativ-
ism) or differences in our personal character will be causes of 
conflict. Hume had to reconsider some of the initial conditions 
of the standard of taste as its limits. They are at the heart of the 
problem of the standard of taste, but the point is that any stan-
dard will come from them (Michaud, 1998, p. 93). I think that 
Tilghman expresses the very same idea when pointing out that 
“aesthetic and artistic evaluation can run deep in human life 
making connections with wider human relations and moral-
ity….. It can connect us with our own history and culture and 
in addition, it can connect us personally with one another” 
(2004, p. 259). Agreement is then important to us but we 
also know that there is always room for disagreement, and it 
doesn’t have to be necessarily negative as sometimes diversity 
in taste and appreciation is in fact valued (Ibid.).
5.  Aesthetic value and the value of art
Given all the factors that shape taste, we should always 
have to admit the possibility of disagreement, and even certain 
aesthetic relativism. There isn’t a closed list of artistic proper-
ties and the value of aesthetic qualities cannot be fixed by any 
principles, because it will depend on their interactions with 
other qualities of the objects, so even experts would disagree. 
But it is a fact that we have aesthetic criteria working in many 
different domains. So subjectivism should not be a worry that 
would stop us recognizing standards of taste20. I have fol-
lowed Michaud’s account that, in postmodernist scenery and 
considering the subjective aspects of the issue, it makes sense 
of aesthetic criteria as linked to the aesthetic judgements that 
come from aesthetic experiences. Michaud defends himself of 
being a mere conventionalist, but for the sake of what he calls 
a “relativism under strict restrictions”, he declares an irreduc-
ible pluralism of artistic forms and limits any normativity to 
the inner boundaries of every community of evaluation and 
language game. However, I would not follow him if that meant 
declaring a complete incommensurability of aesthetic experi-
ences, even restricted to the artistic domain.21 It is true that we 
cannot reduce the pluralism of artistic practices; we cannot 
20 It was the fact of existing standards of taste, demanding an explanation, what 
made Hume step away from his former scepticism (Hume, The Sceptic, 1742 ).
21 I am not sure if Michaud’s view has those implications. I cannot pursue here 
how Goldman’s view of aesthetic experience as engagement of our mental 
capacities could work as criteria for evaluation that restricts Michaud’s relativ-
ism ever further. I consider this a subject for future work.
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close the list of artistic qualities and make impositions on the 
conditions of the production and on our aesthetic reactions. 
However, if I have succeeded in showing what aesthetic experi-
ence is and why it is worthy, it could be seen why it should be 
counted as criteria for the value of art, inside its own area and 
in comparison with other domains in which we could obtain 
aesthetic experiences. Art works are not the only objects of 
those we could experience aesthetically, but they, particularly 
the great ones, are objects that engage simultaneously our 
perceptual and emotional capacities as well as our intellects, 
challenging them in a way that other objects and practices 
don’t. Great art works in the past have made us fully engross 
and exercise our perception, thought, imagination and feel-
ing; even if it does not exhaust their value, we have obtained 
benefits in terms of enjoyment and enlightment by experienc-
ing them aesthetically. We would be right to expect the same 
benefits from present and future art.
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M y point of departure for thinking about the relationship between sense and concept in aesthetic theory is a question raised by Adorno in the “Draft Introduction” to his Aesthetic Theory (1970). There, Adorno 
asks about the possibility of constructing a theory of aesthet-
ics when the task of any “theory” would lead it to sacrifice 
the very things that seem to matter most about art. Criticism 
can attend to the sensuous detail and concrete particularity of 
this particular work, and can respect its stubborn refusal to be 
subsumed under conceptual generalities. Art’s resistance to a 
full and complete rendering in a language built around abstract 
concepts is something that interpretive practice can likewise 
honor, and does, in the attention that criticism devotes to 
detail. Consider the adherence to “close reading” in the field 
of literary criticism, which I regard not as a fethshizing of “the 
text” but as a reluctance to forego one of the crucial things that 
distinguishes a work of literature from its paraphrase. Artworks 
speak as particulars. They address themselves to the senses. 
They are the bearers of meaning but, as Hegel reminded us, 
they are the sensuous manifestation of the truth.1 The difficulty 
with aesthetic theory is that it seeks to measure the truth of art 
by means of conventional concepts, which are dis-embodied, 
schematic, and abstract. Little surprise, then, that aesthetic 
theory has so often seemed to miss the very thing that it hopes 
to explain. Indeed, it could well seem that when art is asked to 
submit its truth-content to the demands of a discourse built 
around abstract concepts the results will inevitably resemble 
what Walter Benjamin described as “the burning up of the 
husk as it enters the realm of ideas.”2 Benjamin’s remark points 
to a cluster of fears: first, that aesthetic theory is the necrol-
ogy of art--that in discounting art’s material substance and 
sensuous grain, aesthetic theory may leave us with little more 
than a death-mask of the works in question; and second, that 
the transposition of art into the realm of theory may blind us 
to the ways in which artworks themselves make truth-claims, 
albeit claims that are ill-suited to a discourse that limits itself 
to concepts as they are conventionally understood. My argu-
ment is that art can model some of the possibilities for what 
concrete cognition might be, and likewise that art can articulate 
a critique of the ways in which the conventional notion of a 
“concept,” hence of what counts as “rationality,” has largely 
been split off from the world of sense.3 But I would also say 
that the artworks that best accomplish these things tend to 
recognize that the desire to find a plenitude of meaning in the 
world of sense is but a dream, a promesse de bonheur, that is 
bound to remain unfulfilled. Art in the age of aesthetics–which 
is also to say, in the age of modernism--is just as aware of the 
illusion contained in the notion of an “immediacy of sense” 
as it is critical of the abstractions of pure concepts. Insofar as 
aesthetic theory hopes to be responsible to art, it requires a 
refusal of abstract concepts along with a rejection of the false 
ideal of an immediacy of sense. Its task involves a validation of 
what we might best call the “concrete concept.”4
My hope in this essay is to trace out some of the pathways that can lead toward this goal. But I should first acknowledge that any encounter with 
art, theoretical or otherwise, is bound to require some involve-
ment with concepts in their more or less orthodox forms: as 
sources of knowledge, or expressions of opinions, or as state-
ments of beliefs. One can hardly attempt to exclude the knowl-
edge that a particular painting by Caravaggio is of the head of 
the Medusa; or the belief that Kenneth Branagh, the director of 
a film based on Shakespeare’s Hamlet, is also, as an actor in that 
same film, the prince of Denmark; or the opinion that in au-
thoring Don Quixote Cervantes also created the first modern 
novel. But such things are a matter of our cognition of these 
works, rather than of what they cognize by virtue of their exis-
tence as works of art.5 If I place “cognize” in scare-quotes here 
it is to underscore the fact that the kind of knowledge implicit 
in artworks can hardly be formulated in the way that concepts 
as philosophy conventionally regards them apply to objects 
or states of affairs in the world. Indeed, part of what aesthetic 
theory has been unable to explain is that artworks are artefacts 
whose truth-content is “of ” the world rather than “about” it.6 
Recognizing that artworks are at bottom artefacts, 
Adorno located one of the great paradoxes of aesthetic theory 
in the fact that art offers us something that is at once made and 
true. “The metaphysics of art,” he writes, “revolves around the 
question of how something spiritual that is made, in philo-
sophical terms something ‘merely posited’ can be true” (AT, 
p. 131).7 Adorno’s response to this puzzle revolves around the 
conviction that what is made in art has the form of semblance; 
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semblance in art is akin to positing in a material form. What 
must be claimed, validated, and redeemed by aesthetic theory 
is precisely the truth of semblance.8 The claim of art is that a 
given image--and I would include tactile and sound images as 
well as visual images here–can say or show something true. 
To cite Adorno again, “the question of the truth of something 
made is indeed none other than the question of semblance and 
the rescue of semblance as the semblance of the true... Of all 
the paradoxes of art, no doubt the innermost one is that only 
through making, through the production of particular works 
specifically and completely formed in themselves, and never 
through any immediate vision, does art achieve what is not 
made, the truth” (AT, p. 131).9
If works of art challenge conventional aesthetic theories, 
then, it is because they confound the paradigm of concept-
grounded knowledge by virtue of their sensuous character. 
And if they challenge conventional philosophy it is because 
they locate truth and rationality in the materially conditioned 
world of artefactual production. In so doing, they stand to 
reveal the manner in which conventional models of cognition, 
which tend to focus on such things as sense-data and proposi-
tions, sacrifice the historical and material density of the world, 
not to mention the social relations that crisscross it, for the 
sake of a form of the concept that can only be schematic. In 
a crucial passage of the Aesthetic Theory Adorno argues that 
theoretical thought as a whole suffers from “an idealist preju-
dice insofar as it disposes solely over concepts” (AT, p. 258). 
It gives us a thinned-out, immaterial, schematized world, a 
death-mask of the world. Art, by contrast, draws upon what 
Adorno calls the “crude material” of the world, which it seeks 
to render eloquent and alive; in so doing it hopes to reverse 
the damage that theory has done to the material basis of life 
(see AT, p. 258). The task of aesthetics, following Adorno, 
would be to show how art establishes a materially-grounded 
mode of reason and, beyond that, to formulate the conditions 
of possibility for such a form of reason in this, the late- or post-
modern age. This involves articulating the specific, historico-
material logic associated with art; its charge is to free concepts 
from their externality to the objects in question and to locate 
them within the works themselves (AT, p. 181).10 According 
to Adorno, art is a grasping of the truth, not a form of “end-
lessly talking about it, illustrating it, or somehow imitating 
it.” “The truth-content of artworks is not what they mean but 
rather what decides whether the work in itself is true or false, 
and only this truth of the work in-itself is commensurable to 
philosophical interpretation and coincides.... with the idea of 
philosophical truth” (AT, pp. 130-131). This is fundamentally 
different from the way in which the philosophical tradition, 
and especially the tradition of epistemology, has conceived 
the truth.
But before continuing with Adorno and with his his-toricist perspective on this question, I want to explore a series of parallel issues that emerge in the work of 
Gilles Deleuze. Especially in those instances where Deleuze 
focuses explicitly on art–such as in his study of the works of 
Francis Bacon, and in the chapter on “Percept, Affect, Con-
cept” in the book written with Felix Guattari, What Is Philoso-
phy?, as well as in his study of Nietzsche and in his analysis of 
Leibnitz and the baroque, The Fold, he provides various ways 
of orienting the aesthetic field around the materialist catego-
ries of ”force” and “sense.” For Deleuze, art stands to play a cru-
cial role in the effort to find ways out of the matrix of concepts, 
of representation, and of what he calls “figuration,” because it 
produces a logic of sensation, and not merely a phenomenology 
of sense or of experience. The logic at work in art culminates 
in artefacts whose function is to preserve what Deleuze calls a 
“bloc of sensations,” that is to say, “a compound of percepts and 
affects.”11 “Percepts” are perceptions objectified and made ma-
terial; likewise, “affects” are independent of a phenomenology 
of experience in part because they have a material existence 
apart from those who experience them. “The aim of art is to 
wrest the percept from perceptions of objects and the states of 
a perceiving subject, to wrest the affect from affections” (What 
Is Philosophy?, p. 167). 
The artist’s task is not to create or to express, but to make 
the work stand up on its own. “Sometimes this requires what is, 
from the viewpoint of an implicit model, from the viewpoint 
of lived perceptions and affections, great geometrical improb-
ability, physical imperfection, and organic abnormality. But 
these sublime errors accede to the necessity of art if they are 
internal means of standing up (or sitting or lying). ‘Standing 
up’ alone does not mean having a top and a bottom or being 
upright... it is only the act by which the compound of created 
sensations is preserved in itself–a monument, but one that 
may be contained in a few marks or a few lines, like a poem” 
(What Is Philosophy?, pp. 164-65).
I will return to the question of “standing up alone” in rela-
tion to the internal logic of artworks in my further comments 
on Adorno below. For now, I would simply note that Deleuze 
understands art not as the expression or imitation of anything, 
but as a form of thinking the world: art is a thinking of the world 
through sensations, which makes it different from, though not 
necessarily better than, philosophy or science. “Thinking is 
thought through concepts, or functions, or sensations and no 
one of these thoughts is better than any other, or more fully, 
completely, or synthetically ‘thought.’” “The three routes of 
thought,” he writes, “are specific, each as direct as the others” 
(What Is Philosophy?, p.198). 
And yet the Deleuzian notion of “sensation” is unable to 
generate an aesthetic logic without the complementary notion 
of force. Neither sensation nor sensibility is anything other 
than “a becoming of forces.”12 The notion of “force” is crucial 
because it can provide a way out of the impasse of empiricist 
and rationalist understandings of the problem of relations, 
which is in turn critical for understanding the fabric-like qual-
ity of the world. For empiricists of a Humean stripe, all rela-
tions between terms must be external to the terms themselves, 
and cannot be connected in any necessary way with them; the 
rationalist response to this view, which conceives relations 
as logically “internal” to the terms involved, hardly yields a 
more satisfactory view of the world. Deleuze gets beyond this 
impasse by conceiving “force” as a form of material relation; 
while he has sometimes been described as a “transcendental 
empiricist” he is equally a “material rationalist.” Following 
Nietzsche, he views “force” as a form of material relationality; 
he locates “force” at the essence of things rather than applied 
to them from the outside. His claim is that in order to find the 
essence of something–whether a human, a biological or even 
a physical phenomenon--we must know the force [puissance] 
which “appropriates the thing, which exploits it, which takes 
possession of it or is expressed in it.”13 
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The task of art in this regard--whether painting or music 
or sculpture or any other kind--is that of capturing forces, rather 
than of reproducing or inventing forms. Such is especially the 
case, Deleuze argues, in the paintings of Francis Bacon. “Ba-
con’s Figures seem to be one of the most marvelous responses 
in the history of painting to the question, How can one make 
invisible forces visible?”14 “The extraordinary agitation of 
Bacon’s heads is not derived from a movement that the series 
would supposedly reconstitute, but rather from the forces of 
pressure, dilation, contraction, flattening, and elongation that 
are exerted on the immobile head.... The wiped and swept 
parts of the face here take on a new meaning, because they 
mark the zone where the force is in the process of striking. This 
is why the problems Bacon faces are indeed those of deforma-
tion and not transformation” (Francis Bacon, p. 50).
The achievement of an artist like Bacon is to allow the 
forces associated with sensations to produce de-formations, 
rather than to suggest trans-formations, as might have been the 
case with one of his most important predecessors, El Greco. 
But a materialist version of the Kantian question nonetheless 
remains: what, if anything, explains the synthetic unity of a 
sensation? This is hardly intuition or concept, but neither is it 
the “figured thing.” Rather, Deleuze proposes that the unity of 
sensation is “rather like a snapshot of motion” of a multisen-
sible Figure [field], which “recomposes movement in all its 
continuity, speed, and violence, as in synthetic cubism, futur-
ism, or Duchamp’s Nude” (Francis Bacon, p. 35). This snapshot 
is one view of an “original unity of the senses,” which the 
artist draws out into the visual field. But this is possible only 
if the sensation associated with one domain (here, the visual 
sensation) is in contact with what Deleuze describes as “a 
vital power that exceeds every domain and traverses them all. 
This power is Rhythm, which is more profound than vision, 
hearing, etc. Rhythm appears as music when it invests itself in 
the auditory level, and as painting when it invests the visual 
level.... Cézanne, it is said, is the painter who put a vital rhythm 
into the visual sensation.... Could it be that Bacon’s closed and 
artificial world reveals the same vital movement as Cézanne’s 
Nature?” (Francis Bacon, pp. 37-38).
These views can certainly explain how art–certain kinds of art, at least–upsets the role of the concept as the principal form of “truth” about the world. 
They can also help avoid a bluntly literalist, optical interpre-
tation of art. And yet there is a huge risk involved in all this. 
Deleuze’s affirmation of “life,” which roots in a Nietzschean 
vitalism, leads in the direction of the undifferentiated ground 
of the “body without organs.” “This ground, this rhythmic 
unity of the senses, can be discovered only by going beyond 
the organism.... Beyond the organism.... at the limit of the 
lived body, there lies what Artaud discovered and named: the 
body without organs.... The body without organs is opposed 
less to organs than to that organization of organs we call an 
organism” (Nietzsche, p. 39). But while Deleuze describes 
this as going beyond the organism, his rejection of the or-
ganized body is in fact regressive. It refers us back to some 
primordial place in the range of pre-linguistic and pre-sub-
jective experience. It asks us to trade a historical materialism 
for a Nietzschean vitalism, a primalism of sorts, that regards 
history as a “variation of the senses,” that is to say, as “‘the 
succession of more or less profound, more or less mutually 
independent processes of subduing.’”15 The historical mean-
ing of force is power.
Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory is, by contrast, committed to a late-Marxist, modernist, historical form of ma-terialism that, not at all surprisingly, demonstrates 
significant affinities with aesthetic modernism. Published post-
humously in 1970, the Aesthetic Theory was written toward the 
end of modernism’s long historical course, some would say at 
a time when modernism had reached the limit of its potential 
validity as a source of truth. But Adorno could also recognize 
modernism as a moment when the continuation of art seemed 
to hinge on its powers of reflection on the conditions of its 
own possibility, both historical and material. Modernism was 
a moment when art began to (re)claim its own material condi-
tions and to articulate its role in modeling the possibilities for 
what sensuous cognition might be. Its labor in re-discovering 
its own materiality was to carry forward the work of thinking, 
albeit by other than conceptual means. This implied coming to 
terms with the un-mastered residue of thought, allowing that 
residue to challenge what “thought” could mean, rather than 
appropriating it for whatever it already believed to be true. But, 
as modernist works also help make clear, art had itself often 
conspired in allowing thought to ignore the things that might 
resist it. Especially in its adherence to “figuration,” art had 
habitually invited spectators to look “through” rather than “at” 
its materials in order to aim at the truth beyond them. Thus, 
modernism is fully aware of the fact that claiming art’s power 
as a vehicle for the concrete concept also required a critique 
of much of the history of art since at least the time when the 
Albertian model of perspective drawing became dominant. 
On the positive side, the modernist critique was animated by 
the desire to reclaim the material motives that Western art has 
tended to exclude from the discourses of truth.
Among Adorno’s recent expositors, Jay Bernstein has 
been among the most emphatic in linking Adorno’s interest in 
modernism to the recovery of these “material motives.” “Tradi-
tional works of art [my emphasis] are for the sake of ideas and 
ideals that were presumed to exist independently of the mate-
rial formed. Modernist works, Adorno contends, enact a rever-
sal in which form is for the same of what is formed; or better: 
the intelligibility of modernist works, the development of 
abstraction and negation, the role of dissonance in them, etc., 
all only makes sense if, apart from all intentions, modernism is 
dragged or pushed forward by a material motive that subtends 
all contesting ideal motives.”16 But, pace what Bernstein goes 
on to say, this material motive does not lead to the condition 
in which modernist works are identified with their materials--
with “colors, paint-on-canvas, the rough brush stroke, the drip 
of paint” (ibid..). That would imply an untenable reductivism. 
To be sure, modernism corrects the habit of “looking through” 
the materiality of art by insisting that we also “look at” its 
materials, but it does so while also acknowledging the desire 
to “look through” or “in” those materials to some form of 
meaning or sense. Modernist works thus tend to hover in the 
movement that switches between “looking at” and “looking 
through,” somewhat like the figure of the duck-rabbit that Wit-
tgenstein borrowed from psychologist Joseph Jastrow. 
In this “switching,” modernist art emphasizes that paint-
ings are made of paint and brush-strokes, that they are applied 
to a flat canvas, and also that the canvas has a surface, a texture, 
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and an edge; it sees that sculptures are indeed constructed, 
which is to say that its materials are fashioned, composed, 
joined, arranged. It also holds the promise of a meaning that is 
not reducible to those materials. It is in the end the site of an 
ongoing negotiation between these two modalities or inter-
ests, a place of critical dialogue, conflict, and active struggle. 
When compared with representational painting, for instance, 
the lines in Jackson Pollock occur within a space that has its 
own material coherence and establishes its own rules. (Cf. 
Adorno: “Each artwork is utopian insofar as through its form 
it anticipates what would finally be itself.... No artwork cedes 
to another,” AT, p. 15). This, rather than any kind of literal 
concreteness or absolute materiality is what subtends the 
mysterious inner beauty and strangely compelling rationality 
of modernist works. Indeed, modernist art is characterized by 
the development of an internal logic that seems to be at once 
true and implausible or unfathomable.
To say that artworks of any sort have a logic at all means 
that they exhibit the force of a claim and that they display a 
set of internal relationships that appear as if necessary, in spite 
of the fact that they may not offer representations of anything 
in the world. As for the first of these points, art makes claims 
through its media and techniques, which may well include 
various forms of contextual reference.17 Witness Duchamp’s 
“Readymades” and their assertions about what it means to 
be a work of art in relation to a world of “mere real things.” 
Indeed, every work has some assertive force (call it a rhetori-
cal force) associated with it. (Cf. Wittgenstein’s argument in 
the Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and 
Religious Belief, that a large number of adjectives were first used 
as interjections, carrying with them a nearly gestural force: 
“Lovely!” “Fine!” “Beautiful!”;18 or in a more contemporary 
American idiom that has its own metaphorical basis, “Sweet!” 
or “Tight!”) As for the second point, the internal logic of 
artworks, this is based on a desire to model states of affairs 
that display a form of necessity without being reducible to any 
kind of naturalism. To refer back to Deleuze, they are capable 
of “standing up on their own.” The force of the “ought” that 
governs this aesthetic logic is on a par with the “ought” that ap-
plies in the world of practical or cognitive reasoning, except for 
the fact that it is embedded within a framework of contingent 
material relations that have no propositional content.19 
In the work of Bernstein and, in turn, Robert Brandom, 
it has been proposed that the logic of art parallels that of mate-
rial inference structures. Brandom gives the following examples. 
“Consider the inference from ‘Pittsburgh is to the West of 
Philadelphia’ to ‘Philadelphia is to the East of Pittsburgh,’ the 
inference from ‘Today is Wednesday’ to ‘Tomorrow will be 
Thursday,’ and from ‘Lightning is seen now’ to ‘Thunder will be 
heard soon.’ It is the contents of the concepts West and East that 
make the first a good inference, the contents of the concepts 
Wednesday, Thursday, today and tomorrow that make the second 
inference correct, and the contents of the concepts lightning and 
thunder, as well as the temporal concepts, that underwrite the 
third. Endorsing these inferences is part of grasping or mastering 
those concepts, quite apart from any specifically logical compe-
tence.... One could say that the set of possible worlds in which 
the premises of these inferences is true is a subset of the possible 
worlds in which their conclusions are true.”20
The difference between these material inferences and the 
material inference structures at work in art lies in the fact that 
in art there is no conceptual content, no “terms” to be defined. 
Artworks are fundamentally material and therefore ultimately 
non-discursive.21 This means that art must establish logical rela-
tions out of purely material terms. In the case of a painting, this 
means that there is a logic of such things as adjacency, color, 
line, and shape, etc., all of which operate independently and in 
relation to one another in order to create a sense that a given 
work “could not have been otherwise.”22 The visual logic of 
painting, and especially of modernist painting, works to estab-
lish itself as coherent and as independent of any resemblance 
to the empirical world. There is, for example, a logic of color, 
hue, border, and blend that establishes the coherence of any 
given Mark Rothko “colorfield” painting, or of a Kandinsky 
abstraction even while recognizing the untranslatability of that 
logic. It is a logic of the type that says: given this in the way of 
color, shape, boundary, and form, then this follows from it.. In 
music, this happens by the creation of a syntax out of tonali-
ties, sequences, and rhythms, all of which can be organized 
(or disrupted) to yield an overarching sense of necessity even 
while foregrounding the contingent relationship of these ele-
ments.. The appeal to “convention” as the source of the logic 
of art simply obscures these facts. To explain, for instance, that 
a tonal composition “resolves” in a particular way because of 
“convention” or because of certain “rules” of harmony, or to say 
that it refuses to do so for the sake of opposition to established 
conventions, is to cede the inherent logic of the work to the 
“institutions”–generic and conventional–in which the possibil-
ities of its materials and their history have become embedded. 
Moreover, it is the business of modernism to disturb the force 
of conventions, aesthetic and otherwise.
Finally, it is the materiality of the world, and what has 
become of the materiality of the world in modernity, and not 
just the materiality of art and its media, that modernism urges 
upon us. And that materiality is lodged in the densely com-
plex, deeply inhabited, and sometimes alienated forms of tradi-
tion, memory, labor, and practice. Modernism, in the end, is as 
much a discovery and revelation of the distance between these 
complex forms of life and their elemental, material substrata 
as it is a direct recovery of the material basis of life. For Adorno, 
aesthetic relations of production are always the “sedimenta-
tions or imprintings of social relations of production” (AT, p. 
5). This means that modernist reflection on the material con-
ditions of its own possibility is at the same time a reflection on 
what has become of the world under the conditions of produc-
tion that hold sway in modern times. Modernist works reflect 
critically on the modern world by producing the semblance of 
something that does not in fact (yet) exist: a world of absolute 
sense. “Art desires what has not yet been, though everything 
that art is has already been. It cannot escape the shadow of the 
past. But what has not yet been is the concrete” (AT, p. 134). 
One way to read modernism’s irrepressible self-consciousness 
would thus be as its recognition that a “utopian” leap into a 
realm where meaning can be discovered in pure materiality is 
impossible from the historical ground on which we stand. The 
only way possible is by means of semblance; semblance is nec-
essary if art is to avoid a simple displacement of the abstract 
concept by a materialism that is incapable of thought; and it is 
in the end through semblance that, as Nietzsche suggested, the 
world is made more true.
©Anthony J. Cascardi
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(Endnotes)
1 Hegel, Lectures on Aesthetics (henceforth LA), trans. T. M. Knox 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975). Adorno explains how this 
is far more complex a matter than Hegel had imagined: “Artworks 
are enigmatic in that they are the physiognomy of an objective spirit 
that is never transparent to itself in the moment in which it appears” 
Aesthetic Theory (henceforth AT), trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor 
(Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 128.
2 Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne 
(London: NLB, 1977), p. 31. Benjamin articulates the issue in 
language (the husk / the kernel) that echo medieval hermeneutics.
3 Cf. Eckbert Faas, The Genealogy of Aesthetics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002) on the overemphasis in aesthetics on spirit 
and the underemphasis of the body and sexuality. 
4 Jay Bernstein’s in-depth work on the “complex concept” comes 
closest to this idea. See Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
5 Adorno writes “art itself thinks” (AT, p. 99).
6 Christoph Menke writes of a related issue in his discussion of beauty 
in The Sovereignty of Art: Aesthetic Negativity in Adorno and Derrida 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999). To the extent that art is “about” the 
world it solicits interpretive discourse (hermeneutics); to the extent 
that it is “of ” the world it solicits an account of “aesthetic experience,” 
which is he describes as nonconceptualizable (p. 110). Adorno 
writes: “A painter paints a picture rather than what it represents” 
(AT, p. 6). Equally, though, Menke’s point is to underscore the 
configurative discontinuity, the linkage of insight and blindness, 
in the interpretive statements we make about art. This blindness is 
a blindness to the aesthetic strategies of the work in question. The 
matter roots in Hegel’s Aesthetics and in the responses that Adorno 
and Derrida give to Hegel’s idea that the beautiful in art is comprised, 
a “content” (“an aim, a meaning”), of “the expression, appearance, 
and realization of this content,” and of the essential relation between 
the two (see Hegel, LA, I, p. 95).
7 See also AT, pp. 178-9. More than this, the artefact is an invitation to 
spirit: “spirit is that particular [thing] that makes an artefact art” (AT, 
p. 89). 
8 Deleuze takes up this question in The Logic of Sense, ed. Constantin 
Boundas, trans. Mark Lester (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1990), pp. 253-266. Cf. Deleuze’s discussion of the simulacrum in 
relation to Lucretius and Epicurus (pp. 266-279).
9 On semblance in Adorno see Lambert Zuidervaart Adorno’s Aesthetic 
Theory: The Redemption of Illusion (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1993).
10 Indeed, an empiricist like Hume could only fathom “relations” as 
external to the terms involved. Such a view can best be understood in 
contrast to efforts by rationalist philosophers to resolve the paradox 
of relations–that either a means is found to make the relation internal 
to the terms, or a more profound and inclusive term is discovered to 
which the relation is already internal. I adopt this formulation from 
Deleuze’s essay “Hume,” in Desert Islands and Other Texts, 1953-1974 
(Los Angeles: Semiotext(e); and Cambridge, MA: distributed by 
MIT Press, 2004), p. 163. The challenge of aesthetic theory is to 
explain how art offers something other than the Humean-empiricist 
or the rationalist position. 
11 Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What Is Philosophy? (henceforth 
WIP) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 164. “Art 
preserves,” he writes, “and it is the only thing in the world that is 
preserved. It preserves and is preserved in itself,” even though it may 
last no longer than its material supports–stone, canvas, pigment, and 
so on” (p. 163).
12 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy (henceforth N) (New York : 
Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 63.
13 Deleuze, N, p. 3. Nietzsche identifies the principles of “force” as 
involving affirmation and negation, obedience and command: “Every 
force is related to others and it either obeys or commands. What 
defines a body is this relation between dominant and dominated 
forces. Every relationship of forces constitutes a body–whether it is 
chemical, biological, social or political. And any two forces, being 
unequal, constitute a body as soon as they enter into a relationship. 
This is why the body is always the fruit of chance” (N, p. 40). “The 
image that follows from these premises takes sense and value rather 
than the concept as fundamental” (N, p. 104).
14 Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. Daniel W. Smith 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), p. 49.
15 N, p. 3; Deleuze cites from the Genealogy of Morals, II, 12. 
16 See Jay M. Bernstein, Against Voluptuous Bodies (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2006).
17 There is a large literature on this subject, but see, in particular, 
Stanley Cavell’s chapter on “Assertions in Techniques,” in The World 
Viewed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979).
18 Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and 
Religious Belief, ed. Cyril Barrett (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, n.d.), p. 3.
19 I would add, however, that the internal “necessity” of artworks is 
counterbalanced by the opposing fact, namely that any given work 
might have been any way, and is not in itself necessary at all. (A 
work is, after all, akin to a claim, and claims, while potentially true, 
need not necessarily be made.) Especially in modernism, it is the 
paradoxical binding of necessity and contingency that gives art its 
power to speak the truth without being bound to the empirical 
world. Contingency is in turn heir of what Benjamin termed aura: 
“Aura is not only ... the here and now of the artwork, it is whatever 
goes beyond its factual givenness, its content” (AT, p. 45). At its 
extreme, this means that art can no longer be presupposed. As 
Adorno says at the very beginning of the Aesthetic Theory, “nothing 
concerning art is self-evident anymore, not its inner life, not its 
relation to the world, not even its right to exist” (AT, p. 1). 
20 Brandom, Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive 
Commitment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 
97-98. Note that neither the premises nor the conclusions of these 
inferences employ logical concepts; this is what sets them apart from 
inferences whose correctness depends strictly on logical form. 
21 As Adorno says, “although artworks are neither conceptual nor 
judgmental, they are logical. In them nothing would be enigmatic if 
their immanent logicality did not accommodate discursive thought, 
whose criteria they nonetheless regularly disappoint. They most 
resemble the form of a syllogism and its prototype in empirical 
thought” (AT, p. 136).
22 Cf Adorno: “Fantastic art in romanticism, as well as its traces in 
mannerism and the baroque, presents something nonexistent as 
existing. The fictions are modifications of empirical reality. The effect 
they produce is the presentation of the nonempirical as if it were 
empirical” (AT, p. 19). 
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KITSCH AND ILLUSION
THEME-HOTELS FROM MEDITERraNEAN COASTS OF TURKEY
In The Unbearable Lightness of Being Kundera claims that 
to reveal the true nature of kitsch we need to ask questions, 
because “a question is like a knife that slices through the stage 
backdrop and gives us a look at what lies hidden behind it.”1 
This paper aims at bending the exclamation mark after “kitsch!” 
which we use to humiliate things that are most likely not ap-
preciated by us and making it a question mark like “kitsch?” in 
order for an attempt to understand what it really is. 
If we are to define what kitsch is, it can be said that kitsch 
is a modern term following the process of modernization. 
Nowadays, it has mostly been used for defining the taste of bad 
or popular art. However, it is something more than being popu-
lar and different than being bad. Unless we consider its being 
pretentiousness and its tendency to counterfeit, we can not fully 
comprehend what kitsch is. The crucial feature of kitsch is that it 
disguises itself and lies about its identity. Kitsch functions like a 
fake-sign which flatters the kitsch-lover’s pride and relieves him 
by offering him some sort of sweet illusions. In order to do that, 
let us talk about Don Quixote for a while. 
1.  The Adventures of Don Quixote
Don Quixote, as we all know, is a story of a thin and a 
less than affluent man around his 50s who decides to set off a 
journey for “redressing all manner of wrongs.” Being a passion-
ate reader, Alonso Quijano becomes obsessed with books of 
chivalry which are very popular at his time. One day, he makes 
up his mind to leave his home and “turn knight-errant and travel 
through the world with a horse and in search of adventures.” 
Equipping himself with old, rusty armor and a cardboard hel-
met, he renames himself Don Quixote de La Mancha. As a final 
step in his transformation into a knight-errant, he picks a girl, 
whom he calls Dulcinea Del Toboso, as every knight-errant in 
the chivalry romances has a lady with whom he is in love. With 
the same reason, as every knight-errant in the romances has 
a squire, Don Quixote persuades Sancho Panza, a fatty local 
worker, to be his squire by promising him an island to govern at 
the end. 
The novel gets funny as our protagonist distorts every thing 
he sees. He muddles up windmills to be giants, flocks of sheep to 
be armies etc. Other characters in the book, accompany him and 
sometimes collaborate with him (some for fun, some for pity) 
even though they do not share his false perception. The story 
goes from one failure to another until we find him returned to 
his home, humiliated and on his death-bed, overcoming his 
illusions. He dies, perhaps disappointing most of his readers, 
acknowledging who he actually is and who he is not.
1.1 The Principle of Quid Pro Quo
The question is that, what makes Don Quixote confuse the 
things he sees? According to Girard, in the case of Don Quixote, 
the problem is quid pro quo meaning something for something 
else. Don Quixote confuses, for example, windmills with enemy 
giants as he misjudges them, because his “…sense of reality is 
lost and judgment is paralyzed.”2 He fights against windmills as if 
they are giants. However, Sancho does not share his “paralyzed 
judgment” and evaluates windmills as windmills. The strange 
thing is that, although Sancho corrects him, he doubts not and 
keeps on believing what he used to believe in. 
““Look, your worship,” said Sancho; “what we see there 
are not giants but windmills, and what seem to be their 
arms are the sails that turned by the wind make the 
millstone go.”
“It is easy to see,” replied Don Quixote, “that thou art not 
used to this business of adventures; those are giants; and 
if thou art afraid, away with thee out of this and betake 
thyself to prayer while I engage them in fierce and unequal 
combat.””3
Owing to “little sleep and too much reading,” Don Quixote 
starts to live mentally inside of chivalry romances. The more he 
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reads the less he lives his daily life in his village in La Mancha. 
At the end, his past world dissolves into the world of chivalric 
stories and the vocabulary he uses to define his life changes into 
one of chivalry. For instance, Don Quixote sees a man wearing 
what he imagines to be the famous helmet of Mambrino when 
it starts to rain a little. Mambrino is a fictional king, famous in 
the romances of chivalry, having a gold helmet which makes its 
owner untouchable and invulnerable. To have this gold helmet 
is the dream of all the great knights in the romances. However, 
the man Don Quixote sees is a barber and what he carries upon 
his head is a basin protecting the barber against the rain. But, 
“in Don Quixote’s imagination the basin remains a helmet” as 
Cervantes says. 
The contrast between his past vocabulary and his new 
vocabulary (including a king called Mambrino, a magical gold 
helmet and all sorts of heroic acts) creates a misunderstanding 
which produces the element of comedy. For Rorty, human be-
ings have a “final vocabulary” which is “a set of words which they 
employ to justify their actions, their beliefs, their lives… They 
are the words in which we tell, sometimes prospectively some-
times respectively, the story of our lives.”4 This vocabulary is final 
in the sense that it designates the limits of man’s thoughts and 
perceptions of life. On that account, the shift in the set of words 
is the shift of realities. Don Quixote’s being inside of chivalry 
romances seems to blind him to the common vocabulary which 
he used to share with others before. Consequently, it can be said 
that the romances are the source of Don Quixote’s illusions and 
are his blind spot where his eye lacks understanding or its view 
is obstructed. 
Let us jump to the world of kitsch again and give some 
examples from a touristic Mediterranean coastal city in which 
I was born, Antalya, promising to return to the issue of Don 
Quixote afterwards. 
2.  Tourism Architecture in Mediterranean 
Coasts After the 80s
Although, the emergence of the kitsch dates backs to the 
middle of 19th century, its widely acceptance and in a way, legiti-
mization, owes too much to the conditions of postmodernity. 
After 1980, Turkish entrepreneurs unanimously agreed that 
mass tourism is a way of earning good money whilesaving effort. 
Due to this fact, year by year the most beautiful and the most 
fertile coasts of Turkey were filled with hotel chains and holiday 
resorts one of which, for example, has 95 tennis courts in it. 
Besides, owing to an increase in the number of hotels and 
resorts due to the historical and natural beauties of the city and 
to the convenient economic services, Antalya became one of the 
most important tourism centers in Turkey. However, this situ-
ation has brought about competitions. Hotels mostly erected 
after 80s must be evaluated as they were built in an environment 
which is a stage for tough competitions. Therefore, this situation 
has leaded owners and the new entrepreneurs to create a “differ-
ence.” This difference has been called “a regional architecture.” 
In order to produce this “regional touch” and attract either 
local or foreign tourists, some strange elements, aiming at 
producing some kind of exotic and oriental effect and claiming 
to be peculiar to Mediterranean, started to appear. (Image 01) 
However, these exotic-oriental details are rather decorative than 
regional. The relationship between Mediterranean and a giant, 
British style porcelain tea pot seems quite questionable, though.5 
(Image 02) Therefore, the Mediterranean coasts started to be 
a setting for a certain kind of kitschy architectural types whose 
reality is weak but the illusionary aspect is pretty strong. 
2.1 Theme-Hotels
Within 2000s, a much stronger ring has been added to the 
attempts of differentiation and appeal chain: The Theme-Hotels. 
Again linked to the raise of competition all along the 90s, en-
trepreneurs and architects looked for more attractive styles and 
finally, found a solution as importing the theme-hotel issue from 
America6. Just after the construction of Hotel Topkapı Palace 
(Image 03) in 1999, other “World of Wonders” started to invite 
us for “a holiday in a magnificent palatial architecture that we 
have never experienced,” especially if we “look for a different, ro-
mantic and unusual holiday to enjoy very special and unforget-
table moments.”7 Before Hotel Topkapı Palace, there were only 
decorative, kitschy details. However, with the emergence of it, 
touristic architecture changed its face dramatically. They exceed 
the preceding ones in the sense that they are totally kitsch. 
In 2003, we have seen Hotel Kremlin Palace (Image 04) 
imitating the Grand Kremlin Palace, Titanic Hotel (Image 05) in 
the shape of a ship, The Orange Country Hotel (Image 06) imitat-
ing a street in Amsterdam and The Concorde Hotel (Image 07) in 
the shape of a plane said to be constructed for the honor of the 
disappearance of Concorde planes. These hotels are appreciated 
for combining modernity and nostalgia and are taken as a hope 
for a good season. The architecture of the first theme-hotel says 
that “Theme-hotels are very important tools for selling. They can 
be distinguished from other hotels in a very short time. They can 
easily be engraved in memories. Due to their appearance and 
comfort, they will always attract a higher number of people.”8 
If the eventual aim is selling, attaining the greatest possible 
number of consumers and to be distinguished and remembered, 
perhaps no other tool can work better than kitsch. As for Kulka 
“the purpose of kitsch is to please the greatest possible number 
of people (as) it always plays on the most denominators” and 
“in order for the spectator to respond appropriately to the rep-
resented subject matter, he must able to recognize it. …What 
characterizes kitsch is the instant and effortless identifiability of 
the subject matter.”9
3.  Kitsch and Illusion
Now, let us return back to the story of Don Quixote and 
repeat the same question for Hotel Kremlin Palace. What makes 
the lover of kitsch confuse Hotel Kremlin Place with the original 
Grand Kremlin Palace? 
In his famous trip to America in the 1830s, Tocqueville 
notes that when he first arrives in New York, he sees “a number 
of little palaces of white marble, several of which were of classic 
architecture” at some distance. He decides to go and see them 
more closely as he is attracted by them. After getting closer, he 
realizes with disappointment that these palaces’ “walls are of 
whitewashed brick, and their columns are painted wood.” For 
Tocqueville, in modern democracies there is always “a multitude 
of persons whose wants are above their means” and “whose for-
tune is on the increase, but whose desires grow much faster than 
their fortunes.” These people are looking for “short cuts”, and are 
“very willing to take up with imperfect satisfaction rather than 
abandon the object of their desires altogether.”10 This analysis 
gives us an insight for one of the functions of kitsch which is dis-
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play and Baudrillard’s “magical affiliation to the upper-classes,”11 
that is to say, status seeking. 
However, for Calinescu, kitsch-lovers “…pleasure does 
not stop there. What constitutes the essence of kitsch is its 
open-ended indeterminacy, its vague “hallucinatory” power, its 
spurious dreaminess, its promise of easy “catharsis”.”12 Therefore, 
kitsch is a response to the desire to escape from everyday life. 
It is tool for relaxation and forgetting. Yet, this forgetting is an 
inevitable source for a saccharine-type remembering. It banishes 
the unpleasant elements of the past and renders it as a positive 
tool of sweet illusions in the form of nostalgia. Therefore, what 
you have is a domesticated past which is purged of all the possi-
ble dangers of pain and whose relationship with history has been 
castrated. For Adorno, “the positive element of kitsch lies in the 
fact that it sets free for a moment the glimmering realization that 
you have wasted your life.”13 As a result, the second function of 
kitsch is satisfying the need to run away from the unbearable. 
That is why, it has to deceive.
“The positive element of kitsch” is equal to “the absolute 
denial of shit”14 in Kundera’s terms and also to Mambrino’s 
magical, golden helmet. The eyes of Don Quixote, like the eyes 
of kitsch, are blind to objects which are not glorious. They can 
only pick up palatial beauties, renowned stories or heroic acts… 
For their eyes, there is nothing like an ordinary basin function-
ing just to protect from rain. This is one of the simplest forms of 
pride. Pride, no doubt, produces a possibility for both a sweet 
remembering of the past and endless illusions for the future 
whose falsity comes into the scene again and again, just like in 
the case of Don Quixote. 
Don Quixote’s pride never lets him to acknowledge his 
real situation. He is a 50 year-old ordinary man who (as he 
“desires above his means”) “has wasted his life.” He desires to be 
a renowned chevalier, yet he thinks he is a chevalier. His pride 
is deaf to the words of the others. A peasant needlessly tries to 
persuade him. “Take heed, sir, that I am neither Don Rodrigo 
de Narvaez nor Marquis of Mantua. But Pedro Alonso your 
neighbour: and you are neither Baldwin nor Abindarraez, but 
the honorable gentleman Senior Quixano.” (27) Don Quixote 
refuses the peasant’s words as he answers “I know who I am.” 
The paralyzed judgment and the loss of reality, making Don 
Quixote misjudge the things he sees, are shared by the lovers of 
kitsch. For Broch, “…kitsch represents falsehood (it is often so 
defined, and rightly so), this falsehood falls back on the person 
in the need of it, on the person who uses this highly considerate 
mirror so as to be able to recognize himself in the counterfeit 
image it throws back of him and to confess his own lies.”15 Kitsch 
creates a “short cut” in the considerate mirror and makes the 
kitsch lover consider himself as if he is someone else. Therefore, 
the value of the self comes from the value of the desired self. 
Now, let’s remember the invitation of one of our theme-
hotel palaces. “Staying in the comfortable rooms of ‘Harem’, 
having meals in the ‘Kitchens of the Palace’ or ‘Hagia Irene’, 
getting refreshed at the ‘Fountain of Ahmet III’ at the Sultan 
Ahmet Square, sipping your wine while enjoying the splendid 
view from ‘Justice Tower’, tasting the special milk pudding in the 
‘Mecidiye Pavilion’ and more…”16 they say. It is an offer to spend 
time without the worries of your 9 to 5 daily life and of who you 
actually are. If you have a little to give, you can buy these privi-
leges for a week or two. 
Kitsch is, not doubt, related with the “beauty” that has 
been put on sale. When you commercialize “beauty” on account 
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are undoubtedly fabricating an ultimately suitable environment 
for misjudging. In such an environment, man is ready to confuse 
and misjudge the value of a matchless object “…whose original 
aesthetic meaning consisted, or should have consisted, again for 
Calinescu, in being unique and therefore inimitable.”17 Hotel 
Palaces owe their entire values to the value of the uniqueness of 
original Grand Kremlin or Topkapı Palaces.
4.  Conclusion
Consequently, the different appearances of the same ob-
ject prove that our belief in, in our case these hotel palaces, are 
questionable. The day when Don Quixote decides to “redress all 
manners of wrong,” he already has a cliché in his mind originat-
ing from chivalry books. The adventurous spirit making Don 
Quixote act does not stem from an excitement for the new and 
unknown. He acts according to some ready formulas18 which 
leave no space for experience. In other words, in his adventure, 
“all answers are given in advance and preclude any questions.”19 
He ventures into the adventure to find a repetition of what he 
has found in the romances, therefore, his adventure “derive(s) 
from the basic images (he has) engraved in (his) memories.”20
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche talks about the conva-
lescent, a person recovering from an illness. For him, the conva-
lescent should sing and his singing would be different than both 
the healthy and the ill ones. He advises him to “go out to where 
the world awaits (us) like a garden.”21 The convalescent is a per-
son who is aware of new possibilities, who passes beyond pre-
scriptions, the clichés of his era. Then, Cervantes is a recovered 
Don Quixote, “…a Don Quixote who can see a barber’s basin as 
a barber’s basin but who nevertheless remembers that he once 
saw it as Mambrino’s helmet.”22 Only this possibility makes Cer-
vantes a great writer. If Cervantes would not be able to break free 
from his paralyzed judgment and become clear-sighted again, he 
probably will not be able to write the first modern novel which 
is born as opposed to romances. For Sontag, “Don Quixote is a 
book which is, first of all, an attack on a certain kind of literary 
kitsch.”23 Thanks to his illusions and then his recovery, Cervantes 
gave us the art of novel as a present. His singing is different than 
that of the ill Don Quixote who can only repeats the language of 
the romances. “’Scarce had the rubicund Apollo spread over the 
face of the broad spacious earth the golden threads of his bright 
hair, scarce had the little birds of painted plumage attuned their 
notes to hail with dulcet and mellifluous harmony the coming of 
the rosy Dawn…’” etc. Besides, his singing is also different than 
Sancho’s. Cervantes is Nietzsche’s convalescent. The grain of 
Don Quixote falls into the ground and dies, so it brings forth a 
fruit like the art of novel.24
Now, let us summarize what we have said about kitsch 
shortly. Kitsch is not only an object but also a certain kind of 
behavior of the subject who is ready to deceive himself. Our 
palace-like, ship-like or plane-like hotels can not be considered 
without the kitsch-lover. Therefore, to be against kitsch architec-
ture does not sense have much meaning, unless we try to un-
derstand the gap in modern man. The reason why, we can more 
clearly understand the principles of modern life depends on a 
possibility immanent in kitsch. Kitsch behaves like a caricature 
as it exaggerates the features. It makes us see what we have failed 
to see before. Here, what we fail to see is a subject who tries to 
fulfill the gap inside of his soul with the crowd of objects as he 
attributes them some qualities which they do not possess. 
Therefore, I think, before we humiliate and exclude kitsch 
as the other (with the exclamation mark after it), we need to 
consider the man’s desires, hunger and dilemmas producing 
kitsch as Kundera says “everything has a right to be under-
stood25” and this also includes kitsch. 
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1.  Introduction
It seems that Hegel’s and Nietzsche’s philosophies do not 
have anything in common. Nietzsche is generally known as 
one of the severest opponents of rationalistic philosophy. On 
the contrary, Hegel consistently adheres to rationality. We can 
accordingly assume that concerning the tragic, they are also 
opposite to each other. 
Hegel regards tragedy as a phase of the dialectic process 
through which Spirit [der Geist] gets through the finite and 
finally reaches the infinite. For him, the tragedy, of which the 
typical one is Greek tragedy, could be distinguished from 
the concept of the tragic [das Tragische]. The former could 
be counted as one of the spots where Spirit shows itself in 
the aesthetic way. On the other hand, the latter would imply 
the cognition of the rational nature embodied in tragedy. He 
exposes [darstellen] the intrinsic nature of tragedy from the 
entirely rationalistic point of view, to be exact, from the per-
spective of absolute Spirit. 
Conversely, for Nietzsche, the tragic as the essence of 
tragedy could never be compatible with the so-called rational-
ity. It would rather indicate a kind of breakdown of positive 
attitude towards rationality or towards rationalistic knowledge. 
Therefore, it would signify what the limit of rationality or 
rationalistic thought is and how it can be overcome. In this 
sense, it also implicates what the unexhausted fountain of life’s 
vitality truly is. That is why he emphasizes on only Greek trag-
edy among lots of tragedies. 
Thus, it is no wonder that someone insists on as follows: 
in regard to the tragic, Hegel and Nietzsche have nothing 
in common with each other. It does not definitely mean, of 
course, that they never converge in any way. 
In this paper I would like to take a short general view of 
the basic difference between Hegel and Nietzsche in the mat-
ter of the tragic, and then to give an opinion on the inquiry 
into two contrary philosophical positions. The reason why I 
try to do this is that we could hereby be reminded of an at-
titude of life which would strongly be demanded and could be 
supported by many people these days. Namely, while inquiring 
into the two contrasting views about the tragic, in my opinion, 
we could again be aware of the fact that an antagonism might 
often be a false one and the most important is our actual life. 
2.  Hegel on the tragic
As is generally known, for Hegel, arts, namely fine arts 
[die schöne Künste] imply one of the self-expressions of Spir-
it.1 The former are the outcomes of the latter that shows itself 
in the aesthetic way. First of all, thus, we need to try to under-
stand Hegel’s spirit exactly, in order to cognize the core of his 
opinion on arts and tragedy. 
For Hegel, Spirit is not the word that we used to regard as 
the opposition to the body in everyday language. It does not 
denote an ability which makes us perceive, think, consider and 
judge, etc. It would rather be called the rationalistic principle 
of life through which we can understand not only the essence 
of things in general, but also of society and history in general. 
Hegel goes so far as to call it Subject in itself.2 From this point 
of view, therefore, it could be said that the whole process of life 
is the self-development of Spirit. In other words, Spirit, being 
ceaselessly sublated [aufgehoben] in its own way, shows itself 
in our social and historical life. 
Accordingly, Hegel’s view about arts is quite different 
from Kant’s. The arts he mentions presuppose a social nature. 
This means that an experience of arts can not be a subjective 
one rooted in any simple emotions or feelings at all. Such an 
experience always includes within itself an objective element. 
Hegel considers poetic arts as the greatest among all 
the arts, because they express the most complete aesthetic 
phase of the self-movement of Spirit. And the highest 
among all the poetic arts is the drama [das Drama]. It is 
the most integral not only contently, but also formally. An 
action [eine Handlung] in the drama embodies the unity 
of epic objectivity and lyric subjectivity.3 The action is 
taken from the subjective internality of the hero who al-
ways decides what to do and how to do independently and 
autonomously. At the same time, it always results from the 
objective nature of the state of affairs [die Sache selbst]. It 
1 Of course, according to Hegel, the fact that fine arts are nothing but the self-
expressions of Spirit is not the premise of his philosophy of art, but the result of 
a phenomenological inquiry into spirit or consciousness. As everybody knows, 
the book in which such a result is written is Phänomenologie des Geistes. 
2 See, G. W. F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, Hamburg, 1952, Vorrede. 
3 See, G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik, in: Werke in zwanzig Bände, 
Frankfurt am Main, 1986, p. 474 ff.
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thus keeps the unity of individuality and universality and 
accordingly the so-called concrete totality, even though it 
does in the aesthetic way. And the pathos of such an action 
nearly comes up to the stage of absolute Spirit. For this 
reason, the plot of the genuine drama must unfold on the 
basis of its internal necessity.4 
Hegel insists that modern tragedy is the same as Greek 
tragedy in that it embodies the unity of individuality and 
universality. He even mentions that the one is superior to 
the other in some aspects. However, he regards the latter 
as the most typical tragedy and then, on the basis of it, ex-
plains the essence of tragedy.5
In the Greek tragedy, in which the ethical substance or 
the ethical actuality is expressed,6 according to Hegel, the 
important is not chorus, but action. He consistently asks 
the ethical justification of tragic action.7 Of course, such a 
justification must not already be determined or confirmed 
before the plot of the drama unfolds in its own way. Greek 
tragic dramatists treat this issue of tragedy distinguishedly. 
And any people can not but be impressed at their works, not 
only humanely but also artfully.8
In Greek tragedy, the action which a hero takes under 
his clear consciousness and the accident which is given 
prior to his will or his consciousness are treated as a contra-
dictive relation and described so. Of course, such a relation 
eventually dissolves. Hero’s actions are thereupon justificat-
ed as the pathos based on ethicality [die Sittlichkeit].9 In this 
way, the hero is explicated as a person who basically acts in 
accordance with his individual existence, but, at the same 
time, holds the idea of totality in his action.10 His life or his 
action definitely expresses the concrete totality as aforesaid. 
In Hegel’s view on tragedy, however, what mat-ters is that tragedy’s distinctive position is to be 
sublated[aufgehoben] by the self-development of absolute 
Spirit. It does really matter. A tragic experience is nothing 
but a phase of the endless play in which absolute Spirit 
throws itself into a trial and then puts up with it, and finally 
results in a higher phase. 
Consequently, we may well say that the tragedy Hegel 
observes is a kind of vechile for the self-movement of ab-
solute Spirit. It is no more than one of the productions of 
absolute Spirit in which the eternal or the absolute or the 
divine is shown to us in the aesthetic way.11 The meaning of 
the tragic must also be subordinate to the absolute Spirit, 
therefore, as long as viewed in Hegel’s insight.
4 See, Ibid., p. 480. Of course, an author of the drama is demanded that he must 
have the ability to cognize the spiritual or the absolute. This implies, on the 
other hand, that it needs some degree of historical process for us to produce a 
great drama. See, Ibid., p. 481. 
5 See. Ibid., pp. 534ff.
6 See. G. W. F. Hegel, Pänomenologie des Geistes, p. 314ff. That is why tragedy 
can not merely be considered as a literary work. For Hegel, an experience of 
tragedy should be understood from the ethical [sittlich] point of view. He 
points out this fact not only in the Pänomenologie des Geistes, but also in his 
early works. See, G. W. F. Hegel, Werke Bd. 2, Jena Schriften, Frankfurt am Main, 
1986, p. 495.
7 Hegel emphasizes on Antigone rather than Oedipus. This means that the former 
describes its ethical meanings in a more excellent way. See. G. W. F. Hegel, 
Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik, p. 550. 
8 See. Ibid., pp. 544-545.
9 See. Ibid., pp. 545-546.
10 See. Ibid., pp. 549-550.
11 See, Ibid., pp. 572-574.
3.  Nietzsche on the tragic
The tragedy that Nietzsche concerns for is definitely 
Greek tragedy. He describes its core through two worlds, 
i.e., the Apollonian and the Dionysian. He likens Apollo to 
the world of dream and Dionysus to the world of ecstasy or 
intoxication. According to him, Greek tragedy could have 
been yielded out of a specific combination of these two 
elements.12 
Apollo stands for the plastic art which is related with 
the imaginary beautiful world. By contrast, Dionysus stands 
for the music related with the origin world prior to and 
beyond all the imaginary appearances.13 At the first glance, 
therefore, plastic art seems not to be related with the Dio-
nysian. Since modern arts, says Nietzsche, it has in fact 
been developed only in such a way. 
In the first ancient Greece, however, the development 
of plastic art did not diverge from the Dionysian power and 
vitality.14 At that time, the Greek people were well aware 
that the plastic is originally stemmed from the Dionysian. 
They thought that Apollo inevitably collapses in case he is 
not with Dionysus. They early realized this fact and pro-
duced their artworks accordingly. This reveals their life’s 
greatness. Greek tragedy came into being only from this 
spirit of theirs.15 
Nonetheless, this spirit primordially signifies the 
spirit of music. Of course, as mentioned above, it does 
not mean that in Greek tragedy, the Apolline is entirely 
driven out and accordingly the Dionysian alone exists. 
Greek tragedy presupposes these two elements at the 
same time. The important is that only through the Dio-
nysian, precisely speaking, through the Dionysian music, 
the tension between Apollo and Dionysus could truly be 
sustained and then the genuine aspect of life would also 
be manifested. Any art which tries to configurate only the 
Apolline must be the same as the one that breaks away 
from original life, namely from the life in natural state 
[Naturzustand]16. 
In this context, it is to understand that “tragedy has 
been created out of tragic chorus and fundamentally it was 
only the chorus and nothing but the one.”17 Greek tragedy 
could take shape on the basis of the chorus. Without it, the 
tragedy must have been an art like a empty ear of wheat, or 
at most the one which sings only any desolation of life. It 
has been said that action is the kernel of Greek tragedy. This 
means that the essence of the tragedy consists in its ethical 
element.18 However, according to Nietzsche, the heart of 
tragedy is chorus.19 The ancient Greek people consider the 
chorus as the intrinsic nature of life.20 
Dionysian music helps us stare at the origin of life. 
That is to say, the music tells us the limits of theoretical 
12 See, F. Nietzsche, Die Geburt der Tragödie, in: Nietzsche Werke, hrsg. von 
Giorgio Colli und Mazzino Montinari, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1972, p. 22, 
p. 78.
13 See, Ibid., p. 47.
14 See, Ibid., p. 78.
15 See, Ibid., p. 36ff.
16 See, Ibid., p. 51.
17 See, Ibid., p. 36ff.
18 As stated above, it is Hegel who takes a view of Greek tragedy in this way. 
19 See, Ibid., p. 58.
20 See, Ibid., p. 51.
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knowledge and further how to get over tragic sufferings or 
situations, and still more helps us realize what the true life 
is.21 The tragedy opens our eyes to the true knowledge of 
life that is neither only for theory, nor ruled by a certain 
regular norm.
Greek tragedy says that even the most theoretical man 
never avoids a tragic situation, that through his tragic cir-
cumstance, he eventually gets a kind of magic power (Dio-
nysian laugh or cheeriness)22 and herewith takes a cheerful 
view of life.23 In this way, Greek tragedy tells us the tragic 
insight to life. 
Here the first and most important is that the element 
which makes us tide over tragic situation emerges from 
Dithyrambic music, namely Dionysian chorus. This chorus 
makes it possible that we can get out of the fear of tragic 
situation and ride out such a situation.24 The so-called 
cheeriness of Greek tragedy springs from the power of this 
chorus. In this sense, the chorus of Greek tragedy, so to 
speak, the satrymusic is diffenciated from other choruses.25 
Although Greek tragedy was born from the duplexity of the 
Apolline and the Dionysian, thus, it is at bottom based on 
the latter, and therefore it could be a hollow one in case the 
latter is rejected or eliminated.
In the history of Greek tragedy, by the way, the Diony-sian has been neglected since Euripides. He emphasizes 
on the so-called Socratic. He tries to ground the tragedy 
only on the Apolline and hence to make it a theory. He is 
not so much a poet as a thinker. He says, “everything is to 
understand in order to be beautiful.” It exactly corresponds 
to Socrates’ principle as follows: “everything must theoreti-
cally be known in order to be virtuous.”26 
Euripides is really an antagonist of Greek tragedy, 
even if he intends to produce a newly revised tragedy. The 
Socratic principle he supports is oppsite to the chorus of 
Greek tragedy. The tragedy that lies in Socratic optimism 
leads to its death.27 Socraticism destroys the essence of 
tragedy by means of its syllogism. It reduces the Dionysian 
element of life to the logical and accordingly turns the 
tragedy into a supplement of science [Wissenschaft]. Tragic 
cognition takes place where theoretical knowledge comes 
to its limits and then tragic situation is close at hand. In 
Socraticism, however, the state of affairs is exactly converse 
and tragic cognition is fully covered by theoretical one. 
The spirit of music sets people free from the situation 
of isolated individual, for instance, from the situation of 
modern individual under the compulsion of universality or 
theory.28 Dionysian music is the idea of eternal life in itself. 
Greek tragedy is the great treasure in which a figurative 
language embodies Dionysian wisdom.29 People who always 
21 See, Ibid., p. 52. 
22 See, Ibid., p. 68. 
23 For instance, we could say as follow: Oedipus had at first been placed in a 
desperate situation, and then took a kind of magic power through the suffer-
ings, and eventually greeted his life with cheerfulness.
24 See, Ibid., p. 53.
25 See, Ibid., p. 53. In this regard, the important thing is that Dithyrambic chorus 
makes us forget something, for example, our past, our social situation, etc. 
Herewith, we all become a unit. 
26 See, Ibid., p. 81.
27 See, Ibid., p. 90. 
28 See, Ibid., p. 104.
29 See, Ibid., p. 105.
live in this wisdom are the ones like children, and the an-
cient Greek people are such ones.30 
Hence, the tragic view of the world that Greek tragedy 
suggests must be in a struggle relation with the theoretical 
one that had been based by Socrates and has been further 
developed since modern society. This means that the trag-
edy could rebirth someplace where theoretical knowledge 
or the spirit of science discloses its limits31 and on the other 
hand it would disappear someplace where the spirit of Dio-
nysian music is excluded.32 
In sum, for Nietzsche, the most important regarding 
the tragic is not theoretical or scientific knowledge, but the 
Dionysian view of the world, through which we can look 
out over the total world truly and overpass tragic situations 
and eventually greet our life with cheeriness. 
4.  Few remarks
Hegel’s exposition [Darstellung] of tragedy thoroughly 
rests on a rationalistic point of view which is owing to a 
kind of teleological insight into the whole human history. 
He thinks that the whole of human being’s life can abso-
lutely be comprehended and accordingly explained from 
the rationalistic point of view. For this reason, he all the 
time criticizes the positions according to which there is 
something that could never be replaced by rationality. In 
regard of tragedy as well as fine arts in general, his opinion is 
authenticated in such a rationalistic philosophy. 
As stated above, says Hegel, fine arts are the places 
where absolute Spirit displays itself in the aesthetic way. 
Tragedy is one of the fine arts, which should be sublated 
into the further complete rationality and finally transferred 
to the absolute Spirit as the highest of rationality. In respect 
to tragedy, after all, the most important is that Spirit should 
get over its limits, namely its aesthetic phase and then 
proceed to the absolute. In this regard, we could say that 
the tragedy only has the meaning of which the boundary is 
completely defined by absolute Spirit, for all that it could 
newly be interpreted in our contemporary aesthetics.
On the contrary, Nietzsche continuously points out that the origin of our life is rather based on irrational 
element than rational one. Here, of course, the irrational 
does not simply signify the opposite to the rational. It 
could rather be called an element that transcends the su-
perficial contradiction of the rational and the irrational. 
It is the very meaning of the tragic and the aesthetic in 
Nietzsche. 
Accordingly, for Nietzsche, the tragic could never be 
determined and explained as the rationalistic or the irra-
tional in the general sense. It rather stands for the original 
force of nature. It symbolizes the true element of life that is 
previous to the evident divergence between the rational and 
the irrational. It refers to the limits of rationalistic attitude in 
life. Namely, even those who thoroughly follow after the so-
called rationalistic position cannot but have their limit and 
consequently confront with a certain insuperable problem. 
30 See, Ibid., p. 106.
31 See, Ibid., p. 107.
32 See, Ibid., p. 110. 
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And further it alludes how men can genuinely overcome 
such a situation or circumstance. 
The tragic is prior to all of the stereotyped artworks or 
arts. On this account, Nietzsche’s art has rarely anything in 
common with the traditional art rooted on the representa-
tion of existing state, for instance, with the painting based 
on the principle of perspective drawing. According to Ni-
etzsche, the traditional art emphasizes one side of life and 
further turns it into the whole of life. Therefore, such an art 
eventually distorts and destroys the essence of life, and gets 
away from the genuine artistic and aesthetic. 
Such being the case, it seems to be quite natural that someone only insists on an opposition between Hegel 
and Nietzsche regarding the tragic. The only thing we should 
obviously recognize seems that we need not be impetuous to 
look after their common points and to rush to a conclusion.
Nonetheless, there are at least the two questions we 
needs must do. Firstly, can we say that the essence of tragedy 
could thoroughly be cognized in the name of rationality? 
Secondly, must we give up any attempt to catch hold of the 
essence of tragedy rationally, just because tragedy says that 
there is something not to be solved through rationality, i.e., 
that there is something beyond rationality? 
Rarely could we get an affirmative answer to these ques-
tions. In this regard, we could say that regarding the tragic, 
the contradiction of Hegel and Nietzsche might be a false 
one. Their thoughts of the tragic might supplement each 
other, unlike their superficial opposition. 
Hegel and Nietzsche, both of them have in view a depth 
element of life underlying the superficial, which means that 
their points of view regarding the tragic are based on a pro-
found dimension. Therefore, even if their basic directions 
upon which they treat the tragic seem to be quite different, 
it may safely be said that their remarks might complement 
each other in the depths of rationality or irrationality.33 
While trying to study Hegel’s and Nietzsche’s views on the tragic and then to interprete them newly, anyway, 
we must not be far from our actual [wirklich] life. And much 
less must we be indulged into treating such an inquiry in the 
abstract. Without mentioning Nietzsche, Hegel also thinks 
much of this point. Contrary to the superficial glance, Hegel’s 
spirit or rationality is never far from our actual life. If someone 
insists that Hegel’s spirit is definitely far from it, Hegel will 
never agree with him. The Spirit which is irrelevant to our ac-
tual life, says Hegel, is not the authentic, but the abstract one.34 
Therefore, we can safely assume that with regard to the 
tragic in Hegel and Nietzsche, any new interpretation unavoid-
ably falls in an abstract and prosaic one in case it is far from our 
actual life in itself. This is what we should deeply impress upon 
our mind when we try to inquire into a common feature in He-
gel’s and Nietzsche’s theories of the tragic and then to interprete 
it newly, I think, whether we successfully do it or not. 
33 We could take out a clue of such a possibility from the fact that Nietzsche 
affirms the truthful knowledge despite he denies truth or knowledge in general. 
See, Ibid., p.53.
34 The Spirit which is far from the actuality of life and definitely opposed to it, 
according to Hegel, is called self-alienated Spirit. The faith which flees from the 
actuality and stands beyond it is an example of this self-alienated Spirit. See, G. 
W. F. Hegel, Pänomenologie des Geistes, p. 376ff. 
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THE HIDDEN HISTORY  
OF IMAGINATION
T here is the well-known, history-of-philosophy and-dictionary approved, history of imagina-tion.The following pages are motivated by the fact that even the most pedestrian survey 
of the concept of imagination shows a certain fuzziness: 
“imagination” is quickly discarded if there is a better way to 
define a problem.1 The concept is not quite as obsolete as 
the legendary phlogiston, a substance assumed to cause burn-
ing: imagination, the imaginary and related terms even have 
periods of intense revival.
It simply is not possible to deny the human activity of 
creating mental pictures of things not actually perceived, 
the activity of creating images of things never perceived, of 
things contradicting simple experience. The minimal defi-
nition of imagining as the activity of picturing something 
absent is simple enough; but the protean nature of the whole 
range of imagining activities introduces history. You can’t 
define something historically mutable.
However there is a clear bifurcation. On one side there 
is imagination in epistemology, on the other side there is the 
realm of “as if ”, of the fictional.
Our story starts with Aristotle: “Imagination (phan-
tasia) is the process by which we say that an image (phan-
tasma) is presented to us” (De Anima 428a 1-4) “The soul 
never thinks without a mental image (phantasma)” (De 
Anima 431a 15-20). 
Imagination mediates between perception and thought. 
From the very beginning there was a less then clear con-
nection between the necessary work done in combining 
the contributions of the senses, the necessary work done 
in “calling to mind” absent things and images produced by 
desire. Imagination “from the beginning” is literally com-
mon sense but already showing elements later developed in 
numerous binary oppositions between imagination and real 
life, real knowledge etc. Descartes develops the elements 
of a dualist mind-body scheme where imagination keeps 
re-appearing in a minor key. Hume stresses the defects of 
1 The usual references in the philosophical literature are Jeanne Bernis, 
L’Imagination, Paris 1954; 1961 and Mary Warnock, Imagination, London 1976; 
slightly more enterprising:Dietmar Kamper, Zur Geschichte der Einbildungskraft, 
Rheinbeck-Hamburg 1990.
imagination and Kant’s Einbildungskraft is both a force of 
order and ultimately impenetrable …
The romantic period introduces the subversive use of 
imagination. Imagination developed in the “as if ” world is 
used as a paradigm for change and revolution. The whole 
range, the differences between creating, inventing, discover-
ing are differences in the use of imagination.
Sometimes as part of the Enlightenment project, 
sometimes against it.2 We still have to puzzle out Adorno’s 
sentence from Negative Dialectics:3 ”Utopia is blocked off by 
possibility, never by immediate reality.” Imagining an uto-
pian Other while seeing every detail of our material world, 
not just spinning out different versions.
We can’t repeat all stages but start from a recent way of 
connecting epistemology and subversion.
I  take a work of Arjun Appadurai and quote him on fantasy as social practice: 
“Until recently, whatever the force of social change, a case 
could be made that social life was largely inertial…and 
that fantasy and imagination were residual practices, 
confined to special moments or places. In general, 
imagination and fantasy were antidotes to the finitude 
of social experience … As the deterritorialisation of 
persons, images and ideas has taken on a new force, 
this weight has imperceptibly shifted. More persons 
throughout the world see their lives through the prisms of 
possible lives offered by the mass media in all their forms. 
That is, fantasy is now a social practice; it enters, in a 
host of ways, into the fabrication of social lives for many 
people in many societies.”4
How new is this and how different from the stories of Don Quijote and Emma Bovary? The last decades have seen the flowering of research on 
2 Very much part of the dialectic of enlightenment is Adorno’s concept of «exact 
imagination»; see Sherry Weber Nicholsen, Exact Imagination, Late Work, 
Cambridge Ma, 1997.
3 A sentence recently used as a starting point in Alexander Garcia Duttman’s new 
book on Visconti.
4 Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large, Minneapolis 1996, pp.54, 55.
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reading so that we now really know who read, where exactly, 
what kind of books etc. although the impact of this activity 
is still hard to measure. The glorious days of reading ended 
in the twenties or thirties of last century and since then we 
have another question, the question of changes caused by 
new media. 
A contemporary way of studying the impact is the con-
stant recourse to anthropology and evolutionary theory. 
Again, an obvious quote, from an article by Steven 
Mithen, a rather long passage containing all assumptions:
“There are various types of human imagination whose 
origins lie at different places in our evolutionary history. 
Imagination in terms of thinking (perhaps unconsciously) 
about the consequences of different courses of action is 
likely to be very old indeed, as this is a type of imagination 
most likely shared by many animals. Imagination in terms 
of thinking about the contents of other minds probably 
stretches back to the common ancestor of 5-6 million years 
ago, and was an essential means of maintaining the complex 
and large social groups of Early Humans. This way of think-
ing played an essential role in human evolution, and remains 
critical to our everyday thought and behavior. We revel in it, 
and applaud those artists who place this type of imaginative 
thought at the centers of their work. 
Imagination in terms of narrative would also have 
become important within the world of Early Humans, as 
transmission of tool-making skills, the planning of big game 
hunting, and communication about new places and land-
scapes were essential. In the absence of language, gesture 
and mime may have played a critical role. But it was because 
of – not in spite of – the absence of spoken language, that 
such selective pressures may have been placed on imagina-
tive abilities. If another individual could have simply told 
what he/she had seen or what was being planned, the Early 
Human mind may not have required such powers of imagi-
nation.
Imagination in terms of creating worlds in which the 
rules of nature and society are broken – fantasy – is the 
most recent form of imagination to have evolved. Evolution 
had guarded against such ways of thinking that are poten-
tially so maladaptive by creating minds with both ways of 
thinking and bodies of knowledge quite isolated from each 
other. Modern humans, especially those after 50.000 years 
ago, learned how to overcome those evolutionary con-
straints by exploiting material culture, by telling stories, and 
performing rituals as a means to offload and provide cogni-
tive anchors for ideas that have no natural home within the 
evolved mind. In this regard, the modern brain is unlikely 
to be significantly different from that of a Neanderthal. But 
it is linked into the world of human culture that augments 
and extends its powers in remarkable ways. It is this link-
age that leads to works of art and science, which then act as 
cognitive foundations for further works and so on through 
human history.”5
Mithen’s idea about a cumulative and on-going dia-
lectic between brain and culture is only one of the prolif-
erating ways of importing theory of evolution in cultural 
matters.
5 Steven Mithen, “The Evolution of Imagination; An Archaelogical Perspec-
tive», SubStance, Umiversity of Wisconsin, 30,1&2 (2001), p. 51, 52.
Somewhere, outside academic circles, cultural institu-tions and the world of sophistication in general, there still are people who assume that philosophers, should 
such a need arise; provide answers of a general nature to all 
kinds of questions without unduly consulting science.
Still, imagination is discussed in psychology and 
cognitive science and even if we consider philosophy to 
be an activity generating events and not as a discursive 
formation stringing together propositions susceptible of 
logical refutation,6 something I do not subscribe, we all live 
in a world heavily determined by science. We may not be 
satisfied with a story of art based on artifacts as tools for 
developing cognitive fluidity and so evolutionary valuable 
but neither is our imaginary museum a collection of timeless 
achievements.
The increasing popularity of invoking anthropology in 
aesthetic matters has a respectable genealogy; again, only a 
short reminder of a not so hidden connection, the French 
ethnologist, anthropologist, pre-historian Andre Leroi-
Gourhan who died in 1986. Leroi-Gourhan is an important 
point of reference in Derrida’s Grammatology.
“L.-G. no longer describes the unity of man and the hu-
man adventure thus by the simple possibility of the graphie 
in general; rather as a stage or an articulation in the history 
of life – of what I have called differance – as the history of 
the gramme. Instead of having recourse to the concepts that 
habitually serve to distinguish man from other living beings 
(instinct and intelligence, absence or presence of speech, of 
society, of economy etc) the notion of program is invoked 
… That is irreducible and impregnable. If the expression 
ventured by Leroi-Gourhan is accepted, one could speak of 
a ‘liberation of memory’, of an exteriorization always already 
begun but always larger than the trace which, beginning 
from the elementary programs of so-called ‘instinctive’ be-
havior up to the constitution of electronic card-indexes and 
reading machines and the possibility of putting in reserve: 
it at once and in the same movement constitutes and effaces 
so-called conscious subjectivity, its logos and its theological 
attributes.”
Aesthetics deals with the specific functionality of non-
functional, non-immediately useful artefacts and activities. 
Why are they “good to think with”? The displacement in 
a different realm can give these artifacts and activities a 
pivotal role in the symbolic mediation of human existence. 
Displacement is seen both as transferring an activity into 
no-functional objects, or performances, spectacles and as 
the displacement as the foundation of any kind of human ac-
tivity. The most usual form of displacement is doublement: 
re-production, the mimetic. What is the role of imagination?
There seem to be two schools of thought. One of them 
treats the human mind like a kind of Swiss (army) knife, a 
knife that sports multiple appliances, domain specific and 
diversified and the other schools only sees a general purpose 
learning mechanism. Both stress that prehistoric artifacts 
must have been “good for thinking”, must have stored, trans-
mitted and retrieved information.
From an other anthropologist, from Mary Douglas, 
comes the chilling question: what if art becomes impossible 
6 A good explanation of this position is Eric Alliez’s “Questionnaire on Deleuze” 
in Theory, Culture and Society, Vol.14, No 2, May 1997.
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the moment its function becomes too self-conscious (inspi-
ration, genius, avant-garde and post-modernism being just 
strategies to go on producing unpredictable artifacts – l’art 
pour l’art position a highly successful strategy). Auto-telic 
self-sufficiency is part of the achievement, of the develop-
ment in certain cultures but an endangered achievement.
Imagination is hidden behind the binary opposition of 
the mimetic and the expressive. It is hidden even in Benja-
min’s notion of the optical unconsciousness. Let us examine 
the well-known passage from the “Little History of Pho-
tography”: “It is through photography that we first discover 
the existence of this optical unconscious … meaningful yet 
covert enough to find a hiding place in waking dreams … 
make the difference between technology and magic visible 
as a thoroughly historical variable.“7 
On the other hand, Barbara Maria Stafford argues 
“against the narrow tendency, evident in cognitive science 
and disciplines influenced by it, to equate consciousness 
solely with linguistic capabilities: “High order images, like 
cross-linking works of art, exhibit how our polarized per-
ceptions of the world are processed as representations in 
various areas of the brain.”8 Networked spatial relations are 
crucial in the construction of self-awareness.
This new vocabularies introduce new ways of dealing 
with the amazing mediation between exterior and interior 
elements that constitutes experience.
Michael Taussig studies of the mimetic are already clas-
sic9 and only slightly less known is Jay’s constant develop-
ment of Adorno’s positions.10
Jay’s summary of Adorno reads: mimesis is problem-
atic when it is in league with the instrumental rationality 
of the modern world. It remains the basic mode, the core of 
displacement. We repeat and play at make-belief: summon-
ing an absence into presence. Imagining.
Experience is a difficult concept and under heavy at-tack for most of the twentieth century but of course at least a necessary fiction. Because we no longer 
argue for immediacy, presence, evidence of the here and 
now, detours, mediations, displacements are the constitutive 
elements to define experience. 
Allow me as well to find an appropriate point in Leroi-
Gourhan. Writing about the “language of forms” in the 
counter point of prehistoric and contemporary art he argued 
that social memory exists, its reason for existence is larger 
but inclusive of aesthetics. He also argued that the loss of 
manual discovery, of the personal encounter between hu-
man and matter in the exercise of craft, has closed one of the 
doors to individual aesthetic innovation …
Artistic popularization enables the human masses to 
live passively on the planet’s cultural stock.
But how passive is the social practice of imagination? 
No one could deny the impact of imagined communities 
described by Benedict Anderson. The idea of constitutive 
imagination is beautifully developed in Paul Veyne’s classic 
book Les Grecs ont-ils cru a leurs mythes but the short answer 
7 Trans. in W.B. Selected Writings 2, Harvard University Press 1999, p. 512.
8 Barbara Maria Stafford, “The Combinatorial Aesthetics of Neurobiology”, in 
Aesthetic Subjects, ed. Matthews&McWhirter, Minneapolis 2003.
9 Michael Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity, London 1991.
10 Most recently in Martin Jay, Songs of Experience, Berkeley 2005.
(they did and they did not) is different I what Anderson call 
“print capitalism” and what Appadurai researches as “elec-
tronic capitalism”. With satellite dishes on every roof in im-
migrant communities, emotional ties are kept up on a daily 
basis. Offense and outrage are easily communicated. Rush-
die and Danish cartoons get to audiences they don’t seek
Now, the Western world is supposedly dis-enchanted, 
ent-zaubert. The prevailing imagination is described as 
ironic.11 “Westerners” are supposedly immersed in fictional 
worlds but never lost. But: our own experience and proper 
scientific research show as that “make-believe”, “as if ” games 
are mastered by human infants all over the world very early, 
before they walk and talk.12 The constant re-negotiation of 
between the “real” and the “imaginary” goes on and on all 
over the world. Globalization is a factor because of constant 
interferences. 
A brave new world, if we are lucky. 
11 An entertaining view developed by Michael Saler, “Modernity, Disenchantment 
and the Ironic Imagination”, “Philosophy&Literature” 28.1 (2004) Baltimore.
12 A willingness to deal with evidence of all kinds is shown by the contributors of 
the volume Imagination,Philosophy, and the Arts, ed. Matthew Kieran&Dominic 
McIver Lopes, London 2003.
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LE PERFORMEUR DEVANT SA MORT
(SI FUNESTES DéSIRS…)
Avant-propos
Aujourd’hui, qui est la fête du drame hongrois1, je vou-
drais parler devant vous sur deux figures emblématiques du 
théâtre hongrois. J’ai l’intention de parler sur le théâtre réel 
(réalisé) de Péter Halász et sur le théâtre rêvé (imaginaire) 
d’András Jeles.
Quelqu’un du dehors : András Jeles
Le théâtre d‘András Jeles n’est pas un théâtre d’un homme 
de théâtre. Jeles veut faire du théâtre, mais il ne veut pas être 
un homme de théâtre. Comme ses grands précurseurs  –An-
tonin Artaud, Piero Pasolini- il est contre les conventions. 
Ils sont tous arrivés du dehors. Ils protestent que la matière 
théâtrale soit l’œuvre écrit, le drame. Néanmoins, András 
Jeles est un homme littéraire. Il a publié un scénario (Joseph 
et ses frères2), un drame (Passion3), un volume d’aphorismes 
(Bataillon disciplinaire4) et les essais (Création, cauchemar5). Et 
surtout, comme son ami et collègue András Forgách avoue : 
« Il travaille sur un roman de Jésus, depuis je le connais »6. On 
peut constater que dans son théâtre, comme dans sa person-
nalité, il y a quelque chose d’énigmatique. Son théâtre est une 
rareté, ses choix personnels sont toutes les fois les origines des 
événements dramatiques.
Je voudrais présenter son idée sur le théâtre en citant sa Let-tre à propos d’une « laboratoire théâtrale »7, écrite en 1979, 
adressée aux jeunes cinéastes (aux membres de Studió Béla 
Balázs). Il commence cette lettre–manifestation par déclarer 
qu’il existe une exigence passionnée entre eux pour faire un 
« vrai » théâtre. Le théâtre-projet, ce qu’il propose, ne peut 
pas être un guide pour le « vrai » théâtre, mais peut être consi-
déré comme un chemin instructif (avec grand enseignement 
et résultat). Selon sa thèse, sur les planches actuelles, il y a un 
conflit, un combat entre le Drame et l’Acteur. Il n’y a plus de 
1 le 23 septembre (pour la mémoire de la première représentation de la Tragédie 
de l’Homme d’Imre Madàch en 1863) 
2 JELES András: József és testvérei in: Filmvilág
3 JELES András: Szenvedéstörténet in: Színház, 1997. márc.
4 JELES András: Büntető század, Budapest, Kijárat, 2000.
5 JELES András: Teremtés, lidércnyomás, Budapest, Kijárat, 2006.
6 FORGÁCH András: Valami Figaró-féle alak, Budapest, Neoprológus, 1993.
7 jeles András: „Levél a B.B.S. tagságának egy Színházi Laboratórium létrehozá-
sáról“ in: Másvilág, Budapest, Bölcsészindex, 1995.
place pour les recherches. Le mécanisme théâtral (ce qui fonc-
tionne d’une certaine manière) ne peut pas mettre en question 
son fonctionnement. À l’avis de Jeles, la parodie de la conven-
tion théâtrale pourrait être représenté par un spectacle dont les 
acteurs immobiles et muets resteraient sur les planches sans 
aucune expression, mais les spectateurs, au contraire, en riant 
ou sanglant,  imiteraient les acteurs. En bref, dans ce cas, le 
spectateur pourrait jouer comment l’acteur s’identifie avec son 
rôle (et ce spectacle pourrait être une comédie de l’imitation).
Vers la fin de cette lettre-manifestation, A. Jeles pose la 
question essentielle : « Comment continuer ? » Selon sa ré-
ponse, il faut « recommencer », pour qu’on puisse voir le vrai 
visage de notre époque au miroir du théâtre. Le laboratoire 
théâtral –contrairement toutes les méthodes - est en vérité 
une « expérience ». Tout au long de leur travail actuel, les artis-
tes, les créateurs posent à nouveau leurs propres interrogations 
(comme les questions premièrement posées) : « Qu’est-ce que 
c’est le texte ? l’acteur ? la parole ? le public ? le décor ? » etc.. 
En écrivant cette lettre A. Jeles a posé également ces questions 
fondamentales. Il a continué cette interrogation en pratique: 
pendant les années 80’ et 90’ il a travaillé beaucoup au domaine 
de théâtre (avec le group nommé „Monteverdi Cercle“).
»Kleist est en train de mourir…«
Pour illustrer son travail, je voudrais présenter en quel-
ques mots sa mis en scène de 1994, intitulé : Kleist est en train 
de mourir. Plus précisément, c’est un opéra de Lászlo Melis et 
András Jeles (sur la base des textes8 établis par András Forgách 
- qui sont les traductions des lettres de Kleist, des témoignages 
du double suicide du poète et d’Henriette Vogel, du procès-
verbal après la découverte des corps…).
La « devise » de ce spectacle pourrait être une lettre de 
Kleist, adressée à sa sœur, dont la formule finale est : « Fait à 
Stimming, à côté de Potsdam, au matin de ma mort » (le 21 
novembre 1811) ». 
Tout au long du spectacle, nous sommes témoins d’un 
seul moment dans son prolongement (on se demande : est-ce 
que ce moment peut durer jusqu’à l’éternité ?) À la place d’une 
histoire continue, on voit une série des états (dans leur dis-
continuité). Nous sommes témoins d’une enquête sans aucun 
8 FORGÁCH András: Kleist meghal, Újhold évkönyv, 1990. 1.sz. 211-233.
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résultat (on ne sait jamais le motif de l’acte suicidaire, on ne 
comprend pas ce désir, si funeste). Jusqu’au dernier moment 
des actes, l’action (le double-suicide) reste une énigme. 
Dans sa mise en scène, András Jeles a élaboré une esthé-
tique de « théâtre de marionnettes » (dont le fondateur était 
Heinrich von Kleist). Au cadre de cette représentation, le pla-
teau avait deux niveaux (pour les acteurs et pour les musiciens). 
Derrière les acteurs, il y avait un décor idyllique (baroque, qui 
représentait le „Paradis quitté“). Mais le plupart du plateau 
restait vide. Les acteurs étaient présents comme les poupées. 
Ils portèrent les costumes (comme les masques). Ils étaient 
presque immobiles (ils bougèrent comme les automates). Leurs 
récitations furent hésitantes, comme les bégaiements pénibles à 
entendre, contrairement aux arias et ensemble. C’était un spec-
tacle ambigu, dont en tous les moments il y avait une tonalité 
pathétique à côté des effets comiques. Jeles a joué (comme il 
jouait toujours) avec les contraires, les contrastes, les contra-
dictions. Chez lui, à côté du « pathos » il y a aliénation. Idylle, 
harmonie et climat désertique sont co-présents.Tout se passe 
dans un « no man’s land », dans un temps de l’intervalle entre le 
jour et la nuit ; c’est-à-dire, au matin de la mort)
 
La re-naissance du théâtre de Péter Halász
Quand András Jeles a commencé de faire de théâtre, 
Peter Halász avait déjà quitté la Hongrie. Il était le centre de la 
« subculture » hongroise : pendant les années 70, il a fondé le 
Studió Kassák, après il a fait un théâtre dans son appartement à 
la rue Dohány (un lieu de rencontre pour les artistes indépen-
dants, révolutionnaires). Comme A. Jeles a témoigné dans une 
lettre : « Il faut dire pour les lecteurs, qui ont peu d’informa-
tion sur ces temps anciens, il faut leur dire que ça exista, qu’il y 
eût un Lieu où les spectateurs allèrent pour se purifier. Où les 
acteurs ne jouèrent pas des tragédies, mais - comme les Chré-
tiens disaient - ils furent eux-mêmes la tragédie… Le théâtre 
que vous fûtes, c’était tellement brûlant que ma jeunesse. »9
Halász était émigré avec son group en 1976 vers l’Europe 
de l’Ouest, après ils sont parti ensemble pour les Etats-Unis, 
où ils ont fondé le Squat et le Love Theater. Au début des 
années 90’ ils ont fait une tournée européenne, et c’était leur 
premier retour à la Hongrie. 
En 1991, A. Jeles a adressé une lettre publique à Peter 
Halász, intitulé Lettre pour le nouveau monde. Il a fait avertir son 
ami : « Prépare toi à ta renaissance ! »
La re-naissance du théâtre de Halász en Hongrie a com-
mencé avec une pièce qui a montré « la renaissance avant-
garde » ; avec un spectacle intitulé Piero della Francesca Cabaret 
dont le sujet était le conflit entre l’artiste avant-garde et son 
public, son époque (n’importe quelle époque). Ce cabaret ironi-
que et improvisateur était tout à fait différent que les spectacles 
très concrètes et stylisées, longuement répétés de Jeles. Jeles a 
écrit ses propres spectacles, dont il travaillait avec les archéty-
pes, pourtant il utilisait un cadre métaphorique (les citations : 
Goethe, Dostoïevski, Weöres, et la musique : Bach, Schu-
bert…). Pour évoquer les oppositions, disons que le théâtre 
de Halász était comique, celui de Jeles plutôt tragique. Comme 
Péter Nádas (écrivain hongrois, très célèbre) a remarqué après 
un spectacle de Jeles : « On pourra périr d’un tel spectacle. »10
9 JELES András: Levél az újvilágba (Halász Péternek), in: Teremtés, lidércnyomás, 
122-125.
10 NÁDAS Péter: Jeles színházi napja in: Töredékek Jeles András naplójából, 
Budapest, Nyolc és fél Bt, 1993. 
Une collaboration échouée
C’était une évidence, que le théâtre de Jeles était opposé 
au théâtre de Halász. Jeles ne croyait pas à la « profession 
théâtrale », aux acteurs innocents (il préférait travailler avec 
les civils, les prisonnières, les SDFs). Il faisait un théâtre rituel 
qui était en recherche de la sacralité profane. À sa part, Halász  
luttait aussi contre les stéréotypes de la profession théâtrale. 
Contrairement à Jeles, il faisait un théâtre quotidien (théâtre 
de journaux) qui « n’était pas plus de vie, mais déjà du théâ-
tre ».
Néanmoins, en 2000, ils ont fondé ensemble un nouveau 
théâtre, le Théâtre de la Cité (à la banlieue). Ce nouveau 
théâtre était une provocation, une révolte en isolation. La 
fondation de ce group était un Entrée et un Exodus de la culture 
subventionnée. C’ était l’extrémité institutionnalisée, car leur 
devise restait : « Il faut provoquer les scandales ». Comme 
Halász a déclaré dans plusieurs interviews : « Malgré le fait 
que nos productions sont très différentes dans leurs styles, ils 
sont très proches en mentalité, qui est à la base des produc-
tions. On va faire un théâtre scandaleusement bien, on va faire 
de révolte ! ». En vérité, ce théâtre avec son « Janus visage » 
a affronté avec beaucoup des problèmes. Les deux fondateurs 
ont travaillé avec des codes théâtraux différents, ils avaient les 
conceptions opposées. Finalement, Halász a réussi de faire un 
„théâtre de la blague“, Jeles a subi un échec de faire un „théâtre 
de la magie“. Dans un an, leur coopération s’est arrêtée, les 
deux laboratoires se sont désintégrés. 
Pourtant sans regarder ses conséquences tristes, exami-
nons plutôt leur intérêt commun. Tournons notre regard vers 
le théâtre et l’esthétique de marionnettes, pour s’en tirer un 
exemple éclairant et illustratif.
L’esthétique du théâtre de marionnettes 
On peut avoir un étonnement de voir l‘intéressement des 
deux artistes sur le théâtre de marionnettes. Ils prenaient un 
grand plaisir à la pantomime et „mimique“ de ces poupées car 
selon leurs opinions, non seulement un danseur (comme chez 
Kleist) mais un acteur (comme chez Craig11) peut s’en retirer 
maint enseignement.
Dans l’essai très célèbre de Kleist intitulé Sur le théâtre 
de marionnettes12, on entend un dialogue (« séducteur ») 
entre Monsieur C (danseur à l’opéra) et le Narrateur. Je cite le 
Narrateur : « Il me demanda si je n’avais pas, à la vérité, trouvé 
beaucoup de grâce à certains mouvements de ces poupées, 
lorsqu’elles dansent…  Tout mouvement, disait-il, a son centre 
de gravité ; il suffisait de maîtriser ce point à l’intérieur de la 
figure…  et chaque fois que le centre de gravité décrivait une 
ligne droite, les membres, eux, évoluaient déjà selon des cour-
bes ».. Cette ligne donc, qui décrire le centre de gravité est 
« fort simple » et, sous un autre aspect, « très mystérieux ». 
Car elle n’est finalement rien d’autre que « le chemin décrit 
par l’âme du danseur ». Notre question se pose ici: Comment 
connaître cet itinéraire ? Comment le maîtriser ?
L’essai met en question le rôle du machiniste, c’est-à-
dire, celui du metteur en scène moderne. Pour découvrir ce 
chemin, le machiniste devrait se placer au centre de gravité 
de la marionnette, ce qui revient à dire : en dansant. Peter 
11 Edward Gordon CRAIG: On the art of the theatre, London, William Heine-
mann, 1911.
12 Heinrich von KLEIST: Sur le théâtre de marionnettes, trad. Jean-Claude Schnei-
der, Paris, Séquences, 1991.
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Halász a accepté ce conseil. Dans son théâtre, il était toujours 
l’acteur principal. Dans cette perspective, il faut que le metteur 
en scène expérimente cette danse mécanique et magique. Le 
champ de ce mouvement des poupées est certes limité, mais 
ceux qu’ils sont en mesure d’exécuter, ils les accomplissent 
avec un calme, une aisance et une grâce qui plongent dans 
l’étonnement les esprits attentifs. On y voit une harmonie, 
mobilité, légèreté à un degré supérieur. Mais ajoutons, qu’en 
ce point, c’est impossible à l’homme d’attendre la perfection 
du mannequin. Comme Kleist remarque, seul un dieu, en ce 
domaine, pourrait se mesurer à la matière. Cette grâce n’existe 
que pour les marionnettes et pour Dieu. Les hommes (après 
avoir goûté à l’Arbre de la Connaissance) ont provoqué les 
désordres, les dissonances inévitables : ils ont perdu la grâce.
Le texte de Kleist peut être considéré comme un texte 
parfait, une écriture gracieuse, sur la perdre de grâce. Le Narra-
teur dit : « J’affirmai alors bien connaître les désordres provo-
qués dans la grâce naturelle de l’homme par la conscience ». 
Dans ce texte, la grâce consiste dans la parallèle entre un ours 
dangereux et un beau jeune homme, qui est presque divin. 
Comme conclusion, le Narrateur ajoute : « Nous voyons 
que dans le monde organique, lorsque la réflexion s’affaiblit, 
s’obscurcit, la grâce y gagne ». La grâce : c’est la perfection 
inconsciente, c’est l’absence de la conscience. C’est un état 
impossible à retrouver. « L’expression biblique Le Chute est la 
paraphrase du fait que nous avons détruit l’Eden et la maison 
natale, nous sommes les vagabondes dans un monde étranger, 
et nous bégayons car nous avons oublié notre langue. »13 
- écrivait A. Jeles dans son livre d’aphorismes. (Bataillon dis-
ciplinaire). On peut remarquer qu‘au début des années 2000, 
Jeles a voulu continuer ses recherches sur l’esthétique de ma-
rionnettes (après l’expérience de Kleist est en train de mourir). 
Il a projeté de faire un spectacle sur la base de la musique de 
Schubert (Voyage d’hiver). Dans cette intention, il a adressé 
une lettre aux acteurs dont il avait présenté ses idées sur son 
propre théâtre de marionnettes. Je voudrais re-présenter cette 
lettre-manifestation d’un projet inachevé.
Lettre aux acteurs de »Voyage d’Hiver«14
Selon ce dessin, les acteurs sont présents à la scène comme 
poupées, car l’acteur comme poupée est une créature magnifi-
que qui a des aptitudes magiques. Pour que ce soit possible, il 
faut que l’acteur assimile une poupée. Jeles nomme cet „acte“ 
par le terme l’appropriation. L’appropriation est un processus qui 
demande beaucoup de patience, de l’attention et de temps. C’est 
une observation infaillible, une reconstruction stricte.
 Après l’appropriation, l’acteur vit la simplicité, l’intem-
poralité et l’intensité des poupées. Il faut qu’il montre et garde 
une expression (l’expression du visage de la poupée choisie 
par lui) qui est sure et unique (mais qui est indéfinissable). 
Pour l’acteur, il n’existe que cet unique visage, que ce seul – 
mais éternel - sentiment dans le visage. Cette expression éter-
nelle, vitale ne disparaît qu’avec la disparition physique (elle 
s’est réduite en cendres). Dans cette intensité existe le pouvoir 
théâtral des poupées, des masques.
« L’effet du masque »  consiste dans le fait que -pendant 
tout est en vie autour de lui- l‘acteur réagit avec un seul visage 
13 JELES András: Büntető század, 15.
14 JELES András: Levél a „Téli utazás“ című produkció színészeihez, in: Teremtés, 
lidércnyomás, 141-145. 
(personnage). Ce qui donne l’atmosphère des poupées, des 
masques, des statues archaïques : « Ils sont magnifiques, parce 
qu’ils sont inexpressifs ! » . Jeles ajoute que les hommes reli-
gieux peuvent connaître cette situation. Quand ils regardent 
leurs idoles avec tension, tristesse, passion … les statues ré-
pondent avec l’expression convenable (sur le visage inchangé, 
immobile, mort).
Pour reprendre le texte, les poupées pourraient être nos 
compagnons simples et captivants tout au long du Voyage 
d‘hiver. En quoi consiste-t-il ce voyage ? En citant Kleist : « Il 
nous faut entreprendre un voyage autour du monde et voir 
si peut-être il n’est pas, par derrière, quelque part, ouvert à 
nouveau»15. Les poupées pourraient être notre guide, car ils 
sont les êtres médiateurs (comme les démons ou les anges), ils 
sont les passages entre la vie et la mort, le réel et l’imaginaire.
L’acteur-poupée exerce la limitation de soi (qui lui donne la plus forte expression). Selon ce projet de travail, 
pendant la représentation, il y aura peine de mouvement et de 
parole. Les mouvements et les paroles, tous ces événements 
théâtraux sont comme les catastrophes. Catastrophes, dont les 
poupées sont les facteurs et les victimes. Les poupées sont très 
maladroites, très naïves. Elles sont inexpérimentées au monde 
humain. Leur naïveté est presque divine. Ils existent avec une 
présence étrange. Leur étrangeté consiste dans l’inconvenance 
cohérente de l’expression, ce qui donne, à la fin, leur présence 
dramatique.
L’ambition de Jeles était de montrer que -pendant la 
répétition-  l’acteur-poupée pouvait naître. Plus précisément, 
comme dans la Genèse, quelqu’un va naître du rien. Le théâtre 
d’András Jeles, qui veut travailler constamment au domaine 
de la mort, est à la recherche de la création. Néanmoins, il 
avoue que : « Pour l’homme, créer n’est pas possible » - mais 
il ajoute : « Pourtant, on essaie –c’est l’art- étant en désaccord 
avec soi-même, avec horreur, avec angoisse, car nous craignons 
la liberté imprévisible, chaotique. En vérité, pour nous, toutes 
les créations sont les cauchemars»16.
À nos regrets, le spectacle de Voyage d’hiver n’était pas 
venu comme un événement théâtral. Après cet échec, jusqu’à 
nos jours, Jeles continue ses recherches au domaine de cinéma. 
Son théâtre imaginaire reste encore un rêve. 
La dernière performance de Halász
Pour parler sur Halász, il était (c’est absurde et incroya-
ble, mais il faut que je parle en passé) un „réelisateur“17.. 
Quelqu’un, qui a mis en vie - par ses mises en scènes- le réel. 
Pour finir, je voudrais évoquer sa dernière performance.
Le 6 février 2006, un catafalque était posé au foyer du 
Musée de l’Art Contemporain. Halász eut occupé sa place dans 
son cercueil, bien avant sa dernière séance. Les invitées pour 
cette cérémonie profane furent ses amis (qu’ils prononcèrent 
les éloges funèbres). On peut remarquer, entre parenthèse, que 
de cette cérémonie d’adieu András Jeles resta absent. 
Après cet événement, Péter Halász est quitté son pays na-
tal pour jamais. Cette dernière performance signifia pour lui la 
« pre-présentation » réel de cette scène unique et imaginaire 
– en vérité, ça fut la répétition générale de sa mort.
15 kleist Ibid. 27.
16 Préface pour le Teremtés, lidércnyomás 
17 FORGÁCH András: A travesztia virágkora, Alföld, 2001, 2.sz. 
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T he claim around which this paper is articulated is the view that of all the geographical cultures of the world, the Mediterranean has given form to a way of living and celebrating which has created similar qualities in the architecture 
of its many different racial, social and religious communities. 
Notwithstanding the great variety of architectural produc-
tion over millenia, and despite the regional differences in 
climate and local materials, this paper presents an interpreta-
tion of the architecture that is found around the Mediter-
ranean as a symbiosis of certain aesthetic qualities. Although 
this may be seen as a generalization, and although counter 
arguments can be made pointing to the existence of similar 
qualities in other architectures, I believe that the Mediterra-
nean presents a unique case and that one could clearly point 
to a continuity between cultures and histories. One could 
furthermore often assess that political and historic ruptures 
have also contributed to the awareness of a regional heritage 
as in the case of the Ottomans who succeeded the Byzantine.
The Mediterranean has been one of the most original and fertile sources of human culture and history, and is still one 
of the richest sources of cultural memory, in terms of its archeo-
logical, agricultural and artistic heritage. The geography with the 
great contrasts of rocky mountains, highland and the turquoise 
coasts and depths, the Mediterranean as the fluid melting pot of 
many diverse civilizations and races, the Mediterranean as the 
birthplace of cities of culture in many diverse forms, the birth-
place of many species of flora and fauna; the Mediterranean 
as the birthplace of the modern State. All these diversities and 
riches are reflected in Mediterranean architecture. 
The Mediterranean, before and beyond anything else, is a culture, and should be seen foremost as a special 
Habitat. Every bit of nature has contributed in detail to the 
development of the Mediterranean as culture and has also 
evolved a somewhat common human type in spite of all the 
diversity it possesses. The poetics of the Mediterranean is 
before anything else, due to the quality of its many peoples 
who have principally approached life with poetry and joy, in 
spite of the deep awareness of the tragic, as Nietzsche has to 
beautifully expressed.1
Millions of years ago, the great sea Tethys extended between the west Indies and the Pacific. What we 
know of the Mediterranean today, erupted from the depths of 
the Tethys to form a kind of necklace around what remained 
to be the Mediterranean Sea: The Caucauses, the Atlas, the 
Balkans, the Alps, Apennines, and the Taurus. As Braudel de-
scribes, the traces of this process have remained all around, 
as a rich heritage in geology: the beautiful limestone queries, 
the marbles of Italy, the coraline limestones of Malta, the 
Istrian stones of Venice and the coastal rock formations had 
all been heaved up from the depths of the sea.2 
 
Braudel begins his book by declaring that commonly the Mediterranean is known as the land of La Dolce Vita, 
but that for all its beauty it is a land of ongoing fight for 
survival and ongoing struggle amongst the elements and a 
tortured geology. From the Red Sea to the Atlantic the faults 
are everywhere, creating riches as well as disasters with the 
floods, vulcanos and the earthquakes. The typical Mediter-
ranean landscape is that of mountains piled one on top of 
another, and of the sea, which are both sources of freedom 
and of confinement. In talking about this geographic dichot-
omy Braudel relates it to ways of life and culture. “Up in the 
high country, only the most primitive ways of life could hold 
and somehow survive. The Mediterranean plains, for lack of 
space are mostly confined to a few … pockets of arable land. 
…Worse still the plains, were often invaded by floodwaters 
and had to be reclaimed from inhospitable marshland.”3
According to Braudel these “lowlands which called for land improvement could be occupied by hierarchical 
societies … These were the opposite of the high perched hill 
settlements, poor but free. People who lived on the plains 
felt themselves to be superior, but their cities … were always 
under the threat of attack.” ... “Dramatic descents from the 
mountains took place in every period and in every region of 
the sea. Mountain people – eaters of acorns and chestnuts, 
hunters of wild beasts, traders in furs, hides or young live-
stock, always ready to strike camp and move on—formed a 
perpetual contrast to the lowlanders who remained bound 
to the soil, some as masters some as slaves, but all part of a 
society based on working the land, a society with armies, 
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cities and seagoing ships. The plains aimed for progress, the 
hills for survival.”4
In describing the struggle between the coast, the sea plains and the desert, which neighbor each other Braudel again 
draws attention to the strife between the nomad and the sed-
entary: “Every successful civilization on the mediterranean 
coast was obliged to define its stance towards the mountain 
dweller and the nomad, whether exploiting them, fighting 
them off, reaching some compromise with one or other …”5
This dynamics and strife still continues today, albeit in different forms. The nomad may no longer be the one 
coming from the mountains but those who migrate from 
the poorer regions, from the south to the north. Fernand 
Braudel’s descriptions make explicit to what extent the ar-
chitecture, or the forms of habitat imagined and constructed 
by the Mediterranean peoples, take their many forms, 
whether vernacular, classical or modern, from the effort to 
harmonize with its topography, its materials and its climate. 
Mediterranean architecture, in its varied examples from the 
early Greek temples which house a sacred representation 
and take their form according to the play of light on color 
and material, and according to their visibility from the land, 
or in the examples of Hadrian’s fantastic creations of pools 
and arcades and bridges and rooms for solitude and reflec-
tion, or undergound dormitories and passages for slaves in 
Tivoli, or Corbusier’s Villa Savoy, attests to forms of adapta-
tion and forms of admiration for the land and the landscape. 
The inner court, the balcony, the veranda, the portico, the 
colonnated arcade, the pool, the second storey that juts out 
to the street (the cantilever), the separation of the private 
and the public, the garden kiosk, the well, the airy spacious 
furnishing that is part of the architecture, the kitchen, the 
bath are still in use whether directly in the vernacular or 
as inspiration to modern examples; they can be traced all 
the way back to the descriptions in Homer’s Odyssey, or to 
archeological examples. 
 
The simplicity of architectural forms are enriched by their relation to the land, and to the light. Geometric 
forms take on light and shade and become beautiful in their 
relationship to the exterior. This results in a kind of monu-
mentality even in the most modest forms.
Forest and mountain architecture are conceived in dif-
ferent colors than on the coast. Added to this is the special 
feeling for materials which come directly from the land and 
which absorb its light. Marble, stone, wood, tile or plaster 
reveal their qualities so much more intensely in the Medi-
terranean light which is always moving with the play of the 
varied flora like the olive tree, the yellow pine, the cyprus, 
bending in the many breezes.
Whatever the architecture, vernacular, sacred or monu-mental, it cannot be seen without its surrounding 
flora that create myriad shades and shadows. But language 
cannot cover one very important quality that surrounds 
Mediterranean architecture: the million different aromas 
and smells that come with the breeze from the sea, from the 
bitter sweet fig leaf, from the tomato under the sun, from the 
geranium, the jasmin, the lemony magnolia, the pine, etc. 
We can also talk about some continuing features that are typical. Centrality, in the form of the inside 
court, covered or open, the central hall to which all the 
rooms open, or the dome; the three dimensionality in the 
vertical as a building adapts itself to the topography; this cre-
ates different eye levels and relationships where the staircase 
becomes the important actor; the separation between pri-
vate and public is a basic aspect of the social structure that is 
reflected in spaces; different layers of opening to the exterior, 
such as the iron grill, the glass, the sunshades; the garden 
pavillion, the articulation of the wall just to receive the light. 
In viewing the Mediterranean as Habitat, one has to under-stand how seemingly different cultures like the Moslem or the 
Christian, have synthesized under the intense and impressive 
qualities of existence in the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean 
Habitat as an environment shows general signs whether it be-
longs to Islam, Jentile or Jew. In the Book on the Mediterranean, 
Braudel and his colleague Maurice Aymard, talk about the house 
as the space for women and their production, and the public 
space, whether it is the town square or piazza, or the Sug of the 
Medina (bazaar of the Islamic city) as the stage for men. The 
house is not just a shelter but rather a space that separates the 
family from the rest of the society and creates a private realm 
which is the honor of the male. The public space, the piazza or 
the sug, is not so much a place for work, but for a kind of idle-
ness where men show off their virility, and take part in the social 
interaction. Idleness, in this geography which requires constant 
effort for survival, is the norm of the everyday theatre, especially 
for men. Maynard describes the Mediterranean house as a 
complex space, All the directions and the walls, are given differ-
ent symbolic names, such as ‘plastered by the trowel of the lord 
of the house’, or’painted white with the hand of the wife’. The 
hearth of the house is sacred and cannot be crossed except with 
special care. Just across from the door is placed the loom. As we 
know, each region in Anatolia has its own special carpet or rug, 
in each house the woman is constantly veaving for clothes, sacks, 
wall and floor rugs. This portion across from the door, where the 
visitors are accepted, is the area which harmonizes the qualities 
of light and dark, night and day, male and female.6
Another important quality of Mediterranean Habitat is that in history we always have seen that even a thousand 
people, a small community was enough to form a city. This 
is because of the diversification of human talents and aspira-
tions which have evolved with the constant human struggle 
against the forces of nature. In the Mediterranean, the farm 
and the village are dependent on the town to sell their goods, 
and for the peasant to find work in the winter months. What 
has historically made the special civilization of the Mediter-
ranean, from the towns of the Magrib, to those of Mozarabic 
Spain and Andalusia, to Southern France and Italy, to the 
Adriatic coast and Greece and Anatolia, is the rich diversity 
and number of cities, all with their special identities and 
productions and all in many social and architectural ways 
somewhat similar. The Mediterranean is basically a city cul-
ture even for the dead, since distant history.7
Vernacular architecture of the Mediterranean, whether on mountain or plain, will show similar spatial qualities 
such as elevated structure from the ground, a centralized 
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lobby to which all rooms open, different possibilities of 
opening to the exterior through layers of doors and windows 
(transparent, grilled, semi-transparent, closed), insulated 
walls, bath and kitchen within the exterior court, etc. These 
will vary slightly according to local climate and materials. 
On high terrain, stone will be the basic material, in arid 
parts, the mud brick and on forrested areas, wood would be 
the basic construction material. The structures may change 
accordingly. On the other hand, with monumental or pres-
tige architecture the similarities in form are more constant 
between cultures and regions. Stone is generally the chosen 
material for monumental, religious buildings. While wood 
may be chosen for palatial structures, in various cultures, the 
way these materials are articulated scarcely differ. As remark-
able examples, we can look at similarities between Venetian 
water palaces, and the wooden villas around the Bosphorous 
in Istanbul, all relatively from similar periods, and even the 
first palace built by Mehmet Conqueror in the 15th century 
in Istanbul. The colonnated balconies, the articulation of the 
frontal elevations, the rows of windows or doors creating a 
rhythmic patterning, seem to come from a similar sensibility. 
One of the important characteristics of monumental Mediterranean architecture is the effect of historic 
continuity on the architectural forms. From the Greek and 
the Etruscan to the Roman and the Hittite and later the Byz-
antine and Arabic and Ottoman, the handing over of lands 
from one culture to another has created a kind of historical 
and political consciousness which has also created a conti-
nuity in the architecture. One could cite endless examples. 
Let me focus on the well known examples of the Pantheon, 
the Hagia Sophia, the Dome of the Rock (which is the first 
great Islamic monument), the Seljukid Karatay Madrasa 
in Konya and the Mosque of Suleiman the Magnificent in 
Istanbul. The structural and plan similarities between the 
Hagia Sophia built in 537 and the mosque of Suleiman built 
in 1557 go beyond the practicalities of engineering. When 
Suleiman became accepted as the greatest of all monarchs, 
after the treaty made with Charles V, his claim to sovereig-
nity over both the Christian and the Moslem, was expressed 
in the symbolic similarity to Justinian’s church which was 
inspired by the temple of Solomon. Suleiman also claimed 
the ancestry of Solomon through his name. The plan which 
is conditioned by the supporting half domes on the north 
south axis is very similar to that of the Hagia Sophia, albeit 
that the ambience of the interior and the size of the buildings 
greatly differ.8 In almost all of these structures, the centrality 
of the main hall around which usually a colonnated space 
is enveloped, the emphasis put on the dome, the quality of 
light, especialy in the Seljukid and Ottoman examples, the 
priority given to the structural qualities of the buildings in 
conveying the aesthetic ambience, have great similarities. 
They are obviously generically related, as are the people who 
have built them. Besides, from the exterior, all these build-
ings have a sculptural quality. They are composite structures 
which, viewed from a distance are perceived as possible to 
grasp in the palm of a hand.9 Then, there are other conti-
nuities which are more conscious, as with the example of 
the Baroque architect Borromini, as he consciously studied 
Hadrian’s buildings in Tivoli and applied many specific forms 
to his religious buildings. The campanile structures in S. 
Agnese and in S. Andrea della Fratte in Rome are directly 
taken from Hadrian examples. One can also mention how 
both Byzantine and Ottoman architects accorded a special 
attention to the quality of light, although towards different 
goals. Notwithstanding, the oculus remained an important 
element that would bring light centrally, all the way from the 
Roman to the Seljukid, Ottoman, Renaissance and Baroque 
examples. As the Byzantine churches searched for a mystical 
and enigmatic quality of light that was enhanced by artifi-
cial lights and reflections from the mosaics, the Ottomans 
favored direct penetration of light through many windows. 
Some of these windows were of colored glass, creating a 
kaleidoscopic effect on the walls, similar to those of Gothic 
structures. The blue tiles that were used on some of the Otto-
man mosque interiors also created reflections, along with the 
glass faunas of oil lamps. Certainly, one of the most fascinat-
ing aesthetic qualities of the Mediterranean is the quality of 
light which, as the impressionists so well represented, is a 
light full of color. The great Selimiye Mosque, built by Sinan 
in Edirne takes notice of this in a wonderful manner.10 In the 
evenings, the pink light from the west bades the building in 
pink tones and creates a tapestry of rose in the outer court. 
This awareness and aesthetic use of light continues with the 
architecture of Le Corbusier as seen in his Savoy Villa and 
the Marseille apartment building and in the work of a more 
recent Swiss/Italian architect Mario Botta in his typically 
Mediterranean architecture. 
As a last point which would place the architecture within a specific context, one has to look at the approach to nature 
within the city. The inner courtyard, which may have stemmed 
from the early Greek or Roman colonnated house, is one of 
the most effective features of Mediterranean architecture, in 
that, not only does it effect the formation of the house, but it 
also effects the city. All Mediterranean cities are cities that are 
turned inwards and that have domesticated nature. Nature in 
the Mediterranean city is not an exterior but a core, interior 
element. If we take a bird’s eye view at Marseille, for example, 
or any Mediterranean city, we shall see very little green in the 
common areas. The city of the Magreb, likewise, such as Tunis, 
are labyrinthian cities, where circulation through the narrow 
streets sensitizes the body to light and shade, to sharp turns, 
to sound coming from interiors, or from the turn of the road 
ahead.11 On the other hand, nature becomes a privatized and 
domesticated element. The court that is surrounded by walls 
and that is often entered through the house becomes a sym-
bolic paradise, a private realm, a haven with water and green 
and bird song. It is the family’s most private realm which may 
be opened to guests at special times. In the Christian context 
this garden would even often house an altar to which offer-
ings and candles are placed. In central Anatolia this is where 
women often do their work, and often the kitchen is placed 
here. The pergola with the vine or jasmine is a typical element. 
In Andalusia, the inner walls are decorated with flower pots 
and in almost all examples the existence of a well guarantees 
water in many regions where the summers are dry. 
I t is impossible to encompass all the different aesthetic quali-ties and the thousands of examples of similar architecture 
from the Mediterranean. One point which we could conclude 
and summarize with is the great simplicity of Mediterranean 
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architecture which has always inspired a sense of monumen-
tality and luxury in making use of light, of color and of basic 
geometries that stand in contrast to nature, but in reality, that 
diffuse with it in a symbiotic relationship. Even when we see 
great ruptures or contrasts, a common use creates relationships 
amongst these. For example, the white wash in the vernacular 
architecture creates a unity; in some cities like Urbino in Italy, 
which has lived through different cultures over millennia, the 
exclusive use of brick relates every form to each other. When 
such conscious uses fail, it is the soft light again bringing differ-
ences close to each other. This aspect has been very succintly 
pointed to in the paintings of the French impressionists whose 
landscapes often included architectural elements. These paint-
ers were very aware of the common quality of Mediterranean 
architecture and how this shared quality was highlighted by 
the quality of light. Paintings of Utrillo and Cézanne could be 
referred to.
In this paper I have tried to show how the varieties and differencies throughout history and amongst cultures, in 
the Mediterranean, have, in essence, basic common aesthetic 
features that originate from the peoples’ approach to life and 
their efforts to live in harmony with nature. Also, the historical 
and political continuities and ruptures have likewise created 
a conscious effort in the architect’s approaches to lay claim to 
historic examples. Although both very rich in their respective 
examples, the vernacular and the monumental and palatial 
architectures also have similarities in their general simplicity. 
I have also tried to show how, in whatever culture or urban 
context, the approach to nature has been rather similar and 
certain examples have been favored commonly amongst 
different cultures and in different historic times. The inner 
courtyard is a common element all the way from Magrip to 
Spain to central Anatolia. This feature has created, at least till 
the era of Modernism, a certain urban ambience where nature 
is domesticated and where the city is a dry, stone or brick 
conglomeration. Thus we see that both in the vernacular, in the 
more monumental architecture and in the urban context, ‘the 
Mediterranean’ means a common approach to life which has 
created its own common forms, even if there may exist many 
exceptions to the rule. 
(endNotes)
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W e would like to put the contents of this paper in a kind of cultural history in which we have proposed the substitu-tion of the concepts of rupture and return, originality and appropriation, 
authorship, deconstruction and the death of the author, for 
the concepts of internationalism, nationalism, diaspora, 
multiculturality, globalism, new internationalism, locality 
and interculturality, which seem to respond to a common 
denominator: their proximity to the word culture beyond 
that of art and their commitment to the question of identity 
beyond language. 
We think that Visual Culture, with its interdisciplinary 
vocation, with its interest in anthropology, sociology and 
culture (here the pictorial turn goes beside the cultural turn1), 
and with its renewed concept of “social visuality” (which has 
few to do with the sociological, Marxist component belong-
ing to Cultural Studies), is that which at the present time 
contributes in a more radical manner to opening the disci-
plinary structure of the humanities and which challenges the 
field of art history and its canon linked to “Western culture” 
and its universality.2 
What is more, we believe this cultural visuality3 un-
derstood as a “third phase” in between Visual Studies and 
Cultural Studies is the most suitable with our global space:4 
a space metaphorically “without borders” that can seem like 
the consolidation of the utopic agenda of the “global vil-
lage” that Marshall McLuhan put forth in the seventies.5 A 
space in which new concepts are definitively imposed. For 
example, the concepts of identity and difference that suppose 
a tenser relationship between the nation-state and the new 
1 Frederic Jameson, The Cultural Turn. Selected Writings on the Postmodern 1983-
1998, London and New York, Verso, 2000. 
2 Cherry Beborah, “Art History Visual Culture”, in Art History, vol. 27, 4, Sept-
ember 2004, pp. 479-493 .
3 Mieke Bal, “Visual essentialism and the object of visual culture”, in Journal of 
Visual Culture, vol. 2, 1, April 2003, pp. 5-33.
4 Susan Buck-Morss, “Images in the Mind: Visual Studies and Global Imagina-
tion”, in ArtUS, 5-6, January-February 2005 special issue. 
5 Our understanding of globalisation is quite different from Marshall McLuhan´s 
1960s notion of the “global village”, in which globalisation produced a new 
colonising consciousness inconmensurable with the consciousness of other 
technologies. See Ian McLean, “On the Edge of Change? Art, Globalisation 
and Cultural Difference”, in Third Text, vol. 18, 3, 2004, p. 293. 
post-national states: “What’s emerging, asserts Arjun Ap-
padurai (and this will connect to a very important part of our 
discourse, the search for locality), are powerful alternative 
forms of organization for the traffic of resources, images and 
ideas, forms that either actively challenge the nation-state or 
are antagonistic peaceful alternatives that constitute large-
scale political loyalties.”6 
Following Appadurai, we are now belonging to a post-
national world in which the appearance of a new ethnicity is 
imposed that’s capable of attracting people and groups that 
due to their spatial dispersion are much vaster than the eth-
nic groups studied by traditional anthropology. An ethnicity 
that, far from being linked with the “primordialist” practices 
of the nation-state, is transnational and lays claim to a new 
understanding of the relationship between history and social 
agency, the realms of affection and politics, the large-scale 
factors and the local ones. 
This is the world in which a growing number of artists 
work such as FrAntoni Muntadas, Francis Alÿs and Santiago 
Sierra. 
The artist Antoni Muntadas is perhaps the most significant artist within this concept of what’s global, which he has tackled in his work-in-progress On 
Translation (1996- ) of whom today we present one of his 
latest projects, the Spanish pavilion in the 2005 Venice Bien-
nial. In this case, the Pavilion, named On Translation, has 
become a “laboratory” where the different mechanisms that 
mediate among the Pavilion itself (place-nation), the Giar-
dini (physical, scenic and above all discursive place) and the 
Biennial (place-territory) interact from.7
In this complex process, the Giardini assume an essential 
role, metaphor of a microcity within the macrocity that is 
Venice (City Museum). The Giardini, according to Muntadas, 
have become obsolete as carriers of a false map of the world 
that situated some countries on the map but left others in 
oblivion. In any case, it’s well-known that since their creation 
in 1895 the Giardini followed the model of world’s fairs in 
6 Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large, Minneapolis, University of Minessota 
Press, 1996, p. 177.
7 Muntadas: On Translation: I Giardini, Spanish Pavilion, 51st Venice Biennale 
(exhibition catalogue), 2005. 
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which different countries came together and competed under 
the common denominator of what constituted “the world.” 
This is the very model that Muntadas seeks to combat. But 
more than the Giardino as a “place,” Muntadas’ true reflec-
tion revolves around the Spanish pavilion and its relationship 
with the concept of nation, or rather of post-nation, with the 
following reconsideration of the concepts of identity and 
difference: “The idea of the Pavilion as the representation 
of a country”—affirms Muntadas in an interview with Mark 
Wigley—is obsolete. The structure of the Giardini to receive 
art has been surpassed. The idea nonetheless persists because 
it works like a theme park and makes it easy for artists to 
structure their work and see, represent and identify things.”8
It follows that his first and most radical intervention 
is centered on the façade of the Pavilion, on which he has 
concealed the sign with the word SPAIN (and, implicitly, 
the idea of “nation”) with a large-scale piece from his series 
Warning: Perception Requires Participation). Inside, Muntadas 
converts the Pavilion’s big central space, a great hall measur-
ing 12 by 12 meters, into a transit zone, into a hybrid space 
close to what Marc Augé calls a non-place:9 a place that 
cannot be defined neither by its identity nor as relational 
or historic; a place, in short, that is anthropologic. For this 
“non-place” Muntadas has conceived objects, texts, images 
and furniture designed not only to be seen by spectators but 
also to be used by them. Which explains the presence of seats 
(encounters), of a stand (information), of screens (questions 
and rumors) and of light boxes (stand by) in an “environ-
ment” that so recalls a waiting area at an airport, a real estate 
office or the vestibule of an informative space. In this sense 
we would emphasize the inclusion of public phones with an 
anonymous voice relating the history of the Giardini in Eng-
lish and Italian in the manner of an audioguide, and of light 
boxes (stand by) of anonymous people absorbed in queues 
waiting around in different situations (businesses, immigra-
tion offices, leisure spots, museums, airports), reproducing a 
typical and topical image of so-called cultural tourism (“The 
protocol entails waiting to see something without knowing 
exactly what there is to see”), as well as 65 photos of the 
history of the pavilions as a “map” of a Biennial that was born 
with the claim of representing the world and which at pres-
ent day is globalized. 
And in a path parallel to the one suggested by some 
cultural theorists in the postcolonial field, what Muntadas 
is clearly doing is declaring the concept of nation as a repre-
sentation of “identity” as antiquated, and is instead thinking 
of a new ethnicity that would be transnational and would 
demand a new understanding of the relationship between 
history and social agency, the realms of feelings and politics, 
the large-scale factors and the local ones.10 
From the Belgian-born artist Francis Alÿs we present here his works that reflect everything a passer-by can see, hear, perceive and feel within a radius of ten blocks 
around his studio in Mexico City, in a relationship that repro-
duces on a micro-scale the relationship between the global and 
8 “A Conversation between Antoni Muntadas and Mark Wigley, New York”, in 
Muntadas: On Translation, op. cit., pp. 269-320. 
9 Marc Augé, Non-lieux. Introduction à une anthropologie de la surmodernité, París, 
Éditions de Seuil, 1992. 
10 Arjun Appadurai, op. cit., p. 197. 
the local in the geopolitical realms generated by the new map 
of globalization. Alÿs’s vocation to travel and live as a nomad, 
as well as his concentration in drawing, painting, documentary 
films, photography, Internet and other media in order to ex-
plore the social and economic conditions of the different cities 
he travels to or lives in, is well known. His “walks” have a lot 
to do with Baudelaire and Benjamin’s idea of the flaneur,11 but 
above all they recall the practices of the Parisian situationists 
known as the dérive and détournement. 
For Alÿs the streets and the homeless, street vendors, 
animals (especially dogs), pedestrians strolling in Zócalo 
square, an urbanistic place that’s also very significant politi-
cally, acquire an anthropological dimension that brings his 
attitude close to that of ethnographer, interested in local phe-
nomena, and even more in inframiniscule social phenomena. 
His visuality is, besides, always connected to the action 
of “walking” and with a list of activities related to “walking 
as hiding, telling, adding, crying, asking, keeping, speaking, 
drinking, snooping, etc”. This is the reason for the existence of 
a group of “collectors”, small constructions that incorporate 
magnets and wheels designed to be dragged across the floor 
and pick up metallic scraps, associating the artist with the role 
of the “draper” and the city as a place where collecting things is 
the fruit of a hidden economy. But what without a doubt best 
defines his work are his series of slides (Sleepers, 1997-2002 
and Street Vendors 1992-2002), and his video installations (If 
you are a true spectator, what you really do is wait for an accident 
to happen, Zocalo, 1996),12 in which the act of strolling trans-
forms into an act of language in which the narrative coexists 
with the visual in equal conditions to the point of turning the 
stroll itself into an almost linguistic “enunciation” space. 
Alÿs calls these incursions into urban space “infiltrated 
actions” and in all of them the idea of intercultural transfer-
ence is fundamental, where the “one” (Alÿs himself in his 
role as a foreigner, sometimes as a tourist and “foreign”) 
constantly gets confused with the “other,” with the native, 
the local.13 In this sense we think Alÿs moves in a purely 
paradoxical space: he engages his work in an impossible dia-
logue between the micro and macro, metaphor of the local 
and the global, or between the mythical and the banal.14 A 
paradox that the artist resolves from the double combination 
11 The flaneur is arguably the first great type of modernity , a figure summonded 
into existente with the rise of modern city appearing on the scene, as Walter 
Benjamin noted, at the moment of the early 19th Century when cities were 
becoming bussting metropoli. See James Trainor, “Walking the walk: the Artist 
as Flaneur”, in Border Crossings, vol. 22, 4, November 2003, pp. 82-92. 
12 In this work, Alys follows the movements of a plastic bottle pushed by the wind 
on the ground of the Zocalo Plaza in Mexico City. Although it appeared that its 
function as spectator would be entirely passive, soon enough, resides the action 
of the wind, passers-by began to pick the bottle from one place to another 
encouraged by the presence of the camera. In the end, nonetheless, the “acci-
dent” that the artist was waiting did happen: concentrating on the movements 
of the empty bottle, Alÿs walked into the street and was hit by a car. The video 
simbolically proves the impossibility of the artist to keep hi distance from the 
society around him, tghe end o fan era in which an unstated contract of no-
interference ruled. See Cuauhtémoc Medina, Francis Alÿs. Walking Distance from 
the Studio, Mexico, Antiguo Colegio de San Ildefonso, 2006, p. 48.
13 As James Trainor pointed out, while everybody else is rushing about this bu-
siness as usual –travelling to or from jobs and appointments, shopping, eating 
on the run, doing errands- Alÿs is engaged in an activity that has no outwardly 
discernable or useful aim”. See James Trainor, op. cit., p. 83. 
14 Alys, according to Deborah Parsons, would add new maps to the city, those of 
myth, memory, fantasy, and desire, reading the un-scrolling urban scene like a 
text, while reinscribing it as he passes. See Deborah Parsons, Streetwalking in the 
Metropolis: Women, the City and Modernity, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000. 
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“modesty-imagination”: and how parting from this combina-
tion he formalizes from the periphery a double attitude of 
opposition (aesthetical but also political) toward high val-
ues, toward the monumental and the demonstrative.15
S antiago Sierra’s work figures within a set of criti-cisms that throughout the 20th century have put into question the belief that art is an autonomous, sublime 
and disinterested activity. Beginning with his activity in the 
mid-nineties, Sierra’s work explains with modest clarity the 
repetitive mechanism of the exploitation of workers and the 
human submission to an economic destiny, denying the sup-
posed purity of art. 
In regards to Wall Enclosing a Space, his intervention in 
Spain’s Pavilion in the 59 Venice Biennial (2003), it clearly 
points us to the technologies of intermediation and restricted 
access represented by borders and limits, both the visible and 
invisible ones, that situate people in different geographic, 
social or ideological territories. As Sierra clearly affirms: 
“The biennial piece was already marked: it had to talk about 
the concept of nation, of the representation of Spain, about 
the significance of those pavilions because you can´t forget 
that the countries that participate in the Biennale are the 
most powerful ones in the world. I mean, there is no pavilion 
for Ethiopia. So the theme was already a given. People have 
received it very well, although the Spanish press took it as a 
provocation, when it was simply a reflection.”16 
 Wall Enclosing a Space seems to us as a work particularly 
symptomatic of our globalized world, a work that requires 
the anthropological and geopolitical knowledge of a cultural 
theorist for its interpretation and contextualization. Wall 
Enclosing a Space connects with Arjun Appadurai’s ideas of 
post-nation and his theory of the “social life of visible things.” 
In this sense it’s a simple reductio ad absurdum of the prin-
ciple of “national representation” that at the beginning of 
the 21st century still emerges as an organizing principle for a 
large number of artistic events around the world. In regard 
to the concept of nation, Sierra pointed out that a nation is 
actually nothing: “When astronauts went into space they 
did not see a line between France and Spain. France is not 
painted pink and Spain blue. They are political constructions, 
and what´s inside a construction? Whatever you want to 
put there. And in fact the pavilion wasn´t empty: there were 
leftovers there from previous shows. It was an act of respect 
to the history of the place. But the work was not the empty 
space but rather the situation.”17
Reflections 
In light of this exposition and upon having analyzed 
the artistic projects of Alÿs, Muntadas and Sierra we would 
15 “This idea of modesty is formalizing a position on the periphery of artistic and 
institucional practices that give preferente to works with high production values. 
Producing a project from scratch with reduced means, from what is available at 
hand, has become both an aesthetic and a political statement. It matches a desire 
to show things down, to reinvest the value of the leftover, in a nonmonumental, 
nondemostrative way. This trend can be defined as the production of meaning 
and content from the rear, from a position of a revitalizad underground, a 
position itself outside the mainstream of a normalizad network”. See Philippe 
Vergne, “Globalization from the Rear: “World you care to dance, Mr. Male-
vich?”, in How Latitudes Become Forms. Art in a Global Age (exhibition catalogue), 
Minneapolis, Walter Art Center, February-May 2003, p. 25. 
16 Teresa Margolles, “Santiago Sierra”, in Bomb, 86, Winter 2003-2004, p. 62.
17 Ibid, p. 63. 
like to conclude this reflection by offering a new cultural 
concept to clarify the current tendencies toward both glo-
balization and resistance to globalization. In this sense we 
think we have to get past the “multiculturalism” phase with 
all of its contradictions and paradoxes and embrace a differ-
ent political philosophy, “interculturalism,” that is to say, an 
interchange of cultures across national borders, with all that 
would suppose for a new appropriation of the “national” and 
its renewed critical contacts with the “international.”
The future would be in an “interculturalism”18 that sur-
passes the antiquated dichotomy of identity/difference and 
the dialogues between different national contexts through a 
greater strengthening of subjectivities, the particular realities 
of each human being beyond the concept of ethnicity, and a 
greater dialogue between the universal and the local, under-
standing by the local (synonym of room or place) more as 
relational and contextual than scaled or spatial. 
In this sense, in which we think that in a world basically 
dominated by the concepts of inter-culturality (culture), 
imagination (image, a new concept posed by Appadurai), 
inter-visuality (the visual), interaction (relationship, collabo-
ration) and interdisciplinarity. it’s imperative to rearticulate 
all of the knowledge (new and inherited) in function of these 
new societies of knowledge in which the visual, the historic, 
the technological and the cultural should cohabitate just like 
the title of one of the Néstor García Canclini’s latest books 
says: from their difference, from their inequality and from 
their disconnection.19 
18 Rustom Bharucha, “Interculturalism and its Discriminations. Shifting the Agen-
das of the Nacional, the Multicultural and the Global”, in Third Text, 46, Spring 
1999, pp. 3-23. See also Niko Papastergiadis, “The Limits of Cultural Trans-
lation”, in Gerardo Mosquera and Jean Fisher (eds.), Over Here. Internacional 
Perspectives on Art and Culture, New York, Cambridge, Mass., and London, The 
New Museum of Contemporary Art and The MIT Press, 2004, pp. 330-348. 
19 Néstor García Canclini, Diferentes, desiguales y desconectados. Mapas de la intercul-
turalidad, Barcelona, Gedisa, 2004. 
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LA CRéATIVITé  
DE LA PHILOSOPHIE
L’ art, est-il le seul domaine de la créativité? Ou bien, la philosophie, comme création des con-cepts, d’après la définition de Gilles Deleuze, est-elle également une forme de la créativité, une créativité discursive? Est-ce que la philoso-
phie n’est que la réflexion de la présence sensible de l’art et de 
sa production de la vérité, ou, au contraire, la philosophie est-
elle aussi ou même la seule capable de connaître directement la 
vérité? Depuis Platon, l’essence de la philosophie est transcen-
dante – la pensée de la pensée, et l’art n’est qu’une imitation 
de la vérité suprême. La critique du platonisme exige qu’on 
admette l’immanence de la vérité dans l’art, et le seul rôle de la 
philosophie par rapport à l’art serait l’élaboration de sa vérité. 
Est-ce que cela veut dire que la philosophie doit décidement 
renoncer à la recherche de sa propre vision de la vérité pour ne 
pas être accusée de retomber dans la transcendance?
Dans cette conférence, j’aimerais aborder la question de la créativité en exposant le rapport entre la philosophie et 
l’art, le statut de la présence artistique et de la représentation 
philosophique, en cherchant à mettre en évidence le déplace-
ment de la vérité, de la transcendance à l’immanence. Je 
m’appuyerai sur la philosophie française contemporaine, sur la 
pensée d’Alain Badiou et de Jean-Luc Nancy notamment. 
Comment approcher la philosophie  
à la créativité sensible de l’art?
Jean-Luc Nancy met au centre de sa philosophie phénomé-
nologique la question de la vérité et du sens. En réfléchissant 
sur l’art, il se concentre sur l’artiste et sur son rapport à sa 
propre créativité. Selon Nancy, le sens de l’art n’est que dans la 
recherche de sa propre vérité. La créativité de l’artiste est in-
trinsèque à son questionnement sur le sens de l’existence. Par 
conséquent, l’approche esthétique et l’approche ontologique 
s’entrelacent dans la philosophie de Nancy. Regardons tout 
d’abord l’aspect ontologique de sa réflexion sur la vérité et le 
sens.
Dans son oeuvre Une pensée finie (1990), Nancy procède de la philosophie de Martin Heidegger. Il lie la ques-
tion de la vérité et du sens à la finitude de l’être humain, c’est-
à-dire à l’être-pour-la mort. Comme la mort est une énigme, 
elle ne nous offre pas de réponse finale. Par conséquent, le 
sens de la vie ne peut provenir que du manque de sens, de 
la finitude, définie comme le manque du sens absolu. Il en 
dérive le sentiment de la liberté comme la possibilité de tous 
les rapports possibles envers le monde. Ainsi, la liberté est-
elle la vérité du sens. Selon Nancy, le sens de la vie n’est que 
le sens fini et non pas le sens final. L’existence est à soi-même 
sa propre essence. 
Dans l’oeuvre Le sens du monde (1993), Nancy renforce encore sa pensée ontologique, appuyée sur celle de 
Martin Heidegger, selon laquelle le monde et le sens sont liés 
réciproquement : le monde est structuré comme le sens, et le 
sens est structuré comme le monde. Tout commence par la 
naissance de l’existant où il faut souligner la différence entre 
la notion du sens et celle de la signifiance, car le sens précède 
toute signifiance, articulée surtout à travers le langage. Le 
monde a donc du sens avant qu’on lui donne n’importe quelle 
signification linguistique. Il suffit que le monde existe pour 
qu’il soit sensé ; il s’en suit, encore une fois, que l’existence a 
du sens en soi-même. Par conséquent, nulle interprétation ne 
peut usurper le sens du monde.
En explorant la tradition phénoménologique proprement française, probablement celle de Merleau-Ponty, et à la 
différence de Heidegger, Nancy fait ressortir le toucher com-
me le sens principal par lequel l’existant commence à chercher 
le sens du monde. C’est qu’en arrivant au monde, l’existant 
touche soi-même et l’autre, et vice-versa. La naissance signifie 
donc le commencement par lequel on se touche avec le monde 
réciproquement. C’est du toucher que provient le sens de la 
vie, depuis la naissance jusqu’à la mort. 
Le toucher est ainsi une source inépuisable de la pensée ontologique de Nancy, et esthétique aussi. Il essaie 
d’accentuer par l’esthétique, d’une manière la plus expres-
sive, l’essance sensible de l’existant: l’homme crée son propre 
sens et le sens du monde à travers sa sensibilité. Nancy lie 
le toucher à l’émotion esthétique, au plaisir et au déplaisir 
esthétique. En outre, la notion de l’esthétique prend sa 
source dans l’aisthesis, c’est à dire dans la sensibilité. C’est 
précisement à travers l’esthétique, par la réflexion de la créa-
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tivité artistique que Nancy tient à approcher la philosophie 
à l’immédiateté de l’expérience existentielle. La philosophie 
ne peut pas être si immédiate que l’art puisque la réflexion 
est l’essence de la pensée. Nonobstant, la philosophie n’a de 
sens qu’en réfléchissant l’immédiateté d’une telle expérience 
existentielle et sensible. 
Dans Le sens du monde, Nancy définit l’art contemporain comme l’art du fragment. Du point de vue ontologique, 
tout d’abord, il propose de remplacer le monde « présent-
able », ou totalisé de sens imposé métaphysiquement ou 
idéologiquement, par une fragmentation qui s’ouvre à 
l’événement d’être ou à l’existence. Comment penser l’art dans 
un monde où la fragmentation serait la présentation la plus 
pertinente de l’être? Est-il encore l’art ? En quel sens, l’art ? 
Est-il nécessaire à la pensée du sens du monde ? 
Au sens le plus large, le fragment est le plaisir ou la douleur que l’existant sent à travers son existance. Au sens plus 
étroit, voici la définition de l’art de Nancy : «L’art est frag-
ment parce qu’il touche au plaisir : il fait plaisir, il est fait de 
ça et pour ça, pour ce plaisir grâce auquel il touche – et ce 
toucher est son essence. »1 C’est toujours d’une façon unique 
que l’art touche l’existant. Il s’en suit que la vérité artistique est 
unique, au sens d’un événement. L’art ne se rapporte donc pas 
à la vérité comme la philosophie l’aurait voulu : dans un sens 
final et établi. 
La philosophie n’a pas le droit de soumettre l’art à ses pro-pres aspirations : celui-ci « a fini d’être art religieux ou 
philosophique, tout comme d’être art (théologico-)politique. 
Du même coup, l’art est ouvert à cette fragmentation de sens 
que l’existence est. Il y fut toujours ouvert. »2 Il ne faut donc 
pas que l’art soit au service de la philosophie : le sens de l’art 
n’est que dans la manifestation de sa propre vérité. Si l’art est 
un événement sensible, cela ne veut pas dire qu’il n’est pas la 
pensée aussi. Bien au contraire, depuis la modernité, l’art est 
devenu de plus en plus conceptuel. Ce que Nancy voudrait 
souligner, c’est que l’art ne fut peut-être jamais ou ne sera plus 
une représentation sensible de l’Idée, comme encore Hegel et 
même Nietzsche l’avaient exigé. 
Est-ce que l’art a besoin de la philosophie?
La réflexion d’Alain Badiou sur le rapport de l’art et 
de la philosophie est un point décisif dans la philosophie 
des dernières années. On va regarder de plus près son Petit 
manuel d’inesthétique (1998), surtout le premier chapitre 
« Art et philosophie ». Il examine leur rapport, ou leur 
« nouage », du point de vue historique, en s’appuyant sur la 
notion de vérité comme la catégorie principale de la philoso-
phie. Le nouage de l’art et de la philosophie est pensée sous 
trois schèmes : didactique (Platon), classique (Aristote) et 
romantique (Heidegger). La thèse du schème didactique est 
que l’art est incapable de vérité ; le schème romantique s’y 
oppose absolument: la thèse en est que l’art seul est capable 
de vérité. Le dispositif classique, à partir d’Aristote, tient 
en deux thèses : l’art est incapable de vérité, ce qui n’est 
pas grave, car l’art ne prétend pas l’être. L’art a une fonction 
1 Nancy, Jean-Luc: Le sens du monde, Éditions Galilée, Paris 1993, p. 205.
2 Ibidem, p. 212.
thérapeutique et éthique et non pas du tout cognitive. L’art 
doit plaire pour procurer de la catharsis, et pour cela il lui 
suffit d’être vraisemblable. 
Le vingtième siècle, dont les dispositions majeures de la pensée philosophique sont pour Badiou au nombre de 
trois aussi : le marxisme (didacticien), la psychanalyse (clas-
sique) et l’herméneutique allemande (romantique), n’a pas 
réussi à introduire de nouveau schème. En revanche, Badiou 
va tenter de proposer un quatrième mode de nouage entre la 
philosophie et l’art qui va se défaire du rapport passé de l’art 
et de la vérité. 
« Les catégories de ce rapport sont l’immanence et la 
singularité. ‘Immanence’ renvoie à la question suivante : 
est-ce que la vérité est réellement intérieure à l’effet artis-
tique des oeuvres ? Ou bien l’oeuvre d’art n’est-elle que 
l’instrument d’une vérité extérieure ? « Singularité » renvoie 
à une autre question : la vérité dont l’art témoigne lui est-elle 
absolument propre ? ... Dans les schèmes hérités, le rapport 
des oeuvres artistiques à la vérité ne parvient jamais à être 
simultanément singulier et immanent. On affirmera donc 
cette simultanéité. Ce qui se dit aussi bien : l’art lui-même 
est une procédure de vérité. ... Et cette pensée, ou les vérités 
qu’elle active, sont irréductibles aux autres vérités, qu’elles 
soient scientifiques, politiques ou amoureuses. Ce qui veut 
dire aussi que l’art, comme pensée singulière, est irréductible 
à la philosophie. »3 
L’art n’a donc pas de sens ou de but qui lui serait imposé. En nous approchant d’une création artistique, il ne 
nous reste qu’à « rencontrer » son existence. Du point de 
vue de l’immanence et de la singularité de sa vérité, l’art est 
une pensée, qui est parfaitement capable de réfléchir, seule, 
sur son essence. Qu’est-ce qui reste alors à la philosophie ? 
Est-ce que l’art n’en a point besoin ? Pire encore : N’y-a-t-il 
pas de vérités proprement philosophiques? La réponse de 
Badiou n’est pas entièrement négative : »La philosophie, ou 
plutôt une philosophie, est toujours l’élaboration d’une caté-
gorie de vérité. Elle ne produit par elle-même aucune vérité 
effective. Elle saisit les vérités, les montre, les expose, énonce 
qu’il y en a. ... Enfin, elle compossibilise des vérités disparates 
et, de ce fait, énonce ce qu’est ce temps, celui où elle opère, 
en tant que temps des vérités qui y procèdent. »4 
La philosophie n’est donc pas la source de vérités, et l’art n’est pas seulement leur présentation sensible. Pourtant, 
le nouage de l’art et de la philosophie a encore du sens : la 
philosophie ne peut exister qu’en réfléchissant sur des vérités 
que procurent des procédures différentes, parmi elles : l’art, 
et l’art a besoin de la philosophie, du moins de temps en 
temps, pour q’elle l’aide à éclaircir son sort. En tout cas, la 
philosophie n’a plus le droit de déterminer l’essence de l’art.
Si l’art est une production immanente et singulière de vérités : quel en est la définition possible ? Selon Badiou, 
il faut chercher la réponse dans le rapport entre infini et 
fini : une vérité est une multiplicité infinie, tandis qu’une 
oeuvre d’art est essentiellement finie ; l’art est création de 
finitude. « Si donc on soutient que l’oeuvre est vérité, il 
3 Badiou, Alain: Petit manuel d'inesthétique, Éditions du Seuil, Paris 1998, p. 20-21.
4 Ibidem, p. 28-29.
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faudra soutenir du même mouvement qu’elle est descente de 
l’infini-vrai dans la finitude. »5 Pour ne pas retomber dans le 
romantisme, Badiou souligne que toute vérité s’origine dans 
un événement qui s’est passé ou a été inventé dans un temps 
et dans un lieu. 
I l n’est pas possible d’imaginer qu’on puisse inventer – et la vérité est invention -quoi que ce soit au de-là de cette 
dimension spatiale et temporelle d’un événement. Sinon, on 
retomberait dans une conceptualisaiton «géniale» ou idé-
aliste de l’invention. Pourtant, il est impossible que l’oeuvre 
d’art soit à la fois une vérité et l’événement qui origine cette 
vérité. Par conséquent, Badiou propose de distinguer l’oeuvre 
et l’événement. Une oeuvre n’est qu’un fait de l’art. En plus, 
une oeuvre ne puise pas toute la vérité. Comme nous le 
savons déjà, une vérité est une procédure, artistique dans le 
cas présent, qui est initiée par un événement. « Cette procé-
dure n’est composée que d’oeuvres. Mais elle ne se manifeste 
– comme infinité – dans aucune. L’oeuvre est donc l’instance 
locale, le point différentiel d’une vérité. ... Une vérité n’a 
nul autre être que des oeuvres, elle est un multiple (infini) 
générique d’oeuvres. Mais ces oeuvres ne tissent l’être d’une 
vérité artistique que selon le hasard de leurs occurrences 
successives.« 6 
Une vérité est donc un multiple infini d’oeuvres, tandis qu’une oeuvre est un fragment fini. Une vérité est 
singulière, alors qu’une oeuvre est particulière. Des oeuvres 
composent une vérité dans le sens d’une configuration artis-
tique. Bref, une vérité est une configuration artistique, initiée 
par un événement. Un événement dans l’art est en général 
un groupe d’oeuvres, un multiple singulier d’oeuvres. La 
différence entre une vérité comme configuration artistique 
et un événement est en ceci qu’une configuration artistique 
n’a pas de contour fini, elle n’est pas seulement un multiple 
d’oeuvres déjà faites, mais aussi une potentialité d’oeuvres 
qui, probablement, feront jour dans un avenir indéterminé. 
(P. ex. : le roman est une configuration artistique pour la 
prose, ou la tragédie grecque pour le drame, etc.)
Toute oeuvre est donc une recherche de sa propre vérité à l’intérieur d’une configuration artistique, et, vice-versa: 
une configuration se pense elle-même dans les oeuvres qui 
la composent. L’art est donc capable de réfléchir, seul, à 
partir de son propre expérience, sur son essence, sur les lois 
de sa créativité. De ce point de vue, l’art n’a pas besoin de la 
philosophie. Pourtant, leur collaboration est souvent très 
féconde. Quel en est, donc, leur sujet? Selon Badiou, il s’agit 
d’une “coresponsabilité de l’art, qui produit des vérités, et 
de la philosophie, qui, sous condition qu’il y en ait, a pour 
devoir, et tâche très difficile, de les montrer. Les montrer veut 
essentiellement dire: les distinguer de l’opinion.”7 
Pourquoi est-ce qu’il serait difficile à la philosophie de montrer des vérités que l’art produit ? C’est qu’une 
vérité artistique exprime des idées nouvelles par des formes 
nouvelles qui ne sont pas encore formalisées entièrement. 
5 Ibidem, p. 23.
6 Ibidem, p. 24-25.
7 Ibidem, p. 29.
Une oeuvre originale est contingence d’une forme nouvelle, 
s’engendrant dans un événement, qui est en train de se for-
maliser. Il se peut que même une seule oeuvre particulière, 
comme événement initial, déclenche une rupture avec une 
vérité singulière. Alors, il n’est pas facile, dans le cadre d’une 
énormité d’événements artistiques, d’annoncer et nommer 
une vérité ou une configuration nouvelle de l’art. Malgré la 
source contingente et événementielle de l’art, celui-ci est, 
d’après Badiou, un genre universel qui ne permet pas de 
classification antérieure quelconque, c’est-à-dire qu’il n’est 
pas possible de le réduire à un genre qui serait encore plus 
fondamental et générique que lui.
La conclusion
La question principale de l’esthétique que se posent 
Nancy et Badiou est donc celle-ci: de quelle manière l’art et 
la philosophie pourraient-ils se rencontrer? 
Nancy plaidoie pour le nouage du discours philoso-phique et du style artistique de l’écriture, conformé-
ment à l’intention nietzschéenne. C’est par cette voie que 
la philosophie pourrait s’approcher encore plus à la vérité 
du monde, et l’art, en s’appuyant sur la conceptualisation 
philosophique, pourrait ainsi encore plus profondément 
saisir son propre sens. En réfléchissant sur la présence sen-
sible de la vérité dans l’art, la philosophie évite le danger de 
retomber dans la représentation transcendante. Malgré la 
conviction que la vérité du monde est une seule et la même 
pour la philosophie et pour l’art, Nancy ne veut pas en traiter 
à la façon d’une totalité qui donnerait la réponse finale sur 
l’essence de la vérité. Nancy affirme, en accord avec son af-
finité phénoménologique, que l’homme ne produit pas la 
vérité et que celle-ci s’engendre en rapport avec le monde et 
entre nous-mêmes. 
Selon Badiou, la philosophie ne fait que réfléchir la / les vérités que l’art, lui, peut créer comme une des procé-
dures de vérité(s). Contrairement à Nancy, pour Badiou la 
vérité du monde n’est pas une seule et la même. Il n’y a pas 
seulement une vérité, mais des vérités singulières et imma-
nentes à leurs procédures (l’art, dans notre cas, mais aussi la 
science, la politique et l’amour). Si la philosophie ne suivait 
pas ce chemin, elle pourrait retomber dans le platonisme 
transcendant. 
Nancy et Badiou ont donc peur de la chute platonici-enne; pourtant, pour l’éviter, l’un insiste sur une vérité, 
et l’autre sur leur multiplicité. Ils sont d’ailleurs d’accord qu’il 
est impossible de fonder la vérité entièrement parce que 
tout système de pensée s’origine dans ce qui se soustrait au 
pouvoir totalisant de la vérité. La vérité ne connaît donc pas 
le sens final, puisque nous ne connaissons pas le sens du sens, 
ou, simplement, il n’y en a pas. 
Comme la philosophie, elle aussi, est une pensée impar-faite et non totale (ou ne devrait plus être totalisante), 
elle est obligée de renoncer à son désir narcissique de juger 
l’art et de prescrire ses limites. Nancy et Badiou sont convain-
cus que la philosophie n’a pas de pouvoir ontologique qui lui 
permettrait de platoniser l’art. 
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Il serait donc pertinent de demander à l’art de se présenter lui-même. Pourtant, Nancy a très bien souligné que la 
notion même de l’art, dans son origine grècque et latine, 
avait été étroitement liée aux concepts philosophiques de 
la créativité. Dès leurs origines donc, l’art et la philosophie 
s’entrelacent, ce qui est pour Nancy une raison de plus pour 
affirmer leur entrelacement stylistique aussi. Badiou est plus 
prudent sur ce point : il se passe trop souvent qu’une inter-
prétation philosophique déforme une image que l’art se crée 
de soi-même. En plus, l’art, comme pensée qui est capable de 
penser ses propres fondements et procédés, ne dépend pas 
de la philosophie existentiellement. 
Le rapport entre l’art et la philosophie est donc semblable à une impasse : il ne suffit pas que la philosophie pense 
la créativité comme telle, ontologiquement, elle doit se 
plonger dans l’océan artistique, mais, en même temps, elle est 
contrainte d’en dire le moins possible.
En dépit de tous les empêchements justifiés qui pèsent sur la philosophie pour ne pas retomber dans le pla-
tonisme, on pourrait néonmoins supposer qu’elle est douée 
de sa propre créativité réflexive, au moins comme création 
des concepts, d’après la définition deleuzienne de la phi-
losophie. Cette constatation ne change en rien son essence 
qui est de représenter la présence du monde. On pourrait 
se poser la question aussi, si ce n’est effectivement que la 
création artistique qui pourrait nous toucher ? Est-ce qu’un 
discours philosophique ne pourrait point, jamais, se vanter 
de cette qualité ? De l’autre côté, on pourrait douter parfois 
de l’aspect sensible et touchant de l’art contemporain, sur-
tout de l’art conceptuel. On peut supposer donc que parfois 
une philosophie est plus poétique que l’art et celui-ci plus 
conceptuel que ne l’est une philosophie. 
 
Pour Nancy et pour Badiou, l’art, lui aussi, est une énigme. Jusqu’où pourrait-on alors parvenir en examinant sa 
vérité ? On n’est même pas sûr de chercher une seule ou bien 
une multiplicité de vérités. Badiou affirme qu’il y a des vérités 
qu’il serait difficile de dégrader au niveau des simulacres. Si 
l’on insistait même sur un Tout des vérités, c’est-à-dire sur 
la vérité, on ne pourrait pourtant qu’affirmer des proposi-
tions comme: il est vrai qu’il y a des vérités, ou la vérité est 
la création de ce qui est nouveau, ou bien la vérité est le 
changement du potentiel au réel. Et, dans certains cas, les 
vérités sont éternelles et les mêmes pour tout le monde (en 
mathématiques, p.ex.). Nancy s’approche de Badiou par sa 
propre voie: la philosophie, l’art, et les autres savoirs, suiv-
ent la trace d’une seule vérité qui, pourtant, restera toujours 
indéterminée à cause du manque de sens transcendent. Par 
conséquent, toute intentionalité a le germe de la vérité, toute 
vision est une vérité à l’intérieur d’un certain horizon. Ainsi, 
Nancy, lui aussi, disperse-t-il la vérité unique, la seule et la 
même. Chez Nancy la vérité reste plus ou moins indétermi-
née dans sa détermination, tandis que Badiou préfère suivre 
le concept de la multiplicité de vérités, en insistant sur le fait 
que les vérités sont sans fond transcendant, ce qui ne veut 
pas dire, pourtant, qu’elles sont sans fondement. 
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CIRCLE AND CROSS AS MOTIFS IN EARLY DEVICES:
HISTORICAL AND ICONOGraPHIC INTERPRETATION
Ines Jerele
Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia
1.  Basis
The article travels back in time to the period of renaissance. It 
describes special printers’ and/ or publishers’ signs,1 from now on 
referred to as devices. The main subject is a very popular motif in 
devices used at the end of the 15th and at the beginning of the 16th 
century. This is actually an abstract motif compound of a circle 
and a double cross also called “a double Latin cross on a top of a 
terrestrial globe”.2 
This abstract motif contains two graphic symbols.3 Joined together they serve as devices instead of impresses or em-
blems. It is simplicity of their form that makes these devices with 
the abstract motif so very different from all the other devices made 
at the same time.4 
The research made for this article is based on examples of devices with this abstract motif which were found in books 
kept in the library of the Franciscan monastery in Novo mesto 
(further on FSNM). The six devices found in FSNM books were 
printed between 1504 and 1521. Five of them originate from Italy 
(Venice, Bologna) and one from France (Lyon). They all have the 
same motif, the double Latin cross on terrestrial globe but every 
single motif is distinctly modified. Changes are especially seen in 
design and composition of the devices. Nevertheless, the motifs 
here concerned are clearly emphasized enough thus we can talk 
1 In the early period of print developement different functions in print production 
(printing, publishing, bookselling) were not separated. Mostly the three functi-
ons were joined in the work of one person. In other words, printers worked also 
as publishers and booksellers. There were also some large publishing houses 
employing smaller printers in this period in leading print centers like Venice. 
2 Numerous examples of devices with this particular motif can be found in cata-
logues like Signete: deutsche Drucker- und Verlegerzeichen 1457-1600 (Wendland 
H., 1984); Le marche dei tipografi e degli editori italiani del Cinquecento: repertorio di 
figure, simboli e soggetti e dei relativi motti (Zappella G., 1998); Deutsche Buchdrucker-
signete des XVI. Jahrhunderts: Geschichte, Sinngehalt und Gestaltung kleiner Kultur-
dokumente: mit hundertvierundvierzig Signetbildern (Grimm H., 1965); Printers & 
publishers' devices in England & Scotland 1485- 1640 (MacKerrow R.B., 1949). 
3 Cross is the most known graphic symbol. It is also the central symbol of Christi-
anity. Circle on the other hand in many cultures symbolizes something perfect. 
In Christian iconography it is recognized as a symbol of God (Germ, 2001). 
4 In devices from the 15th and 16th century normally antic themes mixed with 
sacral and profane ones are used. More about themes and forms of devices see 
the article “Signeti 16. stoletja: zgodovinski oris ob gradivu iz Frančiškanskega 
samostana v Novem mestu” ( Jerele I., Golob N., 2006).
about special forms of devices. This arouses the question of accu-
rate iconographic and iconological interpretation.5 6
The basic motif of the double Latin cross on terrestrial globe in the first picture here is made in white lines on a black sur-
face (see picture 1). The circle should be divided in three parts as 
it was typical in the Middle Ages (it symbolized the known world- 
Europe, Africa and Asia). Instead it is only divided in two halves. 
The lower half is white and has a triangle with the black letter G 
attached at the bottom part. The cross goes through the top of the 
circle ending as the letter A in the upper half of the circle.7
At the second device (see picture 2) the background of the white motif is filled with narrow vertical lines, the result of 
a woodcut technique. The attention, when looking at the motif, is 
first drawn by a triangle in the middle of the composition contain-
ing the letter B. It is turned downwards and through its angels a 
circle is added. The letter B has two meanings. It points to the name 
of the printer that used this device as well as to the place of printing. 
The cross stands on the upper horizontal line of the triangle. 
2.  Provenance and sacral meaning of the motif
The meaning of the graphic symbol can be found in profane 
as well as in sacral iconography. The fact is that symbols have 
many meanings and are very closely connected with cultural 
surroundings of its usage (Germ, 2001). In connection with this 
it is necessary to trace the origins of the motif discussed about, 
namely the place and time of its first appearance. 
The literature found in Slovenia mentions Venice as the provenance of the device with the motif of a double Latin 
5 It is necessary to define the meaning of the symbol and its cultural background 
(Germ, 2001). 
6 First device is printed in a book with a number FSNM 7199, Č1-a-1. It was 
used by a printer Giorgio Arrivabene also known as Georgio Mantovano or 
Parente. The printer worked in Venice between 1502 and 1517. The book 
from FSNM was printed in the year 1504 (Zappella, 1986; Gallarotti A., 
1989; EDIT 16). The second device was used by a printer and publisher Faelli 
Benedetto from Bologne. He also signed his prints with a name Benedictum 
Hectoris (EDIT 16). The device seen here was printed on the 13th of March in 
1521 in the book now kept under the number FSNM 7684, L-c-55.
7 Letters A and G are used as a monogram of printers name. 
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cross on a terrestrial globe. In his work Deutsche Buchdrucker-
signete des XVI. Jahrhunderts (1965) Grimm inexactly points out 
that the first device with this motif was printed in Venice by a 
printer Johann von Cöln on 28 January 1481. This printer alleg-
edly made his device as a copy of an earlier sketch for a water 
mark.8 Grimm’s catalogue has no reproduction of Von Cöln’s 
device. There are only other examples of devices with this motif 
printed by German printers. 
As analytic research in additional secondary sources has shown later on, there was a printing office using this ab-
stract motif as a device already in the year 1476. The reproduc-
tion of this earlier device can be seen in the German catalogue 
titled Signete: deutsche Drucker- und Verlegerzeichen 1457-1600 
(Wendland, 1984). The device from 1476 was printed in a 
printing office in Rostock (Germany) which belonged to a com-
munity of brethren called Domus Hortus Viridi or “House at a 
Green Garden”. 9
The community of brethren of the “House at a Green Gar-den” belonged to an order of the “Brethren of Common 
Life” which was founded in the second half of the 14th century 
by Gerard Groote. This order was especially interested in educa-
tion. Consequently they needed as many books as possible. They 
opened a printing office in Rostock. Another important fact is 
that Groote lived in the Carthusian monastery of Munnikhuizen 
near Arnheim.10 
The connection between Groote and his order of “Brethren of Common Life” with the Carthusian monastery men-
tioned above might provide the origin of the motif of the double 
Latin cross on a circle. According to the references the Carthu-
sian order has been using the motif of a terrestrial globe with a 
8 There is no evidence of an influence between water marks and devices though 
there were some examples of water marks containing terrestrial globe with a cross. 
For further reference see for example Piccard G., Wasserzeichen Kreuz (1981). 
9 Device is taken from the Wendlands catalogue (1984, 68). Original device can be 
found in incunabula Sermones discipuli de tempore et de sanctis (Herolt Johann, 1476) 
kept in The British Library, library of Stockholm RL and in library of Uppsala UB.
10 An abstract of Gerard Grootes biography is published in The Catholic Encyclope-
dia, Volume VII (1910). 
cross on top of it in their coat-of-arms fore centuries. Under the 
sign the motto in Latin says: Stat crux dum volvitur orbis.11 
The brethren of the “House at a Green Garden” have prob-ably borrowed the central symbol of the Carthusian coat-
of-arms. They changed it somewhat (see picture 3) with deco-
ration. Furthermore the single cross was made into a double 
one. They have also turned the earth symbol downwards. 
Accurate determination of the provenance of the abstract motif the article talks about has given us the possible 
origin of this motif. But it does not explain the popularity of 
the same motif among printers from different countries in the 
forthcoming years. 
 
3.  The spread of the motif resulting from the 
spread of printing and its profane meaning
We could suspect that the motif of a double Latin cross 
on the terrestrial globe came to Italy from Germany by the 
name of the printer mentioned above who was wrongly as-
signed the invention of this motif. His name Johann von Cöln 
suggests he originates from Köln (Germany) but there is no 
evidence to prove that.12 
The main fact is that the motif of a double Latin cross on the terrestrial globe became popular only after it had 
been printed in Italy. It has been estimated that until 1500 
already 63 Italian printers had used this motif for their own 
device (Grimm, 1965; Zappella, 1998; EDIT 16). In the next 
century until 1600 additional 140 variants of this basic motif 
occurred in Italy alone (Venice, Torino, Milano, Bologne, 
Napoli, Rimini, Rome…) (EDIT 16). 
11 Their coat-of-arms contains a cross (Church, faith) that stands still (is eternal) 
while the whole world is turning around (changing) (Vallier, 1891). In Slove-
nia we can see their coat-of-arms on products from the monastery in Pleterje or 
for example on their web page (Kartuzijani in Kartuzija Pleterje).
12 In the first period of print development printers travelled a lot from one city to 
another. They also used different names as it was already pointed out (Stein-
berg, 1961). 
An example of a French device 14
Example of Italian 
device with this motif 6
A copy of a reproduction of the 
first known device with a double 
Latin cross on the circle
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Numerous devices with this motif also occurred in other European countries. It can only be assumed 
that this motif has spread through Europe together with 
the spread of printing from Italy.13 First it arrived to France 
(Lyon 1483, Paris 1487) and Spain. Then it returned to 
Germany (1495) and Austria (Vienna 1499/1500) and 
continued its path further on to England and the Nether-
lands (Grimm, 1965).14
At devices printed in countries other than Italy, the basic motif is mostly included in a composition with other 
symbols and motifs (see picture 4). Only in few cases the mo-
tif stands alone as a graphic symbol independent of all other 
symbolic connections. On the other hand the modification 
of a double Latin cross into the bookselling sign (named also 
Mercury’s stick) in the motif is rather common.15
The basic motif alongside the bookselling sign combined with the long history and vast geographical spread-
ing point to an entirely new profane meaning while used in 
print production. It is possible that the motif was accepted in 
Europe as a common sign for a printing and/ or publishing 
work.16 Furthermore the large printing families (like the Scotto 
printing family) used the devices with the motif of the double 
Latin cross on the terrestrial globe at the same time and to-
gether with other devices.17 
4.  Conclusions
This iconographic interpretation attempts to show the 
special meaning the abstract motif of the double Latin cross 
on the terrestrial globe in the shape of the devices has had 
in the printing and publishing history. The correct date and 
provenance of the original motif helped us recognize the 
sacral origins and the sacral meaning of this motif along with 
its change into the profane one. This occurred mostly due to 
the mass production which began in Italy and secondly due 
to the simple yet nevertheless strong and meaningful subject 
it contains. 
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THE PHILOSOPHY OF LATE ALTHUSSER:  
ALEATORY MATERIALISM
T he present paper outlines the problematic of the philosophy of late Althusser, namely aleatory materialism, alias the materialism of encoun-ter. In general, many of Althusser’s readers understand his later creative period merely as a 
curiosity and do not take it into serious consideration in com-
parison with his earlier work, while others understand it as a 
separate entity, or as a complete break with his previous work. 
On the contrary, we will focus on the philosophical aspect of 
his later period and present it as a possible way of understand-
ing his preceding work. It is well known that Althusser in the 
famous period of self-criticism distanced himself from his 
earlier work and labelled it “theoreticism”. In our view, his late 
work, the materialism of encounter, puts the theory of the 
period of his book For Marx into a new perspective and pro-
poses some possible solutions to the problem of his so called 
“theoreticism”. 
Therefore, we shall show a possible way of reading the 
continuity between Althusser’s earlier work (the period of so 
called theoreticism) and his later writings from the point of 
view of the transformation of his comprehension of philoso-
phy.
This kind of conception of the historical line of philo-
sophical materialism was, according to him, secretly present 
throughout the history of philosophy, which Althusser named 
the “underground current of the philosophy of encounter”. The 
term aleatory materialism was coined in the last still creative 
period of Althusser’s theoretical life, that is, in the eighties of 
the last century. In Latin alea means chance, hazard, incerti-
tude, contingency. The materialism of encounter was renamed 
“aleatory materialism” in the year 1986 and in our opinion 
it designates a qualitative shift in Althusser’s conception of 
philosophy from his “theoreticist period”, where he defined 
philosophy as “the theory of theoretical practice,” to the later 
period of philosophy as the “class struggle within theory”, 
which one of his famous disciples from the period of his 
teaching at école Normale Superieure in Paris, Alain Badiou, 
characterized as pure “politicism” in his theory. According to 
him, Althusser’s philosophy was “sutured” by politics. What 
is at stake here is that both of his definitions of philosophy are 
founded on a very specific and unique conception of praxis; 
nevertheless an important transformation of the concept of 
praxis takes place simultaneously as does the transformation of 
his conception of philosophy.
As is well known, Althusser, following the model of 
Gaston Bachelard, introduced an epistemological break into 
Marx’s science, which he detected in the concrete theoretical 
work of Marx himself around the year 1845.1 The break, which 
was meant to be continuous, had two major roles. The first one 
was the introduction of a new paradigm in science, and the 
second one, tightly connected with the first one, was the in-
troduction of a new conception of philosophy, which however 
did not have anything to do with Marxist philosophy or the 
philosophy of Marx, but was a philosophy “For Marx” (also the 
title of Althusser’s famous book). The expression philosophy 
“for Marx” is tightly connected with Althusser’s inquiry into 
thorough antiessentialism and his claim for the antiteleological 
in the theory of history, or the understanding of the concrete 
situation, namely, the capturing of the position within the 
concrete historical conjuncture. We could say that the epis-
temological break simultaneously opened up two fields, that 
is: the science of historical materialism, on one hand, and the 
philosophy named materialistic dialectics on the other hand. 
The latter was named the “theory of theoretical practice” or 
“the science of science”.
Not until the epistemological break was introduced into 
Marx’s work did Marx’s so called “continent of history” as the 
first scientific theory of history come into being. é. Balibar 
wrote: “Althusser explains that Marx “switched the terrain” 
by changing his main questions (by posing different kinds 
of questions which were not only a simple “inversion” of the 
previous ones, but represented the true “emergence”): by the 
annihilation of the illusory problematic of feuerbachian Man 
and the Subject of history and by shaping the real determina-
tions of the historical process, he passed from the ideological 
to the real foundation (the base of the mode of production and 
the political-ideological superstructure)”.2 We will try to grasp 
Althusserian materialism, which is also the basis of his early 
conception of philosophy as a science of science. It is defined 
1 Althusser, L., Éléments d’autocritique in: Solitude de Machiavel, PUF, Paris 1998, 
p. 167. 
2 Balibar, É., Objet d’Althusser in: Politique et philosophie dans l’oeuvre de Louis 
Althusser, PUF (collection “Pratiques théoriques”), Paris 1993, p. 88-89. 
Translation from French by Katja Kolšek. 
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by three main determinants: 1. by the thesis of irreversible 
discontinuity (impossible delimitation) – complete dissym-
metry between knowledge and reality (the ultimate criticism 
of Cartesian dualism), between notion and consciousness, 
between science and ideology 2. by the primacy of object over 
knowledge and at the same time the impossibility of differenti-
ating between the real object and the object of knowledge and 
3. by praxis.
This epistemological break is the denouncement of the 
guarantee of knowledge. According to Althusser, materialism 
is only possible in those philosophies which posit their posi-
tions right from the outset (materialistic thesis) and assume 
them as true. By this means they escape the ideological circu-
larity of demonstrating the demarcation between Truth and 
Error. Reality as the exterior gains an altogether new status, for 
it exists only from the point of view of the strait immanence 
of scientific knowledge. The difference between science and 
ideology is thus asymmetrical. There is no direct translation of 
one into another.
The continuity of the discontinuity of the epistemological 
break is thus an irreversible interruption of the umbilical cord 
between Being and Thought as the univocal dualism or cor-
relativity between the two. Their relation consists of the im-
penetrable mutual membrane, which is a display of the emer-
gence of the signs of the blind effectiveness of both sides (effet 
de connaissance, effet du social). Althusser’s conception of the 
materialistic dialectic itself at first covered both sides (social 
formations and theoretical practices), but later on, conjointly 
with his turning-point in the Elements of Selfcritique, a transfer 
from the emphasis on dialectic to an emphasis on material-
ism as such took place, and it passed to the other side of the 
epistemological break, that is, from the science (theory) to the 
topography as such (social concreteness): “[…] Althusser has 
always connected the break ‘and the topography’, but finally 
their relation in the end dissolved. The dominant subject be-
came subordinate and the other way round.”3 His conception 
of the theory of theoretical practice lies in his interpretation of 
the materialistic dialectic.
He put thesis or factum as an eminent clause of material-
ism in the scientific theory of knowledge. With the introduc-
tion of thesis both extremes which originate from the Cartesian 
dualism, are excluded. On the one hand, empiricism as an 
abstraction of external reality, and on the other, speculative 
philosophy, which, according to Althusser “creates its own 
materiality”, so that materiality is understood only as the prod-
uct or phenomenon of the original interior of the development 
of the notion. With that an ultimate interruption of the rigor-
ous dichotomy or mutual reflectiveness between the order of 
Being and the order of Thought, between theory and praxis, 
takes place, which is also part of Althusser’s criticism of Sartre’s 
ideology of consciousness and his conception of ideology as 
both imaginary and material practice. The merging of both 
sides of the dichotomy into a mutual plain (level) does not yet 
imply the total exclusion of science. 
With this change we are dealing with the concept of over-
determination, which Althusser took from Freud and intro-
duced into his own work. It is actually a kind of synonym for 
3 Ibid., p.106.
the epistemological break. It is all about the theory that a sin-
gular historical conjuncture has risen from the core of the ide-
ology. We can infer from that that Althusser’s epistemology is 
already an ontology. From the point of view of the epistemol-
ogy that leads to the separation between Truth and Error, the 
true and the untrue (the mistaken), and from the point of view 
of ontology that implies that there is in fact no empirical real-
ity – Being – which is not mediated via theory (epistemology). 
With the assertion of the impossibility of defining the ultimate 
limit between both the aforementioned spheres by introduc-
ing this break, a new field of exploring materiality comes into 
existence, on behalf of which all the illusions regarding the 
possibility of a direct understanding of “external” reality disap-
pears. Therefore, the epistemological break has the status of 
“factum” or “thesis”. At this point Althusser follows the example 
of Spinoza, whom he sees as one of the rare representatives of 
materialist philosophy, because Spinoza in contrast to Hegel 
did not start his philosophy with the world or with spirit, but 
directly with God, which he did not try to prove, but affirmed 
in advance apodicticly as a factum. That way Spinoza did not 
commit the same mistake as his opponents, who were seeking 
to prove the existence of God and fell into the vicious circle 
of proving the existence of God. He affirmed his existence in 
advance, and by that gained the position of the opponents, 
which he afterwards transformed according to his philosophy, 
and tried “not only to interpret the world, but also to change 
it”: “Here, I shall defend the thesis that, for Spinoza, the object 
of philosophy is the void. This is a paradoxical thesis, in view of 
the great many concepts that are worked out in the Ethics, the 
main object of Spinoza’s philosophy is the void. Yet one only 
need notice how Spinoza begins. He confesses in a letter that 
“some begin with the world and others with the mind of man; 
I begin with God”. The others: first, the Schoolman, who begin 
with the world, and, from the created world, traces things back 
to God. The others are also Descartes, who starts with the 
thinking subject and, by way of the cogito, traces things back to 
the dubito and God as well. All of them take a path that leads 
through God. Spinoza shuns these detours and deliberately 
takes up his position in God. Hence one can say that he occu-
pies, in advance, the common fortress, the ultimate guarantee 
and last recourse of all his adversaries, by starting with this 
beyond-which-there-is-nothing, which, because it thus exists 
in the absolute, in the absence of all relation, is itself nothing. 
Saying that one ‘begins with God’, or the Whole, or the unique 
substance, and making it understood that one ‘begins with 
nothing’, is, basically, the same thing: what difference is there 
between the Whole and nothing? – since nothing exists out-
side the Whole …What, for that matter, does Spinoza has to 
say about God? This is where the strangeness begins.”4 
The introduction of factum or thesis in his work thus 
solves two of Althusser’s problems at the same time. The 
first one is a criticism of the teleology of transcendentality 
or the dialectic of notion, which shows a priori the path of 
development of the process of the real. On the other hand, 
however, there is a danger that factum itself falls into a pitfall 
of metaphysical hypostasis in the sense of praising the so-
called “accomplished fact” (fait accompli). Therefore it is very 
4 Althusser, L., Philosophy of the Encounter, Later Writings 1978-1987, ed. François 
Matheron, Verso, London 2006, p. 176. 
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important to notice Althusser’s emphasis on factum as “a fact 
yet to accomplish” (fait à accomplir) as an entirely contingent 
fact, of which emergence is completely unnecessary and purely 
contingent. Factum is not a transcendental a priori condition of 
possibility, but a material condition of existence. Its contingen-
cy is to be understood through two main gaps: firstly, that it is 
possible not to exist, and secondly, that it possible to disappear 
(cease to exist) for ever. 
Along with the factum of the epistemological break, the 
so called “recurrent perspective” opens up. That means that we 
are always already within the field of science, that there is no 
access to the real object, and that we can refer only to the pre-
vious knowledge. The knowledge has no exteriority, it creates 
its own criteria of comprehension. An immanentism of the 
Althusserian universum arises, which nevertheless does not 
imply the renouncement of the possibility of knowledge, but 
a condition of the possibility of material knowledge. Althusser 
once took Spinoza to be an example of a philosopher with a 
true materialistic position, because he affirmed that there is no 
Truth as such, but only “the true as index sui, which by itself 
shows the untrue.” That means that it indicates itself as pres-
ence, however as a product in two senses of the word: 1) as a 
result of the process which discovers it and 2) the proving of 
itself through the production.5 It is important that the criteria 
of delimitating the truth from error becomes immanent to the 
object of delimitation itself.
Another basic aspect of Althusser’s materialism is the 
problem of the object of knowledge. In the complete im-
manentism of knowledge there is of course also the question 
of the existence of the object of knowledge. Althusser strictly 
differentiates between the real object and object of knowledge. 
That means that it is not enough to say that matter precedes 
consciousness, that praxis precedes theory and object pre-
cedes subject, because in that way we would still remain 
caught in Cartesian dualism. Here Althusser simultaneously 
deals both with the empirical as well as with the speculative 
positions, which affirm that the starting point of the process 
of knowledge or the process as such is identified with the real 
object. From Althusser’s strict divide between the real object 
and the object internal to the thought there follows the con-
cept of knowledge as production in a Marxian sense, where all 
the moments of the working process have to be of one and the 
same nature. It thus destroys the hypothesis of the limit be-
tween knowledge and the real object. The only way to accom-
plish the primacy of the real object over knowledge itself in the 
recurrent perspective and the irreversibility of knowledge is to 
understand that we have become reconciled to the fact that the 
knowledge of the object is always already misrecognition. 
The dichotomy science/ideology is not an analogy of the 
difference between the real object and the object of knowl-
edge, quite to the contrary, it is possible only due to their strict 
separation. The question arises how it is possible to recognize 
ideology. é. Balibar gives an answer in saying that histori-
cal materialism is the only junction point between science 
and ideology. Ideology is a social instance, and it cannot be 
reduced to a misrecognition, an epistemological error, or an il-
lusion. It is true that ideology in the concrete historical condi-
5 Althusser, L., Sur la philosophie, Gallimard, coll. “L’infini”, Paris 1994, p. 59.
tions produces false knowledge, but we could never absolutely 
define it as one, through the negative relation to knowledge. 
On the other hand, as Pierre Macherey said, “every science, in 
the relation it has to the ideology it emerged from, can only be 
thought of as a ‘science of ideology’.”6 The introduction of the 
epistemological break into Marx’s work completely changes 
the concept of epistemology. “The relationship between sci-
ence and ideology is by all means a relationship of inequality, 
heterogeneity, within which the two entities can not connect 
spontaneously and directly ‘act upon’ each other without the 
invention of some third term, which is: the praxis.”7 In this way 
Althusser places the theoretic ideology right at the outset of 
the process of knowledge as production (abstractum) – the 
basic matter, of which the transformation into knowledge 
represents the process of knowledge itself. 
The last point of the determination of Althusser’s early 
philosophy as epistemological materialism is the theory of 
theoretical practice as the process without the subject. The 
epistemological break is as a matter of fact the working of the 
theoretical practice itself. By taking as a starting point the im-
manent world, the indiscernability of the object of knowledge 
and the real object and the world of pre-existent erroneous 
cognitions, that means that the only way we can obtain knowl-
edge is through practice as a work of the-self-differentiation 
of science in the pre-existent indiscernible compound of sci-
ence and ideology. Althusser took Marx’s production process 
as a model. The epistemological break opens the field of the 
immanence of knowledge as practice, which decomposes the 
pre-existing evidence of primary ideological abstractions.
The epistemological break makes the emergence of a 
unified essence of a certain historical conjuncture impossible. 
There is an impossibility of a coupe d´essence, a cutting through 
of the essence, of which the teleological development would 
demand only one unified theory of dialectic, Hegel’s for ex-
ample. On account of the epistemological break, Althusser’s 
dialectic is split into two fields, into the field of the dialectic 
of social formation (historical materialism) and the theory of 
theoretical practice (dialectical materialism). The period of 
Althusser’s work Pour Marx is still bound to the process of the 
constitution and development of scientific theory. It is marked 
by his “materialistic turn” of the idealistic (Hegel’s) dialectic, 
using his own words, turning the dialectic from “the head back 
to its feet”. This is Althusser’s attempt at a construction of a 
materialistic dialectic not as a turn but as a break from Hegel’s 
dialectic, which is the main task of Althusser’s first conception 
of philosophy as a theory of theoretical practice. This would 
appear as the reverse side of the science of historical material-
ism, which emerged simultaneously with the epistemological 
break in Marx’s work. In his conception of praxis as work 
(process without the subject), Althusser tries to build a dia-
lectic which would escape the unitarian conception of Hegel’s 
dialectic of the spirit, where all the contradictions have only 
one and the same origin in the development of the notion, and 
thus one and the same end, for they are predictable in advance 
as a teleological development of the spirit (Absolute Idea, No-
tion). Althusser considers that as a hyposthazing into Being, 
Origin or End. 
6 Cf. Althusser, L. et al., Lire le Capital, Maspero, Paris 1965.
7 Balibar, É., “Le Concept de ‘coupure épistémologique’ de Gaston Bachelard à Louis 
Althusser” in: Ecrits pour Althusser, Découverte, Paris 1999, p. 39.
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 In the above cited work, é. Balibar even considers the 
epistemological break to be the object of Althusser’s early 
philosophy par excellence, moreover, Althusser’s early concep-
tion of philosophy as theoretical practice does not even have 
an object, while the object itself is the epistemological break 
as a void in the instalment of a practice of separating science 
and ideology. At this point it becomes obvious that Althusser 
is facing the problem of a kind of double dialectic, as he by 
means of the epistemological break, on one hand, analyses the 
scientific method of theoretical practice, while, on the other, 
through the concept of the over-determination defines the 
social formation and conjuncture of concrete historical cir-
cumstances (ideology). 
In the period of Althusser’s self-criticism materialism as 
such becomes a more important issue than dialectic. Althuss-
er’s new materialism, which is here at stake, is the materialism 
of events, practices, and the relations of power. That is the 
reason why the idea of a ‘break’ (as a revolution) indisputably 
still belongs to the dialectical theoretisation, while ‘Marxist 
topography’ (and elsewhere ‘Freudian topography’), which 
Althusser incessantly marks as a category, is even the material-
ist category par excellence. 
For the French philosopher Alain Badiou, Althusser’s 
famous so called ‘break after the break’, or the desepistemolo-
gisation of Althusser’s philosophy lies in the transformation 
of the relation of philosophy and science, where it becomes 
unavoidable that science for philosophy no longer occupies 
the position of object, but its condition. Thus the question 
that arises is what the position and role of science is, when it 
becomes impossible that the famous epistemological break 
remains included in the philosophical act itself. The very act 
of Philosophy now becomes an act of the inner delimitation 
of “The Scientific” from “the Ideological”.8 Althusser’s second 
definition of philosophy as a “class struggle in theory” gives us 
some answers as to the prevailing reproach of “theoreticism” 
from his middle period. This second conception of philosophy, 
which brings into question and emphasises the theme of the 
class struggle in ideology. Alain Badiou criticised this second 
definition as mere “politicism”. However, we do not think that 
his new concept of philosophy is an ordinary politicism in 
theory, but rather that it tries to show the point where as a kind 
theory it acts in the middle of the field of ideology, and respec-
tively represents a kind of registration of the effects of ideology 
within the field of theory. He named it effect-philosophy.9 The 
second conception of the philosophy of Althusser assumes the 
role of an unusual mediator or limit between the Theoretical 
and the Ideological. It seems that philosophy plays only one of 
these roles in the topological structure of the conjuncture, and 
for which it soon becomes clear that its role is crucial for the 
non-teleological and aleatory thinking of articulation/disar-
ticulation among the instances, thus the emergence of a non-
totalised mutual ground between the Scientific and the Ideo-
logical. Therefore, philosophy no longer deports itself in the 
meta-position any longer. It appears in the guise of a rupture 
(demarcation), the pure empty gesture (the gesture of void, 
nothing) in between the two aforementioned instances and 
as such creates an empty space, upon which the Theoretical 
8 Althusser, L., Ecrits philosophiques et politiques, Tome 2, Biblio-Essais, LGF - 
Livre de Poche (21 avril 1999), p. 37.
9 Ibid.
and Ideological can border. In this way philosophy digs a hole 
into a situation, in the conjuncture, therefore the conjuncture 
does not become totalised and is viewed as completely non-
teleological and aleatory. Philosophy somehow intervenes into 
and in-between the two. That is the new practice of philoso-
phy, whose object is yet again some kind of void or nothing, 
which the philosophy hollows out in each particular situation. 
In this way it enables thinking within the field of ideology. It is 
all about the question of how philosophy thinks its conditions, 
however without being sutured to them. 
In the eighties Louis Althusser strived to outline the kind 
of philosophy named aleatory materialism, which is exactly 
the materialism of a kind of new practice, which Althusser 
searched for in the dim underground of the magnificent con-
struction of the history of philosophy. In conclusion, we may 
say that aleatory materialism finally returns to the primary 
stake of Althusser’s first conception of philosophy as an episte-
mological break, which is in itself an unending task. His con-
ception of philosophy in the last period abandons the attempts 
to insert the class struggle into his conception of ideology, and 
tries to build a new conception of the epistemological break, 
which is constituted as a kind of detector of an underground 
current of materialistic philosophy which continuously per-
sisted throughout the history of philosophy. It is a kind of his-
torical view which sees the history of established or idealistic 
philosophy as an attempt to repress the transcendental abyss 
of the void, which is a basic constituent of all the truly mate-
rialistic philosophies and which decomposes all the idealistic 
conceptions into pure contingencies. This kind of materialism 
sees philosophical concepts as affirmative nonteleological con-
tingent agglutinations of aleatory elements (Epicurian clina-
men) and the analysis of the world as pure facts in the sense of 
the Heideggerian ‘Es gibt’. This confirms our initial thesis that 
we should read the Althusserian epistemological break only in 
connection with his later work, namely, aleatory materialism 
or the materialism of encounter. 
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FUNDAMENTAL PSYCHOANALYTICAL  
CONCEPTS AND THEIR VISUAL EQUIVALENT:  
LACAN THROUGH HOLOGraPHY
Almost everyone today has a camera and takes snaps. Just as almost everyone has learned to write and produce texts. Anyone who is able to write can also read. But anyone who can take snaps does not necessary have to be able to decode photographs.1
Introduction
If we want to decode photographs we must first under-
stand what photographs are, then how they are created, what 
their effect is and finally, what language they speak. Knowing 
answers to these four moments enables decoder an environ-
ment in which one can relatively easily and adequately trans-
late photographic code into one’s one language, understand-
able to oneself and people who think similarly.
The reason I dwell on photographic language analysis is 
quite simple.
Visual plays key role in contemporary life. It is essential both regarding perception of the world and (its) creation. It is 
exactly why one should know how it is structured. Only through 
such knowledge one can cross the border of only passive ev-
eryday reception of visual and analogously passive automatic 
images creation, we often run into. Only with this knowledge we 
can make a step further and get from passive to active role.
Why the visual impacts us so strongly? Why do we, 
willingly or not, follow certain patterns when crating visual 
representations? What can we do to perceive and create visual 
world differently?
Answers to these questions require thorough reflection. 
First one must isolate basic visual building block. This is not too 
difficult. It is clear each visualia is two folded.2 On one hand it is 
clearly an image. Be it a painting, a photograph, mental image or 
whatever, visual has always some sort of image, representation 
present. On the other hand each visualia is something non-
pictorial, non-imaginable, something we can only place under 
1 Vilém Flusser: Towards a Philosophy of Photography; Reaction books, London 
2005, p. 57.
2 Twofoldness of visions will be discussed almost throughout the whole text. Some 
things, initially more or less presupposed, will later be substantiated through concrete 
analysis. Right now it should be sufficient to state that duality of the visual is a thesis 
which can be found, in various forms, in the works of Maurice Merleau–Ponty, Michel 
Foucault, Roland Barthes, Jean Baudrillard and others. Shortly, the division is not a 
new one; if anything is new it is its application on a specific view of photography.
descriptive, linguistic label. This other part we can also call the 
narrative part. Each part has its meaning within a certain narra-
tive. Even more, it can exist only if itself is a part of a story.
Relation between image and narrative in visual is the one 
which concerns the structure of the visual the most. Only after 
its unveilment one can do useful things with the structure of the 
visual. For instance take on visual art criticism, different kind of 
looking at surrounding world, creation of new visualia, and similar.
But to understand why the visual effects us or what is its language, which were the initial questions, it is not 
enough only knowing how visual or photography is structured 
but also knowing in what condition is current visual (photo-
graphic) theory and its application.
In this sense the analysis origins in the work of Roland Bar-thes. Himself a structuralist but also the man who erected 
one of the most powerful and influential theories of photogra-
phy, claimed, that photography as a media is determined most-
ly by two forms. According to Barthes, photography is always 
some sort of analogon, reflection of reality, and at the same 
time describes a time, time gone. Thus his forms are: this is it 
and this was.3 Beside those, Barthes touches two additional 
questions. First is the question of meaning of the photograph. 
In this regard he speaks of three levels: denotative (punctum, 
informative level), connotative (studium, symbolic level) and 
obtuse meaning level, where according to him, photography 
shows a certain surplus of meaning acting as a counterbalance 
to connotative, notionally very transparent level4. Second 
question concerns photographical referent. Barthes’s thesis is 
that photography is its own referent, its best description5.
Barthes’s, although very strong and difficult to upgrade 
theory of photography, has one great disadvantage. It almost 
entirely obliviates the author of the photography. And it is pre-
cisely the last 40 years of photographic creation that obviously 
3 In his works Camera Lucida, reflections on photography (1980) and Elements of 
Semiology (1968).
4 The idea of the third meaning can be found in Barthes’s movie scene - pho-
togram analysis: Roland Barthes: The Responsibility of Forms; University of 
California Press 1991.
5 Despite the fact Barthes is talking about self-referentiality of the haiku he is 
very close to his theory of photography. In Roland Barthes: The Empire of Signs, 
Hill and Wang, New York 1983.
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showed how important if not even controversial is the role of 
photographic author. Vast group of photographers including 
renowned artist ( Jeff Wall, Cindy Sherman, Gregory Crewdson, 
Marcos Lopez, Nicole Tran Ba Vang,…) is doing the so-called 
directed or narrative photography. They are trying to include 
authorial, authors stories in photography and thus exceed plain 
representation of reality Barthes speaks of. As a matter of fact 
one could say they are constantly on the level of third, obtuse 
meaning, they are constantly playing with surplus of meaning.
Following mentioned, only partially conscious response 
to Barthes theory of photography, is the fact contemporary 
photography and their authors are more or less aware of the 
constant span between fiction and reality, narrative and the 
image, which is structurally inherent to photography itself.6
Similar issues, close to Barthes’s, are discussed by Czech philosopher Vilém Flusser, although on slightly different, 
more photographically technical way:
»Photographs are ubiquitous: in albums, magazines, books, shop windows, on-bill-boards, carrier bags, 
cans. What does that signify? Thus far, reflection has suggested 
the thesis (still to be examined) that these images signify 
concepts in a program and that they program society to act 
as tough under a secondary magic spell. However, for people 
who look at photographs naïvely the signify something differ-
ent, i.e. states of things that have been reflected onto surfaces. 
For these people, photographs represent the world itself. Ad-
mittedly, such naïve observers will concede that the states of 
things are reflected onto surfaces from specific points of view 
but they don’t worry too much about that. Any philosophy of 
photography will therefore seem to them a complete waste of 
mental energy.
Such observers tacitly accept that they are looking 
through the photographs at the world out there and that there-
fore the photographic universe and the world out there are one 
and the same (which still amounts to a rudimentary philoso-
phy of photography7). But is this the case? The naïve observer 
sees that in photographic universe one is faced with both 
black-and-white and coloured states of things. But are there 
any such black-and white and coloured states in the world out 
there? As soon as naïve observers ask this question, they are 
embarking on the very philosophy of photography that they 
were trying to avoid.
There can not be black-and-white states of things in the 
world because black-and white cases are borderline, ‘ideal cases’: 
black is the total absence of all oscillations contained in light, 
white the total presence of all the elements of oscillation. ‘Black’ 
and ‘white’ are concepts, e.g. theoretical concepts of optics…
The disadvantage of such a black-and-white way of look-
ing at the world, of course, would be that this mixture would 
turn out to be not coloured but grey. Gray is the colour of 
theory: which shows that one cannot reconstruct the world 
anymore from a theoretical analysis.
Black-and-white photographs illustrate this fact: They are 
grey, they are theoretical images…
6 Foundations of such explanation of Barthes’s views are found in Jan Babnik: 
Pripovedna fotografija (Narrative photography), magazine Fotografija, no. 19/20, 
Ljubljana 2004.
7 Here Flusser is very close to Barthes’s analogon to reality.
Colour photographs are on a higher level ob abstraction 
than black-and-white ones, Black-and-white photographs are 
more concrete and in this sense true: They reveal their theo-
retical origin more clearly, and vice versa: The more ‘genuine’ 
the colours of the photograph become, the more untruthful 
they are, the more they conceal their theoretical origin.”8
Flusser therefore talks, similarly to Barthes and the others, about span between fiction and reality but it is interesting 
how he emphasizes the fact that colours or their absence is 
deceiving and that theory, this first-class narrative is concealed 
in photographs.
Exactly the question of narrative or derived, question 
of the language of the images, in Flusser’s thought is what 
transfers the focus of the photography from specific, technical 
image on broader visual and consequently verbal level. All of a 
sudden photography is not limited to images anymore but can 
talk to us on different ways, more language based.
We are now closer to the answer why visual works and what is it language. We know visual is divided on image 
and narrative, we know what photographical theory has to say 
and what photographical practice. Next step is to look for a 
general visual theory of the image and see how much linguistic 
practice there is inside of photography.
Interesting and coherent general philosophical theory of image can be found at Hegel. In his lectures on esthetics he 
talks about beauty, natural and artistic, and says art with its 
span between higher causes and frivolity often turns out to be, 
not a meaning for itself, but as means for something.
»And finally, what concerns the form of this means it will perhaps always remain a bit inadequate; for even if art 
would truly subject itself to more serious purposes and would 
produce more serious effects, the means it uses for this purpose 
is deception. Because beautiful has its life in appearance.“9
Basically the question of fine arts is concerned which is nothing else but deception hiding in appearance. But He-
gel supplements this formulation only a couple of pages later.
»But appearance itself is essential for the essence; the truth would not exist at all if it was not shown if it 
wouldn’t appear, if it wouldn’t be for one, both oneself and 
spirit in general. Therefore the subject of the reproach cannot 
be appearance in general but only that specific mode of ap-
pearance in which art gives reality to what is in itself indeed 
real.”10
Hegel, in other words, says it is real the appearance is deceiving but this is the only possible way. Because it 
is exactly through appearance that things which are not only 
appearance but truth come to light.
Hegel inserts his thesis also in logical, more ontological 
framework.
8 Vilém Flusser: Towards a Philosophy of Photography; Reaction books, London 
2005, pp. 41–42, 44.
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the paradoxical result that the more people take snaps, the 
more difficult it becomes to decode photographs: Everyone 
thinks there is no need to decode photographs, since they 
know how photographs are made and what they mean…
Photographs are received as objects without value that 
everyone can produce and that everyone can do what they like 
with it. In fact, however, we are manipulated by photographs and 
programmed to act in a ritual fashion in the service of a feedback 
mechanism for the benefit of the cameras. Photographs suppress 
our critical awareness in order to make us forget the mindless 
absurdity of the process of functionality, and it is only thanks to 
this suppression that functionality is possible at all. Thus photo-
graphs form a magic circle around us in the shape of the photo-
graphic universe. What we need is to break this circle.”13
Now, when we have also the theory of the image and we saw that all it has to be done is to break the photographic 
(visual) circle of deception, we have to, in order to answer why 
visual works or what is its language, see what forms the decep-
tion of the visual. Following a saying that log in ones own eye 
is harder to see than splinter in the eye of the other, we shall 
move somewhat away from the photography in general and its 
theory and focus on a concrete example. On one side there we 
will have holography, borderline photographic procedure, di-
vided from the rest of the photography mostly by the fact, that 
light, with which it scribes is electronical, therefore by itself, a 
sort of (artificial) deception, and psychoanalysis, borderline 
linguistic procedure, sometimes called talking cure, for which 
the concept of deception is essential.
Elaboration
Jacques Lacan has dedicated most of his creative effort to 
elaborating Freud’s ideas and their transposition from clinical 
to speculative, philosophical area. For psychoanalysis in general 
it can be said that it deals with human beings, more specifically 
subjects and their relations to the environment, especially oth-
ers. In order to enable better understanding and interpretation 
of the just mentioned problematic, psychoanalysis, more specifi-
cally its founder Freud, has developed theoretical backbone of 
the four essential processes of the human cognition which he 
detected during his work of healing psychic diseases.
He named them: unconscious, repetition, transfer and 
pulsion (trieb). With these processes, in fact their theoretiza-
tion, dealt with Lacan in his, perhaps most renowned, seminar 
XI, entitled: Four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis. Most 
of the words following will revolve around this seminar.
In addition to analysis of fundamental concepts and their 
interaction, for which Lacan claimed is essential, he also took 
time for analysis of the field of the gaze, which is, according to 
him, most elementary case of subject’s encounter with the other.
But, there is a problem. Relation between the gaze and 
the fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis has never been 
well explained. Although Lacan, in effort to achieve this, 
sowed his text with numerous diagrams and topological sche-
mas, these are, much like psychoanalysis itself, complex and 
hard to understand.
13 Vilém Flusser: Towards a Philosophy of Photography; Reaction books, London 
2005, pp. 57, 59, 64.
»Appearance in its essence is not something different to appearance itself, appearance of the essence itself … 
essence is its reflection in itself.”11
Deception in the sense of reflecting oneself in oneself is perhaps most interestingly presented in Phenomenology 
of the Mind, in metaphysical version. Upon transition between 
sections on the mind and self-conscious. 
»We see that in the inner being of the sphere of appear-ance, understanding gets to know in truth nothing 
else but appearance itself, not, however, appearance in the shape 
of a play of forces, but that play of forces in its absolutely univer-
sal moments and in the process of those moments; in fact, un-
derstanding merely experiences itself … The two extremes, the 
one that of the pure inner region, the other that of the inner be-
ing gazing into this pure inner region, are now merged together; 
and as they have disappeared qua extremes, the middle term, the 
mediating agency, qua something other than these extremes, has 
also vanished. This curtain [of appearance], therefore, hanging 
before the inner world is withdrawn, and we have here the inner 
being [the ego] gazing into the inner realm – the vision of the 
undistinguished selfsame reality, which repels itself from itself, 
affirms itself as a divided and distinguished inner reality, but as 
one for which at the same time the two factors have immediately 
no distinction; what we have here is Self-consciousness. 
It is manifest that behind the so-called curtain, which is 
to hide the inner world, there is nothing to be seen unless we 
ourselves go behind there, as much in order that we may thereby 
see, as that there may be something behind there which can 
be seen. But it is clear at the same time that we cannot without 
more ado go straightway behind there. For this knowledge of 
what is the truth of the idea of the realm of appearance and of its 
inner being, is itself only a result arrived at after a long and devi-
ous process, in the course of which the modes of consciousness, 
“meaning”, “perception”, and “understanding” disappear.”12
Hegel comes to similar conclusion as Flusser, images are deceptions, but he adds a vital component, essence of 
the deception is not only similarity but self-similarity, self-con-
scious, this is what escapes the mind (intellect). But Flusser 
also has some things to say about the rules of deception.
»Despite the fact that the camera is based on complex scientific and technical principles, it is a very simple 
matter to make it function. The camera is a structurally com-
plex, but functionally simple, a plaything. In this respect it is 
the opposite of chess which is structurally simple, and func-
tionally complex, game…
Anyone who writes has to master the rules of spelling 
and grammar. Anyone who takes snaps has to adhere to the 
instructions for use – becoming simpler and simpler – that are 
programmed to control the output end of the camera. This is 
democracy in post–industrial society. Therefore people taking 
snaps are unable to decode photographs: They think photo-
graphs are an automatic reflection of the world. This leads to 
11 G. W. F. Hegel: Wissenschaft der Logik, 2. Teil: Die subjektive Logik oder Lehre vom 
Begriff, http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/hegel/logik2/toc.htm, my translation. 
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This is why I will try, through introduction of theory of ho-
lography that in optical sense directly relates to Lacan’s formula-
tions, simplify relation between the gaze and four concepts.
Before I start concrete comparison of psychoanalytical concepts and holography some introductory information 
regarding Lacan’s understanding of the gaze have to be made.
Lacan’s key thesis concerning the gaze as objet petit a14 is 
there is always a certain split, a certain schism between the eye 
and the gaze. This is so, because the gaze always escapes the eye. 
It escapes, to put it somewhat simplified, because of the differ-
ence between the light and the image. Light is what can never 
be looked into directly. Direct light intrusion can injure our eye. 
Thus we need, in order to see the image (picture), some sort of 
a screen. It enables us, due to its non-transparency, to see things 
in light, as Lacan would put it, to see geometrical optical space 
with perspective, colours and all the other appurtenances. As 
defined by Lacan, screen works similarly to shutter blades in 
photographic camera. Higher the f-stop on the camera’s lens, the 
more obscured our view is, the more we see. Namely the depth 
of field of our view is increasing.
The screen has, besides obscuring our gaze, another impor-
tant feature; It can also reflect light, working similarly to mirror. 
It obscures because it is reflective. Light which reflects from the 
screen is the light of our gaze, screen returns our gaze, it enables 
us to see ourselves in the image.
Both effects of the functioning of the screen can be, simi-
larly as screen itself, described with photographing techniques. 
When we measure the light of an object we want to photograph 
with a light meter15 we can choose among two options. We can 
measure incident light which tells us what settings we should 
choose to make the object in the picture look accordant with its 
surroundings, so it will be clearly seen what parts are better lit 
and what parts worse (on the level of Lacan’s interpretation of 
the gaze we could talk about geometrical image) and reflected 
light which will tell us what settings should be made in order 
to make the object be seen in the best possible light. Other 
elements of the picture will be either underexposed or overex-
posed.16 Inside Lacan’s reasoning we could say, we will only get 
the screen or the stain in the picture.
Due to reflectivity of the screen the gaze and indirectly also 
light enters our eye. Thus Lacan makes two statements. Through 
the gaze I am being photo-graphed, referring here to the fact 
light enters the eye from outside, and the gaze is always outside 
me, referring here to the fact that the gaze is the one who looks 
at me, since it photo-graphs me, not vice versa. These two state-
ments have huge impact in the field of psychoanalysis for Lacan 
uses them to implicate the thesis that image in reality is nothing 
but illusion, that we have eyes in order not to see how (that) 
other see us, but we will get back to this issue later.
I t is time to spend some time on two images, present in this text, I think excellently represent relation of psychoanalysis 
and holography. First is a reproduction of the painting by Hans 
14 In psychoanalysis object petit a represents the instance of the other. In the 
context of the gaze the subject’s relation with the other through the gaze is in 
question.
15 The light meter in question is a hand light meter, the ones that are built in 
cameras measure, more or less accurately, only light reflected from the object.
16 In case the elements surrounding the object are equally reflective as object 
itself, the resulting picture will not be different from that, taken with incident 
light metering. Such cases are quite rare in practice.
Holbein Ambassadors painted in 1533 (picture 1). Original 
was created in time, when research of geometrical optics en-
abled ways of fairly precise determining of correct perspective. 
Let me only mention the famous Dührer’s screen.17 Due to 
this research, playing with perspective or the so-called ana-
morphoses, became popular. Lacan ascribes them the point of 
implementation of the gaze in the image.
We can see two men on Holbein’s painting, surrounded 
by numerous objects that, in the spirit of the time of the paint-
ing’s origin, symbolized knowledge and art. On the bottom 
of the painting, beneath the figures and objects a stain can be 
seen. Distortion to which, at first, no logical form could be 
ascribed. Only when we look at the stain from the right per-
spective18 we see that it is actually a skull painted in a different 
perspective than the rest of the painting. The need to glance 
at the painting with the right gaze and see the skull, which 
by the way alludes on vanity (vanitatis) of knowledge and art 
surrounding the ambassadors is loquacious witness in favor of 
Lacan’s conception of the gaze.
Second image is a diagram of hologram capture procedure 
(picture 2). It shows how we can achieve the so called inter-
ference effect to be written on (photographic) plate by using 
a laser beam split on object and reference beam; one lits the 
object and reflects to the plate, the other travels directly to the 
plate. It is precisely interference which, when hologram is later 
lit at the angle of the reference beam, enables the viewer to see 
three-dimensional, spatial images, which have, in opposite to 
(normal) photographs, the parallax.19
Holograms are basically nothing else then images of emp-
ty space formerly occupied by the original object, now sur-
17 See http://www.all-art.org/durer/durer5.html for detailed explanation of 
Dürher’s work and his drawings.
18 On how the Ambassadors should be gazed to see, what the stain represents, Jurgis 
Baltrušaitis has written in his Anamorphic Art, Harry N. Abrams, New York 1983. 
The painting was situated in a hall with two entrances. Visitors entered through the 
right one. They could inspect the painting thoroughly. Usually they could see the 
stain but could not make sense of it. When they were leaving the room, through the 
doors on the left, they took another glance at the painting. Then, when they turned 
their head from the left to the right, they could see, what the stain really was.
19 Parallax is the ability to see around objects.
Picture 1: Ambassadors (Hans Holbein)
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rounded by light.20 Somewhat structuralistic like loss, which in 
addition of reminding of the vanitatis of the Holbein’s painting 
carries also other analogies to which we will return.
We have reached the point when we introduce hologra-phy. First we will take a look at analogy between the 
functioning of the laser and pulsion.
Laser is a device that emits a special kind of light, which in the time of the invention, in the 1960s, enabled tremen-
dous progress in holography.21 The name laser is an abbrevia-
tion for Light Amplification by Stimulated Emission of (elec-
tromagnetic) Radiation. Its electronic light is distinguished by 
three features. The most important one being the fact that laser 
light is the most coherent light we can produce. This means 
its waving has equal frequency or, with other words, that light 
waves transmitted by laser of exact same power and follow 
each other in exact same time intervals. Second key character-
istic of laser light is the fact it is in phase. Because of the coher-
ency of the light its waving is symmetrical, implicating that 
two different wavings, both in phase, can be easily summed. 
The phenomenon is called constructive interference and is 
the opposite of destructive one, where the two wavings an-
20 The fact, that in laboratory conditions, upon preparation of the hologram 
capture, one can not tell the difference between the real object and laser 
holographic image, tells us how illusory can certain images be.
21 The technique of making holograms was invented 1948 by Hungarian physicist 
Dennis Gabor who didn’t have the light source quality enough at his disposal to 
create holograms which could match those created after the invention of the laser.
nul each other (see picture 3). Quality hologram recording is 
possible only when interference between the object and the 
reference beam is constructive.22 Third important feature of 
the laser light is that it is very focused. Photons travel in the 
same direction in the shape of a beam.
Now, let’s include pulsion23 which in psychoanalysis repre-sents, crudely said, a force through which the effects of 
the unconscious are shown. Perhaps it would be best to start 
off by inspecting Lacan’s sentence in which the pulsion is ex-
plicitly linked to the rest of the fundamental concepts:
The pulsation of the unconscious is attached to the 
transfer through the wish.
Let us take a closer look at the sentence. Pulsation of the 
unconscious means its effect, a way in which unconscious 
is manifested. Well, this pulsation attaches to the transfer. 
Transfer in psychoanalysis is an instance, where the analyst 
and patient meet. The subject and the other. It can be posi-
tive or negative, depending on the harmony of their relation. 
I should say depending on how harmonious are their desires, 
since Lacan’s sentence interpreted here, says that pulsation 
attaches to the transfer through the wish. Wish, according to 
22 Interference carries another interesting hologramic characteristic. Because the 
interference pattern between the reference and object beam stored on hologram is 
coherent and constructive, there is a part of the whole in every part of the hologram. 
In practice this means that we can cut any hologram in half and still get, when lit, 
the whole image, only half smaller. Due to this very fact, Karl Pribram developed his 
thesis about the holographic functioning of the human brain and memory.
 It is amusing that approximately a century before, following similar experiences, 
Freud came to its theory of unconscious in which each part also corresponds to 
the whole. We must not forget Freud started his career as neurologist. In his work 
in Brücke’s laboratory, upon researching the aphasias, he performed a task, one of 
the last in his neurology days, of classifying results concerning relation between 
various parts of the brain and their functions. Due to very contrary claims by 
numerous authors about which part of the brain is meant for what, he came to the 
conclusion that no individual centers exist in the brain that ought to be related to 
certain functions, since the brain can perform these functions even when the part 
of the brain, meant for their control, is missing. This conclusion led him to resolu-
tion, vital not only for the elaboration of the idea of the unconscious but also for 
vastly more general field. Namely Freud made a claim that source of aphasia is not 
of organic (somatic) nature but of functional, a very radical thesis for his time.
 A couple of years later, when he was writing his Three Essays on the Theory of 
Sexuality he repeated his claim, he said that problem of neurosis is not bodily 
disorder but merely over-disfunctionality (cf., Davidson, Arnold Ira: Emergence 
of Sexuality; Harvard University Press, London 2001).
 Translated into the language of the holography this would mean we are sound, when 
our psyche is interferencially constructive, ill when it is interferencially destructive.
23 Freud called the process Trieb, Lacan pulsion, it is sometimes translated into 
English as instinct.
Picture 4: Schema of pulsionPicture 2: Hologram capture procedure
Picture 3: Constructive and destructive interference
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Lacan, is what can never be satisfied. Satisfying one wish gives 
birth to another. Wish in that respect is constantly sliding, it 
eludes us. Much like it was the case before, when the gaze was 
in question. Because satisfaction of the wish is always a failure 
or at best partial success, the satisfaction must be sought again. 
Again and again. And here is the place of the fourth of the 
Lacan’s fundamental concepts, repetition.
Pulsion according to Lacan24 is thus a constant, omnipres-
ent and permanent force which consists, due to the failure of 
satisfying the wish, of many little repetitions, variations. If we 
want to present it in optical sense, a diagram is obtained, which 
is practically identical to the picture of waving. When pulsion 
is lifted of the subject from its source (edge) and surrounds the 
object (a), it returns (unsatisfied) to its origin. And then once 
again emerges (see picture 4).25
For easier understanding of the said I will describe an example, through which it will be clearer, I hope, how as 
distinct things as constancy of the pulsion and its variation, 
meaning of the eye-gaze split, function of the screen and op-
eration of the laser light are connected.
Let us imagine a computer or television screen. The image 
we are looking at appears to be constant, monolith. If we want 
to see its true nature, therefore the fact the image is constantly 
refreshing, constantly reloading, we must turn our eyes away 
from the screen and look past it. Only then we see, in the 
corner of our eyes, in the area the screen takes place, that the 
image is actually flickering.26
Conclusion
What has analysis brought us to? How then the visual 
effects us and what is its language? The answer lays hidden in 
the sphere of the gaze. It is there where the subject encounters 
the other; it is there the deception takes place. To understand 
the mechanism of the deception we must have in mind both 
Hegel’s self-consciousness and Flusser’s wish to break the 
circle of deceit. We can add to them Lacan’s answer he gives at 
the end of his seminar.
“For the subject who is supposed to know, we should suppose, he evaporates precisely in the moment his 
existence gains the most powerful grounding. If therefore the 
term liquidation should have any sense, only the liquidation 
of the deception can be concerned, through which the trans-
fer tries to achieve the unconscious to close. I described the 
24 Let me note, that although I ascribe most of the psychoanalytical terms to 
Lacan, these, in similar form, exist already within Freud’s own work.
25 Good interpretation of functioning of the pulsion has Alenka Zupančič in one of 
her articles where she takes on, interesting, linking psychoanalytical concept of 
pulsion with a film by French director Cris Marker entitled La jetée (airport plat-
form), which talks about a special time paradox and is half-hour long, sci-fi movie 
composed solely of photographs. “Lacan positions pulsion’s circular nature, its 
reverse movement, its transposition and switch-ability as key or fundamental 
level of each pulsion.” (in Alenka Zupačnčič:: La jetée ali ljubezen kot pulzija [La 
jetée or love as pulsion], magazine Problemi 7/8 98, Ljubljana 1998.) Precisely 
the fact that pulsion involves both circularity and waving is similar to the physi-
cal interpretation of the pulsion, namely pulsation of a pulse laser, which bursts 
sudden, short but strong emissions of light. Laser light moves, in accordance to 
quantum laws of physics, as all other electromagnetic waving, concentrically and 
in wave forms at the same time, is both particle and energy.
26 All screens flicker. It is true that newer and better, both computer and television 
screens flicker faster. The oscillation frequency is often so fast our eye does not 
detect flickering even when we are looking past the screen. But this does not 
mean, that repetition is absent; only the deception of the gaze is more powerful.
mechanism of this deception when I linked it to narcissistic 
relation in which the subject makes itself an object of love. 
With reference on the one it should love, it tries to lure the 
Other into some apparent, deceiving relation inside which he 
tries to convince the other is worthy of its love.
Freud noted natural fulfillment of this relation within the 
function called identification. Identification concerned here 
is not … mirror, direct identification, but its support. It sup-
ports and carries perspective the subject chooses in the field 
of the Other, perspective from which mirror identification 
can be perceived as satisfactory. The instance of the ideal-self 
is the point where the subject will see himself, as we say it, as 
if someone else was looking at him – and this will offer him 
support in some dual situation, which for him can be satisfied 
from the viewpoint of love.
Love in essence is, as far as it is a specular apparition, a 
deception. It invests itself in the field on the referential level 
established by the one and only signifier, needed for introduc-
tion of perspective whose initial point if the gaze is an ideal 
point, the big I, somewhere in the other, – the point from 
which the other sees me in form that pleases me.
But inside this very concordance, in which the analysis 
is brought in by the deceiving face which operates in transfer, 
we can find something paradoxical – discover the analyst. This 
discovery can be realized only on some other level, level on 
which we positioned the relation of the alienation.”27
What is Lacan saying? Nothing surprisingly new but nonetheless fascinating. On the point of the self-
identification the subject sees (and deceits) himself as the one, 
who gazes and is gazed at the same time, is thus a subject split 
simultaneously on itself as subject and object, Hegel would say 
it is a devious process. And while at it, he discovers the analyst 
which would in the language of the holography correspond to 
the reference beam.
Does the subject with this action break the magical pho-tographical circle Flusser mentions? By all means. Visual 
effects us with its certainty of deception, that we are alone, that 
we listen to our own language. When we find out we are not 
alone and there is always the Other present, tough only in our 
heads,28 we see we are not bound to plain pulsating, eternal 
failed encounter with ourselves. Only when we meet the other 
we get to know ourselves.
But one has to be careful. Once broken circle does not bring freedom from (self)deception. One has to meet the 
other more often, or as things in holography work: hologram, 
the whole picture, can be seen only when it is being lit by a 
reference beam or later on its surrogate.
Only constant (constructive) interference between the 
analyzed and the analyst, object and reference beam, photog-
raphy as created and the human being as the photographer, 
prevents falling back into plain certainty of deception and 
brings the possibility of progress, development.
27 Jacques Lacan: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, (Trans. 
Alan Sheridan), Norton & Co, New York-London 1981, p. 259.
28 Descartes has concluded his doubt in the other with the thought that as a mat-
ter of fact it is not important whether the other exists, it is also not important 
whether we, ourselves exist, it is important what the awareness of the other 
brings forth, what kind of split inside a human being. 
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MUSIC AND EMOTION: AN EMPIRICAL CRITIQUE  
OF A KEY ISSUE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC
Overview
There is a long tradition of speculative writing on music 
by aestheticians and musicologists, with notable contributions 
by Avison (1752), Hanslick (1854), Gurney (1880), Langer 
(1942) and Meyer (1956), whose ideas are very much alive 
in the contemporary thought of philosophers of music such 
as Davies (1994, 2001), Kivy (1989, 1990, 1999), Levinson 
(1990, 1996) and London (2001-2002). The crux of the debate 
in these works has been the relationship of music and emotion, 
and specifically the issues of expression and induction of emo-
tion by (instrumental) music. Kivy has addressed these issues 
influentially, in part by means of his emotivist versus cognitivist 
dichotomy. A related topic has been the comparison of “musical 
emotions” to those that arise in the non-musical “real world.” 
The aims of this paper are: (a) to show that the most 
important claims by the contemporary philosophers of music 
are empirically testable; (b) to review some of the recent ex-
perimental work, including that in the author’s laboratory; and 
(c) to demonstrate how such methodological and empirical 
advances can render certain aspects of the philosophical com-
mentary obsolete (including Kivy’s – as it turns out – rather 
simplistic dichotomy). 
The paper concludes with a statement of the attempt to 
replace the concept of “musical emotions” by those of the 
empirically measurable responses and states of “thrills/chills,” 
“being moved” and “aesthetic awe” – with all three of these 
states being hierarchically arranged components in the Aes-
thetic Trinity theory (Konečni, 2004a, 2005a).
Empirical Testability of Claims  
in the Aesthetics of Music
In papers at three recent aesthetics conferences (Konečni, 
2004a, 2004b, 2005b), in Wuhan (China), Rio de Janeiro, and 
Daugavpils (Latvia), I tried to demonstrate that many claims 
in (philosophical) aesthetics are empirically verifiable. The 
assertion was also made that when a philosophical statement 
permits falsification (e.g., Popper, 1935/1959) by feasible em-
pirical tests, there is little justification for continuing to make 
the claim – especially in the face of competing cogent claims – 
without attempting to carry out the empirical work, or, at least, 
to have a mental readiness to modify the claim when faced 
with the results of reasonable empirical tests. 
Among the various domains of philosophical aesthetics, 
claims in the domain of music are especially notable for their 
empirical testability. Perhaps the main reason for this is the 
formal and highly specialized nature of music theory that does 
not easily permit nebulousness, politically motivated arbitrari-
ness, and relativistic caprice. Even music criticism is rather 
technical, so that examples of “destructive deconstruction” 
(Konečni, 2004a, 2005a) are blissfully rare – limited mostly to 
the occasional excess regarding, for instance, the patriarchal/
male-sexual nature of development in Beethoven’s symphonies 
or the oppression of women in opera; and while the body of 
feminist work in these areas is undoubtedly growing (e.g., 
Clément, 1988; Cusick, 1993; Meredith, 1993-1994; McCla-
ry, 1991, 1993, 1994), it is circumscribed. Other artistic and 
cultural domains are simply more suitable – in part by requir-
ing less technical knowledge – for the purpose of the applica-
tion of socio-political agendas. By being relatively exact, the 
language of music generally forces a greater degree of precision 
in the language about music – and this, in turn, increases the 
possibility of meaningful empirical tests.
The second reason is the key role that the concept of emo-
tion has rightly had in the writings on the aesthetics of music; 
and although definitions of emotion have abounded in both 
philosophy and psychology, the accumulated methodological 
and measurement advances in experimental psychology have 
gradually led to a contemporary crystallization of opinion, 
specifically with regard to a distinction between emotions and, 
for example, moods, drives, attitudes, and personality disposi-
tions (e.g., Barrett, 2006a, 2006b; Konečni, 1982, 1991, 2003; 
Scherer & Zentner, 2001). The fact and nature of measurabil-
ity of emotional experience (as opposed to, for example, an at-
titude about some emotion-related object) dictate definitional 
precision. So, unless philosophers of music decide to ignore 
the recent experimental (including neuro-scientific) work 
on emotion in psychology – which they can do only at their 
intellectual peril – they will have to, as a first step, tighten their 
definitions of emotion. Time has perhaps come to become 
technical about emotion (instead of inadequately introspec-
tive, folksy, or arbitrary).
Most psychologists who work on the relationship be-
tween music and emotion (M-E) pay little (e.g., Gabrielsson, 
2001-2002; Konečni, 2006; Krumhansl, 1997) or no attention 
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to philosophers of music, including Kivy. Unfortunately, an 
examination of Kivy’s (1989, 1990, 1999) emotivist-cognitiv-
ist dichotomy in the present paper will justify its continuing 
neglect by the experimentally (and even logically) minded. 
The attention that Kivy’s approach receives here is not due to 
its objective merit, but to its influence and centrality in the 
philosophy of music: The present focus is a useful demonstra-
tion of whether and how psychological findings may (should?) 
affect the discourse on M-E in philosophy.
Psychological Theorizing and Findings 
Relevant to the Emotivist-Cognitivist 
Dichotomy
Kivy’s view of the emotivist position is that the expression 
of an emotion by music is essentially nothing but the music’s 
power to induce that emotion in the listener. 
Listeners will judge or describe a piece of music as “sad” 
to the extent that it makes them sad. This implies (a) that 
music has the ability to induce, directly, an emotion, such as 
sadness, in listeners, and (b) that listeners are unlikely to judge 
a composition as expressive of sadness if they experience no 
emotion. Perhaps the best defense of the emotivist position, 
which gave a renewed impetus to “arousalism” in the philoso-
phy of music, was provided by Radford (1989, 1991).
The cognitivist position, which Kivy espouses, specifically 
rejects the emotivist point (a) above on the grounds that the 
listener’s sadness, as one of the “garden-variety” emotions, re-
quires an object that is believed by the listener to fall under the 
emotion-relevant description – and music does not fulfill this 
requirement (of course, an off-key singer may cause garden-va-
riety annoyance, but that is not interesting here). With regard 
to point (b) above, the cognitivist view is that the expression 
of emotion by music is related to the listeners’ recognition of 
that emotion (without experiencing it). So one could say that 
both the emotivist and the cognitivist view accept that music 
may express emotion, and the key difference is one of the form 
that expression takes, speccifically regarding the possibility of 
induction of emotion.
This writer’s view, on the basis of psychological theoriz-
ing and experiments, is that both points (a) and (b) above, in 
the emotivist position, are incorrect, but that the reasons pre-
sented for the incorrectness by Kivy are also inadequate: Kivy 
is right, but arbitrary, regarding (a), and right, but incomplete, 
regarding (b); in both cases, he is oversimplifying. 
Emotivist Point (a), Regarding Induction  
of Emotion
Definitions of emotion in experimental psychology are 
based on a great deal of empirical work and are thus forced to 
consider many factors that Kivy, for example, in his armchair, 
has the luxury of ignoring. An example of issues and processes 
that have emerged from over a 100 years of experimentation 
can be found in Konečni (2003, p 332): 
“Because the primary emotions -- anger, fear, happiness, 
sadness -- guide and energize behavior in crucial life situations, 
those with enormous biological consequences, they have been 
subjected to considerable selective and adaptive evolutionary 
pressures. Emotions are psychologically, physiologically, and 
metabolically “expensive” and thus reserved for emergencies; 
when they do occur, they are major events in human pheno-
menology. The key attributes of the basic emotions are that 
numerous bodily systems are involved, simultaneously and 
in tandem; that they are acute, occurring in “episodes,” with 
feedback loops; highly pronounced; readily identifiable and 
reportable by the experiencer; that they flood consciousness 
and are pan-cultural in terms of experience and expression; 
and that they have an unambiguous cause/object.”
As can be seen, the requirement of emotions having a 
cause or object (believed to be relevant by the experiencing 
person) – the requirement that is Kivy’s sole criterion for 
“garden-variety” emotions – is only one in a long integrated 
list. The items on this list have been explicitly taken into ac-
count in several models of emotional states as temporal epi-
sodes, one of which is Konečni’s (1991; 2006, see Figure 1) 
Prototypical Emotion-Episode Model (PEEM). In this view, 
Kivy is correct in rejecting the emotivist point (a), but, since 
he has a limited factual basis for doing so, the rejection can be 
considered gratuitous.
In the present view, the emotivist point (a) – to the effect 
that music can directly induce emotion in listeners – is inac-
curate because of the “directly” specification. Very recent re-
search (Konečni, Brown, & Wanic, in press) strongly indicates 
that the effect of music on emotion occurs, when it does, only 
because it is mediated, for example, by the thoughts, memories, 
and personal associations of the listener – and even then the 
emotion, though genuine, is of low intensity (see also Table 1 
and Figure 2 in Konečni, 2006). 
Although this notion is not entirely new to philoso-
phers, it is not welcome, for different obvious reasons, to 
either emotivists or cognitivists; however, such an indirect, 
mediated effect is all that they are likely going to find, if they 
stick to facts and the empirical literature, with regard to the 
induction of emotion by music. This is because a number 
of well-known empirical studies (e.g., Krumhansl, 1997; 
Nykliček, 1997; Rickard, 2004; Waterman, 1996) that are 
typically cited by emotivists (or part-time emotivists) in phi-
losophy, and the adherents of the M®E model in the psychol-
ogy of music, as supporting their respective points of view, 
are actually far from convincing when subjected to an appro-
priate methodological and experimental scrutiny (Konečni, 
2006; Konečni, Brown, & Wanic, in press; Konečni, Wanic, 
& Brown, in press).
Music-Induced Emotions and Those  
in the (Non-Music)“Real World”
The emotivist point (a) can be usefully addressed from a 
somewhat different angle – traditionally interesting to experi-
mental psychologists of music – by comparing directly the 
emotional states (if any) induced by music to the states result-
ing from experimental manipulations analogous to the ways in 
which emotions typically arise in the non-musical “real world.” 
The study by Konečni, Brown, and Wanic (in press) is perhaps 
the first in the literature to compare the effects of “sad,” neutral, 
and “happy” music on the participants’ emotional state to 
the effects of the same participants’ recall of sad, neutral, and 
happy life-events on their reported emotion, using the same 
13-point happy-sad scale. In the case of recall, the participants 
provided measures of both how they felt at the time the event 
originally occurred and how they felt in the laboratory having 
just thought about the event. The music selections were by Al-
binoni, Respighi, and Vivaldi, with the first and third of these 
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the same pieces that were used by Krumhansl (1997). For 
both the “sad” and “happy” tasks, the participants rated their 
emotional state at the time the (non-musical) real life-event 
actually occurred as considerably more extreme than both (a) 
their emotional response to it at the time of recall and (b) their 
response to the musical stimuli. In addition, even the emotion-
al state experienced in the laboratory after recalling the life-
event was significantly more extreme than the one produced 
by music. In terms of the aforementioned PEEM, there is no 
doubt that thinking of a real-life event is a far more powerful 
stimulus than is listening to music of the same valence.
One aspect of this study conceivably provides some sup-
port for the emotivist viewpoint: The participants’ ratings of 
their emotional state after listening to music were significantly 
different from zero (the scale midpoint). Not much should be 
read into this M®E “residual,” however, because it can be read-
ily and convincingly explained by methodological, linguistic, 
and cultural response artifacts (Konečni, 2006) and, more 
substantively, by the M®Assoc®E model mentioned above 
(Konečni, Brown, & Wanic, in press).
Emotivist Point (b), Regarding Judgment  
of Expressiveness
Given the suspect status of the direct induction of emo-
tion by music, it follows that the emotivist point (b) – that 
listeners are unlikely to judge a composition as expressive of an 
emotion if they do not experience that emotion – is even more 
dubious. Indeed, there is overwhelming evidence that people 
can reliably judge the expressiveness of a piece of music, 
including the emotional “domain” or “label” that a composer 
or performer wishes to communicate, even though they feel 
nothing. Subjective processes remains at the level of cognition 
– evaluation, recognition, deliberation, judgment (no matter 
how fast or unconscious). Kivy’s cognitivist rejection of the 
emotivist point (b) – one could justifiably claim that the latter 
is a straw position – is therefore obviously correct in terms of 
the big picture; however, his rejection lacks detail and contex-
tual subtlety that the research literature provides.
Perhaps the most complete recent reviews of the ef-
fects of musical structure and performance attributes on the 
judged expressiveness are by Gabrielsson (2003) and Gabri-
elsson and Lindström (2001). These authors reviewed stud-
ies from the end of the 19th century to the most recent work 
and considered numerous studies that had used a variety of 
measurement techniques and involved an examination of 
the effects of over 20 structural factors both in isolation and 
in real music. Although Gabrielsson and Lindström (2001) 
note many methodological problems and gaps in the evi-
dence, there seems to be little doubt – even, to some extent, 
cross-culturally – that “music can express, depict, and allude 
to both the differential auditory patterns commonly associ-
ated in the abstract with the fundamental emotions, and the 
specific physical and vocal behavior of a human or animal ex-
periencing and displaying such emotions” (Konečni, Brown, 
& Wanic, in press, p. 3). Without engaging in additional 
definitional quibbling with philosophers of music, it can be 
safely stated that “emotional expression” in music – without 
induction – is a far more complex issue than either emotiv-
ists or cognitivists (including Kivy) have acknowledged, and 
that it has by now been thoroughly documented by psycho-
logical research.
“Musical Emotions” – Or Aesthetic Awe,  
Being Moved, Thrills?
Along with recognizing the possibility of M®Assoc®E, 
Charles Darwin and some of his contemporaries suggested the 
idea of music inducing strong emotions but of a kind quali-
tatively different from the basic emotions – hence “musical 
emotions.” For instance, according to Gurney (1880/1966, p. 
120), “[m]usic’s… essential effect… [is a] production in us 
of an emotional excitement of a very intense kind, which yet 
cannot be defined under any known head of emotion.” Recent 
users of the term have been Kivy (1999), Krumhansl (2002), 
and Scherer, Zentner, and Schacht (2001-2002).
A century and a quarter after Gurney’s (1880/1966) 
book, the term remains deeply unsatisfying. One can only 
agree with Zangwill (2004, p. 35) who writes: “Why call it 
[i.e., musical emotion] an emotion if it does not stand in any of 
the rational relations that we normally think characterize emo-
tions? We are left with a potentially obscurantist view which 
speaks of emotion but which is not prepared to pay the price.”
The dissatisfaction with the term “musical emotions;” 
the realization (reached by Plato, Darwin, and Gurney, among 
others) that music can, at least on rare occasions and in spe-
cial settings, have profound emotional or quasi-emotional 
effects that are subjectively different from the experience of 
the basic emotions; the data from Gabrielsson’s (e.g., 2001) 
Strong-Experiences-with-Music (SEM) approach; the afore-
mentioned findings by Konečni, Brown, and Wanic (in press); 
and the work of Keltner and Haidt (2003) on awe: All of these 
considerations have led the author in the formulation of the 
Aesthetic Trinity theory (Konečni, 2005a), the name of which 
refers to the related states of aesthetic awe, being moved, and 
thrills or chills. 
Aesthetic Awe
Aesthetic awe is regarded as the most profound human 
aesthetic response – to a sublime stimulus-in-context. In the 
present view, the sublime is epitomized by objects of great 
rarity, exceptional beauty, and physical grandeur (among other 
features discussed by Konečni, 2005a). The Cheops (or Khu-
fu) pyramid of El Gizeh, Egypt, is the prototypical sublime 
stimulus to which, under appropriate circumstances, aesthetic 
awe is proposed as the prototypical response. Aesthetic awe 
may have originated in primeval times in response to natural 
wonders, which was later extended to colossal human artifacts. 
It is a mixture of joy and fear, but, somewhat unlike the basic 
emotions, it can be more easily “switched off ” by altering the 
focus of attention: The sublime does not urgently press, from 
an existential point of view (Konečni, 2005a). Nevertheless, 
the perception of existential safety is crucial, especially for the 
natural sublime.
Being moved and thrills or chills are postulated as always 
accompanying aesthetic awe, but are far more frequent re-
sponses (especially thrills/chills). Aesthetic awe presumably 
shares with both joy and sadness the state of being moved. The 
requirement of existential safety differentiates it from fear, but 
it is on the same continuum: Whereas aesthetic awe shares 
thrills with joy, they are experienced as chills when there is a 
modicum of danger (Konečni, 2005a).
Can music induce aesthetic awe? The pinnacles of com-
posed and performed music are often enough called “sublime,” 
but, in the present view, music formally becomes sublime and 
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may induce aesthetic awe only when it is performed in vast 
architectural spaces with superb acoustics, which are also of 
extraordinary beauty (Konečni, 2005a). European mediaeval 
cathedrals are prototypes and they, surely not coincidentally, 
are the locations with the longest tradition of performance of 
Western music of the highest caliber. 
Being Moved Or Touched
Being moved is considered in the aesthetic trinity theory 
to be a genuine and profound subjective state, measurable by 
verbal report (Konečni, 2005a), and often accompanied by 
thrills. It can be induced by structural aspects, plot, and narra-
tive in a variety of art forms, but the being-moved response to 
“absolute” music may be the most interesting case. Scherer and 
Zentner (2001) have suggested that being moved or touched 
is a good descriptor for an intense response to music and, like 
Konečni (2005a), have pointed out that there are languages 
that, unlike English and French, possess a substantive form of 
this term (in Serbian, for example, there are nouns for both the 
stimulus and response side: dirljivost and dirnutost or ganutost; 
in German: Rührung). It is reasonable to infer that many of 
Gabrielsson’s (2001) SEM-project respondents experienced 
such a state, sometimes accompanied by a “lump in the throat” 
or tears (cf. Scherer et al., 2001-2002). 
Thrills Or Chills
This interesting physiological phenomenon has been 
described as an “archaic response of short duration to 
aesthetic (and other) stimuli, consisting of pilo-erection 
on the back of the neck, [and] shivers down the spine that 
can spread to arms and other parts of the body” (Konečni, 
2005a, p. 36). The response can be reported with a high 
degree of reliability (Konečni, Wanic, & Brown, in press). 
Since Goldstein’s (1980) survey and pharmacological study, 
there has been a certain amount of laboratory and retrospec-
tive work on thrills in response to music (e.g., Blood & Za-
torre, 2001; Konečni, Wanic, & Brown, in press; Panksepp, 
1995; Rickard, 2004; Sloboda, 1991), as well as to stories, 
paintings, and architectural objects in combination with 
music, including instrumental versions of national anthems 
(Konečni, Wanic, & Brown, in press). However, detailed 
recent experimental work by Konečni, Wanic, and Brown (in 
press) demonstrated that although thrills may often serve as 
the physiological platform for profound aesthetic experience 
– and frequent as they may be in the lives of many people 
(Goldstein, 1980; Panksepp, 1995) – they are generally fleet-
ing events and can hardly, in and of themselves, be consid-
ered genuine emotional responses.
Conclusions
The Aesthetic Trinity theory suggests that to be moved, 
sometimes with a lump in the throat, tears, or thrills, is the 
most interesting, memorable, and profound music-related 
subjective state. Being moved is rare and rarer still is the listen-
ing environment that can help music be sublime and elevate 
the response state to aesthetic awe.
The theory employs in a new way some concepts of long 
standing in philosophical aesthetics (such as the sublime), as 
well as others (being moved, thrills) to which serious attention 
is only beginning to be addressed by philosophers of music 
(e.g., Levinson, 2006, on thrills/chills). By dealing, in a man-
ner that leaves questions open to experimentation, with the 
set of issues that have been inadequately covered by “musical 
emotions,” and bypassing the emotivist-cognitivist unsatisfac-
tory dichotomy, the Aesthetic Trinity theory can provide a 
bridge between philosophical and empirical aesthetics – spe-
cifically regarding emotion in music. 
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The definition and general characteristics  
of imagination
In different encyclopaedias imagination is usually described 
as the power and process of producing mental images and ideas. 
It enables conscious beings to solve problems (and hence increase 
their mental abilities) by the use of mental simulation (Kovačev, 
1991). The term is used for the process of the mental formation of 
new images, which have not been previously experienced or have 
been only partially experienced and later appeared in different 
combinations. Fairy tales and fiction generally are the result of this 
process of combination. They invite readers to pretend that they are 
true by referring to the objects in their minds that do not exist apart 
from an imaginary world (Bulfinch, 1942).
The fundamental characteristic of imagination is the absence 
of objective restraints. Therefore imagination implies a certain 
unreality. Its freedom from objective limitations makes it a source 
of pleasure and pain (Osborn, 1993).
In general human imagination can be understood as a remark-
able mental power, which enables people to visualize new ideas and 
concepts within their minds, the capability to associate sounds (of a 
language) or marks on a paper, etc. with things and abstract thoughts 
and to communicate these ideas to other people across time and 
place. It is based on the fundamental human abilities and the past 
mental achievements which have contributed to the knowledge and 
progress of mankind (Hamilton, 1996). Because of these character-
istics imagination gave people power to build upon the ideas of other 
people and by this to progress and develop other potentials. 
Human mind constantly explores the mysteries that surround it and slowly progresses forward into the vast unknown. Its tre-
mendous creative power and its insatiable curiosity have made pos-
sible a steady gradual progression of its total knowledge, its penetra-
tion in all directions, learning, questioning, discovering the secrets 
of nature, inventing new technologies and creating new myths and 
stories that control every aspect of human life. This mental power 
has allowed mankind to understand the wonders of the universe, to 
create civilizations, that is to progress on a higher level of individual, 
social and cognitive development (Kovačev, 1991).
Imagination has provided people with extreme communication power that allows them to interact with each other and to build 
upon the ideas of the others. Throughout history people have usu-
ally used the knowledge and abilities, acquired by their predeces-
sors, always interacting, innovating and improving the innovations. 
By such behavioural strategies people have developed the ability to 
progress through the ages.
As a result of the power of imagination human mind has been transformed into a new, unique entity. Nothing comparable 
has ever existed on this planet before. The mind’s curiosity is in-
satiable; its ability to create (by which it often rivals nature) is an 
extension of nature’s creative power. Still, it creates particular things 
that even nature cannot create (Kovačev, 1991).
According to Tim Crow (2002) the “evolutionary jump” – i.e. the transformation of modern humans into imaginative beings 
- began at around the same time when modern humans evolved a 
“language gene”. This genetic transition might have occurred be-
tween 100,000-150,000 years ago. Crow and many other research-
ers believe that language could have been the catalyst for the break.
Imagination and cognition
Human mind has taken on a life of its own. The development 
of modern information technologies enabled the integration of 
knowledge of many contemporary minds, but also the minds that 
contributed to the progress of mankind in the past. Hamilton (1996) 
stresses that the specific abilities of human mind enabled that it has 
explored almost every nook and cranny around the world, created 
thousands of languages and alphabets, developed and continually 
improved different skills and strategies, created and developed thou-
sands of cultures, religions and philosophies. Over the centuries the 
simple innovations and discoveries have been improved and devel-
oped in different areas of the world and at different times.
Since antiquity, the human imagination has been subjected to many empirical beliefs. Some of them were credible, but many 
of them were not. Nowadays imagination is also under study by 
cognitive science (Kovačev, 1991; Osborn, 1993). 
People rely on the imagination amazingly more than they real-ize. They use it almost all the time. It is so deeply intertwined 
with the thinking processes that if separated, people could not 
think at all (Osborn, 1993). The conscious thinking includes the 
ability to analyze and during that process imagination plays a very 
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During the Predynastic period, scenes depicting fantastic ani-mals mingling with wild, real world animals were carved on 
luxury objects, which were most probably of royal origin,. These 
appeared on different ceremonial objects, found in Upper Egypt. 
Most of these early depictions were of winged, falcon headed grif-
fins, leopards with long, winding necks and other accompanying 
animals that are usually considered to have been inspired by the 
models found in Mesopotamia (Gray, 1982).
Later during the Middle Kingdom, these animals were depicted on the walls of tombs belonging to some high officials at Beni 
Hasan and Bersheh in Middle Egypt. At that time the name of the 
capital city of the Mier nome, when written in hieroglyphs, had two 
serpopards back to back and their necks were held by a man. 
From the beginning of Egyptian history, religious significance has been ascribed to hunting beyond the Nile valley. Hunting 
in the desert became a symbol of subduing and taming the hostile 
forces that threatened the fertile Nile and thus Egyptian civiliza-
tion. These fantastic animals became the actors of the protective 
hunt for the benefit of Egypt (Wallis Budge, 1969). During the 
Middle Kingdom, composite animals were also illustrated on the 
so called “magical wands”, made from hippopotamus ivory and 
reworked into simple curved blades.
 
In ancient Egypt demons were not necessarily evil. Many of them were even very helpful. They frightened any kind of 
malevolent beings by their strange appearance. Magic wands were 
frequently offered to women, and particularly to young mothers, 
in order to protect them and their children against other demons 
bearing sickness. However, those fantastic animals, found depicted 
in tombs, probably served a similar purpose of protecting the 
owners during the afterlife when they had to cross the border 
zones guarded by dangerous beings. 
After the Middle Kingdom, such animals were more scarcely illustrated. Only the winged griffin appeared in the New 
Kingdom, during the period when Egypt was in close contact with 
Near Eastern populations and borrowed some religious features 
from them (Gray, 1982). During the New Kingdom, griffins 
were also associated with hunting scenes, but in some cases, they 
hauled the chariot in which there was a young god, particularly 
Shed, whose task was to chase and kill dangerous desert animals 
(Shaw, Nicholson, 1995).
Although the extensive documentation on Egyptian cultural history does not record fantastic animals in all historical 
periods, they have probably been present all the time. Their im-
ages certainly remained in use during the Roman Empire, which 
is proved by hieroglyphs, examples of which can be found in the 
inscriptions on different temples. Fantastic animals continued to 
be regarded as beneficial powers until the Christian period in the 
Roman era. 
Dragon - the most popular fantastic animal
Dragon is one of the oldest mythological creatures. It ap-
peared in the traditions of almost all cultures back to the begin-
ning of time. Because of this widespread adoption, the dragon 
appeared in numerous forms, and local traditions have been 
created around many of them, ascribing this tribe of monsters 
many attributes. They had the power to be both, beneficent and 
important role. In fact, imagination is an integral part of analyzing. 
One cannot effectively analyze without imaginative input because 
it helps to point out the next logical step. Imagination and analyz-
ing are closely connected (Kovačev, 1991).
Human imagination often influences other mental and physi-cal activities. Its power is particularly obvious in dreams. In 
other realms it is not so apparent, but in spite of that it is just as 
active. In almost all human activities, which are characterised by a 
lack of data, humans use imagination to fill the voids. So it could 
be concluded that knowledge creates the framework of thought 
and imagination does the rest (Osborn, 1993). 
Art and imagination
Imagination is closely connected with artistic creation and 
aesthetic experience. Some authors even denote it as the “missing 
link” between sensory enjoyment and intellectual understanding 
(Kovačev, 2002). There certainly exists an important relation be-
tween aesthetic experience and the experience of everyday life. The 
former is an imaginative reconstruction of the latter, which becomes 
interesting precisely because  – however realistic – it is not real.
•••
Many artistic works from Greek vases to paintings by Bosch, Goya, and Picasso, from folk art to comic strips, advertis-
ing, and Hollywood movies include different fantastic animals, 
i.e. sphinxes, hydras, chimeras, dragons, unicorns, griffins, sirens, 
centaurs and many other creatures (Delacampagne and Delacam-
pagne, 2003; White, 1993). Exploring them can visually and intel-
lectually take us to an impressive journey through five thousand 
years of art, providing the symbolic meanings of such monsters 
and their association with the unconscious part of human mind 
(Kovačev, 2005). 
According to Delacampagne and Delacampagne (2003) in such a “bestiary” we can identify five basic structures (uni-
corn, human-headed animal, animal-headed human, winged quad-
ruped, and dragon), whose stories have appeared from prehistory 
to the present day. Their analysis and interpretation can provide a 
fascinating insight into the processes through which artists have 
created these astonishing animals and into their transmission from 
culture to culture. They prove that fantasy enables the creation of 
the mind’s most sophisticated, mysterious, and inspiring works 
(Lurker, 1991).
Fantastic animals of Ancient Egypt
Ancient Egyptians had highly developed and productive 
imagination. Sculptures of gods often consisted of half animal, half 
human forms, but the Egyptians also created fantastic animals of 
different sorts. Essentially, they took parts of various animals in 
order to create a whole not found in nature. Usually, such animals 
were considered demonic according to our modern concepts, but 
the Egyptians probably did not made any specific distinctions 
between demons and gods (Lurker, 1986; Wilkinson, 2003).
The composite animal body was usually only the tentative rep-resentation of a divine, supernatural power. The Egyptians 
seem to have considered these animals to be real, since they were 
often represented as living in the wild, among antelopes and lions, 
in the deserts surrounding the Nile River Valley.
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destructive (Biedermann, 1989; Bresniak, 1995; Delacampagne & 
Delacampagne, 2003).
The dragon’s form arose from its particular power to control the waters of the earth. This gave rise to many of the attributes 
singled out by different peoples as the whole myth developed 
(Brunel, 1995; Cotterel, 1986, 1989; Jobes, 1962). Dragons were 
believed to live at the bottom of the sea, where they guarded vast 
treasure hoards, very frequently of pearls. Rain clouds, thunder and 
lightning were believed to be the dragon’s breath. Besides, dragon 
was also supposed to have control over the destiny of mankind.
As the dragon myth developed in the Western world, dragons came to represent the chaos of the original matter. The de-
velopment of man’s conscience led to the struggle between dragon 
and man and the created order constantly challenged dragon’s 
power. This type of dragon was considered by many to be the 
intermediate stage between a demon and the Devil and as such 
came into Christian belief.
Contrary to the Eastern world, which regarded the dragon as an essentially benevolent creature, the son of heaven, who 
controlled the watery elements of the universe (Christie, 1968), 
the Western type of dragon was completely different. In the West, 
different forms of dragons appeared. Most often they were sup-
posed to have been created from parts of various animals and they 
were described as having eagle’s feet and wings, lion’s forelimbs 
and head, fish’s scales, antelope’s horns and a serpentine form of 
trunk and tail, which occasionally extended to the head (Chevalier, 
Gheerbrant, 1982; Cooper, 1978).
In parts of Africa where dragon was also regarded as an evil power, the monster was believed to be the result of the unnatural union of 
an eagle and a she-wolf. The destructive powers of the dragon were 
supposed to be derived from its fiery breath, which could devastate 
whole countries. Dragon’s eyes that also had that fiery red quality 
were sometimes believed to reflect the treasures they guarded.
 
Since dragon was in Western tradition regarded as the natural enemy of man, his death became the ultimate goal of different 
heroes. Because of that there appeared innumerable descriptions of 
battles between gods and dragons, saints and dragons, and knights 
and dragons in different mythologies (MacCulloch, Moore, 1964).
The dragon as an archetype
The word archetype in this context takes on three meanings. 
It can be used:
as a reference to a prototype, or the initial image, which •	
all the various forms of dragons throughout the world 
were based on;
in accordance with classical Jungian hypothesis of the •	
primitive mental image, inherited from man’s earliest 
ancestors, which was supposed to be present in the 
collective unconscious;
on the basis of the definition, which describes a motif •	
that recurs in art and literature.
1. Dragon as a prototype  
(a historical view) 
In defining the archetypal dragon as a prototype, we are faced 
with the problem of tracing back all the various dragon forms to a 
single source. This can be quite difficult considering that many of 
the myths were formed before writing was developed. Later these 
myths were associated with legends (Eliade, 1952). 
In early Egypt, the dragon was chiefly a representation, albeit with some embellishments, of the snake. Besides, there ap-
peared also some other dragon forms in Egyptian mythology 
(Lurker, 1986; White, 1993).
The Chinese lung was a benevolent creature (with origins in the Shang and the I’Ching), which was ascribed lizard like 
qualities before its later association with rain. This connection was 
established in the second and first millennium BC. Later dragon 
was ascribed also many other attributes, but this association re-
mained fixed (Eberhard, 1987).
The Babylonians provided a clear picture of a dragon in the Epic of Creation from the early second millennium BC. It described 
the struggle of Apsu (the god of the primordial waters under the 
earth) and Tiamat (the sea) against their son Ea. Apsu was defeated 
by Ea who took over his domain and produced a son, the god-hero 
Marduk. Tiamat created all sorts of dragons in order to have her 
revenge, but she was defeated in a single combat by Marduk and her 
body was split to form the earth and the sky (Gray, 1982).
In Babylonian texts dragons were different from snakes and had both, reptilian and mammalian characteristics. The Babylonians 
presented dragon as a completely fictional creature, without any 
realistic qualities. He was regarded as an image of chaos and as 
a guardian. Later the Chinese lungs came to dominate the Near 
Eastern mythology (Gray, 1982). 
In early India, images of dragon were in some ways similar to the Egyptian ones, so dragons were represented as monsters, 
similar to snakes. Some of them were also represented as croco-
diles. In both cases they were identified with animals that existed 
in nature. Generally it is accepted that the Indian dragon had 
the background of early snake worship and to lesser extent the 
crocodile cults, but later it was influenced by the Chinese images 
(Ions, 1967). 
Eurasian dragon images can be traced back to the early dragon forms in Egypt, the Near East, and the Far East. This can also be 
proved by the etymological explanation of the Greek word drakkon, 
which meant a large serpent as well as a dragon. The Greeks carried 
on the idea of the dragon as a guardian serpent (Grant, 1962). 
Dragons in the Islamic world were initially astronomical figures, and were linked to the Egyptian myth of Re’s voyage 
through the underworld. Persian mythology presented dragons 
as evil forces that were usually slain by heroes. This interpretation 
was under strong influence of the Greek legends that most often 
also developed the idea of dragons guarding treasure (Viscuna 
Cifuentes, 1947). 
C eltic and Nordic dragons were almost certainly derived from the more ancient myths, though not many similarities among 
them are obvious. The long-ships used by the Vikings bore dragon 
heads on their prows and by this strengthened the association of 
dragons with water. The Celts used dragons as heraldic symbols 
such as in the story of Hercules, who after triumphing over Ladon 
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carried the image of the dragon on his shield (Wade, 1998). At that 
time there appeared many representations of dragons in heraldry 
and this tradition continued even when the Christian ideals spread 
all over Europe (Ellis, 1992; Squire, 1975). 
Taking much from the Greek and Arabian legends, the Chris-tians were responsible for turning the dragon into the image 
that nowadays prevails, i.e. the fire breathing monster. They used 
the image of the serpent or dragon to represent evil forces and 
frequently even Satan himself (Every, 1987). They drew much 
from the cultures of the lands they encountered (for example 
the legend of St George and the dragon was taken from the Near 
East). The Christian image of the dragon has been set up above all 
in opposition to the pagan religions, such as snake worship. The 
snake has been represented as the Devil in the Garden of Eden and 
the dragon was seen as the incarnation of evil in many horrifying 
forms. Because of that it had to be conquered by a hero represent-
ing the virtues of God.
 
There appeared another form of dragons in the Americas, which was not under the influence of any other culture. These 
were the lake spirits of the North American creation myths, and 
the plumed serpent of Central and South America. The Mayan 
Kukulkan, later the Aztec Quetzalcoatl, was both good and evil 
and was thought to rule the four parts of the earth. The greatest 
god of the Aztecs was Xiuhtecuhtli, who took on many manifesta-
tions, one of which was the fire serpent. Still, there were some 
parallels between American and Chinese myths (Nicholson, 1967; 
Séjourné, 1957).
2. The Jungian dragon
Jung (1972, 2006) interpreted the archetype as an inner men-
tal image within the collective unconscious that dominated over 
rational thoughts. The idea of primordial image that influenced 
consciousness and appeared in different cultures (even if they did 
not have any intercultural contacts) was based on the conviction 
that archetypes were common to entire races and epochs. Above 
all, this was asserted for the most powerful archetypes (such as 
mother, anima, animus etc.). The image of the archetype was 
supposed to be in close connection with the ancient myths and 
symbols (Kovačev, 2006). These were thought to have been cre-
ated from the collective unconscious with a practical purpose: to 
explain certain phenomena, which rational thought was not able to 
explain at that time.
 
3. The image of dragon in art  
and literature 
In all parts of the world there appeared references to dragons 
in art and literature as far back as the fourth millennium BC. In an-
cient forms of dragons, which were carved or engraved before the 
development of writing in the third millennium, there can be seen 
an apparently unconnected series of images. The early Chinese and 
inhabitants of Pakistan favoured ornaments decorated with snakes 
and dragon-like composite beasts. Due to the limited knowledge 
about these very early stages in civilisation it would be very difficult 
to draw many conclusions from those artefacts. 
When writing was developed, in the third millennium BC, dragon images were more defined. There appeared serpent-
like images in Egypt, composite reptile-mammal dragons in Sumer-
ia, crocodile dragons in early India, lizard-like lungs in China, water 
spirits in North America and bird-like monsters in South America. 
There existed little parallels among their physical attributes. Still, all 
of them were regarded as dragons and played an important role in 
the contemporary literature (Scruton, 1981; Willis, 1993).
Following on from the early images, we can see the spread of the Chinese lung image over the Eastern world. Similar images ap-
peared from India to Persia. However, although the dragon image 
spread, the associated meaning did not. The Persian dragons were 
seen as beasts that guarded hordes of treasure and were slain by 
heroes, who then inherited the treasure. This image is very close to 
the Western one. The Greeks took their inspiration from the Egyp-
tian myths, so their dragons were still similar to snakes, but they 
had multiple heads. Snakes with two heads really occasionally ap-
pear in nature, so the early Greeks were probably terrified by them 
and described them in their legends and epics (Simpson, 1987).
With the spread of Christianity the pagan dragon has been identified with the Devil, a creature that had to be 
overcome. This was also a frequent motive in art and literature. 
Christians seem to have taken images from all early civilizations, 
the snake in the Garden of Eden, the winged devil-headed dragon, 
etc. In the Old Testament there also appeared the identification of 
the dragon with water. The horrifying dragon images have already 
been represented before, but at that time they were very varied. 
The emphasis was put on the heroes or the saints, who defeated 
them. Dragons appeared also in alchemical works and as heraldic 
emblems (Wade, 1998).
 
Through the depictions of dragons in the works of Titian, Tin-toretto, van Haarlem and other eminent artists, the dominance 
of the four footed, winged serpentine creature settled in Western art. 
Dragon was most often presented as an evil being, intent on destruc-
tion, sitting atop its pile of gold and usually killed by a hero.
Conclusion
Imagination is one of the main mental abilities. Its power is 
particularly obvious in the creation of fantastic creatures, among 
which dragon had a special role in the history of civilisations.
In the past various dragon images (the Egyptian serpent, the Babylonian hybrid, and the Chinese lizard) appeared around the 
same time, but implied different connotations. There is no evi-
dence that they originated from a single prototype. Considering the 
dissimilarities between these ancient monsters one must conclude 
that they arose spontaneously out of the human need to explain 
various natural phenomena. In Egypt dragon explained night and 
day, in Babylon it formed a part of the creation, and in China it 
was used to predict the spring rains (Bresniak, 1988; Chevalier & 
Gheerbrant, Lurker, 1991; Mercatante, 2001).
Looking at the historical references to dragons, one can see several distinct images. The classical Christian image of the 
fire breathing winged monster is still present in modern Western 
imagination, but also some other forms of ancient dragons appear 
in modern thoughts. Still, the majority of them are more or less 
suppressed. The power of human rational mind is directed towards 
the domination over the unconscious images.
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1.  Introduction
In her book Terra infirma Irit Rogoff, introducing Ana 
Mendieta’s death in 1985, said that »both her life and her 
death have somehow been contained within a very particular 
geographical location, that of the art world.«1 The art world 
is a concept which rings a bell: that of Arthur Danto. But 
where is, geographically, the art world? Irit Rogoff continues: 
»While the art world cannot claim for itself a fixed and con-
crete location, a mapped terrain with distinct boundaries, it 
is nevertheless a world unto itself, with a distinct cultural and 
linguistic tradition and a vehement sense of territoriality.«2 
There is a world with its geography mapped in one or another 
distorted way of projection, and there is a world of art which 
is neither here nor there, but it still has a vehement sense of 
territoriality. Two worlds and two mappings. How do they 
relate to each other? Well, Irit Rogoff believes that there is a set 
of territorial imperatives at work which »continue to privilege 
a Eurocentric, urban and commodity-oriented artistic culture 
whose centre it is claimed is the New York art world.«3 In the 
art world, we have a mapping which makes Eurocentric, urban 
and commodity-oriented art great, while others are dimin-
ished if necessary to fit the distorted projection pattern of 
the art world. And, there is a connection between geography 
and artography, if I am allowed to use this word for artistic 
mapping. Art world is not just territorialized and mapped, it 
is geographized. It knows what it prefers and makes great, and 
what it marginalizes and makes unimportant, of course. Art 
world is an opinionated community. And it has a geographical 
place. Its centre is New York. Famous Danto’s »atmosphere« 
and geographical reality of New York, where he discovered 
this atmosphere on an exhibition of Andy Warhol, are bound 
together into a lasting relationship: community of taste and 
opinion and a community of power as well. New York has it, 
at least for visual arts. To make it even more complicated, as 
ancient Rome had its »Atticism« as an inclination for Greek 
culture valued to be better and higher as its Roman copy, this 
centre of the art world has a special cultural inclination itself, 
1 Irit Rogoff, Terra Infirma. Geography's visual culture, London and New York, 
Routledge 200, p. 122.
2 ibid., p. 122.
3 ibid., p. 122.
that of Eurocentric artistic culture, including preference of its 
Mediterranean primitive but authentic cradle.. What we have 
here, in just a few sentences, is:
that the art world is a location where life- and work-•	
stories of artists are wowed and told; 
that the art world has a geography of its own, and its •	
own mapping therefore;
that geographical and art world’s mapping are •	
connected and interrelated;
that their interrelation goes in many different ways; •	
one of them is mapping executed by power to decide 
what is in and what is out, and another one of them 
deciding which geographical part of the world, with 
its own art world, may produce the rule for the 
others.
And, with Ana Mendieta, we have an artist who »not 
only rejected such centrist organising principles but sought to 
replace them with alternative geographies…«4, so that
artists can adjust to such geographies, or reject them •	
and construct alternative geographies of their own.
This approach to artistic and cultural geography is differ-
ent from geographical and geo-anthropological treatment of 
art and culture in the 19th century, when it developed as one 
of many scientific project targeting to explain art and culture in 
convincing natural science manner.
2.  Art Geography – old and revisited science
Geographical determination of art is not itself a modern 
concept. We can trace it from antiquity on. What is new is 
contradicting parallelism of art’s modernism’s sitelesness/
timelessness, and its presumed dependence on geographical 
and other natural conditions and environment. What appeared 
to be handy and sometimes curious explanations (as Winck-
elmann’s idea that Greek sculptures are so beautiful and repre-
sent eternal canon because of agreeable climate which enabled 
people to go around half naked) became scientific principle 
contested by aestheticism’s claim that the essence of art 
remains untouched by its time and place variations. Art geog-
raphy was still used to explain differences, but together with a 
4 ibid., p. 122.
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scale which put these differences at a time and space ladder of 
lesser and greater civilisations and of more primitive or more 
advanced cultures. Thus, geography of art included national-
ism, racism, and spatial organisation of art according to the 
model of centre – periphery relations, where centre was always 
a stronger and better civilisation together with its art, while 
periphery was dependent on centre’s creativity because it had 
not enough creative power. Even in art, this is not just »ideol-
ogy«, as a bunch of ideas which we could get rid of just by the 
will for change of our ideas. These relationships depend on 
military and economic, political and cultural power, and they 
get materialised in works of art as well as in other domains. For 
instance, amphitheatres all around the Mediterranean speak 
of a common passion for cruel games, and of »global culture« 
of that epoch, but what they represented was the power of the 
empire, the dominant culture, and universal mission of Rome 
to maintain stability in the Mediterranean.
The concept of human geography (Anthropogeographie, 
la géographie humaine) developed as science in the second 
half of the 19th century. Geography of art (Kunstgeogra-
phie) which borrowed some of its fundamental concepts 
and methods from human geography, mapped art according 
to physical/natural, cultural, national and racial fundament. 
Human geography was especially popular in Germany where 
Friedrich Ratzel accepted presumably improved Darwinism 
developed by Moritz Wagner, understood as survival of the 
fittest in struggle for existence according to his principle of 
necessary space for development and survival of the species, 
and consequential fight for space of survival going on under 
certain geographical conditions which influence basic move-
ments of human communities towards their segregation or 
isolation.5 That struggle for space embodied in migrations and 
consequently secessions and isolations of groups became so 
important in the century of nationalism and imperialism is 
not surprising, as it is not surprising that another response to 
Darwinism went in direction of eugenics and racism. Friedrich 
Ratzel, who used Moritz Wagner’s concepts to explain art’s 
geographical relations, invented later so popular and ominous 
concept of Lebensraum – life space6. This included the concept 
of colonisation as a natural concept including plants, animals 
and humans, with famous »Kampf um Raum« - struggle for 
space, and borderspace – »der Grenzraum«.7 With struggle 
for space, he said, there is always an opposition between inside 
and outside, between kernel of the territory and edge- or bor-
der territories. These moves echoed in all art geography which 
used Blut und Boden, ethnic origin and its soil as determinants 
5 Moritz Wagner, De la formation des espèces par la ségrégation, Octave Dion, Paris 
1882 (Bibliothèque biologique internationale IX); Moritz Wagner, The Darwinian 
Theory and the Law of the Migration of Organisms, Edward Satnford, London 1873: 
»The migration of organisms and their colonization are, according to my convic-
tion, a necessary condition of natural selection…Since the commencement of 
civilization the migration of animals and plants, and with it the capability of varia-
tion and development by natural selection, has become more and more limited; in 
fact, it must at last entirely cease and give place to artificial selection. This necessary 
inference – which may serve to quiet many a systematic and zealous collectors of 
species – gives to the law of migration a far greater importance than would otherwi-
se be the case. Its application, especially to the development of the human race from 
the earliest ages og civilization, is certainly capable of much greater amplifications 
than is aimed at in this treatise- This I purpose reserving for a further work.« (p. 5)
6 Friedrich Ratzel: »Das Lebensraum. Eine biogeograpgische Studie«, Festgaben 
für Albert Schäffle, Verlag der Laupp'schen Buchhandlung, Tübingen 1901.
7 »Beim Kampf um Raum entsteht immer ein Gegensatz zwischen innen und 
aussen, zwischen dem Kern des Gebietes und den Rand- oder Grenzgebieten.« 
(Friedrich Ratzel, l.c., p. 165)
of artistic cartography. Finally and for obvious reasons, it 
became very popular among Nazi ideologues, and therefore 
went out of fashion after the Second World War8 together with 
eugenics, genetic theories of ethnic origins and functionality. 
Now, we witness a revival of art geography, this time in relation 
to globalisation processes, post-colonial conditions and neo-
imperial tendencies. This relativity includes concepts which 
were born from cultural turn of the 1960s, and criticism of 
globalisation which takes a position of margin, edge, border 
and other limitations as art’s and art theory’s perspective, 
contrary to previous wave of art geography which was solidly 
rooted in the centre.9
It is not just art geography’s revival; many positivist, 
evolutionary and Darwinian or Darwinist concepts are used 
in art theories and aesthetics again, as in Darwinian aesthetics, 
evolutionary psychology of art, cognitive aesthetics and other 
attempts to find, after modernist purity and post-modernist 
relativity, more solid ground for aesthetics discourse on art 
in at least some natural fundamentals of human artistic drive. 
This second scientification and naturalisation of aesthetics, 
after the first wave of 18th and 19th century, accepts many 
sophistications and critical concepts of modern and post-
modern aesthetics and other human sciences, but at its core is 
a move from contemporary artworld to its biological, genetic, 
evolutionary, psychological and other origins of pre-historic 
pre-human starting point of Homo sapiens10. In this context, 
art geography’s revival does not belong to the same direction 
»back to pre-historical essentials«. It maps art on physi-
cal, conceptual and virtual territories of the artworld and its 
relations with other contemporary worlds, especially that of 
geo-politics. 
Curiously, as much as I know, there is no revival of posi-
tivism similar to that of Hyppolite Taine, who put together 
nature and culture in his own way, in spirit of the time as all 
the others already mentioned, and many others of that period. 
Everybody knows the famous Hippolyte Taine’s positive 
philosophy of art, but it is rarely treated with respect. The idea 
to examine art according to principles of natural science was 
very popular during 18th and 19th century. After that, it disap-
peared from the horizons of philosophy and aesthetics. That 
art was one of the rare objects of philosophy which was not 
totally and persuasively taken over by science has something 
to do with this near-to-total disappearance. Taine’s initial move 
was to shift attention from aesthetics to biology, and than re-
turn to art again, changing the usual lofty attitude of aesthetics 
into more down-to-earth research. The positive, which means 
scientifically articulated and objectified problem of art had to 
8 Not without a finale: Ervin Panofsky and Nikolaus Pevsner had after the war a 
debate on »Englishness of the English art«, which was also a topic of Dagobert 
Frey’s pre-war book, and is connecting art geography with Hyppolite Taine’s 
opus as well.
9 At 30th International Congress of Art History in London in the year 2000, the-
re was a session on »Time and Place, the Geohistory of Art«, later published 
under the same title (Ed. by Thomas DaCosta Kaufmann and Elisabeth Pilliod, 
published by Archgate in 2005).
10 In all social sciences, including sociology, there are similar attempts. Compare, 
for instance, Dirk Richter’s review of sociobiology »Der Scheitern der Biolo-
gisierung der Soziologie. Zum Stand der Diskussion um die Soziologie und 
anderes evolutionstheoretischer Ansätze«, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und 
Sozialpsychologie, Vol. 57, No.3 (September 2005), pp. 523-542; for theories of 
ethnicity, see J. Phillipe Rushton: »Ethnic nationalism, evolutionary psycho-
logy and Genetic Similarity Theory«, Nationas and Nationalism, Vol. 11, No. 1 
(October 2005), pp. 489-507.
86
Imaginacija, čutnost in umetnost / Zbornik referatov III. sredozemskega kongresa za estetiko
Lev KREFT: TERRITORIALIZATION OF ART, 84-89
be explained in terms of biology of his times. What biology 
had to solve without use of any meta-physical or theological 
causes already from Linné on was the existing and past abun-
dance and great variety of species, secret of their origin, reason 
for existence of species and reason for their disappearance and 
death. Such abundance and variety somehow contradicted 
rational structure of the universe, which was suggested by 
Leibniz’s idea of ours as the best of all possible worlds. Varia-
tions of nature and culture were discovered, exhibited and 
popularised in imperialist colonial culture, which included the 
international or universal exhibitions and fairs. Great diversity 
entertained the masses and elites alike, but called at the same 
time for some kind of order and understanding. The way to 
achieve such order proceeded through analysis, examinations 
of similarities and differences, and arrived at determination of 
common features which enabled final unification of the whole 
system. Following these and other scientific procedures, we 
should arrive to consistent understanding, and determine the 
essence of art common to humanity as whole. This scientific 
drive in the field of culture, arts and language in search of 
universal culture, art and language, was one of France’s ambi-
tions. France was competing with England all the way through 
modern age, and built its prestige over English pragmatism 
and industrial power on presumably greater French cultural 
and artistic abilities. In art and aesthetics, there was quite a 
quest for universal artistic essence of humanity, including 
visual arts exhibitions which became part of universal interna-
tional industrial exhibitions from Paris exhibition of 1855 on, 
thus changing the concept which was introduced in London 
exhibition of 1851. Taine is well known also for his differentia-
tion between South (Italian) and North cultural and artistic 
character in renaissance. 
His »moment, milieu, race« arsenal of positive explana-
tions of art’s varieties and differences is one of best known, 
much (ab)used and attacked sites of philosophy of art. In 
context of his own historical moment, cultural environment 
and national particularism, the problem to be solved was: »If 
art is something universal for human species, and something 
autonomous from all its other manifestations, and something 
of an eternal value, how come that works of art from differ-
ent times, different territories and different people are of so 
diverse kind that it is sometimes hard to assert that art is a 
consistent and definable phenomenon of human culture?« 
Taine and the others did not look for answers in direction of 
historical and cultural change of the concept, institution and 
social function of art. What they had in mind was to overcome 
all differences and arrive at a unitarian concept. Not all of 
those who researched differences to find universality of art 
were inclined to present contemporary national art of their 
own country as the highest achievement on the path towards 
universality, but mostly they did, and even when they did not, 
what they introduced as universal was inevitably white, mas-
culine, Christian and European. Territorialization of art was 
used as a necessary part of scientific explanation of its cultural 
variations and differences, and as a background for emergence 
of its »highest«, autonomous and aestheticized appearance 
in Western modernity. There is a constant counterdiction in 
these approaches which, on the abstract level, bring together 
belief in possibility to explain art scientifically, i.e. like in 
natural sciences, and belief that art is itself part of the progress 
of humanity. On one side, they claim that art has its own laws 
of appearance according to differentiations of environment 
(natural and cultural), race, and historical moment. On the 
other side, using these same parameters, such theories put 
different kinds of art together in such a way that the dominat-
ing position of European art is proved and approved; within 
national art histories, even, it offers a way to promote national 
art as the highest necessary link between European or Western 
art and its perfect aesthetic purity. This time, it is not the con-
tradictority or even absurdity of belief in European or Western 
dominance in art that I would like to turn attention to. I would 
like to turn attention that such belief necessarily involves ter-
ritoralisation of art so that it needs at the same time a theory of 
art’s purity which emerges from philosophical aesthetics, and a 
theory of natural, environmental and racial background which 
makes the domination indisputable, as a result of uncontrol-
lable objective natural forces. This is not something that en-
dangers territorialization of art, it is its very core and reason for 
existence: all territorializations of art in aesthetics, philosophy 
of art, and art history, were developed for that reason to make 
hierarchical relations between territorially dependent artistic 
phenomena visible and natural.
3.  The Invention of the Mediterranean
Only after this introduction on geographies and artistic 
geographies, we dare ask: what about Mediterranean as a loca-
tion, and its relations with the art world? and is Mediterranean 
a place with a name in the art world as well? if yes, what kind 
of distortions and biases go on here? 
When the earth was flat, Mediterranean was the centre 
of the earth, and Rome was the centre of the Mediterranean. 
Then, with Christianity, there was a split and division into two 
Romes, the old one and the new one, and consequently divi-
sion of the Mediterranean, later confirmed and strengthened 
by the presence of non-Christian empires of Arabs and Turks. 
Both new centers lost their central position afterwards, one to 
the European West and North, another to Moscow as the pro-
verbial third Rome. When earth became a ball, and when this 
globe was explored from one side to the other, especially with 
oriental trade re-directed around Africa in the 15th century, 
the Mediterranean lost its central place in trade and economy. 
It was not pushed on the margin of the world, but it was 
definitely on the borders, while the centre of order and power 
lied somewhere else. Its division was stabilised in dichotomy 
between Christianity and Islam, between enlightened civilisa-
tion and its orientalism, and, of course, as colonial power and 
its colonies. Modernisation process of the Mediterranean 
produced nation states of different political, economic and 
cultural weight, more or less distributed on the axis between 
the European Union South which plays the role of North in 
the Mediterranean, and Mediterranean South. 
When aestheticians of the Mediterranean decided, thanks 
to our Greek colleagues, especially to Prof. Zivas, to meet in 
Mediterranean context, it was not a decision to meet in the 
centre of power, or where at least cultural capital still influenc-
es the whole world. It was a decision to put together again, if 
only in aesthetics, a place which is on the borders of the Euro-
pean Union, a lesser global empire, and is deeply divided and 
breached in many directions, by geopolitical and/or symbolic 
order. In art and culture, with long history of communications 
and mutual (re)production of common hybridities across the 
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divide, this situation is not new. What is new are the rules of 
global capitalism and of the European Union with their asym-
metric post-colonial distribution of sovereignty, hegemony, 
and cultural capital.
In such a context, of course, Mediterranean as a place of 
lost greatness which became part of progressive history as its 
everlasting starting point and point of new departures in dif-
ferent kinds of crisis could be the place where we meet. If that 
is so, we very probably meet because another crisis of civilisa-
tion might be helped with renewed attachment to the original 
and the authentic. Marino Niola has a characterisation of this 
modern myth of the Mediterranean, originating from the 18th 
century: »So the South became a metaphor for a temporal 
threshold of a mythical past that preceded the time when his-
tory changed gears and archaeology became the material and 
symbolic vehicle for this ‘invention of the Mediterranean’.«11
We could also meet in the Mediterranean because this 
place is a place of eternal beauty. Mediterranean can be so 
beautiful in art, and so recognisable, with its colours and olive 
orchards, with blue sea and white sailing boats, with terraces 
and red soil, wine in glasses and fish on the table, white houses 
and salinas, and breath-taking air’s quivering in summer heat. 
That is natural culture of the Mediterranean.
And there is another geopolitical artistic image of Medi-
terranean, that of divide, borders, margins and cleavages, in-
cluding wired fences, anti-trespassing walls and interceptance 
corridors, »no-man’s« lands, territories of exception, invisible 
black holes and transitional territories. This kind of art is more 
inclined towards performance, installations, video art, media-
tised production, internet art and all other ways of distributing 
image and message to broader publics without traditional 
institutional framework. Their place of inclusion is quite often 
broader civil initiative, movement or group, organised as NGO 
or as an artistic collective, which in this case represents alter-
native institutionalisation, instead of exclusively artistic one. 
If modernism offers an idea of »art without borders«, while it 
strictly develops nation-states and national arts, this kind of art 
is literally art on the border itself.
There is a lot of art in Mediterranean, of course, but it 
seems that these three are the most visible Mediterranean 
kinds of art. It seems as if the first two are more or less a-
political, and the third one is extremely politicised. But this 
kind of statements imply that the political is something alien 
and external to art, which belongs to its own secluded and 
autonomous territory. Which, quite the contrary, it is not, and 
the Mediterranean is not an exception. To explain what I have 
in mind, we have to visit politics in the Mediterranean. 
Think first just about Your journeys here to Slovenia to 
attend this congress. On one side, we have those coming from 
the European Union countries. They do not even need pass-
ports. On other other side of Mediterranean, things are con-
siderably different. You have to obtain a visa. There is a visa for 
Slovenia which is still not part of Schengen area, which means 
that with Slovenian visa You can enter Slovenia only, but not 
the Schengen area of the EU. If You want to enter Schengen 
area, You need another kind of visa, and it depends on Your 
residential state and on Your citizenship, which kind of visa 
11 Marino Niola: »The Invention of the Mediterranean«, Sites of Exchange. Euro-
pean Crossroads and Faultlines (Ed. by Maurizio Ascari and Adriana Corrado), 
Rodopi, Amsterdam and New York 2006, p. 76.
You may apply for. In this procedure, You meet with consider-
able scrutiny and precise means of control, especially if You 
are coming from an Arab country of the Mediterranean South. 
It seems so natural, perhaps, that it is so, but it was not like 
that fifteen or twenty years ago when movements were much 
less controlled, and it was easier to come and to leave as it is 
now. And, what I already mentioned as asymmetric relations 
between the EU and the Mediterranean South, is now part of 
visa politics as well. For me or any other EU citizen, the formal 
procedure to enter any state on the South of Mediterranean is 
much easier than for its citizens to get permit to visit Slovenia. 
If I want to go there, I am treated as a tourist until proven dif-
ferently. If they want to come here, they are treated as migrants 
or terrorists until proven differently.
This visa system is just one of the effects of unrecognis-
ably changed politics which, years ago, was concentrated on 
creation of friendly neighbourhood of EU using similar tools 
as in case of socialist Europe: politics of human rights and 
democracy, and politics of free flow of goods, investments and 
people. These two were joined, as usual, by cultural politics 
of mutual understanding and dialogue built over all differ-
ences. During the nineties and up to now, after eleven years of 
so-called Barcelona process, we have two preoccupations of 
the EU Mediterranean politics: migration and terrorism. The 
third is, still, the same cultural politics of mutual understand-
ing and dialogue built over all differences. The function of 
first two kinds of Mediterranean art is to fulfil what cultural 
politics demands, or better, to fill in the gap of misunderstand-
ing between two sides of the Mediterranean with elevation of 
the eternally great and charmingly common. While these two 
kinds of Mediterranean art and culture certainly prove that 
Mediterranean is a place of past greatness, and that its nature/
culture environment is beautiful, it masks EU politics of strug-
gle against migration and terrorism with control and security 
systems built over Schengen border in a way which still allows 
that goods and investments, and even profitable slavery go on 
as usual, together with friendly exchange of polite dialogue 
between lower and higher cultures treated as if equal. These 
kinds of art create a good climate for tourism as well, build-
ing Potemkin’s villages of fun and entertainment literally: the 
Mediterranean Amusement Parks. Nothing is wrong with 
that, of course. Just that these kinds of Mediterranean art are, 
far from being apolitical, politically very functional, especially 
after the Mediterranean changed from liquid sea with solid 
continents into solid sea with liquid continents. For instance, 
the EU is usually referred to just as Europe; within its Mediter-
ranean programs Balkan ex-Yugoslav states are not eligible, in 
spite of being in the Mediterranean, and may become eligible 
when they enter accession process; but Turkey is eligible, 
not as an accession country but because it is Mediterranean 
Moslem country of the South; Bosnia and Herzegovina is not 
eligible for dialogue, even if it is Mediterranean and Moslem, 
because it is on the European side, it is Balkan country and it 
is not a EU state; all EU member countries and not just those 
of the Mediterranean, are eligible as Mediterranean countries 
according to EuroMed platform, of course, as they are all to-
gether, as EU, the final result of the Mediterranean cradle.
Peripheral zones, says Balibar with Greece and Mediter-
ranean in mind, are zones “where secular and religious cul-
tures confront one another, where differences in economic 
prosperity become more pronounced and strained, consti-
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tute the melting pot for the formation of a people (dĕmos) 
without which there is no citizenship (politeia) in the sense 
that this term has acquired since antiquity in the democratic 
tradition.”12 What is at stake now and in Europe are the 
modes of inclusion and exclusion in the European sphere13, 
so that “the stakes revolve instead around the invention of 
a citizenship that allows us to democratize the borders of 
Europe, to overcome its interior divisions, and to reconsider 
completely the role of European nations in the world.”14 
Here, at the borders of Europe, these policies of exclusion/
inclusion are formed and experienced, and here is decided 
what will become of the European citizenship as an unre-
solved political problem: European apartheid, or a new im-
age of a people emerging from aporia between membership 
in historical communities (ethnos) and continued creation of 
citizenship (dēmos).
Art projects and artworks can follow these policies, 
consciously or not, and are thus political art projects and 
artworks. Their own policies »back to the Mediterranean 
sources of tradition« or »expressing Mediterranean nature/
culture life environment« support that part of politics which 
develops so-called dialogue between cultures as a counter-
balance to anti-migration and anti-terrorism of the other parts 
of EU politics. The scandal of Danish caricatures was quite 
a revealing moment of this politics really. Its story does not 
speak about freedom of expression, nor about the violation of 
religious or cultural principles of the Other, in this case Islam 
principles of iconoclasm. Even caricatures themselves are 
deceiving, because they are not caricatures at all: caricature 
exaggerates so much that it does not represent stereotypes but 
destructs them, otherwise it is not funny. Here, we did not 
deal with caricature, we dealt with an image of the Other as it 
is, without any exaggeration: that is how EU sees Islam in its 
Mediterranean politics, really. The same goes for response to 
caricatures in countries of Mediterranean South: the distorted 
image of EU they exhibited is how they see the EU: a neo-
colonial hypocrite preaching human rights and democracy 
for a change, instead of this or that kind of Christianity, and 
offending the Others at the same time without any care for 
their human rights and dignity, preaching its values without 
making a break, and therefore not listening to the Others at all. 
It is, again, not a caricature, it is a prevailing representation of 
the Other.
4.  Art’s Geo- and Bio-politics 
The third kind of Mediterranean art is consciously 
political, but it is different from traditional political art as 
well, not only in Mediterranean, of course. Emily Jacir, born 
in Betlehem in 1970, well known artist who lives and works 
in-between Ramallah and New York, exemplifies this kind 
of art. Her »Ramallah/New York« two-channelled video 
from 2004, which was shown at the 51. Venice Biennial of 
2005 exhibition »Always a little further« in Arsenale un-
der curatorship of Rosa Martínez, records both locations 
through their everyday life places of encounter (hairdressers, 
delis, travel agencies, bars and shops), and examines many 
12 Étienne Balibar, We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford 2004, p. 1-2.
13 ibid., p.3.
14 ibid., p. 10.
oppositions and binarisms as those of familiar interiors and 
unfamiliar outside, safety of everyday and dangerous history, 
intimate community and destructive wars and exiles. It is 
like a luggage of an in-between existence. What makes it less 
traditional from political aspect is precisely that threatening 
indifference put in comparison between Ramallah and New 
York, where we would expect an allegoric accusation and 
unsurpassable tension between them. Beside being a mes-
sage of Palestinian situation, it suggest how all these passages 
are fluid, hybrid, and anaesthetic. Sometimes we could not 
tell which side we watch, and only their fixed position on 
the left and right channel of this video as their geo-political 
identification can give us a feeling that we can recognise one 
as Ramallah and another as New York. 
In »Teatro della cooperativa«, they produced a piece 
called »La nave fantasma« which was a complete mix of nar-
ration styles, from documentary to sarcastic satire, from tragi-
comedy to political agitation piece, interactive theatre with 
movies and video and even cartoon. This mixture of narrative 
styles was used for presentation of a Mediterranean event: a 
small boat that sunk on Christmas of 1996, with people on 
board, or, better, people transferred from one boat to another. 
They were illegal migrants, and their guides, in spite of bad sea 
and weather, decided to complete the transaction already paid 
for and get rid of migrants. Italian police was silent about this 
incident, aware of political crisis and turmoil deaths of illegal 
migrants can ignite, as in case of Albanians and Lampedusa. 
If it were not for a persistent journalist, and fishermen who 
in next years caught, together with fish, a number of human 
parts, it would all be forgotten. In spite of tragic narration, the 
tone of the piece was much stronger than deploring sentimen-
tality. It was a story of Mediterranean divide, of North and 
South, and of new meaning of this sea. Theatre piece was just 
one of the results; there were research journalism, advocacy 
actions, lobbying pressures, and scientific project as well. Sci-
entific project, part of Multiplicity group work, was an analysis 
of contemporary Mediterranean human geography. It focused 
on flows of people through the Mediterranean called »Solid 
Sea«, »a territory ploughed by predetermined routes and 
insuperable boundaries and subdivided into strictly regulated 
bands of water. A solid space, crossed at different depths and 
in different directions by distinct flows of people, goods, in-
formation and money.«15 In Kassel, where Multiplicity group 
appeared at Documenta 11, there was a discussion on the 
case of the Ghost Ship, and the new social conditions of the 
Mediterranean »Liquid Europe and Solid Sea: Towards a New 
Relation«. Mulitplicity group presented itself and their re-
search project »Solid sea« with these words: »Solid sea is an 
investigation, conceived and co-ordinated by Multiplicity, on 
the nature of the Mediterranean Sea, on the fluxes that cross it 
and the identities of the individual that inhabit it. The research 
collects different case studies and analyses them by means of 
an index paradigm. Using distinct techniques of observation 
(from within the context of analysis, using a point of view 
which allows their comparison), different forms of representa-
tion – maps, photographs, videos, narratives – and multiple 
research formats (interviews, reportages, statistics, shadow-
15 »Doors of Perception 7: Flow« - Stephano Boerie:  
»Around a solid sea«, Amsterdam, 14.-16. november 2002;  
http://flow.doorsofperception.com/content/boeri_archis_trans.html
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ings) Solid Sea reveals the identities and trajectories that flow 
through the Mediterranean.«16
This kind of elaborated structure and ambitious targeting 
is no exception. What makes these kind of projects different 
from various groups from the 1980s, for instance Laibach and 
Neue Slowenische Kunst, is that they take and represent their 
job very seriously, without post-socialist atmosphere of self-
scepticism and self-ironisation, and that their primary orienta-
tion point are not artistic institutions. Another case is »Fron-
tera Sur«, a project dealing with Ceuta and Melilla, two Span-
ish enclaves inside Moroccan territory. For instance, »Euro-
plex«, a video by Ursula Biemann (whom we can find in many 
other projects of this kind) and Angela Sanders, explores ways 
of living and presents cartography of the struggle of authorities 
against possible ways of living in such conditions (smuggling, 
daily migration for menial service jobs, post-colonial third 
world industries). It is done again through everyday lives of 
people, and with ambition to explore and reveal patterns. The 
main pattern, of course, is in this case a fence around Ceuta, to 
protect the European Union from this people who are part of 
the European Union, being part of Spain, but are »dislocated« 
in time (two hours difference between Spain and Morocco), in 
space (being in Africa and neither in Europe nor in the EU), in 
identities (third world identity, Arab culture, living defined by 
geopolitical position and enclosure). By the way, this year they 
built a third fence around Ceuta, with well known European 
Union politics that the third world countries of Mediterranean 
have to prevent migrations, smuggling, trafficking and terror-
ism admitting EU to do it on their own territory, controlling 
flows and their police forces as well17. Again, this collective 
included artistic, research, advocacy and other kinds of work 
and engagement. 
We may conclude that, in case of individual artists or 
groups, we have a new kind of Gesamtkunstwerk. But universal 
work of art involves one or many different arts and techniques 
to build the highest aesthetic effect of sublime totality. Here, 
no totality is constructed – it is already here, present as global-
ity’s locality, and sublimation is not the product, strictly speak-
ing, of artistic and aesthetic effects. The relationship between 
scientific research, policy proposals, lobbying, public relation 
management, NGO activities, advocacy and art does not offer 
grounds where aesthetic dimension of art would give them 
a common context, or aesthetic appeal, or revealing of meta-
physical totality. Even more, we cannot speak of co-operation 
between art and other domains on equal terms and not under 
the hegemony of the aesthetical, because there are no specific 
and unsurpassable borders and limitations between art and 
non-art, science and non-science, politics and non-politics. To 
study and represent borders, limits, divided identities, clo-
sures, cleavages and their shifts, liquid and hybrid substance, a 
construction surpassing those borders and limitations has to 
be made, to reveal global geo- and bio-politics.
Why do I call it Mediterranean art? Well, there are similar 
artistic projects everywhere, of course, because globality is 
producing the same patterns of life anywhere. At the begin-
16 »Multiplicity, Liquid Europe and Solid Sea« (Multiplicity: Stefano Boeri, 
Maddalena Bregani, Francisca Insulza, Francesco Jodice, Giovanni La Varra, 
John Palmesino, Palo Vari, Maki Gherzi, Giovanni Maria Bellu.
17 For these politics, see: Ritvica Andrijašević, »The Southern Gate to Fortress 
Europe«, Policy Perspectives 2006 – Islam and Tolerance in Wider Europe, Open 
Society Institute, Budapest 2006, pp. 30-50.
nings of discussion on globalisation, together with post-
modernist fashionable discourse, there was a lot of talk on 
post-modern fluent identity and disappearance of the subject. 
What was shown as new way of life was going on at global 
scale as individual’s global territory (»The world is your play-
ground!«), with recognisable points of security and control-
lability on any local level (global hotel chains, TV channels, 
global English as universal means of conversation, global food 
chains, global sport events…) and local coloration of differ-
ences displayed as amusement park, while this global cosmopo-
lites, having breakfast in New York and dinner in Hong-Kong, 
really passed his or her time in the virtual reality of computers, 
mobile phones and other attachments. But, on the other side 
of such post-modern bourgeois, there are those who were put 
under control, using multiple and very creative ways of pro-
ducing enclaves, enclosures, divides, borders, limitations, walls 
and fences. Under such conditions, every move you make is 
transgression, and survival itself may serve as a proof of crimi-
nalised activity, because it is not possible to survive any other 
way. The Mediterranean is a locality/glocality of these process-
es, not the only one, of course, but one that belongs to EU and 
is its product. Here, images of »the cradle of civilisation« and 
of »the primordial beauty of life« are used as platforms which 
cover the cellar of divided cells and unburied bodies. 
That is why all three kinds of the Mediterranean art are 
political arts. And, that is why they are Mediterranean, but 
they are not contained within geographical location of the 
art-world only. They cross borders in clandestine ways of their 
own.
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INTERPRETING NIETZSCHE: 
MYTH AND SENSUALITY IN NEOCLASSICAL 
ARCHITECTURE. THE GREEK CASE
1.  Introduction
This paper attempts an approach to Neoclassical archi-
tecture through the scope of Michel Foucault’s genealogy of 
history. Interpreting Nietzsche, Foucault proposes a genealogy 
of history fundamentally opposed to any attempt for a meta-
physical foundation of man and the human knowledge1.
With Nietzsche, the metaphysical basis upon which the totality of Western civilization has been built, is put 
under quest. The shaking of the ground is based on the as-
sumption that knowledge derives from the instincts, without 
been one of them. Knowledge is acquired and not inherent in 
human nature. Existence can be understood and justified only 
in aesthetic terms. The origins of art and of all human creativ-
ity are to be found in the dual aspects of human nature, the 
Apollonian dream and the Dionysian intoxication. Art, science 
and philosophy are all forms of illusion. Through the illusion 
of art, man interprets and re – enacts life experience, giving 
birth to a meaningful, ordered world2. 
2.  Foucault interpreting Nietzsche 
Michel Foucault, extending the application of the work 
of Nietzsche to the whole field of theory and practice within 
logos, stresses the principal role which interpretation occupies 
in contemporary philosophical thinking. 
According to Nietzsche, Foucault argues, there are not ar-chetypal signs; there are only interpretations. Every new 
interpretation does not interpret a sign but a previous interpre-
tation. Every new interpretation appropriates and subjugates 
another, already existing interpretation. Words themselves 
are for Nietzsche interpretations. Interpretation is a violent 
act of subversion and inversion. Its motive powers are allegory 
and suspicion. They reside in the core of language and gener-
ate words3. In this sense, Classical, Roman, Renaissance and 
Neoclassical architecture constitute a series of interpretations 
without the necessity of any metaphysical or other archetype. 
The heteroclite, which resides in emotions, love, conscience, instincts, constitutes the historical – as opposed to the 
metaphysical – truth/ illusion about things. It is to be found 
not in identity, agreement, harmony but in disagreement, 
separation, denial4. A history of a series of interpretations of 
this kind, which mainly deals with relations of domination 
and denies any absolute archetype, constitutes for Nietzsche 
a genealogy5. 
Through the rejection of the precedence of a descendent and absolute subject of knowledge, Nietzsche makes 
possible a history of truth as genealogy, Foucault insists. Ac-
cording to Foucault, the genealogy of history functions in 
three ways, opposite to the Platonic conception of history: the 
first function of genealogy consists in parody and destruction 
of reality, the second in dissolution and destruction of identity, 
the third in destruction of truth or destruction of the subject6.
Next, we will discuss these three functions of genealogy, 
with reference to Neoclassical architecture. 
3.  First function of genealogy
3. a. Parody and destruction of reality 
This function opposes to history as recollection or rec-
ognition. 
The historian offers to the European of the 19th c. – an 
anonymous and miscellaneous human type – alternative 
identities, more real than his own. The Greek archetype finds 
a principal position in the masquerade. The work of the gene-
alogist is to put into motion the great carnival of time, where 
all masks return eternally. The non–reality of Neoclassicism 
recalls our non–reality.
Genealogy is a travesty of history, it exposes and parodies 
the identification of our weak individualities with mighty 
realities of the past, over and over again. Through genealogy, 
Nietzsche says, “we will discover the area where even we can 
be original, may be also parodists of the world history and 
clowns of God”7.
3. b. The Dionysian origin of Classical 
Architecture – Destruction of the 
archetype 
“We hear nothing but the accents of an exuberant, trium-
phant life, in which all things, whether good or bad, are deified. 
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And so the spectator may stand quite bewildered before this 
fantastic superfluity of life, asking himself what magic potion 
these mad glad men could have imbibed to make life so enjoy-
able that, wherever they turned, their eyes beheld the smile of 
Helen the ideal picture of their own existence, floating in sweet 
sensuality”8.
This quotation from Nietzsche’s “Birth of Tragedy” refers to the statues of the Olympian gods standing 
on the gables of the Doric temple. The Greeks created the 
Olympians celebrating life through a sweet sensuality – Ni-
etzsche argues – in order to temper the dread, the horror of 
existence, which the Greeks never ceased to feel very close 
after their separation for the Primal Unity. Sensuality is the 
result of the aesthetic necessity for beauty, inherent in the 
principium individuationis, the primordial desire for appear-
ance, represented by Apollo. In this milieu, the term sensual-
ity mentioned in the quotation, indicates the experience of 
beauty as an “exuberant”, “triumphant”, superfluous”, “joyful” 
expression of life. Existence can be understood and justified 
only in aesthetic terms. 
Art is the first implication of the principium individu-ationis. Nevertheless, individuation presupposes the 
delimiting of the boundaries of the individual, that is to say 
measure. Apollo, requires measure by his disciples. As far as 
measure bears a principally moral sense, it can be built only on 
self–knowledge9. The Apollonian Greek, Nietzsche suggests, 
had to recognize that underneath beauty and proportion, 
his existence lied on a hidden substratum of suffering and of 
knowledge, revealed by the Dionysian, Titan-like state10. Doric 
art in particular, constitutes the permanent dwelling of the 
Apollonian11.
George Hersey, in his book “The Lost Meaning of Clas-sical Architecture”, attempts to reveal the Dionysian 
“truth” underlying the Apollonian “appearance” of Classical 
architecture12. He investigates the meaning of the names of the 
ornamental components of the temples, in relation to the way 
sacrifice was performed. 
Greek sacrifice involves the transformation of an animal 
into a god and then the fusing of that animal – god with the 
worshipers. Hersey suggests that classical ornament represent-
ed the remains of sacrifice. After sacrifice the relics are arrayed 
on altars and shrines. 
 
Greek sacrifice consists in the deconstruction and the reconstruction of the victim. In myth, dismemberments 
are mainly connected with Dionysus. Dionysus himself was 
butchered and cooked by the Titans. Walter Burkert refers that 
frequently in myth the remnants were collected and brought 
back to life13. Many of these myths were foundation myths 
for religious rituals and so a precondition for the erection of 
temples, Hersey argues14. Hersey suggests that: 
“We can see the temple as a grove of sacred trees deco-rated with battle or hunting trophies, or decked 
out like an altar, with reconstructed sacrifices. Rows of teeth, 
garlands, horns, bones, weapons and other things taken from 
victims figure in such displays, as do flowers, fruit, and the 
like”15.
Hersey applies sacrificial meaning to architectural termi-nology. Thus, the vertical fillets created by the fluting of 
a column called ράβδοι (rods), can refer to “the bunched shafts 
used in constructing Dionysus images”16; a triglyph can be a 
thighbone chopped into three, according to the sacrificial prac-
tices; γλυφή means something curved or chopped off17; the 
drops – σταγώνες – beneath the triglyph can be drops draining 
from the thighbones18. The whole temple is interpreted by 
Hersey in this way.
 
Taking this interpretation which deals with the “Diony-sian” aspect of Classical Greek architecture into account, 
we could proceed further suggesting that it was sensuality on 
the one hand and measure on the other that gave Classical 
architecture its “Apollonian” aspect.
For instance, under the process of individuation, the strong tapering of both shaft and capital – which attached the 
column to the stylobate and the architrave rather than stress-
ing its individual character – was progressively reduced and 
modified. This aimed to emancipate the column from the sty-
lobate and the architrave and in this sense, lead to maximum 
sensual pleasure deriving from the driving of the principium 
individuationis to its limits. At the same time, the principle of 
measure gradually lead to lack of differentiations between the 
front and flank columns, while the axial spacings in most of the 
Doric temples are uniform in both sides19. 
From the end of the fifth century B.C., excesses of individu-alism on the form of the temple, express plurality at the 
expense of sensuality and moderation. Lifeless typification 
comes forth through typified mathematical relations, in order 
to cover up the Dionysian threat which undermined Classical 
architecture. 
4.  Second function of genealogy
4. a. Dissolution and destruction of 
identity
This function opposes to history as continuity or tradi-
tion. It aims to the methodical dissolution of our identity to 
innumerable heterogeneous systems, which forbid any iden-
tity. According to Nietzsche, we struggle to articulate together 
and secure our weak identity under one mask. This identity 
is a parody as far as it is inhabited by a multiplicity of mortal 
– not metaphysical – souls, which are in a constant conflict 
among them, about which one is going to prevail. Genealogy is 
opposite to history as “worship of the ancestors” which aims to 
identify the continuities that constitute the origin of our pres-
ent and preserve them with great care for the future, Nietzsche 
insists. Genealogy puts into question the place where we were 
born, the language which we speak, the cities in which we live, 
in order to unveil the heterogeneous systems which – although 
covered up by the mask of tradition – forbid any identifica-
tion20. 
Classical Greek architecture comes out as an illusion or metaphor, as a mask of the horror of existence, as far as 
it was born by that horror. It stemmed out of the Premordial 
World of the Titans in the same way in which a rose comes 
out of a thorny bush, insists Nietzsche. We could say that its 
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origins were lost in myth. Neoclassical architecture does not 
have this origin. It borrows the Classical mask in order to 
cover up the uncanny feelings stemming from the totally new 
political, social and economic conditions brought about by 
its age. Thus, Neoclassical architecture is not a direct deriva-
tive of the principium individuationis in Nietzsche’s sense. In 
fact, under these circumstances, the function of the princi-
pium individuationis is cancelled. 
Nevertheless, Neoclassical architecture sees Classical 
Greek architecture almost as a work of nature. In this sense, 
Neoclassical architecture is identified with truth and beauty. 
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, human desire to dominate nature was expressed through the Enlight-
enment’s search for objectivity of a rational basis. In the 
pursuit of a sort of “natural ethics”, the architects of the 
Enlightenment looked upon Greek architecture as the true 
style from which Roman and Renaissance architecture had 
drawn their origins. Greek architecture represented the most 
ancient period of human history; it was seen almost as a 
work of nature21. Thus, architectural truth and consequently 
beauty could be derived directly from nature, without any 
metaphysical or other implication. In fact, the Neoclassical 
approach to architecture had to be closer to the Classical one 
than anyone before. 
Within the eighteenth century, Laugier’s position on the one hand and Winckelmann’s on the other, gave 
rise to the two diametrically opposite poles around which 
Neoclassical architecture evolved in the nineteenth century: 
the Structural Classicism which emphasizes structure as the 
source the truth and derives its ultimate principles through a 
rational appreciation of nature; and the Romantic Classicism 
which, on the basis of a secular aesthetics, stresses form as 
the essence of architecture. This duality was handed down to 
Modern architecture22.
The Romantic Classicism in particular, was involved with a passionate attempt to reveal measure and proportion 
as carriers of the absolute truth which underlied Classical 
architecture as well as nature and had its origins in Neopla-
tonism and the Renaissance.
4. b. Neoclassical architecture in 
Greece. Its relation to traditional and 
popular architecture
In the mid-nineteenth century, Classical revival in 
Europe offered an opportunity to the new born Greek state 
to strengthen its national identity. Neoclassical architecture 
played a very important role in this attempt. 
 
The architecture of the recovered nation was the so-called traditional Greek architecture on the one hand 
and popular architecture on the other. They both developed 
within the Byzantine world and their roots are lost in the 
Greek, Roman and Mesopotamian worlds. Neoclassical 
architecture came totally from the outside, disrupting the 
continuity of local architecture and becoming a symbol of 
unity, continuity, beauty, harmony, truth at its expense. Far 
from being a rebirth of the ancient Greek architecture, it 
constituted a totally heterogeneous system.
As soon as the new Greek nation was born, European and Greek architects, city–planners and archeologists 
undertook the duty to recreate the splendour of the ancient 
Greek city. Excavations started throughout Greece destroy-
ing all higher archaeological layers in order to reveal the 
Classical one. The German Romantic architect Schinkel 
proposed the erection of king Otto’s palace on the Acropo-
lis and designed the architectural plans for it. Nevertheless, 
this was considered “an unbelievable daring” solution 
which everybody refuted23. The Danish brothers Christian 
and Theophilos Hansen who were Schinkel’s pupils cre-
ated some of the most important Neoclassical buildings 
in Athens, as the Library, the Academy, the University, the 
National Museum.
Resemblance to the Parthenon seems to be the ultimate principle of architecture. Thus Cleanthes, another of 
Schinkel’s pupils, criticizes Kautadzoglou with reference to 
the Arsakeon mansion, arguing that it does not “express the 
idea of the Parthenon properly (…) it makes no honor to us to 
erect Parthenons in Athens imitating Tuscan architecture, when 
all the other nations in Europe are proud to imitate Greek archi-
tecture at all their buildings in general”24. Even the architecture 
of the Byzantine churches started to conform to the new 
principles.
The city–planning of the capital of the new–born nation almost ignored anything existing in the city between 
the Classical period and the nineteenth century. The point 
of departure for the planning was, of course, the Acropolis, 
but it took into account some other ancient monuments as 
the Stadium and the Library of the Roman emperor Had-
rian. Some place was left free for excavations at the foot of 
the Acropolis. The palace was originally placed facing the 
Acropolis at the other end of the main axis25. 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, despite the 
reactions against anything following different morphologi-
cal and compositional rules from the Parthenon, buildings 
using Byzantine, Gothic, Renaissance elements started to 
appear, following similar trends in Europe. They were made 
by architects as Ziller, Kautadzoglou, Zezos and others. On 
the other hand, the builders and workers, who had come to 
Athens in order to work for its reconstruction, erected their 
own dwellings at the slope beneath the Acropolis rock. They 
were popular houses with Neoclassical elements.
Gradually, traditional as well as popular architecture adopted elements of Neoclassical architecture as sym-
metry of the composition in the plan and the elevations, 
architectural elements in relief as cornices around the open-
ings, projected parts of columns and capitals, clay elements 
as acrocerama and balustrades, cast-iron railings. As a result 
of this heterogeneous montage of elements, we often have 
an architecture much more alive than the official one, much 
closer to man, as well as to nature. 
5.  Third function of genealogy
5. a. Destruction of truth
This function opposes to history as knowledge. It aims 
to the sacrifice of the knowing subject. The mask of the 
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historical conscience shows that it is stubbornly attached 
to truth purified of any passion. However, if historical 
conscience puts itself under examination, it will discover 
the plurality of forms and transformations of the will to 
knowledge: instinct, passion, searching mania, vulgar refine-
ment, wickedness, Foucault maintains26. It will discover 
that injustice in inherent in knowledge and that knowledge, 
based on instincts, is not a carrier of love and happiness but 
of hatred and hostility. What motivates it, is not the desire to 
attribute the thing its true being, but to keep it at a distance 
and destroy it27.
5. b. The invasion of the unconscious 
and Neoclassical architecture 
We argue that Neoclassical architectural space is a the-
ater where architecture as a series of masks embodies the role 
for which it was chosen. In fact, Neoclassical architecture is 
the mask which covers up the collision among the social and 
the political forces, the passions and the instincts, the ratio-
nal and the irrational, the desires and the dreams of the man 
of the Enlightenment. Some time later, this collision gave 
birth to the new, Modern era.
I t seems that in the dawn of the new era, man with his changing attitude toward nature, felt more secure to cover 
up the dramatic situation with a familiar face coming from 
the past. Classical architecture offered him this opportunity. 
It embodied truth – not metaphysical – which means abso-
lute and eternal in the sense of Plato or Aristotle, universal 
though and atemporal within the limits of the Enlighten-
ment. Under these circumstances, the only chance for sensu-
ality to operate within the field of the premordial myth was 
to be restricted and isolated in the human subconscious and 
become an object of psychoanalysis and Sigmund Freud’s 
approach to the dream, in particular.
In Nietzsche’s “Birth of Tragedy”, the Apollonian and the Dionysian spirit alike are instincts and both belong to the 
sphere of myth. Nevertheless, they are in opposition between 
them, similar to the opposition which exists between dream 
and intoxication. Dream is the expression of the principium 
individuationis while intoxication destroys individuality and 
leads to a complete “oblivion of the self ”28.
In an analogous way, Freud gives the definition of the dream through its relation to individuality: The dream, ac-
cording to Freud, is a (disguised) fulfillment of a (repressed, 
forbidden) desire”29. The realm of the repressed desires is the 
unconscious. Its main characteristics are: lack of the contra-
diction, emotional condensation and transposition from one 
representation to another, atemporality, replacement of the 
external reality with the mental one, the principle of pleasure 
(edone)30.
Freud in his paper Das Unheimliche, published in 1919 uses the German word Unheimliche which means 
“uncanny”, unhomely, to indicate the dread caused to the 
human subject when he suddenly experiences reality as 
non-reality. Freud conceives of the “uncanny” not as some-
thing strange and unknown but as something very close 
and familiar which has been repressed in our minds and has 
to remain hidden31. In the same way, classical forms used 
by Neoclassicism have to keep their true Dionysian origin 
hidden, although they have been called forth in order to 
express the fundamental relation of Neoclassicism with 
nature. Nevertheless, Neoclassicism’s conception of nature 
bears a totally different meaning from that implicated in 
Nietzsche’s Apollonian/Dionysian spirit or Freud’s feeling 
of the Unheimliche.
Despite this, Neoclassical architecture can still cause aesthetic pleasure experienced as sensuality in the 
psychoanalytic sense. Architectural elements for instance, 
far from been related with any sacrificial practice could cause 
pleasure in the way in which a dream could do. That is to say 
as “a masqueraded fulfillment of repressed desires”.
In the case of Greek architecture, it seems that pleasure 
is stronger when Classical elements “decorate” traditional or 
popular architecture resulting to an heterogeneous but pecu-
liarly “harmonious” whole.
6.  Conclusions 
This paper constitutes an attempt to interpret Neoclas-
sical architecture in Nietzsche’s aesthetic terms. We tried to 
approach the aesthetic aspect of Neoclassical architecture 
within its historical dimension, by building up its genealogy. 
To this aim, following Foucault, we were engaged in a series 
of destructions.
The Europeans of the 18th and 19th centuries appealed to Classical architecture in search of an identity more 
real than their own. Nevertheless, Classical architecture 
had come out of totally different conditions of existence. As 
Nietzsche proposes, Classical architecture came to life out of 
the Titanic-barbaric world of the instincts through the princi-
pium individuationis, which gave it appearance and measure. 
In this spirit, Hersey proposes that the architectural elements 
of the Classical temple originated in sacrificial practices 
which performed the mythical dismemberment and recon-
struction of Dionysus.
The dismembered Dionysus, occupying the entrance of the path to Neoclassical architecture, was certainly 
not what the Enlightenment would be satisfied to accept as 
an archetype. It seems that the Enlightenment’s project to 
approach nature as a homogenous, quantified, measurable, 
objective whole, included Classical architecture. Not so much 
in order to pay respect to it, as in order to hide behind the 
Classical appearance its domination and power instincts. 
The new–born Greek state offered a challenge for a glorious 
return of Neoclassicism to its place of birth. This masquerade 
took place at the expense of traditional and popular archi-
tecture. 
Nevertheless, the adoption of Neoclassical elements by traditional and popular architecture presents a 
particular aesthetic interest. We argue that under these cir-
cumstances, aesthetic pleasure experienced as sensuality can 
be approached through Freud’s conception of dream and the 
unconscious. This seems to be the only way in which we can 
escape from and still remain deep in genealogy. 
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2. It is clear when one looks at this list that they have very different historical traditions and are at differ-ent stages of cultural development.
3. Our perception of the true facts of the situation is, however, to some extent clouded by the fact that nearly all are now eager to enter the world of con-
temporary art. This entry is characterized by a paradoxical 
mixture of cultural co-operation and cultural competition.
4. One symbol of the new situation, here as elsewhere in the world, has been a proliferation of large scale international exhibitions. The long-established 
Venice Biennial has now been joined by the Istanbul Bien-
nial and the Tirana Biennial. Greece celebrated hosting the 
Olympics with two big shows of a kind not previously seen 
in Athens – the Deste Foundation’s ‘Monument to Now’ 
and the Benaki Museum’s ‘Outlook’. What is, however, 
rather noticeable about all these events, however, is that 
they tend to showcase the work of non-native artists. When 
native artists are featured, it is because they have succeeded 
in establishing reputations in northern Europe and/or the 
United States. That is, they tend to be valued at home only 
to the extent that they are known abroad. Many of the best-
known supposedly ‘Mediterranean’ artists are permanent 
expatriates, for political or economic reasons, or for a com-
bination of the two.
5. Where housing and displaying contemporary art is concerned, the different Mediterranean countries operate at very different levels. Barcelona, prob-
ably the most vibrant city culturally on the shores of the 
Mediterranean, is magnificently equipped with exhibition 
spaces – these include MACBA, with a building designed 
by the American architect Richard Meier; the Caixa Forum, 
housed in a vast complex adapted from an early 20th century 
factory by the Japanese architect Arata Isozaki, and the Fun-
dacío Miró on Montjuic, with a building by José Lluis Sert. 
In France Nice has a large and relatively new Musée d’Art 
Moderne et d’Art Contemporain. In Athens the Benaki Mu-
seum has a large new building for contemporary shows in 
Piraeus Street, which he link between Athens and its port. In 
Istanbul there is a new, privately financed Museum of Con-
temporary Art beside the Golden Horn. Israel has a number 
of important museums that offer contemporary exhibitions. 
These include the Tel-Aviv Museum, the Helena Rubenstein 
Pavilion for Contemporary Art and the Haifa Museum. De-
spite these innovations, contemporary art in the countries I 
have listed is often weakly financed, and does not penetrate 
very deeply into the local culture.
6. Mediterranean culture is not a coherent unity – in each of the territories I have listed contemporary artists make reference to local narratives.
7. In Spain, for example, ‘official’ culture remains obsessed with the need to distinguish the Spain of today from the Spain of the Franco years – some-
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12. Contemporary art in Turkey has been strongly influenced by the information offered by suc-cessive editions of the Istanbul Biennial. If 
Greece has strong cultural links with France, Turkey is influ-
enced by its cultural ties with Germany. In addition, there is 
an underlying dialogue about the increasingly strong Islamic 
element in Turkish politics. A number of leading Turkish 
artists are strongly opposed to this Islamist tendency.
13. In Israel, there is an extremely active visual arts avant-garde. This, not surprisingly, has ties to the United States. Another influence, however, 
comes from Russia. A number of leading Israeli artists are 
Russian immigrants, and Russian is increasingly the second 
language of the Tel-Aviv art world.
14. This leaves the Islamic countries, who are in many respects are sharply divided from the rest of the Mediterranean art world. The most active, 
in avant-garde terms, is Egypt. This is partly due to the re-
curring Cairo and Alexandria Biennials. The latter describes 
itself as a ‘Biennial of the Mediterranean’, and endeavors to 
represent the whole of the Mediterranean basin. It is also 
due to the increasing complexity and sophisticated of Egyp-
tian society. Avant-garde art, nevertheless, has shallow roots, 
and there is not much in the way of a market for contempo-
rary art. Artists and curators make exhibitions for each other 
and for a very small elite of interested spectators.
15. Syria, Lebanon, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco are all influenced by their historic links with French culture. In all of these, there is a ten-
dency to look for indigenous Islamic forms, which can be 
adapted for contemporary use. Though all these countries 
participate in the Cairo and Alexandria Biennials, they also 
take part in the Sharjah Biennial in the United Arab Emir-
ates. This, which is a specifically Islamic event, probably has 
more influence, as a point of cultural interchange, than its 
two Egyptian rivals.
16. Lebanon prides itself on its cultural sophis-tication, and the Lebanese art world rapidly becomes aware of new stylistic and technologi-
cal developments elsewhere. There is also quite a strong 
feminist element in much new Lebanese art, which is also 
much less preoccupied with Islamic themes than is the case 
in neighboring countries. These developments, however, 
have sharply checked by the recent Israeli invasion and the 
political and social chaos that ensued.
17. Palestine is a special case. Thanks to the long-last-ing conflict between the Palestinians and Israel, a powerful propaganda art has developed in the 
Palestinian territories. In terms of artistic activity, these, 
despite their desperate economic condition, rival Egypt and 
Lebanon in terms of artistic productivity.
thing that conflicts with the pronounced taste for realism 
found among Spanish private collectors, who sustain what 
is perhaps the most active art market in the whole Mediter-
ranean region, rivaled only by Italy. Another issue is Catalan 
separatism.
8. In France, French centralism tends to drain cultural energy from the Mediterranean shoreline, and direct it towards Paris. The new museum in Nice cel-
ebrates the so-called Ecole de Nice, whose most prominent 
members were Yves Klein, Arman and Martial Raysse, but 
the glory days of this art movement are long since over and 
nothing very distinctive has replaced it
9. In Italy, there is a conflict between Arte Povera, and conceptual ideas in general, and Pittura Colta, which implies a self-conscious return to ‘classical’ 
values. The artists of the Pittura Colta tendency tend to be 
identified with Rome, rather than Milan, and a number of 
the most prominent teach in Catania. Because museums of 
contemporary art are consistently under-financed in Italy, 
private collectors and commercial art fairs have a great 
influence on the development of taste. This tends to give 
Pittura Colta an advantage over its rivals. However, Italians 
remain fascinated by a kind of international ‘contemporary’ 
art that is now in fact some 20 years out of date – witness 
numerous recent exhibitions devoted to the art and career 
of Andy Warhol. While the Venice Biennale remains an in-
ternational forum, ideas about whazt and what is not ‘avant-
garde’ have become increasingly ossified. And, because of 
the attractions of the Italian setting there are numerous 
examples of a phenomenon I call ‘parachuting in’. I mean by 
this permanent or semi-permanent displays of avant-garde, 
or supposedly avant-garde, art that have little to do with the 
Italian context. The latest example is the display of so-called 
Post Pop work, from the collection of the French billionaire 
François Pinault, and featuring artists such as Jeff Koons 
and Damien Hirst, which is now on show at Palazzo Grassi 
in Venice.
10. In the territories of the former Yugoslavia, there is another conflict, between a kind of democratic ‘craft’ tradition, which expresses 
itself through print-making, and a fascination [as in many 
formerly communist countries] with conceptual and instal-
lation art. Conceptual work rooted itself in these territories, 
as it did throughout Eastern Europe, as a way of making 
political points in a way that would escape the attention of 
the authorities.
11. Greece, despite the activities of the Deste Foun-dation (another example of ‘parachuting in’), has remained curiously limited and provincial 
in terms of its own local production. Despite the presence 
of the George Kostakis Collection of avant-garde Russian 
art from the early 20th century in the new State Museum of 
Modern Art in Thessaloniki, Greek art inclines towards tra-
ditional forms of painting and sculpture, often with a slightly 
Expressionist twist. There are strong links between the 
Athens art community and the Ecole des Beau-Arts in Paris, 
where many leading Greek artists completed their studies.
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I deas regarding the aesthetic of architecture and its relationship to natural structures developed during and particularly after the time of Renaissance, emphasized two principal fields of discussion. First, engaging the transcendental and metaphorical relationship between 
architectural structures and the structure of the human body; 
and the second, driving upon the logic of natural grove ac-
cording to permanent laws in developing structures, so well 
represented in Laugiers’ theory of the primal hut. 
However, during the nineteenth, and particularly on the beginning of the twentieth century, one can encounter 
appearance of ideas linking the principles of architectural 
structures to the elements and formations in nature which 
can be named as ‘primordial’. In this paper we will define the 
notion of the term ‘primordial’ in a particular sense. Regard-
ing elementary understanding of natural structures, the term 
can principally refer to the crystalline formations, and natural 
forms as shells. In this sense the term ‘primordial’ is very close 
to the term ‘chthonic’, however separated from its mythologi-
cal content, and keeping only its elementary notion. 
For the purpose of this paper from particular interest is the notion of ‘primordial’ as mentioned by Semper. In 
his writings the term was used with regard to the idea condi-
tioning further development of ‘certain prototypical forms’ 
in a particular sense. From the Semper’s explanation one can 
understand the ‘primordial idea’ as a fundamental creative 
sense which allows appearance of ‘infinite variations’ of these 
prototypical forms (Urformen), however always ‘conditioned 
by more closely determining circumstances’.1 
Even if not exactly defined, knowing the Semper’s architec-tural theory, we can assume that ‘prototypical forms’ be-
long to natural formations. Development of the characteristics 
of each form happens according to the properties of the material 
in which it appears. In the context of our theme Semper’s text 
emphasizes two extremely important aspects regarding the very 
essence of the creative process. First, it is obvious that the notion 
1 Semper, G. (1989). The Four Elements of Architecture and Other Writings. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. p. 136
of ‘primordial idea’ reflects the area of human sub consciousness, 
or in other words, aspects of our elemental belonging to the 
nature and its laws. The ‘primordial idea’ is more a fundamental 
natural sense which triggers the creative process, than a ratio-
nally developed skill. However, Semper recognizes particular cir-
cumstances, as the second aspect of a creative process, guiding 
fundamental natural sense towards more articulated definition 
of ‘prototypical forms’. Regarding Semper’s architectural theory 
we can assume that the nature of these circumstances is deter-
mined by historical, social, technical, and environmental aspects 
guiding the architect’s personal process of thinking.
I t is interesting to emphasize that Semper actually through these two aspects defines the creativity as an objective 
process. The ‘primordial idea’ can be, at its very best, defined 
as objective universal natural sense working through objective 
circumstances. In that context, property and the character of 
materials are more influential in the process of development of 
forms, than architect’s personal, subjective will. Moreover, there 
is a strong feeling that that what we call the subjective compo-
nent of creativity partakes in the fundamental natural sense of 
the ‘primordial idea’ as a universal genius. Its development, we 
can assume, is also conditioned by ‘particular circumstances’. 
Through the process of analyzing ideas and examples related to the late nineteenth century German aesthet-
ics, the expressionist movement, and the architectural circle 
around Bruno Taut, one can have an inside into the further 
development of this particular aesthetic sensibility governed 
by the notion of ‘primordial’. The essential values of so defined 
aesthetic sensibility are based on principles established by an 
inexorable link between human senses and elementary laws 
of natural structures, the interpretation of which is, however 
guided by the necessity of individual genius and feelings of 
an architect. How deeply were the ideas regarding elementary 
aesthetic sensibility rooted in the ground of natural laws, can 
be seen in Zeifing’s exploration of the primordial values of 
the golden section, as a proportion inherent with almost all 
natural structures.2
2 Lotze, H. (1913). Geschichte der Aesthetik in Deutschland. Leipzig, Verlag 
von Felix Meiner. p. 306
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in the creative process reflects an idea of primordial structures, 
however in a more organic way. It is, certainly, an embodiment 
of that ‘organic movement’ mentioned by Finsterlin, empha-
sizing strongly the values of an individual and highly subjective 
aesthetic sensibility. 
In the context of our discussion, the main question at this point can be related to the character of, so many times men-
tioned, primordial structures and prototypical forms. With the 
exception of Semper’s opinion, aestheticians and architects 
regarding this issue are inspired with the world of crystalline 
structures, forms of shells, or at the end of the twentieth cen-
tury in Gehry’s case, with snakes and fishes. These forms are 
undoubtedly bringing up a feeling of primordial, and a sense of 
elementary natural powers and laws of growing; as Lotze stated, 
the real primal aesthetic sense lies mainly in the impression 
with the crystalline forms.8 In that way, creative fantasy and the 
primal aesthetic sense were inseparably linked to the nature 
as a field of energy and laws governing the elementary human 
creativity. This aesthetic feeling developed so strongly that even 
Riegel made a critic regarding the domination of crystalline 
structures in theories at the end of the nineteenth century, as an 
ultimate inspiration in development of architectural forms.9 
I t seems that this idea culminated at the beginning of the twentieth century in the architectural fantasies and few 
projects of Bruno Taut and other architects of its circle. How-
ever, it is important to emphasize that all these ideas were 
rooted in the impression with the primordial forms, in the 
effects of materials, and in the dynamism of new technologies. 
Only these three aspects build up a complete aesthetic feeling, 
and the quality of their combined use was a truthful indication 
of new aesthetic sensibility. Moreover, during the first two de-
cades of the twentieth century the idea of crystalline structures 
as metaphors of spiritual purity was clearly exposed. It become 
even a metaphor of a new social order, transforming the ‘pri-
mordial idea’ and elementary aesthetic senses into a complex 
aesthetic sensibility, where the ultimate aesthetic value of an 
architectural expression corresponds with the higher natural 
order of the human society. The crystal clarity of an archi-
tectural idea and its material expression became a spiritual 
generator of new social values, integrating all members of the 
community around new aesthetic. However, this integrating 
energy, and complex aesthetic sensibility still emanated from 
the elementary natural senses for primordial forms, materials 
and basic laws of expression. 
I t is very important to emphasize that those ideas regarding the higher spiritual and social order never have been di-
vorced from the perceptual quality of materials and structural 
character of forms. More than that, the metaphorical nature 
of a form, and the clarity of its meaning actually depended 
on the perceptual clarity of used materials and structures. 
Trough texts and particularly in drawings of the architects of 
8 Lotze, H. (1913). Geschichte der Aesthetik in Deutschland. Leipzig, Verlag 
von Felix Meiner. p. 537
9 Riegl, A. (2004). Historical Grammar of the Visual Arts. New York, Zone 
Boks. pp. 351, 352
Moreover, in this period, it seems that the elementary notion of Semper’s ‘primordial idea’ developed into 
the aspect defining the inner, even spiritual content of the 
architectural work. In that way established spiritual content 
become a prototype, or better, a primordial aspect of the 
aesthetic feeling. In the writings of Herbart, Zeifing, Schlegel, 
Weisse, and Lotze, among others, this idea is mostly exposed 
in that sense, but bringing up the subjective fantasy as a power 
mediating the elementary, natural, primordial sense and the 
objective aspects of the creative process.3 However, as Herbart 
noted, the elementary aesthetic sense was still an instant trans-
formation of a feeling developed by a basic sensual impression. 
In that context, subjective components of expression, even if 
belonging to the universal natural order and laws, are playing 
important role in development of an aesthetic sensibility.4 
More than that, subjective fantasy was defined as a power transforming the primordial sensibility of elementary 
forms into the primordial aesthetic sense. In that context, 
subjective fantasy still keeps its link with the notion of the ‘pri-
mordial idea’ and its character as a natural elementary sense, 
and equally with the aspects of sub consciousness. That can be 
seen in Prolss writings, where the fantasy is closely linked to 
the notion of artistic reflection working on the primal level of 
the creative process and aesthetic experience.5 
I t is very important that the reflection of these ideas one can encounter in the first two decades of the twentieth century, 
in theories developed by Bruno Taut and other architects 
of the, so called, Crystal Chain group. Through their letters, 
established as a way of communication among the members 
of the group, they developed an important debate regarding 
essential aspects of creativity in architecture. One of the main 
points of this debate regarded the question of universality and 
individuality in the creative process. Bruno Taut as the patron 
of the idea of the universal genius emphasized that the archi-
tect should be only the ‘medium of the primal forces’.6 His, 
often emotionally colored statements, targeted mainly ideas of 
Herman Finsterlin, a firm advocate of the personalized creative 
intuition and individuality. However, despite this disagree-
ment, both of them emphasized the idea of elementary forces 
linking the architect’s creative genius (universal or individual) 
to the ‘primitive laws of expression’ and the primordial sense 
of form. Echoing Semper’s ideas regarding the importance of 
materials and to them belonging technological processing, 
they still observed the process of creating a form trough the 
‘fixation of organic movement’, stressing the importance of the 
basic aesthetic expression of primordial structures.7 
I t is particularly important to emphasize the constant value of this kind of aesthetic sensibility in the twentieth century 
architecture, and its contemporary appearance in the latest 
work of Frank Gehry, particularly the Guggenheim museum 
in Bilbao. His intuitive approach to the development of form 
3 Ibid. pp. 259, 306, 372, 413, 537
4 Ibid. p. 259
5 Prolss, R. (1904). Asthetik: Belehrungen uber die Wissenschaft vom Schonen 
und der Kunst. Leipzig, Verlagsbuchhandlung von J.J. Weber. p. 136
6 Whyte, I. B., Ed. (1985). The Cristal Chain Letters: Architectural  
Fantasies by Bruno Taut and His Circle. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press. 
p. 20
7 Ibid. p. 47
99
Imaginacija, čutnost in umetnost / Zbornik referatov III. sredozemskega kongresa za estetiko
Vladimir MAKO: AESTHETIC SENSIBILITY OF THE PRIMORDIAL STRUCTURES IN THE 20TH CENTURY ARCHITECTURE, 97-100
the Crystal Chain group established the idea that a particular 
form, its spiritual character and primordial sensibility grows 
and develops only within exactly defined material properties 
and structures. 
The roots of this idea can be undoubtedly found in Sem-per’s position and in texts of few important nineteenth 
century German architectural aestheticians. For example, 
in Prolss ‘Asthetik’ one can encounter the term ‘principles 
of primordial unity’ regarding the natural conditions of the 
creative process of an architect.10 In the spirit of that position, 
the Crystal Chain group developed the idea that a form and 
the character of its material and structure are inseparable, 
belonging to the same natural conditions of the development 
of the aesthetic sensibility and the creative process. In one of 
his letters, Bruno Taut defined form as “the productiveness 
of matter”, and he emphasized the importance of the “skill 
and lightness of construction”.11 In that way, the metaphorical 
meaning of the form was actualized trough the character of 
materials and their naturally belonging structures.
Architecture as a metaphor for the spiritual illumina-tion of the society and each human mind was actually 
depending on the translucency, transparency and reflectivity 
of the used materials, their perceptive clarity and crystalline 
effects. For example, Paul Goesch in his “Architektonische 
Aphorismen” links that what he calls ‘mineral architecture’ 
with forms of drops, rays of light, flames and waves. Moreover, 
in his understanding these forms were forms of movement, of 
a dynamic feeling important for developing the metaphorical 
character of architecture and the natural sense of grow.12 It is 
very important that hand by hand with this position developed 
the important idea of a transparent and light construction, 
unifying the inner and external into a natural structure. How-
ever, this inexorable link between the metaphor, form, material 
and structure was thought to work on the level of primal, pri-
mordial senses, perceptual and aesthetical. It targeted the basic 
sensorial processes of perception, immediate emotional re-
spond to the spiritual content, and according to that adequate 
aesthetic communication. 
Another group of examples developing a particular ‘chthonic’ character of an architectural form and its natu-
rally belonging materials proves that this particular aesthetic 
sensibility existed as a principle. Architectural forms based on 
the sensorial qualities of cave and shell structures necessarily 
developed in adequate opaque materials and heavy structures. 
However, as in the first group of examples, the process of aes-
thetic communication worked on the level of the primordial 
sensibility and feelings. 
I t is interesting that a very similar aesthetic principle can be seen in the creative process of Frank Gehry, and his ap-
proach in defining an architectural form. The example of the 
10 Prolss, R. (1904). Asthetik: Belehrungen uber die Wissenschaft vom Schonen 
und der Kunst. Leipzig, Verlagsbuchhandlung von J.J. Weber. p. 130
11 Whyte, I. B., Ed. (1985). The Cristal Chain Letters: Architectural Fantasies by 
Bruno Taut and His Circle. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press. p. 73
12 Ibid. p. 62
Guggenheim museum at Bilbao is extremely illustrative in 
that context. Use of stone base, metal, glass and water which 
determine the character of the form and its exterior/interior 
structure reveals the aesthetic sensibility strongly related to 
that what we can call ‘primordial idea’. The inspiration with 
the fish or snake skin and skeleton is perhaps dominant (or 
consciously dominant)13; however, the materialization of the 
whole composition reveals a particular concern with the exact 
use of these four dominant materials. 
The stone base with its firmness and visual coherence; glass which breaks that firm and solid structure as a crystal 
grooving out of it; metal skin which, as a mineral, waves in an 
endless grow; and water reflecting the whole form, completing 
the aesthetic perception, are elements of a feeling of a primordial 
structure. This impression is also emphasized by the position of 
the entrance. Visitors surrounded by stone, glass and metal are 
moving down, into the cave encountering the world of powerful 
energies and natural structures. The whole visual effect is essen-
tially based on our primal aesthetic sense which reacts instantly 
to the primordial structure and its elements. 
From a particular interest is the structure of the whole building. Inside the space we can feel the natural particu-
larity of each part of the building trough the construction and 
used material. It reveals exactly on the level of primal aesthetic 
sensibility the form character and to it belonging quality of 
the exterior surface. The sense of the perceptual unity of the 
interior/exterior correlation is based on the sensorial proper-
ties of that what Luckhardt named as basic elements of a pure 
form: ‘straight line, curve, and irregular form’.14 Here, the purity 
of form is established on the pure sensibility of primordial 
structures and its components; on the elementary feelings and 
aesthetic response. 
One aspect more reveals the closeness of all the named architectural concepts: the importance of technology. In 
his understanding of the importance of Paxton’s Crystal Pal-
ace, Semper emphasized the unavoidable role of technology 
of new materials and constructions in achieving the particular 
sensorial property of transparency and the feeling of the spatial 
endlessness.15 The inexorable link between technology of new 
materials and construction and new architectural expres-
sion was after that a constant theme in German architectural 
aesthetic writings, and it culminated on the beginning of the 
twentieth century. However, the call for the use of technol-
ogy and its importance for the creative expression were not 
uncritical and blindly technocratic. In that context, Taut was 
talking that “the higher causality is revealed in the generally 
detrimental effect of technology…”. However, the exactness 
of technology “illuminated by the poetic” is acceptable and 
positive.16 Poetic feeling being intuitive and reflective, and so 
close to the ‘primordial idea’, corrects the rationality of science 
bringing into it the element of infinity and metaphysics. In that 
13 Van Bruggen, C. (1997). Frank O. Gehry: Guggenheim Museum Bilbao. New 
York, The Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation. p. 57
14 Whyte, I. B., Ed. (1985). The Cristal Chain Letters: Architectural Fantasies by 
Bruno Taut and His Circle. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press. p. 101
15 Semper, G. (1989). The Four Elements of Architecture and Other Writings. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. pp. 164, 165
16 Whyte, I. B., Ed. (1985). The Cristal Chain Letters: Architectural Fantasies by 
Bruno Taut and His Circle. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press. p. 161
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sense, poetic feeling introduces into the relationship between 
technology and creativity the possibility of primal aspects of 
expression. It shouldn’t be to much emphasized that that sense 
of technology and its role in the creative process can be rec-
ognized in Gehry’s work. Technology is not the purpose but 
a tool for a poetic expression of primordial sensibility of the 
architectural structure. 
At the end of this short exploration, we can finally em-phasize the basic aspects of the aesthetic sensibility of 
primordial architectural structures. It is undoubtedly build 
on the foundations of natural structures, the sense of organic 
grow and movement, the importance of a poeticized used of 
new technologies, materials and structures. However, one of 
the most important aspects defines the character of the rela-
tionship between the architectural expression of primordial 
structures and the natural laws and forms. It can be reduced on 
the question of imitating nature which is a very old one. 
However, in the context of our theme this question reveals a particular position crystallized in analyzed 
ideas regarding the particular aesthetic sensibility of form and 
structure. As Luckhardt emphasized in one of his letters, “ar-
chitecture should not imitate nature but should itself be na-
ture. . .own autonomous structural existence. . .”17 It seems that 
the architectural visions and buildings based on the aesthetic 
sensibility of primordial structures necessarily achieve the feel-
ing of a particular organic existence. Based on elemental sub 
conscious associations with natural structures, and working 
on the level of primordial ideas, intuition and artistic reflec-
tion, this emotional correspondence between human primal 
aesthetic sensibility and natural laws achieves a universal level 
of expression and dynamic perception. Strong materiality and 
organic construction are the aspects of the space structure, 
provoking its particular dynamism which works on the levels 
of the spirit and matter. In that context, there is no unification 
of spirit and matter because they can never be separated on the 
first place. They are not existing hand by hand, but inseparably 
one in another, as a result of intuitional and reflective process 
of creation and perception. 
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1.  Introduction
Style is very influential in the formation of a building 
design. It strongly characterises a building as it enables the 
designer to transform it by grouping or classifying existing 
design-building elements according to some distinguishable 
properties and patterns [Gombrich 68-Simon 75]. Architec-
tural style acts as an ordering rule in architectural design that 
enables building elements, patterns and processes to be struc-
tured, providing an order [Shapiro 61-Ackerman 63-Smithies 
81]. Style is an important dimension of the aesthetic aspect of 
a building [Beardsley 66 -Michelis 01-Michelis 02]. The role 
of style during the phase of conceptual design is crucial be-
cause many fundamental stylistic intentions are introduced by 
designers as guidance for the development of a design [Simon 
75]. Style modelling is difficult because of its qualitative char-
acter. For that reason the introduction of style in a computer 
aided design system is tedious and complicated. A quantifica-
tion of style is problematic because, information about style 
is interwoven with information about each of building’s ele-
ments, its morphology and their syntax. A representational 
scheme that could express styles would enable quantification 
of the aesthetic qualities of style. In the area of Computer-
Aided-Design exists a great lack of stylistic preferences which 
it would enable designers to express their stylistic intents.
1. 1 Research Scope
The objective of this work is to develop a model to capture 
and express qualities of the semantics of style that are important 
in reasoning with stylistic design principles. A general structure 
for modelling architectural style should respond to two issues:
Stylistic information must be represented •	
independently of any style category.
Style representation must follow a frame, which can be •	
easily adapted among the different architectural styles, 
and incorporate all different knowledge of styles.
This paper is organised as following. In section 2 is 
presented the related work. In section 3 we present some 
approaches on the concept of style and we provide an opera-
tional definition of architectural style. In section 4 we present 
the proposed architectural style model within the declarative 
design system. We apply this model for the modelling “Santo-
rini”, “Metsovo”, and “Byzantine” style. In section 5 we present 
a design case study that is used for adaptation to the three 
modelled styles. Conclusions are drawn in Section 6 concern-
ing the applicability of the model.
2.  Related Work
In this section we discuss some relevant effort and ap-
proaches on design by style. The understanding of design style 
will be a great advantage in developing advanced Computer 
Aided Conceptual Design – Computer Aided Design (CACD 
– CAD) tools in design [Sequin 05].
The derivation of procedural knowledge of style is useful in 
design. Such knowledge enables designer to uncover the source 
producing style characteristics of products and to use them for 
producing designs under that style and/or evolve further a style. 
Recent studies of the explicit representation of style include 
the style of Taiwanese traditional house style [Chiou 95], and 
the style of renaissance architect Palladio [Stiny 78]. Both ap-
proaches imply the description of style in the form of rules of 
composition for shape grammars. These approaches can be 
manipulated by the computer to generate designs with that style.
Aesthetic and in particular stylistic concepts are very 
important in every design product. Many researchers under-
line the significant missing of systemisation and formalisation 
of aesthetic related design knowledge [Breemen 98]. However 
the main problem it was the fact that same aesthetic properties 
can be associated to different shape parameters. As a result it 
remains difficult to provide an absolute definition of aesthetic 
character, which makes very inconvenient the explicit linking 
with aesthetics knowledge.
In a research program academic researchers with indus-
trial partners approach the styling process in product design. 
Styling is a creative activity where the designer’s goal is to 
define a product that evokes a certain emotion while satisfy-
ing obligatory ergonomics and engineering constraints. Their 
approach enables the development of tools to preserve the 
aesthetic design intent during the required model modifica-
tions [Podehl 02- Giannini 03].
In an academic research work designers are provided 
with a language that can communicate stylistic concepts to the 
computer for form generation, [Chen 97]. The ‘Style Profile’ 
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the creative process. Constraints could strongly affect the selec-
tion among choices. The third factor is the search order. Simon 
argues that human designers provide specific procedures for the 
priority of goal satisfaction and constraints application [Simon 
75]. During the design process, the order of satisfaction of 
certain aspects of design imposes a sequence in the satisfaction 
of the design aspects. Such a procedure could result in a distinct 
form and composition for the design artefact.
3. 1 Style in Architectural design
The stylistic formation of a building is one of the most 
complex and intrinsic of the architectural design problems, 
[Chan 01]. Style strongly characterises a building as it enables 
the designer to transform it by grouping or classifying existing 
design elements according to some distinguishable proper-
ties and patterns [Krier 88-Michelis 01]. A style could be 
conceived as a system of constraints by architects. In this way, 
a system of constraints that refer to a particular style limits 
the decision within a smaller part of the problem space [Akin 
86-Chan 94]. Style is used by designers for the reduction of 
the solution space. Style enables selection of one among many 
satisfactory solutions because design problems generally do 
not have unique optimal solutions. Therefore the role of style 
in architectural design is twofold; firstly it works as a synthesis 
principle allowing the emergence of building designs while it 
provides imaginative order within a complex-non-measurable 
but ordered design domain [Lawson 94- Rowe 91]. Studies 
on consistencies or patterns of buildings and spatial features 
are a common approach to investigate and model architectural 
analysis and criticism [Michelis 01-Clark 96].
3. 2 Modelling architectural style
For the modelling of architectural style we provide 
mixture between the object and process view. The global 
and local morphology of building elements and the relation-
ships between both structural and spatial elements, evoke the 
specific spatial qualities of each architectural style. Morphol-
ogy, like function, can be regarded as a very general type of 
information, relevant to almost all elements in a building 
design, and even to many non-physical concepts. They are two 
fundamental issues in an architectural concept of building, 
and in particular the building style. First the representation 
of its solid constructed region, the spaces that are enclosed 
within that constructed frame, [ Joedicke 85]. Second the kind 
of relationships between spaces and structural elements, and 
the relationships among the spaces itself, [ Joedicke 85]. As a 
result, we accept that architectural style is composed by:
A set of features represented by a set of spatial and •	
structural elements
A set of principles which are represented by •	
constraints in the form of properties of and relations 
among the aforementioned elements.
In order to regard any legitimate element as stylistic, consid-
ered as a feature and also participating in the corresponding prin-
ciples, for each of the following paradigms, we employ Chan’s 
[Chan 00], working definition about properties of features:
It has a form or composition distinguished by some •	
particular configuration and a contextual relationship 
with other features. 
It is a member of a set of prominent forms repeatedly •	
used.
is a mechanism for comprehensive formal style analysis. Such 
mechanism could records essential properties of styles, and it 
could serves as a framework for style knowledge accumulation. 
Such infrastructure enables the communication of stylistic 
concepts to computer for form generation of products.
In a series of efforts [Wang 03] a research is focused on 
the impact of form features on style through the topological 
structure and geometrical variation. In particular, they evaluate 
the influence of design style by feature geometry. They argue 
that a combination of topological and geometrical attributes 
on both levels of global and detail perception could enable a 
definition of a design style. The user applies a set of procedures 
on stylistic features of an object. In general they deal with 
objects like swords, and statues heads.
A group of researchers, [Ding 01], approach the in-
terpretation of architectural style using syntax – semantic 
model. According to them, it is possible to regard a style as a 
representation of common particular meanings called com-
plex semantics expressed from a set of designs. Style could be 
analysed into an ensemble of complex semantics as emerged 
by the synthesis of some simple semantics after the articula-
tion of a group of forms. The choices of the specific forms, and 
the creation of some new forms), are directed by the design 
decisions. The notion of simple semantics could derive from 
properties of forms (geometric) and relationships (topological, 
organisational) among them. 
The research work of H-J Park [Park 05] concerns the 
study of beauty in morphological design based on the assump-
tion that universal aesthetic principles exist and are quantifi-
able. The resulted computer-based system for quantification of 
aesthetics in the presence of proportionality is utilised in the 
analysis and synthesis of various design artefacts. 
3.  The concept of style
We provide two approaches for the concept of style, the 
object and the process view. The definition of style through 
an object view depends on the set of common characteristics 
of products. The emergence of style is based on a repetitive 
appearance of a set of ‘features’ in a number of products, such 
as buildings, paintings, poems, and music. A list of the char-
acteristics of a work of art includes: first convention of form, 
secondly material, and thirdly technique. [Ackerman 63]. In a 
similar approach formal and qualitative characteristics are more 
decisive for the formation of a style [Shapiro 61]. For that 
reason he proposed the following aspects for the description 
of the style: form elements or motives, form relationships and 
qualities. An analogous approach appeared in architectural 
history [Smithies 81-Pothorn 81].
In the process view the formation of a style is achieved 
through some important factors that characterise a creative pro-
cess. This approach is concentrated in the way of doing things. 
During a process three aspects play an important role, choices, 
constraints, and search orders implemented in a process [Chan 
92]. The birth of a style could emerge around a set of choices 
between ways of performance or procedures during the cre-
ative process, [Gombrich 60- Simon 75]. For Gombrich, these 
choices are of the kind of perceptual cues, while for Simon these 
choices are those that emerge during the design process. The 
decisions made among alternative choices characterise a style. 
The second factor is the constraints that were imposed during 
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3. 2. 1 Stylistic Features
We define two categories of stylistic features for spatial 
and structural building elements. Spatial Features includes 
physical or virtual spaces that satisfy a function according to 
the program (brief) of a building. Examples are the spaces for 
sleeping (bedrooms), living (living rooms). Structural Features 
includes all objects for the definition of the structural design 
of a building. Examples of such features are slabs, (ceilings, 
floors), walls, columns, and beams.
3. 2. 2 Stylistic Principles
A style provides relationships for the placement of its ele-
ments, and it obeys their internal relationships. Such relation-
ships specifically determine both morphological and structural-
functional properties, (e.g. such as the precise place and internal 
proportions of roofs for a style of a house) of a building. The 
principles comprise the following kinds of relationships: those 
between spatial and structural elements, between spatial ele-
ments, and between structural elements. These relationships 
can be classified in two categories: topological and formative 
principles. Topological Principles refers to logical relationships 
between stylistic features. Spatial organisations are expressed 
with topological relationships (‘‘space x is adjacent to the north 
wall of space y”). Topology defines constraints for the geometric 
design space. Topology relations include: Adjacency, Orientation, 
Proximity, et cetera. Formative Principles introduces the forma-
tive constraints that manipulate geometry characteristics. These 
constraints affect both the spatial and formal level of a design. 
They specify and establish the form language, frequency, com-
plexity, and variation of the characteristic forms of a style. The 
formative category is also presenting the physical dimensions of 
the building elements, and it also identifies characteristics con-
cerning area, proportions, et cetera. Manipulations like Rotation, 
Shift, Overlap and geometric transformations. Formative cat-
egory includes: Symmetry, Rhythm, Repetition, et cetera.
3. 3 Three case studies of architectural 
style
For the needs of the current research three examples of archi-
tectural style are modelled. These are style of “Santorini”, [Michelis 
81], the style of Metsovo, and “Byzantine” style [Buchwald 99]. All 
styles introduce a specific typology of spaces, and their shape is 
expressed through characteristic geometrical primitive forms.
3. 3. 1 Style “Santorini”
Most of the Santorini edifices share a relatively simple 
primary form. In the following we consider the building as a 
volumetric composition. Nearly all of the existing habitations 
can be broken down to the following elementary, volumetric 
set-up: a rectangular volume, topped by a vaulted roof. Santo-
rini, houses have a specific composition of spaces, while their 
shape is expressed through characteristic geometrical primi-
tive forms, that of a quadrilateral (cuboid) (Figure 1). 
The spatial composition is either a nearly rectangular 
plan, or a deeper than longer plan. In general the width of the 
spaces is greater than its length while the spaces have the same 
length in many cases. Additionally spaces do not overlap and 
they are adjacent. In many cases buildings have a separate 
ground flour and first floor. The roofs play a prominent role in 
the perception of the composition as a whole, whereby differ-
ent roof forms are applied. A building of Santorini style usually 
topological formative formative
Bedroom  
and living room 
are adjacent
Bedroom  
and living room 
are coaxial
Building plan  
is wider (deeper) 
than long
Bedroom is placed 
on the north side 
of living room
Bedroom width  
is equal Living 
room width




All rooms  
are deeper  
than long
Room roof  
has vaulted  
form
Figure 1 Santorini habitation
Table 1 Santorini style characteristics
combines a number of vaulted and flat roofs. The main charac-
teristic of the roof morphology is that the roofs extend towards 
the longer dimension of the building, (Table 1).
3. 3. 2 Style “Metsovo”
We consider the building as a basic volumetric composi-
tion. The regional architectural style introduces a specific typol-
ogy of spaces, and their shape is expressed through characteristic 
geometrical primitive form, that of a quadrilateral (Figure 2). 
The Metsovo style has a distinct character that it is longer 
than wide. In general the length of the buildings is greater than 
its width or they have a rectangular shape. The upper floor is 
covered by gable roof while the reception area’s roof is placed 
vertically to the longer dimension of the building. This kind of 
building offers an example of space overlapping: the kitchen 
and the bedroom in many cases share the same space area. 
A significant characteristic is the fact that the part of a 
room or two (in general the living and /or the guestroom) 
is overhang for better view. A building usually combines two 
cable roofs. A long roof that follows the length of the build-
ing, while the second in general covers a central space and it is 
placed in a vertical position relative to the main roof, (Table 2).
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4.  Declarative modelling of architectural 
style
In this section we introduce a declarative modelling 
framework for architectural style that will be based on a de-
clarative framework within a declarative design system. The 
layout of a style is a set of its compositional features, repre-
sented by abstract geometric elements. Features are composed 
together by means of stylistic principles which determine the 
architectural character of the design. The abstract elements 
used for representing spatial and building elements are called 
geometric entities.
4. 1 Defining semantics for 
architectural style
In this subsection we present two tasks. First a variety of 
constraint types is defined, each of which can capture specific 
aspects of stylistic principles. Second a set of features is de-
fined, integrated with the constraints.
The introduction of style within a declarative design 
system [Makris 05] was based on a representation that con-
cerns declarative modelling [Plemenos 95] and architectural 
knowledge. We utilise a framework that facilitates the identi-
fication of semantic relationships which is needed to define 
architecture-oriented building models [Makris 03]. The 
description of a building is organised in categories of objects 
with common properties and relations. Any relations between 
objects as well as properties of objects could be specified by 
the declarative semantic of constraints [Plemenos 91]. Within 
the MultiCAD system a domain-specific knowledge base has 
the three following tables of Type of Objects, Type of Properties 
and Type of Relations [Miaoulis 02]. The Type of Objects table 
contains a number of specific objects for the definition of 
spaces and roofs. The Type of Properties table contains funda-
mental information for the description of the scene objects. 
This table has many properties, for example Placement (with 
a range for minimum-maximum coordinates), Length, Width 
and Height of objects. The Type of Relations table contains rela-
tions which define the description of a building. Among these 
relations they include these that play an important role for the 
expression of the architectural style principles. We consider 
the development of an architectural style to happen through 
the composition of spatial planning and the roof morphology 
of a building [Makris 05]. 
4. 1. 1 Spatial planning
We define the constraints that concern the arrangement 
of spatial objects [Makris 05]. First, set of six relations that 
concern object’s placement within the site (Place_North-East, 
etc). Second a set of constraints about adjacency and near-
ness between objects (Adjacent_North, etc, Near_North, etc). 
Third, constraints that expresses overlapping between two ob-
jects (Overlap_North, etc). Considering the geometric proper-
ties of spaces we have relations between two spaces (Same_
Length, Same_Width, et cetera). And properties about a space 
like (Longer_than_Wide, Longer_than_High, et cetera). We 
have also relations for the relative placement of spaces within 
an axis that connects their centres (Axial-Centre_North-South, 
Axial-Centre_West-East et cetera). The constraint Align is 
defined as adjusting spaces position in relation to a certain 
line. Also, objects locations can be adjusted with regard to any 
topological formative formative
Bedroom and 
living room are 
adjacent
Bedroom and 
living room are 
coaxial
Building plan is 
longer than deep
Kitchen is placed 
on the east wall of 
living room
Bedroom width is 
equal Living room 
width
Rooms are deeper 
than long
Bedroom is placed 
on the north wall 
of living room
All rooms has 
same height
Room roof has 
gable form
Figure 2 Metsovo habitation
Table 2 Metsovo style characteristics 
Figure 3 Byzantine 
church
3. 3. 3 “Byzantine” style 
In Byzantine style I the most dominant building type, is 
aisled basilica [Buchwald 99] Byzantine style I is characterised 
by dynamic line, while buildings are clear and simple. Each 
unit (the nave, the aisles, the transept, the narthex, and apse), 
is a discreet, separate, unequivocal geometric form, which is 
experienced as a single spatial element, (Figure 3). The narrow 
and long proportions of the nave amplify the dynamic quality, 
and the location of the major entrance at one end of the nave 
on the major axis of symmetry.
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part of these elements, i.e. edges, centres, or axis. All these 
constraints could be applied both on the building as global 
constraints, and /or the spaces as local constraints. Given the 
above model we could define the three earlier described styles 
as in the following tables, (Table 3) and (Table 4).
In particular, the function fi expresses the local metrics of 
each stylistic criterion. The utilisation of fi shows the contribu-
tion of each criterion in the proposed evaluations to the overall 
evaluation of a building for a style. In order to express the 
style of a building we imply the calculation of the sum of the 
number of the stylistic criteria. For each criterion a constant 
weighting factor ai is provided. In the beginning all criteria 
have a weighting component set to 1, and they have equal 
importance. Later, during the formation of a combination of 
criteria for a style, their weight factors are changed in accor-
dance with the demands of the expressed style.
5.  Evaluation
The proposed modelling framework for architectural 
style has been integrated within a declarative CAD prototype 
system [MultiCAD]. The experiments are based on the ap-
plication of style during architectural conceptual design. We 
first model and then utilise the three styles in order to generate 
design alternatives for given building demands. The system 
offers the designer with successful designs while it provides 
variations of the specific architectural style. Especially the later 
result proves that the selection of the specific stylistic criteria 
were the appropriate in order to provide feasible and alterna-
tive variations of the same style (Figures 4-7).
stylistic criteria weight
Local
Deeper than Long 1






Building Deeper than Longer 5
stylistic criteria weight
Local
Longer than Deep 1





Building Deeper than Longer 5
Table 3 Santorini style criteria
Table 4 Metsovo style criteria
4. 1. 2 Roof morphology 
In order to obtain the characteristic roof forms to particu-
lar styles we define two categories of constraints that control 
the geometric parameters for the roof morphology. The first 
category contains these which control the consistency of the 
roof morphology. The second category of constraints controls 
the degree of curvature, linearity, cavity of the roof form 
[Makris 05].
4. 2 Aesthetic evaluation
In order to capture the aesthetic intentions of the designer we 
also introduce a number of aesthetic criteria. Such aesthetic cri-
teria also applied for style evaluation: Balance, Equilibrium, Unity, 
Density, Regularity, Homogeneity, Rhythm, Symmetry (vertical-
horizontal), and Proportion [Ngo 02], [Staudek 02] [Makris 05].
4. 3 Measure of Style
A style could be expressed as a set of stylistic criteria. The 
measure of style (degree of adaptation to a style) is an aggre-
gate of stylistic criteria for a building composition. A stylistic 
scale is created, with total adaptation (i.e. a building is 100% 
adapted to a particular style) at one end, and lack of adaptation 
at the other (i.e. a building is 0% adapted to a particular style). 
The formal expression of the evaluation is given as a linear 
summation of the weighted evaluations. 
SE = Σ ai  fi (Ei )  0 ≤ a ≤ 100
a
i
Figure 4 Santorini style spatial planning
Figure 5 Santorini style roof morphology
Figure 6 Metsovo style spatial planning
106
Imaginacija, čutnost in umetnost / Zbornik referatov III. sredozemskega kongresa za estetiko
Dimitrios MAKRIS, Georges MIAOULIS, Dimitri PLEMENOS: TOWARDS A COMPUTATIONAL MODEL OF STYLE FOR AESTHETIC DESIGN, 101-107
6.  Conclusions
In this paper we present the development of a model for 
style. The implementation of this model within a design sys-
tem has the following results. First the designer can model an 
architectural style. However he/she can define and model his/
her personal style. Second, he/she can utilise a style in order 
to generate alternative solutions of buildings. In this way build-
ings design can be adapted to an architectural style.
In general, we should underline, as for every operational 
methodological tool, that it could outcomes in two directions. 
First, it provides a useful analysis framework for scholars, 
researchers, critics and designers. It is a tool capable to achieve 
a quantitative understanding of the aesthetic issues involved 
in design, while it can have an impact on style studies. Second, 
although it can amplify creativity, it could easily trapped de-
signers in a mechanistic way of design. However, if we know 
the possible problems we could take our risks, and we could 
profit from the potentialities of this methodology. 
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DU POïéTIQUE À L’ESTHéSIQUE  
PAR L’INTERPRéTATION MUSICALE
Eléments du sémiologie musicale
Les milieux de la théorie musicale semblent de plus en 
plus conscients que le rapport entre l’analyse de la musique et 
son exécution mérite une étude plus approfondie, voire sou-
haitable d’aborder l’analyse et l’interprétation dans une même 
perspective. L’interprète doit toutefois trouver un juste milieu 
entre le spirituel et le réel, sans sacrifier ni l’un ni l’autre. Pour 
ce faire, il faut établir une distinction simple, souvent négli-
gée, entre l’interprétation et l’exécution, ainsi un certain style 
d’interprétation s’impose, mais la façon dont cette interprétation 
est communiquée à l’auditeur dans l’exécution est autre chose. 
L’hypothèse qui se fait jour et que la musique, qui représente 
une dimension importante de l’expérience humaine, constitua 
un aspect spécifique de l’identité personnelle dans sa globalité ; 
son enracinement dans la sphère des émotions, le rapport qu’elle 
entretient avec le système de valeurs propres à l’individu, les 
liens étroites qui existent entre goûts musicaux et style cognitif, 
constituent quelques éléments à l’appui de cette hypothèse. 
Dans cette perspective, la musique, loin de représenter un 
ensemble de contenus et de capacités, est défini comme un 
segment de l’histoire cognitive, sociale et affective de chaque 
individu, que l’on peut faire émerger, valoriser et consolider par 
une réflexion sur sa propre expérience musicale, ses goûts, ses 
compétences et ses conduites de prédilection. Comprendre une 
structure musicale pour tenter de l’expliquer et comprendre une 
musique pour la communiquer sont deux exercices différents 
qu’entretiennent un rapport intrinsèque et se superposent dans 
une certaine mesure, mais la superposition n’est jamais totale. 
L’interprétation musicale implique la compréhension d’une 
œuvre fondée sur les pensées : sémiologiques, sémantiques 
esthétiques, sociologiques et psychologiques. Les recherches 
d’analyse d’une œuvre, dans la perspective sémiologique d’une 
part, permettent de consolider l’ensemble des paramètres, des 
règles, des tableaux et des graphiques ; d’autre part nous voulons 
illustrer le lien entre les trois dimensions de l’analyse sémi-
ologique ; le niveau neutre dans ces rapports avec la poïétique 
et l’esthésique. La méthodologie utilisée dans l’analyse sémi-
ologique est basée sur les critères suivants : la progression mé-
lodique, la diversité rythmique, les procédés de variation, les reg-
istres, l’aspect harmonique de la pièce et l’organisation formelle. 
Le niveau neutre est descriptif et représente l’inventaire aussi 
exhaustif que possible, des types de configurations qu’il est 
possible de reconnaître dans une partition. Ce niveau neutre 
fournit une base sur laquelle les configurations des approches 
poïétique et esthésique seront projetées et représentent l’objectif 
de retrouver, à partir de la seule trace laissée par le compositeur, 
quelles sont ses stratégies de production et celles percep-
tives pour l’interprète qu’il l’exécute et l’auditeur qui écoute 
l’interprète. La poïétique, qui tourne son regard vers l’amont de 
l’évènement, ne s’occupe pas de l’indescriptible obtenu, ni de 
l’émotion, mais de la conduite, souvent laborieuse, qui soudain 
se libère dans la béance de l’œuvre. Et quand elle va jusqu’au 
bout d’elle-même, elle produit la valeur esthétique de l’œuvre 
sur la grande route trans-esthétique instaurée par la poïétique. 
La poïétique est une double opération – productrice et esthé-
tique, l’interprétation sera une production à partir des modes 
d’investissement technique et affective de l’interprète et par la 
capacité de reconnaissance et d’adhésion du récepteur. En tant 
qu’interrogation théorique du processus de création et comme 
philosophie de la création, la poïétique pense les techniques 
d’élaboration et de production qu’ils soient ceux basés sur les 
pensées philosophiques, sociologiques, des sciences exactes, des 
sciences humaines ou des pratiques dites ordinaires. L’analyse 
poïétique met en œuvre les matériaux d’analyse de la production 
et de ses effets étant une entreprise philosophique parce qu’elle 
met en évidence ses propres moyens artistiques qui caracté-
risent une production originale. Toutes ces techniques utilisées 
par l’interprète doivent être vues comme une pensée philoso-
phique transversale de l’œuvre qui est ouverte à l’imprévisibilité, 
à l’ineffable, à l’inspiration et à l’improvisation (l’imaginaire). 
L’interprète. L’interprétation
L’interprète est bien du coté de l’esthésique, car il est le 
premier à faire une série de choix à partir du texte du com-
positeur. Le premier souci de l’interprète est de comprendre le 
caractère de la musique, le but dans lequel celle-ci a été écrite. 
Il ne devrait pas partir avec des idées préconçues sur les émo-
tions où l’humeur à exprimer mais rechercher le caractère dans 
les éléments formels de la musique elle-même. C’est la struc-
ture de la musique, résultant de ses composantes mélodiques, 
harmoniques, rythmiques et dynamiques, qui déterminent 
à la fois la forme et le caractère. Le caractère est conféré par 
la structure, et c’est en comprenant pleinement celle-ci que 
l’interprète pourra transmettre celui-la, alors qu’en tirant la 
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musique dans un sens ou dans un autre, il développera les 
deux. Il doit tenir compte des éléments de la structure, donc 
de la rigueur, en les conjuguant, décides des priorités selon 
lesquels, les agencer, en fonction de son sens des proportions 
et de son jugement de l’équilibre. 
Dans l’interprétation musicale d’une part la partition 
doit offrir le témoignage le plus complet possible des inten-
tions du compositeur et d’autre part l’instrumentiste a pour 
responsabilité d’interpréter, de décorer ces informations et de 
les représenter dans les moindres détails dans l’exécution, qui 
doit aussi baigner inévitablement autour de la contingence 
historique. L’interprète a mission de faire « vivre » une œu-
vre, de traduire les sentiments que ce texte fait naître en lui : 
chaque phase de son travail est tournée vers le moment unique 
où, confiant dans ses possibilités, il délivrera la musique telle 
qu’elle est et tel qu’il la ressent, comme la plus riche et la 
plus fidèle expression possible. Le travail quotidien et toute 
éducation musicale sont les deux approches fondamentales 
qui devraient contribuer à faire du musicien un artiste total 
qui sache traduire son message avec clarté et émotion, son 
rôle est justement de faire « revivre » au sens fort, à travers 
leur personnalité et leur subjectivité de musicien. Bien sou-
vent l’absence de réelle interprétation musicale est due à 
l’importance prise par des problèmes techniques qui devraient 
être déjà résolus, ça lui permettant de jouer son corps et être à 
l’aise dans la musique, dans un bonheur communicatif.
Il faut admettre que l’interprétation c’est une opération 
complexe de consciences, de recherche du propre ego, de 
transfiguration d’une projection du « monde réel », de message 
codifié, par des conventions explicites des symboles signifi-
ants, aussi c’est la recherche, par inspiration, du l’idéal infini du 
savoir et de la perfection du monde existentiel. Elle ne se limite 
jamais sur une transposition sonore des entités constituantes du 
modèle textualisé, vu que même le modèle ne tende pas seule-
ment sa reproduction. L’art sonore n’est pas une organisation, si 
« le souffle- l’ineffable » manque, c’est comme un château fort 
sans vie. Je croix dans le postulat : «  la musique c’est la vie » ; 
donc tous ce que c’est vie peut être exprimé dans le langage 
musical au niveau de la codification du texte et celle de décodi-
fication interprétative. Il faut comprendre la gravité symbolique 
du texte pour pouvoir s’inscrire sur les orbites signifiants de la 
vie et de la mort, de l’héroïsme et de l’amour, avec leurs marches 
impétueuses et leur tourbillon. Pour pouvoir interpréter un 
« forte » (par exemple) c’est pas suffisant de jouer fort avec des 
accents ou faire des gestes ou des grimasses si derrière ces choses 
il n’y a pas l’interrogation : To be or not to be ?
L’interprète qui entre dans le milieu d’un œuvre, il doit 
accepter que la compréhension des signes et l’interprétation 
des significations, par des sonorités et transfigurations psy-
chologiques, représentent un univers des recherches et des 
efforts créatifs basés sur la théorie de la connaissance (de 
soi même en premier lieu) et de s’imaginer l’infini idéal qui 
existe du moment qu’on le sent. En fait, l’interprétation est 
convertie par la perception en objet de plaisir esthétique, 
ainsi l’esthésique avec l’effet sur la sensibilité de celle qui 
écoute, fait l’objet d’un jugement esthétique. Pour rendre 
l’ineffable et le subliminal, c’est-à-dire ce qu’il y a de plus fu-
gace dans la vie intérieure, il ne devait pas s’encombrer de 
considérations rationnelles. Or, l’impressionnisme est l’art 
de traduire, par une technique spéciale, le momentané et le 
fugitif. En découvrant une musique en fixant un moment de 
la durée et non plus seulement une tranche d’espace et de 
volume. De l’impressionnisme, Verlaine a utilisé d’instinct 
la plupart des procédés : le flou, la coloration des ombres, 
les effets de clair de lune, de brume ou de neige, la legérité 
de la touche, la multiplication d’un objet unique, la nota-
tion des séries d’impressions, procédés par lesquels il a pu 
exprimer l’inexprimable et rendre la durée intérieur et ce 
qu’il y a d’unique dans la sensation. Il en est de même de la 
musique où il a joué le rôle de novateur et préparer la voie de 
l’impressionnisme musical d’un Fauré ou d’un Debussy. A 
titre d’exemple on peut parler de la Sonate en La majeur op.13 
pour violon et piano qui est l’œuvre la plus représentative de 
la période de jeunesse du compositeur, marquant sa première 
manière de composition. Les significations expressives déga-
gées par les quatre mouvements de la Sonate sont très variés 
à partir du mystère le plus profond du lyrisme dégagé par le 
premier mouvement et la sérénité transparente du deuxième 
jusqu’à l’atmosphère intime en style oriental du troisième 
mouvement au thème ample et chaleureux entraînant un 
enthousiasme par le rythme irrésistible du quatrième mouve-
ment. Ces images sont réalisées par une diversité des tech-
niques de la composition, telle que la superposition partielle 
de la mélodie avec l’accompagnement, le rythme régulier, 
l’harmonie avec ces modulations brusques et inattendues, des 
sonorités étranges, tous ces éléments définissent le style et la 
personnalité poétique de Fauré. Le beau sonore se déploie 
dans le temps et sollicite la mémoire qui doit reconstruire 
l’objet sonore dans le cerveau. Dans les systèmes esthétiques 
du XVIIIe et XIXe siècles la beauté sonore est toujours le 
produit de l’art, jamais de la nature. Musique et poésie sont des 
arts qui exigent une représentation : la poésie existe par la lec-
ture, silencieuse ou à voie haute, et la musique, par l’exécution ; 
leur beauté se révèle dans la concrétisation de l’œuvre qui est 
à la base du processus de l’interprétation. Cette conception du 
beau est le fruit d’une civilisation de l’écriture où l’esthétique 
est fondée sur la présence d’un texte. Ce n’est qu’en marge du 
code éthico- esthétique que la beauté sonore peut être ap-
préhendée avec la même immédiateté que la beauté visuelle : 
le plaisir sonore surgit en même temps que la sensation audi-
tive ; il est indépendant de la forme, simple ou complexe, ratio-
nnel ou irrationnel, de la musique. Ainsi la perception esthé-
sique, auditive, du sensible qu’il est transmis par l’interprète à 
l’auditeur, lui étant le premier à le percevoir, trouve la capacité 
du public qui apprécie par ses sens et ses goûts. Cette ap-
préciation affective est purement individuelle et exprime une 
attitude esthétique qui donne la valeur de l’œuvre.
Les transformations technologiques depuis cinquante ans 
ont bouleversé la place de la musique dans la vie quotidienne. 
Celle-ci est actuellement omniprésent tout dans l’espace que 
dans les temps sociaux, et ses implications sociales ou culturel-
les sont si forts qu’elles exigent d’être observées et analysées en 
tant que symptôme de la société. Le fait que la musique ne soit 
pas que partition, mais aussi exécution sonore publique, tout 
ce dispositif, cet appareil de célébration de l’œuvre au moment 
où elle est portée à la connaissance de public est tributaire de 
la situation du communication qui accompagne l’œuvre au 
moment où elle est transmise à l’auditeur. C’est Adorno qui a 
« le plus lutté » pour que la musique n’est pas une place « exo-
tique » dans le champ sociologique, tout en ayant souligné 
quel doit mettre en évidence « ce qui est inhérent à la musique 
en soi en tant que sens social, et les positions et la fonction 
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qu’elle occupe dans la société. Le fait musical semble bénéficié 
d’une sorte de respect, comment à tous les faits de pensée et de 
création en général, de sorte qu’il resterait incompréhensible 
dans sa genèse et imprévisible dans son destin il est entouré 
d’un certain « mystère ». Par rapport au compositeur, au 
créateur, c’est le don qui surgirait, inattendue et inexplicable. 
Bref, c’est la théorie de l’inspiration, qui s’impose d’autant plus 
facilement qu’elle ne peut être liée ni à une intension ni à une 
destination ; ou bien si une signification ou une finalité sont 
perçues, elles n’ont plus rien de commun avec une création 
humaine réelle.
Adorno dans « Théorie esthétique » en faisant une tenta-
tive de définition des concepts d’une sociologie de la musique, 
il souligne que le statut de la musique et du fait musical dans 
le monde contemporain est liée à la « dialectique de la rai-
son » ainsi le monde échapperait en partie à la raison, ce qui 
lui permet d’être autonome tout en étant en même temps un 
fait social qui ne peut, en conséquence, échapper à certains 
aspects de la rationalisation. La musique a donc un caractère 
« ambigu » qui permet à Adorno d’abolir la barrière qui se 
trouve placée entre l’approche esthétique de l’œuvre d’art et 
l’approche strictement technique. Ces deux aspects lui parais-
sent inséparable et c’est pourquoi il faut aborder la musique 
par la rationalisation avec ses conséquences esthétiques et 
inversement comprendre en quoi le créateur apporte sa sub-
jectivité dans les obligations de la technique. C’est ainsi que le 
concept de « force productive » inclut dans la composition, 
l’interprétation et la reproduction mécanique.
Le fait musical n’appartient exclusivement ni à l’ordre du 
réel ni à l’ordre du l’imaginaire, il a pris une dimension con-
sidérable dans la vie quotidienne (il vient parfois en tête des 
pratiques culturelles de certains groupes sociaux), ainsi il y a 
une autre dimension à prendre en considération et concerne la 
«  communication immédiate ». 
L’interprétation est le but final de tout travail instru-
mental, sa seule raison d’être. La technique n’est pas que 
le moyen d’arriver à cette fin, l’outil à mettre au service de 
l’interprétation artistique. Pour bien jouer, posséder l’appareil 
technique n’est donc pas suffisant. L’interprète doit aussi 
pleinement comprendre le sens de la musique, avoir de 
l’imagination créatrice et une approche sensible personnelle 
de l’œuvre si ce qu’il en fait ne doit pas rester sec et pédant. Sa 
personnalité ne doit être ni trop discrète ni trop voyante.
Pour savoir ce qu’il faut pour bien jouer en public, donc 
faire une bonne interprétation, le mieux est de se référer aux 
qualités nécessaires à un bon orateur, car ce sont quasiment 
les mêmes. Un bon orateur est ce lui qui a une bonne voix, 
une bonne élocution qui projette bien, qui a quelques choses 
d’important à dire et qui le dit avec autorité, de manière à être 
compris par tout le monde. De même, un bon interprète est 
celui qui allie une maîtrise technique complète et une interpréta-
tion compréhensible et convaincante pour tous. L’analogie va 
plus loin. Un orateur touchera rarement son auditoire si chaque 
mot, chaque inflexion et chaque geste donne l’impression d’être 
soigneusement étudié et préparé. Les mêmes mots impression-
neraient bien plus s’ils semblaient venir à l’esprit de l’orateur où 
il les dit et si les intonations de sa voix, ses pauses, ses gestes et 
tout ce qui accompagne son discours semblaient spontanément 
engendrés par ce qu’il exprime. Tout cela est vrai aussi pour les 
musiciens. Les meilleures interprétations sont toujours proches 
de l’improvisation. L’artiste est si ému par la musique qu’il 
joue qu’il oublie la technique et s’abandonne avec la liberté de 
l’improvisation à l’inspiration du moment. Une interprétation 
de cette nature est la seule qui puisse transmettre à l’auditeur 
l’essence de la musique, de manière aussi immédiate qu’une 
ré-création.
D’autre part, l’interprète qui étudie à l’avance comment 
produire une certaine émotion en planifiant chaque oscillation 
du vibrato, en calculant mathématiquement chaque nuance, 
en agençant de manière précise chaque rubato pour ne jamais 
donner «  la mauvaise impression d’improviser », substitue à 
une émotion authentique un sentiment artificiel, une fausse 
émotion mécaniquement produite. Le public dans son en-
semble n’a sans doute pas une grande capacité d’analyser en la 
matière, mais il possède un instinct imparable pour ce qui est 
authentique et ce qui ne l’est pas. L’élément d’improvisation 
ne doit naturellement pas être trop poussé, et un interprète 
qui n’est pas techniquement et musicalement sûr doit se 
garder de se laisser submerger par ses émotions en jouant. 
L’improvisation doit donc rester dans le cadre d’une intention 
générale pour rendre justice aux éléments stylistiques et aux 
structures de l’œuvre que l’on joue. La liberté d’interprétation 
ne peut être fondé que sur une maîtrise technique complète 
des moyens d’expression.
Esthésique. Eléments acoustiques en concert
La connaissance des lois acoustiques est très importante 
pour jouer en public. Si on parle à quelques personnes dans 
une petite salle, inutile d’élever la voix. Si l’élocution n’est pas 
des meilleurs et même si on parle trop vite, en général, on 
n’aura quand même aucune difficulté à se faire comprendre. 
Cependant, parler dans une grande salle pour quelques mil-
liers de personnes est à l’évidence une toute autre affaire. Il 
faudra parler plus fort, plus lentement et plus clairement. C’est 
évident, et pour tant, il est étrange que si peu d’instrumentistes 
comprennent que ces mêmes principes s’appliquent à eux 
quand ils jouent en public. Beaucoup ne pensent un instant 
que ce qui est bon pour un salon ne l’est pas pour une salle de 
concert et vice-versa. Dans une salle, l’interprète doit projeter 
ce qu’il joue de manière à atteindre claire et compréhensible 
l’auditeur le plus éloigné. Il ne doit pas jouer pour les seuls 
auditeurs des premiers rangs, mais pour ceux qui sont en haut 
du balcon. Pour y parvenir, tout dépend de la taille et des qual-
ités acoustiques de la salle. Si elle est petite et son acoustique 
est bonne, l’adaptation sera moindre. Plus elle sera grande, 
plus qu’il faudra faire attention aux facteurs acoustiques. Si 
la résonance de la salle est mâte, il faudra augmenter toute la 
dynamique. C’est à assez facile dans la douceur, mais quand il 
s’agit des fortes et des fortissimo, il faut avoir de la souplesse 
et savoir quand il faut changer sa façon de gouverner le son 
sans brusquer la sonorité. Tout dépend aussi de la nature de 
l’accompagnement. C’est plus facile avec le piano qu’avec 
l’orchestre. Si l’œuvre jouée est un concerto avec une lourde 
orchestration et si un chef peu attentif laisse les musiciens 
noyer le soliste, celui-ci est confronté à une tâche quasiment 
impossible. Quelques soient les circonstances, l’interprète doit 
avoir une oreille perspicace, la faculté de rectifier prompte-
ment et de s’adapter vite pour savoir pour quel douceur il peut 
ou avec quelle force il doit jouer pour qu’on l’entend dans un 
équilibre adéquat avec l’accompagnement. La vitesse sera aussi 
un facteur important et très variable. Les vitesses excessives, 
mieux vont les éviter dans les grandes salles. C’est une obliga-
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tion absolue dès qu’il y a le moindre effet d’écho, car toute 
vitesse excessive aura alors tendance à brouiller le son.
Cependant, remplir de son une salle n’est pas seulement 
une question de puissance mais relève davantage de la manière 
dont le son porte. Cela dépend en partie de la qualité de 
l’instrument mais plus de celle de la production du son. Mieux 
le son est produit, plus il ira loin. On ne doit pas forcer le son 
d’un instrument. La production du son sur les instruments à 
cordes ne concerne pas que le son continu. Il faut la compléter 
par l’alliance d’éléments percutants ou accentués qui donnent 
du caractère et un contour. Dans la musique instrumentale, 
le rapport entre ces éléments percutants est ceux de la ligne 
mélodique pure est le même que celui des consonnes et des 
voyelles dans la parole puis dans le chant. L’omniprésence 
des consonnes dans toutes les langues prouve qu’elles sont 
essentielles au langage. Ce principe doit être transposé dans la 
musique instrumentale où les sons percutants comme des con-
sonnes sont souvent nécessaires pour donner une définition 
et forme plus claire aux sons voyelles de la ligne mélodique. 
Par exemple, au violon, le son voyelle correspond à la ligne 
mélodique parfaitement conduite avec un début sans heurte 
et une fin de même. Les consonnes (les éléments percutants 
ou accentués) fournissent l’articulation qui peut être produite, 
soit par la main droite soit par la main gauche. Avec la main 
de l’archet, la consonne sera toute attaque qui n’est pas sans 
heurte, comme le martelé, le détaché accentué, le spiccato. 
Avec la main gauche la consonne peut être produite en laissant 
tomber ou lever les doigts vite et énergiquement. En jouant 
de l’instrument ou chanter dans une grande salle, il faut savoir 
faire un bon équilibre entre voyelles et consonnes qui n’est 
pas le même surtout en concert où chaque son ou mot chanté 
doit être distinctement entendu et compris par tout le public. 
Parfois grâce à l’expérience des salles, les instrumentistes et les 
chanteurs semblent exagérer l’articulation des consonnes pour 
porter assez loin leur musique vers un auditeur éloigné.
La musique exerce un pouvoir de transcendance en 
signifiant par référence à un temps vécu propre à chacun. Ces 
perceptions peuvent opérer différemment pour chacun des 
esprits qui la reçoivent tout en conservant une unité et une 
universalité. La sémantique musicale, par essence abstraite, 
crée un monde bien particulier, qui est à la fois immanent à 
son matériau et transcendant au monde perçu par chacun. Les 
énoncés musicaux détiennent un « signifié » qui leur confère 
un potentiel à structurer l’œuvre suivant différents niveaux 
d’hiérarchie. Le matériau musical se déduit de la représenta-
tion ; l’immanence de son expression est retenue pour en af-
fecter l’émotion -au sens de mouvement de l’âme- à un donné 
musical transcendent.
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école des Beaux Arts, Université Aristote de Thessalonique, Grèce
L’ analyse de cette intervention aura pour prin-cipal objet une délimitation possible de la signification de deux paramètres qui semblent au départ être supposés et pris en charge, lors de l'énoncé du sujet. Il y aura ensuite de notre 
part, des hypothèses de réponses ou, -des hypothèses de solu-
tions. La question serait d'abord de savoir s'il existe effective-
ment une certaine forme de parenté (une éventuelle relation 
d'interaction réciproque ou une relation de consécution) 
entre la fonction de se donner un objet en image ce qui serait 
en principe du domaine de l’imaginaire, de l’expérience de 
l’imagination et de la perception des objets imaginés, et celle 
de la sensation plutôt matérielle, -presque tactile ou presque 
s’imaginant tactile-, liée alors absolument aux sens, à partir 
d’un acte réel ou à partir de l’expérience pratique -immédiate 
ou reconstruite plus tard- de relation à un objet: il y aurait ainsi 
une idée, un goût, une évocation de sensation, donnée en tant 
que l'expression de l’état du tempérament sensuel du sujet et 
traduite en termes personnels, subjectifs, -de sensualité. Il y 
aurait enfin, en troisième lieu, un objet presqu’ institutionnel tel 
que l’art (et spécifiquement, dans notre intervention, les arts 
visuels), qui aurait été en quelque sorte la concrétisation matéri-
elle et précise, une certaine synthèse et focalisation matériali-
sée, chaque fois différente selon les artistes-sujets concernés, de 
la manière dont se sont reliées, entre elles, l’imagination et la 
sensualité: de façon ainsi à ce que la première (l’imagination) en 
tant qu’activité spéculative, théorique, par l’intermédiaire de 
son enveloppement par les sens qui lui confèrent une expéri-
ence de matérialité, une apparence et une présence concrète 
(reliée chaque fois à tel ou tel objet précis), devienne matière, 
objet palpable et solide, institutionnel et instruit, -à savoir l'art, 
reconnu comme tel. 
Voilà la manière dont nous avons reconstruit à notre sens les idées du sujet proposé, mais de toute façon selon une approche qui nullement n’en exclut d’autres 
et dont par conséquent nous reconnaissons le caractère partiel 
et restreint. Cependant, la liaison, imagination-sensualité-art, 
indépendamment de la validité totale ou d’une validité seu-
lement circonstancielle et partielle de ses portées théoriques, 
qui auraient été un des volets de la question, pose un problème 
d’histoire -un problème d’origine-, à savoir, comment se fait-il 
qu’il y ait eu à un certain moment la conviction de ces liaisons 
qui sans doute, apparaissent presqu’ évidentes en théorie sur le 
plan du raisonnement général à base de concepts, mais sem-
blent moins efficaces à la lecture des faits ? Ainsi, la question 
qui est posée et semble avoir été un des maillons constituants 
de l’ensemble de ce sujet, est celle de délimiter s’il y aurait eu 
effectivement une raison suffisante qui aurait impérativement 
recouvert, justifié, les passages de l’un à l’autre terme, -à sa-
voir, une implication quasi incontournable d’une définition 
suffisamment ou éventuellement aussi, insuffisamment in-
struite (ce qui est à démontrer), à une autre et de celle-là à la 
troisième (l'art), en tant que leur aboutissement le plus néces-
saire et qui en plus, serait ainsi inévitable. Autrement dit, il n 
y a aucune raison de croire que les choses se passent effective-
ment de cette façon, si la raison suffisante à démontrer (et qui 
n’est pas du tout initialement évidente), ne porte en elle-même 
une telle rigueur de démonstration au niveau du plan orga-
nisateur des raisonnements, qu’elle puisse comprendre aussi 
-qu’elle puisse instruire aussi- son éventuel démenti par les 
faits. Ainsi, la grande question serait en fait l’art (et non pas la 
relation de l’imagination à la sensualité), -mais l’art compris non 
plus en tant que l’aboutissement nécessaire d'un processus qui 
le génère, mais en tant que l'instance qui, inversement, mésure 
elle-même et révèle la portée effective quant à l'art lui-même 
de la fonction des deux autres, et la question serait donc de 
savoir si la conception de l’art -et surtout la conception de tel 
ou tel art- suppose effectivement qu’il y aurait eu auparavant 
sensibilité et imagination lors de la constitution originelle et 
l'installation de son sens artistique. 
La question alors serait renversée: dans quelle mesure l’art suppose-t-il effectivement imagination et sensualité et qu'en est-il alors de leur absence lors des objets 
artistiques déjà reconnus comme tels, mais qui se refusent à se 
charger d'une activité ou d'une origine sensualisée et imagina-
tive ? A notre sens la confusion vient du fait que l’imagination 
et la sensualité sont du domaine des qualités de toute forme 
d’expression du comportement humain dans son activité 
quotidienne et psychologique et que l’art est au contraire 
une construction spécifique (un specific object selon l’expression 
de Donald Judd1) dont le propre serait son historicité et par 
conséquent, les dépendances de ses apparitions successives de 
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la manière dont chaque fois son sens originel -sa constitution 
originelle-, cherchent à se reconstituer, à se retrouver, selon 
des conditions qui ne sont plus celles de l’origine, mais qui par 
contre sont le plus souvent contraignantes -même annulatri-
ces- de la première intuition. Voilà où repose à notre sens le 
fond du problème de la question, à savoir, comment faire en 
sorte que ce qui n’est pas le même, continue à se considérer lui-
même en tant que le même ou en d’autres termes, comment faire 
en sorte que le mouvement cyclique heideggerien (son circulus 
vitiosus), allant de l’oeuvre d’art à l’art et de l’art à l’oeuvre d’art, 
soit compatible avec toutes les transformations subies depuis 
à l’oeuvre d’art et produites aussi par lui, tout le long de son 
histoire millénaire; mais qu’il soit compatible aussi aux con-
ceptions correspondantes de l’art, lors de étapes historiques 
des différents aboutissements formels des images de l’art -ainsi 
que de la manière de ces images, de se constituer en images. 
Il est remarquable de voir comment l’approche ontologique 
de Martin Heidegger dans son “Origine de l’oeuvre d’art”2 de 
l’édition de 1950, se répercute sur les conceptions du peintre 
Américain Ad Reinhardt qui, dans son fameux article de 1962, 
“Art as Art”,3 déclare que [...] L’art en lui-même n’est rien d’autre 
que de l’art. L’art n’est pas ce qui n’est pas de l’art. [...],4 ainsi qu’ à 
celles de l’artiste conceptuel new-yorkais Joseph Kosuth, dont 
les approches correspondantes dans son texte très connu de 
1967 intitulé “Art after Philosophy”,5 soutiennent que [...] ce que 
l’art a en commun avec la logique et les mathématiques, c’est qu’il 
est une tautologie; l’ idée de l’art (“l’oeuvre”) et l’art sont une même 
chose, [...].
 
Le problème ainsi posé se présente pour nous sous un double aspect, très significatif. D’une part, il y aurait un sens tautologique de l’art qui proviendrait de la volonté 
d’insister à considérer, en tant que toujours lui-même, ce qui 
est en continuelle transformation (et qui alors aurait pu être 
aussi essentiellement différent, pourvu qu’on définisse le sens 
de cette différence) et d'autre part, il y aurait son historicité, 
à savoir les transformations évidentes de l’art, qui posent la 
question de la manière et de la portée de la validation chaque 
fois et à chaque étape historique, de son identification. Voilà 
où repose à notre sens la question liée à ce que l’art présente 
son historicité, sous forme du suivi, -du continu- des conditions 
conceptuelles, pratiques, techniques et matérielles quant à l’ 
installation et l’exercice de son objet, mais liée aussi à ce que 
l’art présente son sens tautologique, sous forme de ruptures 
qui tout en rejetant son historicité conceptuelle, pratique, tech-
nique et matérielle, continuent à lui rendre aussi son identité 
d’origine, comme par une nostalgie de vouloir être toujours là, 
d’où il n’y aurait qu’une seule issue, qu’une seule possibilité, 
-celle de partir. 
En quelque sorte cette origine, cette prédisposition à la continuité et -simultanément- à la multiplicité historique comprise en tant que cercle vicieux chez 
Heidegger, serait aussi une ouverture vers la multiplicité 
des idées sur l’art et par conséquent dans un sens inverse à 
l’esthétique du 18ème siècle qui instaurait la déduction de 
l’art à partir de la philosophie et instaurait ainsi, de façon 
systématique, la pré-compréhension de l’art. La situation par 
contre chez Heidegger serait celle de l’ouverture vers quelque 
chose qui ne saurait être “ni un seul” “ni un multiple”, ni se 
déployant selon un corpus pré-conçu, ni instaurant un corpus 
dont il en serait depuis le modèle, -mais de l’art, en tant que 
fondamentalement non pré-compréhension platonique de son 
essence, donc en tant qu’exclusivement perpétuel exercice de 
son expérience. Les deux approches qui résultent de notre 
analyse, sont les suivantes. Il y aurait d’abord, sur le plan tech-
nique de l’histoire de l’art -et précisement de l’histoire de l’art 
moderne- une question du regard, celui-là consistant à recon-
struire l’expérience du monde selon un modèle de perception 
qui soumet l’expérience visuelle à la documentation d’une 
forme pré-conçue de raisonnement. Les analyses exhaustives 
d’Hubert Damisch dans son “Origine de la Perspective”,6 sur les 
systèmes de la représentation de la Rennaissance et celles de 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty relativement à Cézanne dans “Sens et 
Non-Sens”,7 ainsi que celles de son livre posthume “Le Visible et 
l’Invisible”8 relativement à une reconstitution inductive, non-
géométrique de la perception de l’espace, étalent en quelque 
sorte, analysent, les problèmes formels résultant de la soumis-
sion de l’objet “monde” à la documentation pré-construite d’un 
système de représentation: ce dédoublement selon lequel il y 
aurait une simulation du monde par sa substitution picturale, 
ne saurait être indépendant aussi d’une distanciation par rap-
port au système “rennaissant” de la part des Romantiques dont 
en fait, chez eux surtout, on reconnaît l’étendue de la prise en 
charge de l’expression. Disons que le problème serait le suiv-
ant: d’une part, celui de ramener le monde à la mesure de son 
image et par conséquent diminuer le monde, le réduire, à la 
dimension des conditions du regard et l’autre, celui de l’emprise 
sur le monde, (éliminant le monde), faisant du regard son 
propre objet. 
Face à ces deux systèmes, l’un Rennaissant et l’autre Romantique, se situe à notre sens le dilemme moderne qui consiste, soit à soumettre à partir surtout du 19ème 
siècle, la fonction artistique dans son ensemble, aux disposi-
tions aléatoires de la notion littéraire -et de la sensation ou de 
l’état psychologique- du tempérament (une expression chère 
à Baudelaire), soit de faire le vide autour de la personnalité 
de l’artiste pour se fixer à la structure de l’objet. Cependant, 
la critique artistique de Baudelaire tout en étant orientée vers 
une subtilité analytique de reconstitution des sensations, 
prédispose à la situation intermédiaire et moderne qui consiste 
à considérer en tant qu’aléatoire, incertaine et mal exprimée, la 
pré-compréhension même, de l’art lui-même. Ainsi, la fameuse 
phrase de Baudelaire, [...] Le beau est toujours bizarre, [...]9 dans 
son texte de 1855 intitulé, “Méthode de critique de l’idée mod-
erne du progrès appliquée aux Beaux Arts ”, représente aussi bien 
l’ancrage de l’auteur sur le concept du Beau pris en tant que la 
fixation d’une définition non exprimée et hypothétique (mais 
se donnant pourtant sous forme de définition ouverte à toute 
présomption possible et future), que la prise de distance, en 
même temps, à toute conception définitive du Beau puisqu’il 
est toujours bizarre, ce qui lui enleverait toute concordance 
eventuelle, par rapport aux conditions toujours en transforma-
tion, de l’environnement. 
La situation de Baudelaire est à peu près celle de Céza-nne, à savoir celle d’une situation de compromis entre une réalité extérieure qui se suffit et dont l'artiste 
aurait acceptée sa propre structure d'organisation à elle, lui 
appartenant, et la volonté en même temps “expressive” de 
l'artiste qui, lui, aurait voulu incorporer cette structure, mais 
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à la manière seulement de sa propre actuelle, a priori, forme 
d'organisation et méthode d'incorporation. Ainsi, l'ordre 
conceptuel de Cézanne –et notamment, la géométrisation 
de l'espace- sera facturé à celles des expériences du monde 
qui seules, effectivement, lui correspondent. D’autre part et 
de la même façon qu’historiquement parlant, “Le doute de 
Cézanne”, selon l’expression de Merleau-Ponty, s’adresserait 
à la vision future d’une vue du monde périphérique en mou-
vement et en profondeur spatiale, mais fixée dans le présent 
en intégration -en condensé-, sur un même et unique plan 
plat, pictural aux dimensions prédeterminées, l’artiste 
actuel recherche aussi son client virtuel, personnifié en 
musée futur de l’histoire des idées. En relation à ce Musée 
il lui prédispose déjà les conditions de travail réalisé dans 
le présent à l’intérieur d’un système d’art considéré actu-
ellement nécessaire et impératif, mais qu’il reloge dans le 
futur. Ainsi le présent, même sous une forme sous-entendue, 
préconçue, en tant qu’esquisse seulement, en tant que vision 
d’une hypothèse de futur, sera déjà une prédétermination, 
-une pré-compréhension de l’art à faire -et de l’art à venir. 
Voilà comment fonctionne aujourd’hui le cercle vicieux de 
Heidegger, allant d’une volonté de sortir d’un système, par 
l'installation auparavant du système qui aidera à sortir de ce 
système: avec la différence que ce qui semble, chez Heide-
gger, constituer une antinomie logique (la tautologie), il ne 
sera pas pour lui un défaut, mais plutôt, une meilleure com-
préhension. Le système nécessaire serait l' a priori installé en 
anticipation à la théorie future de l'art, considérée en tant que 
nécessité découlant d'une mise en place dont les paramètres 
seraient définitifs, par la situation même, des conditions 
artistiques actuelles. 
I l y a ainsi un paradoxe, à savoir, que la création, tout en étant en rupture relativement à l'expression, elle la sou-tient, par une projection dans le futur qui aurait déplacé, 
dans le temps, l'action du présent en tant que projet présent 
mais qui serait l'oeuvre à venir et dont l'artiste n'institue que, 
simplement, les prochaines conditions. Ce déplacement vers 
l’installation d’une antériorité du futur dont cette installation 
aurait été l’origine, altère la signification de l’expression en lui 
substituant les conditions mises en place en tant que la future 
expression ou la définition de l' expression future de l'art (et 
donc, faisant des conditions un “cadre” vide, oeuvre lui-même 
à remplir prochainement et définition de l’ oeuvre-conditions à 
venir et ainsi de suite), de manière à ce que dans ce système, 
l’art et l’idée de l’art seraient une même chose. Cela a été très 
manifeste chez Kasimir Malevitch chez qui l'installation du 
non-contenu d’un mur noir, neutre et aveugle, ne saurait être 
que la nostalgie d’une antériorité et origine sans contenu, 
sans conditions, -finalité et limite elle-même originelle des 
conditions qui allaient surgir et dont elle aurait été l'ultime 
référence. Depuis, l’art du vingtième siècle joue en principe 
autour de ce tableau en inventant des limites, des dégrada-
tions, telles que l’implosion de l’artiste Français Daniel Dezeuze 
ou l’entropie de l’artiste Américain Robert Smithson et où, 
relativement à cette auto-analyse de l’oeuvre, un des premiers 
commentateurs serait le philosophe espagnol José Ortega y 
Gasset, ayant préconisé, autour de 1925, l’auto-référentialité 
de l’oeuvre artistique (dans son livre “La déshumanisation de 
l’Art”10 ), -déjà 35 ans environ avant l’article “Art as Art”, de Ad 
Reinhardt. 
L’ idée de la dégradation sera le thème principal de l’exposition “L’informe, mode d’emploi”11 réalisée en 1996 à Paris, au Centre Georges Pompidou, par 
Rosalind Krauss et Yve-Alain Bois, sur le principe d’une 
histoire non-formelle de l’art et où les dogmes de la pure 
opticalité du champs visuel et de la planéité de la surface de 
Clement Greenberg, seraient contestés, face au déclasse-
ment et le rabaissement préconisés par le terme de l’informe, 
formulé par Georges Bataille en 1929. Par ailleurs, les 
idées que l’horizontalité, le battement, le bas matérialisme et 
l’entropie, seraient des sections d’une analyse non-formelle, 
non-mécanique et non-continue de l’art, auront été formulées 
à cette exposition, à la suite déjà de certaines observations 
très pertinentes, l’une de Rosalind Krauss, dans un arti-
cle de 1972, essentiel aujourd'hui pour la bibliographie 
contemporaine (“Un point de vue sur le modernisme”12) et 
l'autre, de Yve-Alain Bois dans un article de 1976, intitulé 
“Malevitch, le carré, le degré zéro”13. Dans le premier, la pro-
fesseur Americaine préconisait la description d'une série 
des pièces alignées l'une après l’autre et dont chaque artiste 
en les traversant, fermerait la porte derrière lui tout en 
ouvrant la porte de l' autre pièce, en face, qui s’annonçait 
au présent. Elle décrivait ainsi, en rapport au mouvement 
expressioniste analytique, la conception mécaniste d’un 
développement irréversible de l'art contemporain où, au-
cune de ces pièces en enfilade n'étant pas conçue pour le 
mouvement inverse –à savoir, pour le retour en arrière-, il 
n'y aurait d'autre issue que la seule fuite en avant et, -nous 
ajoutons- à l’image du développement irréversible et conti-
nu que proclamaient à grands coups d’optimisme au début 
des années 1960, les organismes économiques intergouver-
nementaux. 
L’autre observation, celle de Yve-Alain Bois, allait porter une nuance de différenciation quant à la conviction d’une planéité idéale de la surface pic-
turale -c’est à dire de la surface en tant que non-lieu-, faisant 
remarquer que [...] : la frontalité “n’existe” pas, l’oeil toujours, 
habitude culturelle peut-être, ou conditions physiologiques, 
creuse. [...]14. La surface serait ainsi réelle et concrète, la mat-
ière palpable, un objet déterminé selon l’action artistique et 
selon chaque action, d’une façon ou d’une autre. Face à ce 
système actuel de la formation et de la définition de l’art, il y 
a deux orientations qui se présentent. L'une, aura été la dislo-
cation et l'éclatement d'une suite et de la conséquence de la 
manière de construire les formes, à partir de l'enseignement 
de la peinture. De cette façon, il y a plutôt des difficultés à 
faire insérer la sensualité de l’imagination dans un programme 
d’installation des conditions du futur, telles que les condi-
tions de l’aménagement de la nature, du paysage urbain, de la 
reproductibilité mécanique et de l’usage du corps. Les oeuvres 
seraient alors par définition virtuelles et cette installation 
des conditions du futur (et des conditions de la théorie mu-
séale du futur), n’aura pas été sans incidences sur le reste de 
la conception artistique, d’une manière relative à celle que 
préconisait de façon tout à fait décisive Walter Benjamin dès 
1939, lorsqu’il renversait les conditions du problème. [...] 
On s’est dépensé [...] écrivait-t-il [...] en vaines subtilités pour 
décider si la photographie était ou non un art, mais on ne s’était 
pas demandé d’abord si cette invention même ne transformait 
pas le caractère général de l’art. [...].15
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Ce que Benjamin préconisait clairement au delà de la photographie, dans son texte fondamental (“L’oeuvre d’art à l'époque de sa reproductibilité technique”), était la 
valeur méthodologique de l’induction dans l’art contemporain 
où il n’y aurait plus à faire déduire, d’un ensemble de concepts 
préétablis, le jugement des qualités de l’action artistique, 
mais inversement, il y aurait à définir, par l'action artistique, 
la qualité des jugements des concepts. Dans ce même texte 
il s'agissait aussi de l'autre face, d’une autre version de ce que 
Adorno soutenait dans son “Aesthetic Theory”, 16 relativement 
à la non-réductibilité du sens de l’oeuvre artistique aux définiti-
ons extérieures à son organisation interne. Surtout c’est chez 
Heidegger que nous retrouvons, à travers son concept de la 
choséité, la conception moderne de la forme, non plus en tant 
que dissociée, différente de son support matériel et supposée 
être posée sur lui, mais en tant que la nécessité de la matière, 
relativement chaque fois à son emploi, de se rendre conforme 
à la configuration formelle adéquate. Par ailleurs, la conception 
chez Heidegger de l’unité (du rapprochement efficace) de la 
forme et de la matière, ne semble pas être indépendante de 
l’antécedence d’une petite phrase, extrêmement essentielle de 
Parménide, le philosophe grec du sixième siècle avant notre 
ère, dont le fameux poème comportait un vers significatif: “être 
et comprendre c'est la même chose” ou “το γαρ αυτό νοείν εστιν τε 
και είναι”. 
 
A cet effet nous allons proposer deux observations. L’une sera liée à une petite phrase presqu’anodyne de Braque, lors d’une entrevue à Dora Vallier au 
milieu des années 1950 et où, se référant à la peinture cubiste 
analytique des années 1908-1909, le peintre expliquait que ce 
qui les intéressait, à l’epoque, Picasso et lui, était le “ton local”, 
à savoir, le ton qui fonctionne à côté des autres, mais en même 
temps aussi, de façon indépendante par rapport aux autres, 
sans retombées donc sur le ton des structures avoisinantes, -par 
conséquent, sans retombées aussi sur les structures voisines 
elles-mêmes. Il s’instaurait par là un système de juxtapositions 
qui, n’ayant pas des limites imposées par les définitions des 
conditions du cadre, annulait les fonctions picturales traditio-
nnelles de la périphérie et du centre. Mondrian a su imposer le 
système juxtapositionnel lors des “Boogie-Woogie” et depuis, ce 
système a fait éclater tout aussi bien les structures de la con-
stitution des tableaux, jusqu’aux interventions dans l’espace 
géographique naturel et l’espace bâti. Cela était très évident à 
partir des années 1950, avec les travaux à même le sol et sans 
limites préconçues du cadre chez Pollock (exposé également 
à même le sol, lors de l’exposition de Rosalind Krauss et de 
Yve-Alain Bois à Paris), -mais aussi en architecture, dont les 
systèmes operationnels de l’architecte Français Yona Fried-
mann et de l’architecte Américain, Christopher Alexander, 
représentent des exemples très ponctuels quant à l’emploi 
fonctionnel et conceptuel de la juxtaposition: le premier, ayant 
constitué un répertoire par graphes de quelques millions de 
possibilités d’aménagement des logements17 et le second, éta-
blissant un pattern language18 qui consiste à concevoir un ar-
rangement fondamental d’une configuration comportant trois 
parties dinstintes dont la première serait le contexte (les condi-
tions de la forme), la seconde, la solution (et qui serait la forme 
correspondant aux nécessités des conditions) et la troisième, le 
problème, à savoir la prise en considération des conflits découlant 
de la relation des conditions aux solutions. 
Voilà quelle est aujourd’hui une situation presqu’incontournable selon laquelle, il y aurait eu un éclatement des relations. Empiriquement parlant 
il y a ainsi autant de systèmes de transfert de la forme à l'idée et 
vice versa, que des oeuvres et des artistes. D’autre part le rêve 
de l’histoire, à partir de Hegel, serait l’homogénéisation du 
système. Le problème ne serait donc pas le transfert lui-même, 
mais la constitution du système à réaliser le transfert. En tant 
qu'historiens ou philosophes -ou même en tant que simples 
regardeurs des choses- nous sommes en présence d’idées 
variées des artistes qui plus ou moins se suivent et se revêtent 
chaque fois, en évoluant ou en se remplaçant l’une l’autre, des 
formes spéciales appelées par Donald Judd, “objets spécifiques”. 
La question est de savoir s’il y aurait eu des continuités entre 
ces formes spéciales de l'une à l'autre ou si au contraire il y 
aurait eu des localités, -des “dits locaux”, des “récits locaux”, qui 
s'épuisent chaque fois en même temps que leur mise en place 
et expression directe ? Face à l'observation de Braque vers le 
milieu des années 1950 concernant le ton local, une autre ob-
servation de Frank Stella et de Donald Judd, dix ans après, vers 
le milieu des années 1960, dans une entrevue à Bruce Glazer,19 
confirmait que “les parties sont non-relationnelles”. Il s’agissait 
d’une attitude correspondante à celle de Braque relative à la 
non-ingérence des parties aux autres parties ou relative à la 
disparité des parties, -en même temps cependant, que le même 
Judd déclarait aussi, que “le grand problème est de préserver le 
sens du tout”, -et il sous entendait, “de l’ensemble”. 
 
Ainsi, face à l’éclatement, la position artistique serait de préserver un autre type de relation qui établirait l’unité entre-elles des parties non-relationnelles et celle 
là, en quelque sorte, serait la question fondamentale puisque 
la non relation établit la rupture, -face à l’avenir et face à la situ-
ation de l’après de la forme- un avenir qui se présenterait donc 
en tant que l’ajournement face au présent, et en tant que le ren-
voi des disparités vers une réunification centripète, hypothé-
tique, -mais surtout une réunification prochaine. Il y aurait 
ainsi un nouveau a priori, à la manière des anciens systèmes, 
installé en anticipation à la théorie future de l’art, instituant le 
déplacement vers le futur des disparités actuelles ou évoquant 
une nostalgie de l’originel, -mais nostalgie du futur. A l’image 
du dix huitième siècle français qui se réjouissait de constater 
que les anciens lui ressemblaient (et plus précisement, les 
Grecs), nous nous réjouissons aujourd’hui de ressembler à un 
futur que nous avons nous mêmes installés, en anticipant de 
façon conquérente aux idées à venir. Le post-modernisme serait 
notre succession que nous avons nous mêmes installés, pour 
préserver nos assises actuelles. 
Dans un texte prophétique, écrit en 1979 et publié en France, en 1981 aux éditions Balland, sous le titre, “L ’histoire de l’art est terminée”,20 le peintre Français 
Hervé Fischer qui serait probablement le premier a avoir mani-
festé une approche systématique à ce sujet relativement à la 
fin de l'art, avait établi le rapport entre la création du concept 
explicite de l'histoire de l'art au 19ème siècle et la manifesta-
tion des avant-gardes au 20ème, -en tant que volontés pour 
créer l'histoire. Plusieurs auteurs après Fischer, tels que Hans 
Belting publié en 1983 et Arthur Danto en 1992, traitèrent 
à peu près la même situation: dans quelle mesure en effet y 
aura-t-il des artistes qui informeront sur le non possible de 
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l’art, sur le vide, établi en définitive par la non-relation ? D'autre 
part il est tout à fait évident que les anciennes connotations 
entrainées par une approche plutôt descriptive de l'art (telle 
que l'imagination ou la sensualité), n'ont plus de prise dans 
un monde de l'art exclusif de son désir de se conformer à un 
programme du futur, dont il aurait fait le support de sa propre 
survie au présent. Le texte de Fischer est assez explicite con-
cluant exactement sur une attitude qui provient d’une démysti-
fication du futur. Il écrit: “Ce qui est terminé c'est l'histoire de l'art 
en tant que nouveauté”.21
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T he observing of the landscape has inspired many writers and painters to immerse them-selves in a vision that amalgamates the world of reality with that of dreams. Daybreak or dusk, the alternation of day and night as well as the 
cycle of the seasons, have promoted a visionary sense of time 
and place. In the splendour of the eternal flux of all things, a 
thought offered by Heraclitus comes to mind: “Those awake 
share a common world but those asleep withdraw into their 
own private world” (14, A 99). This idea is echoed in another 
of this ancient philosopher’s statements, namely: “The sleeping 
are the artificers of things that occur in the world and they are 
instrumental in their production” (14, A 98). The external and 
the interior worlds collide and the intervention of the senses 
involves the dynamism of reason in a continuing process of 
exchange between the real and the ideal. 
We should also include mirages in the category of reality 
and dream. Is Hölderlin’s Greece, in Hyperion, not a mirage? And 
what about the gardens of Alcinoö in the Odyssey (Book VII), 
the enchanted places of Lorrain, or the woods evoked by Racine? 
Mirages are definitely images.
The question arises as to whether or not there exists or 
could exist an aesthetics of the landscape and, if so, when it 
might have come into existence. Certainly, the question must be 
examined in relation to a feeling and a judgement of taste that 
have as their object nature, sensory experience, artifice, imitation, 
imagination, ethics, and freedom. We are dealing with a network 
of relations underpinned by a “critique of the gaze.”
The aesthetic experience that we achieve in nature through 
the perception of the landscape is completely perturbed in the 
postmodern age. Natural beauty exists in the Mediterranean area 
as an outcome of myth, culture and history. And this is what we 
have to safeguard as far as technological changes are concerned. 
In this way the quality of the identity of the places to be pre-
served and protected is not lost.
Where does the image of the natural landscape come from? 
When we talk about nature we mean all those things that surround 
us and that are laden with human, cultural and historical values, 
as has always been stated. Simmel observed that the configuration 
of the world after the Middle Ages, upon the decline of symbolic 
thinking, for the first time disclosed to us the landscape of nature. 
It comes as no surprise, therefore, that in the Middle Ages or in an-
cient times it was not possible to seize the meaning of landscape, 
in the sense of the significance of details linked to one’s state of 
mind. Indeed, it was not until the 15th - 16th centuries that the for-
mal independence of the spiritual act of landscape was translated 
into landscape painting. Furthermore, Simmel claimed that it was 
only recently that aesthetic form had succeeded in finding richness 
and reconciliation in the landscape in relation to nature; whereas, 
the latest developments of society, technology and morality had 
caused a rupture in human culture. Landscape remains inextri-
cably linked to nature, to its unity and wholeness, in spite of its 
restricted focus on the individual perspective. When we observe 
and admire a landscape, there is a shift towards an enhancement 
and purification of the process through which landscape is per-
ceived as a work of art, beyond its relationship with painting. In a 
similar fashion to artists, albeit to a lesser extent, observers act and 
eliminate the immediately given, chaotic and boundless world to 
enhance all this as a self-sufficient meaningful unity, first by taking 
a distance from the world but then rejoining it. Simmel goes on to 
say that art derives from life, from the existing phenomena which 
lend form to things. In his view, a landscape should no longer be 
regarded as a sum of individual natural objects, but as a work of art 
at its inception. Given this concept and perspective, the act of vi-
sion coalesces with the act of feeling. The unity of the various ele-
ments revolves around the Stimmung principle of landscape. Stim-
mung, being a psychic process, is a property of landscape itself, 
which means that the landscape has already been transformedinto 
a spiritual form. The unitary representation of the object and the 
feeling that accompanies it blend together: landscape is nature that 
reveals itself aesthetically. This is equally applicable to Simmel. But 
the concept of natural landscape needs to be re-interpreted in the 
light of history, anthropology and culture.
The sight of a beautiful landscape has always fascinated us but 
our judgement of it changes together with the language we use to 
describe it. But, according to Pier Paolo Pasolini, reality around 
us is an archaic, mythic and sacred idiom, a harbinger of hidden 
truth. There is a quid that transcends the comprehension of man.
What comes to mind when we think of the aesthetics of 
landscape? Clearly, we think of a feeling and a judgement of taste 
related to nature, ethics, freedom, the artificial, imitation, the 
imagination and sensory experience. At the same time this map 
of relations is informed by reflections on what is ancient and 
what is modern, on what appears to be lasting and what proves to 
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be improvised or ephemeral, but it is also informed by the mean-
ing of human work from the garden to cultivated land, as well as 
a criticism of the observing eye: is it the individual that activates 
the beauty of the things around us, or do these things reveal 
their beauty independently of the individual? In the 18th century 
all these themes constituted a systematic intermingling within 
which a categorical spectrum of taste was found: beauty, grace, 
the sublime, the picturesque, the je ne sais quo, the neo-gothic. 
These complex ideas together with the great hystorico-stylistic 
models such as the classical, baroque, rococo, and romantic 
were closely connected with the reception of landscape and the 
sentiment of nature. Every landscape in fact belongs to man, his 
activity, his freedom, and his being a maker who creates, modi-
fies, constructs and transforms by means of art and technique. 
We know that a work of art, as distinct from a natural effect, is the 
work of man. However, landscape too can itself be considered 
the result of art, the effect of man’s doing, acting and feeling 
through freedom. Landscape is a manifestation of human free-
dom in nature, as J. Ritter has stated (1963) or, as Simmel argued 
in 1913: “Landscape is nature that reveals itself aesthetically”.
In the middle of the 20th century Martin Schwind (1950) 
observed that landscape could be considered as the art of a people, 
and as the expression of its culture and spirit. A comparison may be 
drawn with a work of art produced by a single man or community, 
but in a more complex manner. This consideration is useful also 
for the Mediterranean area as the result of continuous cultural 
interactions between different peoples over the centuries. We have 
witnessed different modifications of the sites, together with numer-
ous transformations of the forms of representation of nature. An 
important exchange between tradition and innovation is visible, 
thus the landscape appears as an interethnic and transcultural result. 
When we speak of an aesthetics of landscape, we mean the different 
beauties of the territory, and we refer to a possible work of art.
The landscape is a work of art, for it is the object of man’s work 
and skill; at the same time its arrangement appears as a natural 
product of forms. The things around us live on man’s feeling. We 
perceive, imagine and shape at the same time. During the act of 
enjoyment and contemplation, we become artists who perceive the 
landscape as an aesthetic experience. Thus the aesthetics of land-
scape per se cannot be neglected in the analysis of movement viewed 
as one of the qualifying aspects of nature, the artist of the cosmos, 
together with man, the artist of feeling. The landscape in fact pres-
ents itself according to mutable events shaped by the seasons, me-
teorological elements, winds and the action of the elements: earth, 
water, air and fire. Nature is the creator of mutable events. 
Moreover, any parcel of land can become an archaeological 
site for our contemplative spirit. This is true inasmuch as the spirit 
of contemplation allows us to perceive and search for the hidden 
presence of history and culture, to discover enduring evidence of 
the ineffable beauty of the forests, fields and rock formations. In 
this sense, human beings create the world, we are demiurges; origi-
nally, we were farmers and gardeners. In the Hebrew Bible human-
ity is the custodian of the house of God and protector of his lands.
A place may have many different aspects and meanings. In 
Metaphysics (III, 2, 1003a, 33-35), we find that “being is spoken of in 
many senses, but all are in relation to one single term and a specific 
nature for all of these,” These words lend support to my personal 
view that, even when there are no words to describe it, landscape 
can still exist in a sensibility capable of conveying its sense and value.
The Greeks had no word for landscape, opting instead for a 
variety of expressions and terms that revealed a profound love of 
nature and the “spirit of the place”. In Homer a perception of the 
beauty of the landscape (Homeric Hymns, III, 225-228) tran-
spires and the idea that a place could be thought of as space from 
which to observe the surrounding scenery (Odyssey, X, 146-147; 
97-98). A recent form of representation, landscape is an ancient 
idea pertaining to the feeling of wonder awakened by meditation. 
Plutarch shows us that nature is alive when Pan is alive; the 
screeching owl is Athena, the mollusc on the shore is Aphrodite; 
the gods inhabit their biological forms. However, he also notices 
a change: crags, thickets and localities also become symbols. In 
the mental representation of the ancients, we find a mixture of 
religion and nature, as Strabo also makes clear.
The dialectical relationship between the ancient and the 
modern always re-emerges, although it is being threatened by glo-
balisation: the beautiful in nature arouses the feeling of something 
that is forever rooted in the past, of a loss that modern humankind 
has replaced with feeling and idealisation. In antiquity every place 
was the kingdom of a god. Every site was the object of a cult or 
memorial operating through the layers of successive cultures. 
Caves, trees, shore lines and rocks were the sites of oracles. Myths 
and legends provide us with the framework for such a fusion by 
describing places enchanted by an aura of mystery.
The ancient places of worship were selected on the basis of 
their geological features as well as that indefinable something; these 
were sites dear to the gods where they could build their terrestrial 
homes. Thus Apollo, an oracle associated with the beauty of the sun, 
is plentiful in allusions and mysteries that make his shrines powerful 
and attractive. This is also true of the myths of the “great mother,” 
with her physical attributes: oaks, springs, caverns and grottoes.
There are various examples of ancient memory (history, 
literature, representation), in other words, a particular description 
and illustration of sites. I have already spoken about the cult of sites 
to which we can add Homer’s narration of the island of Ogygia, the 
abode of the nymph Calypso, or Sappho’s “garden of Aphrodite” 
with its fascinating synestesia, in which different perceptions and 
feelings of water, wind, perfume, form, colour are interlaced, to help 
us to conjure up an image of the ancient Mediterranean area. We 
witness the epiphany of nature: the wonderful scenery of the land-
scape connected with myth. At the same time we can observe the 
mutation of the environment produced by human communities 
and civilisation, from the Age of the Sahara graffiti and rock paint-
ings (for example Lybia: Fozzigiaren and Sughtd) to the present. A 
continuous metamorphosis of cultures, economies, cultivationed 
land and vegetation can be seen. According to Fernand Braudel (La 
Meditérranée, Paris, 1985; Les Mémoires de la Meditérranée, 1988 
and 2002), this area is not only a geographical and historical real-
ity, but also an ethical and aesthetic reality. We can say, as Martin 
Schwind (1950) did, that our landscape is a “cultural landscape” in 
which traditions and innovations are to be found.
These arguments allow us to analyse the sentiment of na-
ture: the Mediterranean evokes the very spirit of the landscape 
contemplated as a vision, an illusion, a dream. It inspires nostal-
gia for an archetypal nature. An example of this may be found in 
Th. Gautier (1856, Paul d’Aspremont) who describes a Mediter-
ranean landscape as a miraculously untouched environment 
conveying an impression of timelessness. However, most of the 
plants illustrated in this short story did not exist in ancient times. 
The image of the Mediterranean landscape admired as a product 
of “natura naturans” is, on the contrary, an image of “natura na-
turata”. At the end of the 1980’s M. Dufrenne interpreted the two 
concepts in the light of a new anthropology.
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On the basis of the theory of landscape examined above, 
experience indicates that an environment that provides us with 
aesthetic satisfaction is also a healthy and sound environment to 
live in. We may start from this contradiction to consider nature 
as the result of culture and history, namely, as the natural and/or 
urban landscape. In this case, we view it from a phenomenological 
and relational aesthetic perspective, thus going beyond the limits 
of a merely objective or subjective definition of natural beauty—
which is indeed so varied and diverse. This vantage point becomes 
even more effective when analysing the dynamics of environmen-
tal change, in other words, when we realise that a natural land-
scape image—i.e. a landscape made up of “places” (those places 
that identify memory and cult)—is today mixed up with another 
type of landscape, which instead appears to be made up of “non-
places”. The phenomenological perspective proves to be helpful in 
the understanding of the intersection and transformation of places 
and non-places. This is the world of globalisation.
The development of the contemporary context must be 
read and interpreted so as to take into account both the trans-
formation of places and the tragedy or agony that nature itself is 
confronted with, caused by environmental disasters, or hydro-
geological damage provoked mainly by man. While the tragedy 
of nature occurs in certain places, at the same time, somewhere 
else, nature conservation projects are enacted. As a matter of fact, 
two diametically opposed forces are at play: on the one hand, 
destructive forces (wars, natural disasters) and, on the other, the 
reshaping of constructive forces (landscape architecture, resto-
ration of cities, etc.). This may seem paradoxical but it is true: 
violence and aggressiveness on the one hand, peace and har-
mony on the other. Yet destruction today only leads to ruins and 
debris, being totally insensitive to memory and time. There are 
no extant ruins that bring to mind an illusion of eternity or that 
are evocative of a melancholic or nostalgic aura, as might have 
been the case in the 18th century. They are simply the remains of 
an outburst of violence to be eliminated and an empty space to 
be filled in. The point of contact between places and “non-places” 
is characterised by suffering and atrocity, a fit of destruction that 
derives from war, terrorism and speculation.
I would submit that the idea of nature is to be regarded as a 
natural and cultural landscape; as the result of man-made action, 
work and imagination; as a mental and psychological state. That 
is why destroying a landscape means seriously affecting the very 
core of the historical and human community. For this reason 
we should think of the Mediterranean as a variably composed 
identity, aiming at a hypothesis of preservation, focusing the 
principles of the civilisation founded on memory, tradition and 
intercultural and transcultural exchanges.
Conclusion
The distinction between a natural object and an artificial one 
brings up another issue. The natural object can give rise to inter-
pretative distortions if it is understood as a metaphor for nature 
and, therefore, as something artificial. It might be preferable to set 
up an opposition between nature and artifice wherein humankind 
functions as mediator or artificer, on the one hand, and viewer or 
reader, on the other. By means of such an opposition, we realise 
a dream, as in the case of Justus Lipsius’s Heverlea (Belgium) 
an example of a site designed roughly in the 1600s, to include a 
garden, a landscape, and a city near Lovanium. However, we can 
also discover the feeling of places seen only by the imagination, 
such as Avalon or the island of Torre Vermiglia. Thus, we can say 
that the landscape, whether real of imaginary, is the wonder of 
the truthful gaze, the mind, and the heart. Humanity and history 
produce it in a geography of cults, myths, and divinities. In such 
a context nature—whether spontaneous artificer or man-made 
material—is no longer divided into two or three natures accord-
ing to the intervention of humans and the principle of imitation; 
it is one. Erasmus of Rotterdam (Convivium religiosum) reminds 
us of the eloquence of nature and of its teachings. In the text cited 
here, the principal interlocutor, Eusebius, had painted images of 
nature on the walls of the ambulatory around the garden of his 
cloister—images that he would contemplate in reality in that very 
garden. In such a juxtaposition of forms, real flowers and painted 
flowers, nature as artificer and the artistic genius of humankind 
competed to engender a pleasure derived from the object and its 
representation. Here we have achieved the variety of the one and 
same nature whose genius is infused in everything.
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SENSUALITé ET PORNOGraPHIE  
DANS L’EMPIRE DES SENS DE NAGISA OSHIMA
N agisa Oshima est un cinéaste japonais avec une longue carrière sur le cinéma politique. Après une vingtaine de longs métrages sur la guerre, Corée, la démocratie, le Japon et les Japonais, voici qu’il succombe à la proposition d’un 
producteur français de tourner un film porno. Il s’agit évidem-
ment de l’Empire des sens, en japonais Ai no Corrida : La Corrida 
de l’amour (1976). A vrai dire, le sexe a fait progressivement son 
apparition « intense et violente » (Oshima, 1980b, 308) dans 
beaucoup de ses films antérieurs. Mais c’est surtout depuis le 
film Les Plaisirs qu’il sent le besoin de parvenir à une expression 
radicale de la sexualité : faire un porno est pour lui de briser le 
tabou qui lui était imposé jusqu’alors. (Oshima, 1980b, 317) 
De toute façon, ambition de tout metteur en scène est, selon lui, 
de filmer l’être humain sans limites, c’est-à-dire de le filmer en 
train de mourir et en train d’avoir des rapports sexuels. (Oshima, 
1980b, 313) Grâce à L’empire des sens, Oshima devient mondiale-
ment connu. Le film a un énorme succès mais il soulève une vive 
controverse – même une bataille juridique qui dure 6 ans : s’agit-il 
de l’art ou de l’obscénité? La démonstration en gros plans des 
organes génitaux ainsi que de l’acte sexuel le place indubitable-
ment très proche de la pornographie, mais, en même temps, la 
sensualité qui émane de ses scènes1 nous oblige d’admettre son 
grand art. Pourtant, sensualité et pornographie se contredisent : 
la pornographie neutralise l’imagination alors que la sensualité 
l’éveille. Si nous définissons la pornographie comme la stagnation, 
le recul de l’imagination –puisque l’activité sexuelle est montrée 
en ses moindres détails–, comment définir la sensualité ? 
Tandis que le porno a explicitement comme but de provo-
quer une excitation sexuelle immédiate, le sensuel se trouve à ses 
antipodes : fermé sur lui-même, c’est ce qui éveille les sens –la 
plus part du temps sans intention de le faire– en provoquant des 
sentiments érotiques. Peut-on supposer que le sensuel fait bien 
appel aux sens mais en même temps contient quelque chose 
d’inaccompli ? C’est de cette façon alors que la sensualité éveille-
1 Il paraît qu’Oshima s’est inspiré de Utamaro et Hokusai, les grands graveurs 
japonais qui « ont représenté mille et mille fois le visage de la femme embelli 
par l’extase sexuelle, transfiguré par la vague de fond de plaisir, exalté par 
l’orgasme. […] On dirait […] qu’Oshima s’est consciemment servi de ces 
splendides aquarelles et gravures sur bois, car la surabondance de gros plans 
de visages, dans son film, ne cesse de rappeler la beauté des estampes du XVIII 
siècle japonais. » (de Mandiargues, 1976, 46).
t-elle l’imagination ? La femme sensuelle se donne au regard et 
en même temps se retire… Peut-on définir la sensualité comme 
le lancement d’une promesse laissée en suspens ? 
Il n’y a pas de doute que L’empire des sens est l’endroit 
propice pour chercher la réponse. Il a comme point de départ 
un fait divers, c’est Oshima lui-même qui a écrit le scénario. 
L’histoire est à peu près connue. Nous sommes à Tokyo, en 
1936. Un maître de maison, Kichi, s’éprend avec une de ses 
servantes, Sada, ancienne geisha. Très vite ils sont liés par une 
passion charnelle très forte qu’ils les poussent à quitter la maison 
de Kichi, puisqu’il est marié, et à planer et trouver refuge dans 
diverses auberges. Toute la journée ils ne font que faire l’amour 
–tout est filmé de très près–, même devant les autres. Sada est 
toujours jalouse de sa femme, elle commence à le menacer d’un 
couteau, ils font l’amour même avec le couteau dans la bouche 
de Sada. Une autre fois, elle simule la strangulation de son amant 
afin d’augmenter son plaisir à elle. (C’est connu que lors de la 
strangulation d’un homme il y a une stimulation immédiate.) 
Elle le laisse vivre, elle finit par le stranguler réellement avec son 
consentement total. Par la suite, elle lui coupe les organes géni-
taux et se promène heureuse pendant 4 jours dans les rues de 
Tokyo en les gardant dans ses mains. Elle est arrêtée et enfermée 
en 6 ans de réclusion. (Elle a été considérée comme victime de 
sa victime, victime d’un « homme libidineux ». Selon Oshima, 
son film est fait précisément « contre l’image d’Abe Sada que 
forgea le pouvoir » en dévoilant son vrai visage.) (Oshima, 
1980a, 11)
Justement nous avons omis de préciser que quand Oshima 
décide de tourner un porno, il choisit de mettre en scène un 
crime. « Le sexe et le crime ont un point commun en ce sens 
qu’ils sont les impulsions les plus violentes qu’il y ait dans l’être 
humain.» (Oshima, 1969, 53) La mort en général et le crime 
en particulier jouent un rôle primordial dans la vie et l’œuvre 
d’Oshima. « Dès mon enfance, la mort a toujours été pour 
moi quelque chose de familier. A l’âge de trois ans je perdais 
ma grand-mère, à six ans mon père et à sept mon grand-père 
maternel qui nous avait recueillis, ma mère et moi. Donc 
excepte ma mère, tous mes parents directs avaient disparu. » 
(Oshima, 1978, 13) « C’est plus la non-existence de mon père 
que l’existence de ma mère qui déterminera mon propre mode 
d’existence ». (Oshima, 1980b, 235) Depuis lors, une aspiration 
au suicide l’accompagne tout au long de sa vie et « rend […] 
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[s]es nombreuses nuits d’insomnie extrêmement pénibles. » 
(Oshima, 1980b, 240) Se tuer soi-même aboutit finalement à 
tuer les autres : « Chacun vit en cherchant à communiquer avec 
les autres. Certains ne le peuvent que par le crime. Moi-même 
je pense faire partie de ceux-là. […] Dans mes films je compatis 
avec mes assassins. » (Oshima, 1969, 53) Les films d’Oshima 
sont, par conséquent, les mémoires d’un meurtrier profession-
nel : « Il faut d’abord que mon œuvre soit un crime, et elle ne 
sera art que parce qu’elle sera crime, agression contre un état 
de fait à détruire. Si la destruction est accomplie, il y a art. » 
(Oshima, cité par Niogret, 1970, 66) « Faire un film est un acte 
criminel ; […] je suis probablement celui qui commet un crime 
irréparable. » (Oshima, 1978, 12)2 
Comme tout vrai film érotique, L’empire des sens  joue avec 
la dialectique –ou l’alternance– du visible et du caché. Ceci 
signifie que même si Oshima nous montre tout, il nous cache 
des choses. « Il a réussi l’incroyable pari de tout montrer en 
suggérant plus. » (Niogret in Oshima, 1976, 50) Evidemment le 
jeu du visible et du caché laisse toujours quelque chose en sus-
pens, en confirmant ainsi notre définition de la sensualité en tant 
que promesse laissée en suspens. Mais l’alternance du visible et 
du caché ne s’arrête pas là, à des scènes courtes, à des moments 
distincts. Ce qui est étonnant à ce porno de grand maître, est 
qu’il a gagné le renom du plus sensuel porno du monde, tandis 
que le porno se limite à la première partie : à la seconde partie, 
les relations sexuelles ne sont qu’insinuées. Pourtant, il a écrit 
dans ses notes, « Je vais faire un “film porno”, pas seulement un 
film, mais un “film porno” de A à Z. » (Oshima, 1980b, 317) 
Qu’entendait-il par ces mots ?
Evidemment, il y a plusieurs façons de suivre un porno : 
de l’ennui profond et du rire à larmes jusqu’à la stimulation 
sexuelle. Nous supposons que le spectateur suit le film attenti-
vement. La première partie du film –les premières 50 minutes 
précisément– arrive très probablement à l’exciter.3 Mais, à la 
seconde partie, que se passe-t-il ? La stimulation est-elle déjà 
tombée dans l’oubli ? Elle a été complètement gratuite alors, le 
porno pour le porno ? Déjà vers le milieu de la 1e partie les pre-
mières allusions au meurtre et à la castration sont lancées. (Gros 
plans de rasoir, de lame de couteau, de verre cassé, d’aiguille 
pour les cheveux, de ciseaux. Les mots d’une servante à Kichi, 
comme quoi Sada va le tuer s’ils continuent de rester enfer-
més...) La seconde partie trouve le spectateur (idéal) stimulé 
sexuellement, et c’est là qu’Oshima commence à lui jeter sur la 
figure l’angoisse de mort. (Elle commence tout doucement pour 
atteindre son point culminant au meurtre, et encore plus haut, 
à la castration finale.) Toute la seconde partie se trouve sous 
le poids de la 1e en ajoutant, en petites gouttes, l’angoisse de 
mort. Ici les masques tombent, Sada, le couteau dans la main, le 
menace ouvertement de mort ainsi que de castration à plusieurs 
reprises. La démonstration des organes génitaux est ici rare, 
même si le metteur en scène avait souvent la possibilité de les 
montrer. Ceci signifie que les rôles sont inversés : maintenant 
c’est l’angoisse de mort qui est prédominante alors que le sexe 
apparaît seulement comme insinuation. Pourtant, habitués au 
porno de la 1e partie, notre désir de voir reste de plus en plus 
insatisfait. Devant les scènes érotiques, nous avons maintenant 
toujours la même impression, « Tu n’as rien vu de Hiroshima ». 
2 « Fondamentalement, Nagisa Oshima est un criminel, et aussi un révolution-
naire. » (Danvers-Tatum, 1986, 13)
3 Des opinions divergentes sur ce point. Voir, par exemple, Bonitzer, 1976, 51 ; de 
Mandiargues, 1976, 46.
(Etant donné que nous aussi nous parlons de crime, nous nous 
permettons d’abuser de Marguerite Duras.) Le fait est qu’ici les 
organes génitaux sont filmés uniquement aux moments les plus 
décisifs de l’angoisse de mort (du spectateur) réussissant de 
cette façon à lier indissolublement sexe et mort. Et précisément, 
ils sont dévoilés seulement pendant la dernière demi-heure du 
film qui est consacrée presque entièrement aux répétitions de la 
strangulation. 
Qu’est-ce qu’ Oshima réussit-il avec cette mise en scène ? 
Mais, en principe, d’approcher deux « sensations » éloignées et 
étrangères pour les gens dits normaux, la stimulation sexuelle et 
l’angoisse de mort. Avec cette coïncidence contre nature, Os-
hima n’obtient surtout pas l’affaiblissement de la stimulation et 
son remplacement par l’angoisse. C’est tout à fait le contraire qui 
arrive : la stimulation change de visage, au lieu de s’éteindre, elle 
s’approfondit –et se plonge– dans l’angoisse de mort. 
Il est devenu clair que nous soutenons qu’à travers L’empire 
des sens nous faisons la rencontre d’une expérience extra-
ordinaire. Mais, arrêtons-nous à cette coïncidence –que nous 
avons traité de « contre nature »– de la stimulation sexuelle 
et de l’angoisse de mort. Lorsqu’un danger survient pendant 
le sexe, ceci a comme résultat l’arrêt de l’activité sexuelle ; de 
même, pendant la fuite d’un vrai danger toute stimulation est 
rendue impossible. (L’instinct de vie se démontre bien plus fort 
que l’instinct sexuel.) Et voici que L’empire des sens, comme nous 
avons déjà dit, est justement basé au fait qu’au moment de la 
strangulation d’un homme a lieu une érection – c’est un fait qui 
apparaît d’abord dans L’histoire de l’œil de Georges Bataille, le 
plus grand théoricien du sujet sexe/mort. Tout le monde con-
naît par contre que la simultanéité de la stimulation sexuelle et 
de la mort –que l’on rencontre assez souvent chez Oshima– est 
une des plus graves perversions, qu’elle peut conduire directe-
ment au meurtre sexuel et au viol. Mais au suicide aussi : l’auto-
érotique asphyxiation que de Sade décrit en détail dans Justine. 
Comment se fait-il alors que tant de monde a pu suivre et aimé 
ce film ? En deux mots, comment sommes-nous tombés dans le 
piège d’Oshima ? 
Déjà nous connaissons par Freud (1992b, 378-380 ; 
1992a, 45-46) que l’angoisse de mort naît aussi par la restric-
tion sexuelle : c’est la libido excitée mais insatisfaite qui se 
transforme directement en angoisse. Ceci signifie en premier 
lieu que l’angoisse est un destin possible de la libido : Oshima 
ne fait qu’encourager les deux en même temps. Mais le fait que 
l’angoisse apparaît à la place de la satisfaction sexuelle peut nous 
amener à penser que la libido trouve finalement satisfaction 
dans l’angoisse. Oshima en nous offrant excitation sexuelle et 
angoisse en même temps réussit à satisfaire la libido qu’il excite. 
Une seconde réponse pourrait se trouvait chez Burke et 
chez Kant (1986, 99, 113). Le sublime n’est pas le superlatif 
du beau. Au contraire, il procure chez nous des sentiments qui 
peuvent se développer en peur ou terreur. C’est vivre la grandeur 
de la nature mais de distance, c’est-à-dire sans être confronté 
réellement avec elle: la vue d’un cataracte, d’une tempête, d’un 
précipice, de l’explosion d’un volcan… Le sublime (en son sens 
dynamique) nous procure ces sentiments de peur ou de terreur 
au moment justement où nous nous sentons en pleine sécurité. 
En étant éloignés de la source qui nous terrifie, nous sommes 
conscients que notre vie n’est pas en danger. Et c’est là que cette 
source nous lance le défi de sortir de nous-mêmes, hors des 
limites de la condition humaine. Elle nous pousse à vivre nos 
limites, jusqu’à dépasser même la peur de la mort. Nous ne som-
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mes plus enchaînés dans notre entourage, mais nous sentons 
que nous nous étendons au-delà de la nature. Entre l’œuvre d’art 
et le porno, je crois alors que « sublime » est justement la quali-
fication qui convient à L’empire des sens.
Un meurtre peut-il jamais être qualifié de « sublime » ?! 
Essayons de l’approcher de plus près. Ce qui le distingue des 
autres crimes passionnels est évidemment que Sada l’a commis 
sans raison apparente, en ayant obtenu au préalable le consente-
ment de sa victime. Comment ceci a-t-il été possible ? D’abord, 
n’oublions pas que Kichi et Sada appartiennent à une culture 
autre que la nôtre, une culture où la sexualité et la mortalité 
sont vécues à fond. Ils appartiennent à une culture où la survie 
n’est pas une valeur absolue, mais une valeur sous condition. Le 
rôle que tient le suicide –le fameux hara-kiri– dans la culture 
japonaise est connu. Ici ce n’est évidemment pas l’exigence de 
dignité qui a provoqué le meurtre et le consentement de Kichi. 
D’habitude, son consentement est interprété comme désir 
d’offrir à une femme le plus grand plaisir possible. Pour nous, 
c’est plutôt que Kichi a été victime de la douceur de l’approche 
de la mort. Il lui dit, «  Mais, si tu commences [à m’étrangler], ne 
t’arrêtes pas parce que ça fait mal… » Il a été victime de sa dé-
livrance absolue entre les mains de Sada. N’oublions pas pour-
tant que la strangulation comme jeu sexuel est son propre jeu. 
A noter aussi que Sada ne dormait plus et que Kichi était épuisé 
par l’activité sexuelle et l’insomnie – il était resté sans dormir afin 
de faire l’amour avec Sada jour et nuit sans arrêt. Pourtant Sada 
n’a pas tué Kichi pour goûter un moment de plaisir suprême, 
comme on entend dire souvent, en donnant ainsi au meurtre un 
aspect cruel. Quand elle prend ce jeu vraiment au sérieux –ils 
sont en train de faire l’amour– Kichi survit à sa strangulation. 
Pourtant Sada finit par l’étrangler quand même.
Deux personnes qui vivent enfermées dans des lieux clos 
en faisant l’amour pratiquement sans interruption apprennent 
à vivre l’orgasme (la petite mort) tout le temps – et étant donné 
leur grande passion, il n’y a pas de saturation, mais l’orgasme 
garde toute sa force malgré sa répétition. L’orgasme, de moment 
privilégié qu’il est, devient exigence pour tout moment.4 Si ce 
n’est pas possible – et pratiquement ce n’est pas possible, puisque 
la stimulation exige le repos. Si ce n’est pas possible, alors, que 
faire, se contenter de son substitut –ou ambitionner de viser son 
archétype–, la mort réelle c’est-à-dire, la grande mort. Il se peut 
que la sur-consommation de la petite mort conduise directe-
ment à la quête de la grande mort. Oshima affirme à propos du 
Double Suicide, un de ses films antérieurs : « Désirer sans cesse 
de faire l’amour est évidemment un signe de vie, mais nous vou-
lons ne pas omettre de remarquer que quand la vie se présente 
avec une pareille force, la mort ne tarde pas de rentrer en jeu. » 
(Oshima, 1979-1980)
Si on croit Pascal (1978, 77-78), d’ailleurs, déjà le fait 
qu’ils étaient enfermés tout le temps dans des lieux clos les 
place très proche de l’obsession de la mort : sortir hors de 
chez-moi et me divertir signifie, au fond, sortir hors de moi et 
divertir l’idée de la mort. (Parce que chez-moi et à l’intérieur 
de moi il n’y a que la mort qui s’empare de moi, selon Pascal 
toujours.) ‘Rester dedans’ est devenu pour les amants tragiques 
une seconde nature ; ceci pourrait provoquer le désir chez Sada 
de ne pas laisser Kichi sortir de son corps à elle ; le désir chez 
Kichi de rester ‘dedans’ pour toujours. « On me dit : ce genre 
d’amour n’est pas viable. Mais comment évaluer la viabilité ? 
4 »Le désir de Sada est d’être perpétuellement excitée sexuellement.« (Turim, 1998, 135).
Pourquoi ce qui est viable est-il un Bien ? Pourquoi durer est-il 
mieux que brûler ? » (Barthes, 1977, 30) La chambre close qui 
les enferme et les emprisonne à portes ouvertes est une image 
sombre de l’utérus, une initiation à celle-ci. La seule différence 
est que celle-ci, l’utérus, se trouve à l’intérieur du corps de 
Sada : Sada va survivre à son meurtre parce que justement son 
désir n’était pas tant la mort en tant que telle –et tenter, par 
exemple, un double suicide, comme il est fréquent au Japon et 
chez Oshima– mais il s’agissait d’un désir proprement sexuel 
–garder dedans l’homme après le coït–, l’accomplissement 
duquel exigeait malheureusement un meurtre. « Sada : Je veux 
te le couper pour que tu restes dans moi. » C’est la première 
fois que l’idée de castration apparaît chez Sada. « Sada : Si je 
te le coupe, tu mourras ? Kichi : Oui. » Apprendre à accomplir 
absolument tous ses désirs se présente ici comme un long 
chemin sans retour. Selon Bataille (1957, 79), l’érotisme est 
marqué par le jeu alternatif de l’interdit et de la transgression. 
Dans ses lieux clos où ils étaient enfermés, faisant l’amour 
pendant toute la journée, Sada et Kichi apprennent à vivre en 
tant que Un. Le corps étranger, qui est la source du plaisir, est 
vécu comme son propre corps. Le long chemin qu’ils traversent 
en accomplissant tous leurs désirs n’a pas de retour parce qu’il 
est lui-même un retour en arrière. « Je suis le sein », pense 
l’infans selon Freud.5 Je suis le lieu du plaisir. « Le sens dernier 
de l’érotisme est la fusion, la suppression de la limite », écrit 
Bataille. (1957, 143) Pourtant, Un, ça saute aux yeux, ils ne le 
sont pas. Déjà quand Sada donne l’ordre à Kichi de faire l’amour 
avec une passante il est évident qu’elle sent –ou qu’elle veut– 
posséder le corps de Kichi. Mais lui ne fait pas l’amour avec la 
passante – Sada ne possède rien du tout et c’est le moment de 
le réaliser. Sada avait déjà décidé qu’ils ne pouvaient pas vivre 
tous les deux, qu’ils ne pouvaient pas vivre séparés par l’espace, 
en tant que deux. Elle sent que sa mort à lui approche et essaie 
de s’enfuir avec un de ses anciens clients, mais sans succès. Sada 
est descendue à petits pas jusqu’au fond de sa psyché et c’est là 
qu’elle a rencontré, qu’elle s’est confrontée avec la castration. 
Selon Freud (1985, 231), « on peut même aller jusqu’à affirmer 
que l’angoisse de castration elle-même ne recèle pas de secret 
plus profond ni d’autre signification. » La castration finale de 
Kichi, c’est elle qui dévoile le motif du meurtre : c’est maintenant 
que les organes génitaux de Kichi font partie de son corps à elle, 
« Je suis le sein ». Le point culminant du meurtre est justement 
Sada errante dans les rues de Tokyo, rayonnante de bonheur 
–disent les journaux de l’époque–, les organes de Kichi dans les 
5 S. Freud, note du 12-7-1938 (Londres), G.W. XVII, p. 151.
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mains – et c’est justement cette scène de la corrida qu’Oshima 
choisit de nous cacher !? 
Pourtant, si c’est à chercher les raisons du « meurtre », il 
y en a d’autres aussi : D’abord, Kichi continue de temps à autre 
à avoir des relations avec sa femme, chose qui fait chaque fois 
exploser la jalousie de Sada. Mais, à mon avis, il y a encore une 
raison qui est précisément celle qui met en marche la force qu’a 
besoin l’accomplissement d’un meurtre. Il s’agit des moments 
qui précèdent le meurtre. Sada, il y a longtemps, ne dort plus, 
car elle veut regarder Kichi dormir. Kichi ne dort que d’un œil. 
Il ouvre ses yeux, il voit qu’elle ne le regarde pas. C’est évident, 
alors, il n’est plus l’objet de son désir quand il dort… Il com-
mence à réaliser (ou à craindre) que la chute de la passion de 
Sada pour lui a déjà commencé.
K: Je ne sais pas si je peux, mais viens.
S: Vraiment ?
 (Sada recommence à lui faire l’amour mais Kichi 
s’endort, même en se trouvant à l’intérieur de son 
corps. Sada se fâche, elle le réveille, il s’endort, elle le 
réveille, il s’endort, il se réveille.)
S: Tu souffres ? 
 K, montre que non : Je vais dormir, regardes-moi bien.
 (Kichi s’endort, se réveille.) 
K: Si je m’endors, tu vas m’étrangler ? 
 S, montre qu’oui : Tu veux que je t’étrangle ? 
K: Si tu commences, ne t’arrêtes pas à moitié. Après ça 
fait mal.
 (Sada se prépare pour l’étrangler de nouveau. Elle 
essaie en vain de le réveiller.)
S: Je vais t’étrangler.
 (Elle commence. Il ouvre ses yeux. Elle continue… 
Leurs gémissements… C’est fini.) 
Sada commence à réaliser (ou à craindre) que la chute de 
la passion de Kichi pour elle a déjà commencé. Elle le tue en 
tant qu’il est encore amoureux d’elle, avant qu’il ne cesse de 
l’être. Pourtant il est connu que dans le crime un seul moment 
pèse autant qu’un motif éternel et est capable de provoquer un 
meurtre : Sada ne pardonne pas à Kichi de s’endormir en faisant 
l’amour avec elle. Elle se venge en le tuant. Ça ne compte pas 
pour elle qu’il lui fait l’amour continuellement ; ça ne compte 
que ce seul moment, que son corps à lui, –celui qui les unit– l’a 
finalement trahi et elle l’a vu s’endormir et encore s’endormir et 
encore s’endormir… Pourtant Kichi est innocent. Si son corps 
l’a trahi, lui n’a pas trahi Sada : Il l’a appelée seulement parce qu’il 
voulait se trouver à l’intérieur de son corps même en dormant… 
Il l’a appelée parce qu’il voulait –exiger– constituer à chaque 
instant un corps unique avec elle – mais il a échoué, la façon 
n’était pas la bonne. On est obligé alors de conclure que Sada 
–moyennant le meurtre, la castration et les 4 jours d’errance – a 
seulement trouvé un moyen plus efficace pour le même désir/
exigence des amants : être UN, ne plus vivre séparés. (Ça n’a 
duré que 4 jours, oui, mais que faire ?, ça a duré 4 vrais jours 
et 4 nuits !!) Il s’agit d’un compromis multiple. Elle lui ôte les 
organes sans que lui ne les perde, puisque entre-temps il a gagné 
la mort ; sans que lui ne meure à cause de cela. Avec la castration 
Sada a pu vaincre la mort : même pas la mort n’a réussi à séparer 
l’Inséparable. (L’Inséparable –je suis le sein– est l’exigence ul-
time de l’humain se trouvant au fond de la psyché.6) Il n’y avait 
pas d’autre solution pour eux, sa place à lui était à l’intérieur de 
Sada. Il rentrait déjà dans son corps, il devait rentrer dedans 
en entier, mais cette fois-ci y rester : le deuil. (Pendant le deuil, 
le sujet incorpore le mort, en deux mots, il le mange. (Freud, 
1968)
Pourtant, Kichi une fois mort, son corps appartient à sa 
femme. (Nussbaum, 2004, 155) Sada vole le corps : elle lui 
ôte les organes génitaux pour ne pas les céder à elle. L’amour 
passionné entre Kichi et Sada était finalement un amour entre 
un homme marié et une ex-prostituée. (La seconde scène du 
film, avec Sada épiant le couple, déclare l’identité de Kichi, il 
est marié ; la troisième, avec le vieillard, l’identité de Sada, elle a 
été prostituée.) Des fois, les prostituées volent l’argent de leurs 
clients avant de les quitter ; maintenant qu’il n’est plus là, elle 
lui vole son objet le plus précieux pour elle, son sexe. A ne pas 
sous-estimer le fait que Sada était une ex-prostituée japonaise : 
il était fréquent au Japon du 17e siècle de demander des preuves 
d’amour aux « filles de joie » (yûjos) parce que justement elles 
manquaient de sincérité : « quand […] elles prêteraient ser-
ment, elles se feraient couper les cheveux, arracher les ongles 
ou même couper un doigt ». (Asuka, 2003, 51/53-54, 61) Il se 
peut, alors, qu’au Japon une prostituée soit par tradition famil-
iarisée à l’idée qu’à un certain moment il faudra peut-être don-
ner une preuve indubitable de son amour à l’homme qu’elle va 
vraiment aimer. La mort de Kichi –son consentement– était sa 
preuve de son amour pour elle ; la castration, la preuve de Sada 
de son amour pour lui. Au lieu de se mutiler elle-même, elle le 
mutile après mort pour (lui) montrer qu’il était vraiment im-
possible à elle de se séparer de lui.7 Une fois les preuves ultimes 
6 L’exigence du sens apparaît comme la réaction de la psyché à la destruction du 
« Je suis le sein ». (Mirasyesis, 1999a, 125-150).
7 Le voyage d’une semaine qu’elle propose à son ex-client était aussi une quête de 
preuve d’amour de sa part – mais celle-ci n’a jamais été donnée. « Qu’est-ce que 
tu dis ? Si quelqu’un l’apprend, je dois me tuer ! », il lui répond révolté.
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d’amour échangées réciproquement, Sada va écrire sur le corps 
de Kichi avec le sang de la castration : « Sada et Kichi, ensemble 
pour toujours ». 
Mais, finalement, quel a été le but de Oshima dans tout cela ? De nous offrir une stimulation sexuelle sans précédent ? Plutôt, de nous offrir une mort 
sans précédent moyennant un meurtre qu’il n’en est pas un. 
(L’empire des sens brise non seulement la notion du porno 
mais aussi celle du crime.) En suivant le porno sincèrement 
nous nous glissons dans la mort de Kichi tout doucement, 
imperceptiblement. C’est comme si Kichi mourait en suppliant 
Sada de le faire mourir. C’est la mort la plus douce qu’Oshima 
a préservé pour cet homme qui trompait grossièrement sa 
femme même dans leur propre maison. Au début, le meurtre 
approche comme jalousie et vengeance ; au milieu, il arrive 
comme égoïsme extrême, inimaginable : il est le point culmi-
nant de son plaisir à elle afin qu’elle obtienne la plus grande 
satisfaction : Sada, en lui faisant l’amour et en l’étranglant en 
même temps, lui demande de lui nouer les mains afin qu’il 
n’interrompe pas de nouveau –quand il se sentira asphyxié– 
« le plus beau moment », comme elle dit. Il l’accepte, sa 
soumission absolue est obtenue. Entre-temps, le spectateur 
est bouleversé, révolté même, elle le tue, devant ses yeux, 
pour un seul moment de plaisir – même si c’est le moment 
de plaisir suprême !!! Mais juste après, tout ça change. Elle le 
laisse vivre. Et c’est là qu’elle lui demande de l’étrangler cette 
fois pour de vrai. Il est en train de dormir, elle le réveille pour 
qu’il soit réveillé, pour être sûre qu’il n’a pas changé d’avis. On 
s’attendait qu’elle le tue pendant la copulation, mais elle le tue 
juste après. Ou bien, elle l’a tué pendant la copulation (quand 
elle lui nouait les mains pour son plaisir à elle), mais lui a sur-
vécu à sa mort. (Exactement comme à la Pendaison, un autre 
film d’Oshima où le condamné à mort survit à sa pendaison et 
il est nécessaire de le tuer de nouveau). 
Dans L’empire des sens, la mort a été la seule voie pour le 
sexe. La surabondance du plaisir du sexe est ici le moyen pour 
vivre même la mort en tant que plaisir. Démontrer qu’elle peut 
être aussi un autre plaisir. La mort a été le point culminant du 
plaisir du sexe ; pourtant, la mort survient sans sexe pour qu’elle 
soit vécue en entier, pure, sans être mêlée, altérée par le plaisir 
sexuel. Le but était de séparer finalement la mort du sexe – déjà 
depuis longtemps nous avons dit que l’angoisse de mort avait 
empoisonné –ou avait enrichi– le plaisir sexuel. La mort ne 
peut pas être définitivement séparée du sexe : le besoin de la 
castration. Quand Kichi accepte de se faire nouer les mains, il 
se donne à elle entièrement pour lui offrir du plaisir ; quand 
Sada l’étrangle effectivement, elle se donne à lui et lui offre la 
mort pour lui offrir du plaisir. « Kichi : Mais, si tu commences 
[à m’étrangler], ne t’arrêtes pas parce que ça fait mal… ». Elle 
l’étrangle réellement pour ne pas le laisser insatisfait – la mort est 
vécue en tant que désir sexuel. Elle serre ses mains autour de son 
cou, comme il s’était habitué de sentir son corps à elle se serrer 
autour de son membre. Leur relation s’est terminée –c’est-à-dire 
accomplie– au moment où il se laisse étrangler par elle, les mains 
noués – que vivre d’autre, que partager après ça ? Le fait qu’il 
n’est pas réellement mort est un détail sans importance, elle va 
tout doucement, tendrement, combler la lacune. 
Personne ne pouvait s’imaginer qu’un acte aussi violent et 
sanglant qu’une castration pourrait se précéder d’une mort tel-
lement calme, douce, silencieuse. Pourquoi alors tout le monde 
a-t-il retenu la castration et pas cette mort ? Mais, parce que tel 
était le but du metteur en scène. Le rôle de la castration a été 
de bruyamment occulter le moment de la mort. Avec les mots 
d’Oshima, « Pour moi le cinéma est une visualisation des désirs 
du metteur en scène. Seulement, les désirs du metteur en scène 
n’apparaissent pas tels quels, sous leur forme immédiate, sur 
l’écran. Dans un film, les désirs du metteur en scène apparaissent 
sous des formes plus ou moins déviées. Et je me demande si, 
craignant constamment que mes désirs apparaissent dans mes 
œuvres, je n’ai pas tout fait pour les voiler. N’ai-je pas continué à 
faire du cinéma pour cacher mes désirs ? Exprimant mes désirs 
sous une forme détournée, ils en sont probablement apparus 
d’autant plus clairement. » (Oshima, 1980b, 313) Oshima a 
profité de l’acte de la castration pour laisser s’accomplir derrière 
elle, dans son ombre, son plus profond désir : enfin mourir, 
s’éteindre doucement. « Déjà je marche manifestement vers la 
mort. Et lorsque le bois outre mesure, je tente un lent suicide. » 
(Oshima, 1978, 13)
Oshima affirme (1980b, 288) à propos des films porno : 
« Celui qui va voir un film «pink» ne le regarde pas pour se 
préparer à accomplir un acte sexuel. C’est le fait en lui-même de 
voir ce film qui constitue, pour le spectateur, un acte sexuel. […] 
Le film «pink» […] s’adresse seulement aux personnes qui 
trouvent une satisfaction sexuelle à voir ces films. » Nous avons 
dit que l’expérience extra-ordinaire que le spectateur peut vivre 
en suivant cet œuvre-d’art-porno est justement la coïncidence 
de la stimulation sexuelle et de l’angoisse de mort. Nous nous 
demandons, alors, si cette sensation ne veut peut-être pas évo-
quer un vrai acte sexuel entre Kichi et Sada. La différence serait 
qu’à la place de la petite mort, Oshima nous offre la grande : le 
spectateur –stimulé et angoissé en même temps– se glisse enfin, 
tout doucement, dans la mort douce de Kichi. (Pour vivre ce 
voyage, il faut suivre le film sans préjugés moraux – je veux dire 
sans préjugés moraux en ce qui concerne évidemment la façon 
de mourir.)
La question est alors ou est-ce qu’intervient la sensu-alité dans un film porno ? Au début de cet exposé nous avons définit la sensualité en tant que promesse laissée 
en suspens, mais il n’y a rien laissé en suspens dans L’empire des 
sens, au contraire le plus fou désir sexuel est aussitôt accompli ! 
A moins que la sensualité ne fasse pas appel au sexe mais à la 
mort. La sensualité provoque des sentiments érotiques mais 
c’est le désir de mort qu’elle éveille au fond. Quelque chose 
est sensuelle en tant qu’elle fait appel à la mort en utilisant la 
voie –et la voix– du sexe. La plus part du temps la mort ne fait 
son apparition dans le sexe qu’en tant que sexe : la fameuse 
petite mort. Mais ici aussi c’est à se demander si, dans le sexe, 
on ne recherche justement cette rencontre avec la mort… Et si 
ce n’est le sexe –la mort effectuée dans le sexe– qui accomplit 
finalement le désir de mort. (Mirasyesis, 1998b) Si le sexe est 
un substitut de la mort, c’est normal l’anormal, le substitut, à 
un certain moment, d’être remplacé par son « archétype ». 
La première fois que Kichi remarque Sada dans sa maison, 
c’est quand elle est en train de se disputer avec une autre ser-
vante, le couteau dans la main. « Kichi : Tu devrais avoir autre 
chose entre les mains. » La sensualité, une promesse de mort, 
alors, laissée en suspens ?! Mais L’empire des sens accomplit de 
même le plus fou désir de mort – comme si la mort était un 
désir sexuel de plus… C’est là justement que la sensualité ren-
contre le porno : Oshima traite la mort comme si c’était du sexe 
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pornographique. Il la dote de la satisfaction absolue, filmée de 
très près, étape par étape, seulement pour nous. Nous qui avons 
aimé L’empire des sens, nous sommes tous des voyeurs de la mort. 
Je m’explique : 
Nous avons déjà dit que L’empire des sens –comme tout film 
érotique– est fondé sur l’alternance du visible et du caché. Ce 
truc a comme résultat d’éveiller de plus en plus le désir de voir. 
Oshima maîtrise tellement ce jeu, qu’il nous donne l’impression 
qu’un des buts de ce film était non pas de nous stimuler sexuelle-
ment, mais justement de stimuler notre pulsion de voir. Comme 
nous avons déjà dit, le porno s’y limite à la 1e partie, tandis 
qu’à la seconde partie la vue des organes génitaux ne survient 
que quand il y a une liaison directe avec l’angoisse de mort. Le 
résultat est que toute la seconde partie laisse notre désir de voir 
plutôt déçu, insatisfait. Son jeu est révélé à la fin : il nous donne 
amplement la vue de la mort – et il ne la donne qu’à nous. 
La première chose qui nous choque dans ce film c’est que 
les gens font très souvent l’amour devant les autres, ils le font in-
dépendamment s’ils sont seuls ou pas. (De ce fait, par exemple, 
les servantes sont tout le temps spectatrices de la vie sexuelle de 
leurs maîtres.) Ce n’est pas un hasard si deux scènes de voyeur-
isme se trouvent au début du film. (Des enfants dévoilant les 
organes génitaux d’un vieillard pour se moquer de lui ; Sada et 
une autre servante épiant leurs maîtres en train de faire l’amour.) 
C’est parce qu’Oshima avait l’intention par la suite de renverser 
le porno et l’interdit : le spectateur de ce film porno ne se sent 
pas voyeur –et il n’est pas non plus–, car, dès les premiers mo-
ments, il fait la connaissance d’une culture –et d’une époque– 
où tout le monde est en train de voir impunément l’interdit, qu’il 
n’en est pas un. Tout le monde voit, est vu et montre. Si tout le 
monde est voyeur, personne n’en est. Pourtant, si Oshima abolit 
le voyeurisme, c’est pour le glorifier par la suite :
Il n’y a que le soit disant « meurtre » qui survient sans 
spectateur, et il survient après pas mal de répétitions qui ont tou-
jours lieu sans témoin. C’est étonnant quand même que Oshima 
ouvre toutes les portes pendant les moments du sexe mais fait 
mourir Kichi huis clos, alors que la mort célébrée des Japonais, 
le hara-kiri, survient très souvent devant des spectateurs/té-
moins qui restent immobiles et laissent le spectacle se dérouler. 
Nous regardons un porno et nous ne nous sentons voyeurs 
regardant le plaisir interdit qu’au moment du « meurtre ». Cette 
fois-ci c’est à travers notre regard que la mort acquiert quelque 
chose du plaisir du sexe, qu’elle se mêle, pour encore une fois, 
avec lui. La mort de Kichi n’a été vue par personne ; seulement 
par nous, jusqu’au bout. Seulement par nous et par Sada. Après 
tant de témoins aux jeux sexuels des amants, la solitude de la 
dernière scène du spectacle nous bouleverse, elle nous rend 
immédiatement les complices de Sada – comme d’ailleurs 
Kichi a collaboré avec elle au moment de son propre meurtre. 
La vue de la mort de Kichi nous lie intimement avec eux. Si 
nous arrivons à nous glisser si imperceptiblement dans la mort 
de Kichi c’est aussi parce qu’elle est faite seulement pour nous. 
Oshima a su mettre en scène une vraie corrida, comme le titre 
japonais du film, La Corrida de l’amour, à juste titre l’indique. 
La corrida –mieux que tout autre spectacle– utilise et stimule le 
voyeurisme de la mort. La corrida rend clair que le voyeurisme 
peut être de la mort et que la mort peut être le gain d’un jeu. Je 
me demande si les spectateurs de la tauromachie qui poussent 
des cris de triomphe devant la mort du taureau s’identifient tous 
au toréador qui tue ou bien aussi quelque uns au taureau qui 
meurt…
Qu’en est-il alors avec notre définition de la sensualité comme « promesse de mort laissée en suspens » ? Sada est un appel sexuel à la mort, elle mène Kichi 
–et pas seulement– à la mort, mais elle-même y 
échappe. Personne de nous –Kichi non plus–ne verra Sada 
mourir, même si elle nous confie mille et mille fois le visage de 
sa petite mort.
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E ver since the classical period the debates about the relationship between the natural and the artificial played a central part in Chinese aes-thetical thought. Although its context has greatly changed, this question is ever so present in the 
work of contemporary artists and thinkers of today, facing a 
highly urbanized reality of today’s China. 
As a response to the unfortunate landmark of modern 
architecture, the Beijing West Train Station, Beijing sculptor 
Zhan Wang (展望, 1962–) proposed a contemporary varia-
tion of an ancient art form. His suggestion was a remake in the 
line of the so-called jia shan shi 假山石, artificial mountain 
rocks, which were an obligatory addition in the classical Chi-
nese gardens of the Ming and Qing period. Contrary to his tra-
ditional model, Zhan Wang suggested a new version of jia shan 
shi he called jia jia shan shi (假假山石), literally, the “artificial 
artificial rocks”. Bending and pounding sheets of stainless steel 
onto the surface of an original jia shan shi in 1995 he created 
the first artifacts that were later included in his 1997 project 
New Picture of Beijing: Today and Tomorrow’s Capital--Rockery 
Remolding Plan. Convinced that the new urban reality calls for 
a new art form in which the artificial and the natural would 
meet, he published a manifesto containing many subtle hints 
that link his sculptures with the tradition of jia shan shi – not 
only on the formal, but also on the conceptual level. What 
might seem as a simple parody of traditional aesthetic ideals 
or a further step down the platonic ladder of copies is in Zhan 
Wang’s case much more than this. Apart from the very obvious 
reference on the applicability of traditional aesthetic ideals in 
the present time, the manifesto advocates a conceptual deci-
sion which is very much related to the traditional jia shan shi. 
The art form of the artificial mountain rocks can be dated 
back at least to the Ming period when the private gardens were 
first designed in the southern regions of China. In the aesthet-
ics of gardens the distinction between the cultivated and the 
wild nature, between mountains-rivers shan shui 山水 and the 
gardens-fields tian yuan 田园, drawn in the Jin dynasty liter-
ary theory was reinterpreted and recombined. In the changed 
social circumstances of the late Ming dynasty the aesthetic 
principles of the “mountains and rivers” genre transcended the 
boundaries of the representation of wild nature and – together 
with the “fields and gardens” genre – formed a new hybrid art 
form. The art of private garden design incorporated the catego-
ries of the wild nature and aimed for their re-creation. 
This shift is best observable in the philosophical part of the 
text On gardening (园冶) by Ji Cheng (1582–1642?), the cele-




Once upon a time those who appreciated gardens and 
fields lived in the countrside. Nowadays those that long 
for the mountains and valleys, choose a dwelling inside 
the village and then all around their house they plant 
mulberries and hemp, shape the streams and dig ditches, 
build walls and plant willows. 1 
As we can see from the quoted paragraph, the cultivation 
of nature moved from outside of the city walls into the domain 
of human dwellings. Although Ji Cheng mentions the appear-
ance of this phenomenon in the villages, the need to re-create 
the “mountains and rivers” became even more significant in 
the urbanized environment of the expanding cities. It was 
these circumstances that initiated the trend of the creation of 
private gardens among the literati of the Chinese south. The 
wilderness of the “mountains and rivers” – the scenery of the 
landscape painting and poetry entered the courtyards of pri-
vate homes and provided a privilege of a simulated escape into 
the solitude of the mountain wilderness. Ji Cheng thus points 
out that it is not necessary any more to resort into the moun-
tains in order to attain inner tranquility:
足征市隐犹胜巢居，能为闹处寻幽， 
胡舍近方图远；得闲即诣，随兴携游。
It is enough to resort to retirement inside the town, and yet 
it is the same as living in a remote mountain hut. You can 
seek the tranquility beyond the clatter, you can live nearby 
but still ponder upon the far, thus you can attain idleness 
and depart on a journey, following your own desires. 2 
1 Ji Cheng 计成, Yuan ye tu shuo 园冶图说, Shangdong huabao chubanshe, 
Ji’nan 2003, p. 51. 
2 Ibidem, p. 49.
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“Hidden inside the city” a person is provided with a pos-
sibility to escape into the simulated world of mountains and 
rivers. This became the prevalent motif of the art of private 
garden design. 
Nelson I. Wu interprets this escape as a symbolic transfer, 
“a symbolic transition to ferry us architecturally away from our 
world of organized action, yet without leaving it, so that we may 
cultivate our ‘eternal’ nature.” 3 Despite its deliberate and obvi-
ous simulatedness this transfer has real effects. The garden 
becomes a privileged place, where the outside world of the 
official obligations is put aside and the time, space and fleeting-
ness of life seem unimportant:
When man leaves this courtyard and enters his garden, 
thus away from organized society, he is not the social 
man who has to be myopic to eternal values so that  
he may function well in immediate situations, nor  
is he the biological man who is constantly becoming  
and is responsible for reproduction. He is, instead,  
the eternal man of Chinese landscape painting  
and poetry whose growth, adolescence and obligations 
for reproduction are either behind him or are not  
his concern. 4
Although this type of gardens is limited with a small area, 
they are expected to recreate within their borders a whole 
range of scenes from the wild and uncultivated mountain 
nature, adjusted to the participant in this simulative perfor-
mance. A focal idea of the Chinese aesthetics – that man is 
capable of re-creating the natural environment – is pushed 
to its furthest limits in this art form. The entire structure of 
the garden is intended to represent a miniaturized world of 
mountains and rivers. With the serpentine paths, carefully 
shaped streams, controlled tree-growth and seemingly random 
placement of the rocks, the design retains the appearance of 
the natural environment, that has grown by itself, spontane-
ously (zi ran 自然). Every shape or structure therefore has to 
follow the characteristics of the land, plants and materials. We 





Before building the corridor it is necessary to choose 
a narrow strip of land in front of the house or behind 
it, going gradually through the woods. It should climb 
uphill, descend towards the water, obey the high  
and low, curves and bends, following the way  
of spontaneity, breaking and continuing as a path  
of a snake or a snail. 5 
The beauty of the garden is achieved by faithfully follow-
ing the natural/ heavenly characteristics (tian ran 天然) of the 
environment where the garden is placed. Therefore, concludes 
Ji Cheng, it is the best if the characteristics are explicit enough 
for the designer to recognize:
3 Nelson I. Wu, Chinese and Indian Architecture: The City of Man, the Mountain of 
God, and the Realm of the Immortals, George Braziller, New York 1963, p. 48.
4 Ibidem, p. 46.




In order to be able to shape the mountains and forests 
as beautifully as possible, it is best to choose land that 
has higher and lower parts, uneven and deep parts, steep 
slopes and precipitous crevices, even and flat areas. On 
such land the design can follow the inclinations of the 
heavenly nature and the traces of human activities are 
not visible.6
The extreme scope of the attempt to re-create the natural 
by the means of art can be identified in the art form of artificial 
mountain rocks, the jia shan shi. The popularity of this garden 
element can be traced back to the Daoist legends about the 
western Kunlun mountains, where the goddess Queen mother 
of the West is supposed to reside. In her plantation of peach-
trees the special peaches of immortality were grown, and the 
immortals maintained their immortality by feasting there 
every three thousand years. However, the legend about the 
immortals was not the only reason for the popularity of the ar-
tificial mountains. The most important stimulus was the desire 
to use the three-dimensional experience to perform the natural 
environment that was otherwise admired in the landscape 
paintings. Gardens thus became landscape paintings, open for 
the visitor’s experience. It was of crucial importance for the 
spectator that he could stroll through the garden and was ever 
again astonished, inspired and surprised by the carefully de-
signed scenes and their sequence. Thus the garden seemingly 
provoked the same sensations that painters and poets of the 
shan shui genre aspired to.
Artificial mountains served as a transition point where 
the esthetics of shan shui genre entered the gardening design. 
Ji Cheng’s treatise in which the importance and the concep-
tual background of the jia shan shi is established, is a unique 
example among other theoretical texts on gardening of that 
period. The artificial mountains stones, shaped by thought-
ful piling of the picturesquely eroded stones, are perhaps the 
best illustration of the way the garden designers attempted 
to copy the spontaneity of nature. In the introduction to his 
text Ji Cheng emphasizes the complex correlation between 
the garden designer and the natural world. First he mocks at 





Wonderful scenery surrounds the town, and all those 
people of Run that like such things, carefully pick 
stones, place them among bamboo and the trees and by 
doing so they get artificial mountains. When I saw this 
happening, I burst into laughter. Somebody asked me: 
Why are you laughing?7
In order to be able to produce artificial mountains that 
seem as the real mountains, it is necessary to grasp the correct 
correspondence between the natural (the real) and the artificial. 
6 Ibidem, p. 47.
7 Ibidem, p. 25.
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予曰：「世所闻有真斯有假， 
胡不假真山形，而假迎勾芒者之拳磊乎？」
I said: The world has heard that there is the real and 
that then there is the artificial. Why don't you imitate 
the true shape of the mountains and why do you 
intentionally use the shape of the clenched fist, to create a 
mountain from a flat land? 8
The unusual metaphor of the clenched fist can be under-
stood as a reference to a method, where the designer tries to 
produce a successful plagiary by combining isolated natural 
elements – like a fist that can only originate in five stretched 
fingers. On the contrary, Ji Cheng claims, it is necessary to 
imitate nature in its complexity without trying to schematize 
it to form a sum of original elements. A mountain can only be 
copied by copying the complexity of its form. 
Asked about his abilities to do so, Ji Cheng explains his 
method in a very Daoist way – as “following chance”. 
遂偶为成「壁」，睹观者俱称： 
「俨然佳山 也」；遂播名于远近。
I follow chance and thus a wall appears, while all the 
spectators say: what a great and magnificent mountain!9
By emphasizing coincidence as a designer’s device Ji 
Cheng tries to approach the ideal of the spontaneous genera-
tion of an art work. His aesthetic theory makes no value-
difference between the natural and the artificial, between zhen 
真 and jia 假, between the true and the imitated reality. The 
name of these structures, “artificial mountain rocks”, jia shan 
shi, exposes this equalization and transposition. 
Here we come back to Zhan Wang’s argument. In the 
theoretical prologue to his project Artificial mountain rocks, he 
emphasizes the paradoxical way in which the artificial moun-
tain rocks bridge the gap between the natural and the artificial 
in Chinese aesthetics. 
In China, this was not conceived as “art.” Such stones 
had the power of connecting man with nature. What 
really confounds me is that while these rockeries are, in 
fact, real stones, in Chinese cultural terms they are called 
fake or artificial. In fact, in Chinese they are jia shan shi, 
which literally translates as “fake mountain rocks.” Why 
is something that is real called fake? This has to do with 
Chinese aesthetics: What is seen is not a rock, but a way 
to fulfill the imagined idea of a rock. 10
The complex correspondence between the fake/ artificial 
(jia) and the real/true/natural (zhen) is based on a specific 
understanding of the role of human actions, especially the cre-
ativity, in the universe of things and beings. From the quoted 
Ji Cheng’s paragraph we can conclude that there is a true shape 
of mountains (zhen shan xiang 真山形), that individualities 
all possess their own specific suchness, which the artist is 
supposed to follow. In this context we can also interpret the 
notion of spontaneity zi ran, that Ji Cheng sets as the highest 
standard of the mimetic success. The term itself, consisting of 
8 Ibidem.
9 Ibidem.
10 Francesca Dal Lago, Space and Public: Site Specificity in Beijing, Art Journal 
59.1, 2000, p. 75.
zi 自 (originating from) and ran 然 (such-ness) can thus be 
interpreted as “originating in suchness” or “following such-
ness”. But how should we interpret the term “suchness”?
When Ji Cheng writes about the imperative to “imitate 
the true shape of mountains”, it is of course obvious that this 
does not mean copying any particular existing mountain. On 
the contrary, he says that the imitation succeeds when the 
piling of stones “resigns to coincidence.” The suchness of the 
mountain that the generative method of spontaneity zi ran 
chooses to follow is not suchness of any particular mountain, 
but the suchness of the mountains in general – their inner 
nature becoming visible in their shape (xing形). The natures 
of the things and beings are only accessible, explains Ji Cheng, 
by succumbing intentionality to coincidence. In his conclusion 
which follows the classical Daoist paradigm, an artist who lets 
his own nature work together with the nature of the thing or a 
being, works “in cooperation with heaven and earth”. The arti-
ficial mountains are thus merely a specific example of the gen-
erative process in art – an imitation of the spontaneous reality 
and are not valued any less because of their fake or imitative 
character. The real seems fake and the natural seems artificial, 
but at the same time, the fake and the artificial can become a 
reality, equal to the one that has grown spontaneously:
有真为假，做假成真；稍动天机， 
全叨人力；探奇投好，同志须知。
There is the real that seems like a fake; but you can 
create something fake and it becomes real.11
11 Ji Cheng计成, Yuan ye tu shuo 园冶图说, p. 205.
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MYTHICAL LIGHT AND ALLEGORICAL DETACHMENT  
IN PERFORMANCE. A MEDITERraNEAN MAttER  
AND A HUNGARIAN PERFORMER – TIBOR HAJAS
I n the present essay I make an attempt to introduce Tibor Hajas, a Hungarian performance-artist. I will try to do my best to avoid an art for art’s sake introduction to an unknown oeuvre, because in a certain sense it could be an easy enterprise without any risk to me. Presumably there 
are very few outside Hungary who know Tibor Hajas’ activity, and 
it is in great part due to the relative isolation of Hungarian culture 
and art. I do not want to abuse my position, therefore besides 
introducing Hajas I will analyze his mythical performance art in a 
wider context and try to locate his art in the context of discourse 
on representation. Whenever I teach the art of Hajas or deliver a 
lecture on it, I make a presentation of his performances. There is no 
need to inform the reader that with Hajas and generally in perfor-
mance art the lecture form known as presentation carries within it 
a characteristic contradiction, since the word presence is implied at 
the etymologic core of presentation. But on my part this contradic-
tion is only a fatal repetition. I would argue that the impossibility 
of representing a presence is an ambivalent gesture which can be 
found in the very heart of performance. 
I mentioned above the word: mythical. I must explain why I 
used this word for Hajas. But before adressing this subject I refer 
to an earlier mythical example from the history of performance. It 
isn’t difficult to find such examples because there is a great tradition 
in the history of avant-garde which we can read as a claim to origi-
nality. From the very beginning of the avant-garde this claim has 
been represented in mythical stories of artistic foundation. One of 
these was Marinetti’s manifesto1 about his emerging from a factory 
ditch or from a “motherly ditch half full of muddy water” as a birth. 
In her critical analysis of the early futurist’s ideological claim to 
originality Rosalind Krauss called this “amniotic fluid”. 
I cup off sharply and, in disgust, I pitched -- bang! -- into 
a ditch.... Ah! motherly ditch, half full of muddy water! 
1 If we accept Marinetti as a chapter of the history of performance, as RoseLee 
Goldberg does in her Performance Art for instance. I must add that from the point 
of view of mythical stories manifestos are not less valuable traces for scholar re-
search on the nature of performance than traces of the concrete/real performance.
 A short part of Goldberg’s book was published in Hungarian in the former Yu-
goslavia, in a Hungarian art journal titled Új Symposion [New Symposion]. That 
was an art journal of the Hungarian minority living in Yugoslavia. The level of 
cultural autonomy in the former Yugoslavia was relatively high compared to other 
countries of the Eastern block that is why a chapter from a book about the history 
of avant-garde could be published.
Factory ditch! I tasted by mouthfuls your bracing slime that 
recalls the saintly black breast of my Sudanese nurse! As I 
rose, a shiny, stinking gadabout, I felt the red-hot iron of joy 
deliciously pierce my heart.2 
Krauss doesn’t go further in analyzing Marinetti’s text then in mentioning it only as an example for the avant-gardist claim 
to originality. Completing and supporting her criticism from a 
kind of rhetorical aspect we could say that in reading this part of 
Marinetti’s Futurist Manifesto there is a contradiction between the 
artist’s claim to active emergence or birth (i.e. originality) and the 
passive elevation of his car. 
A crowd of fishermen and gouty naturalists had gathered 
in terror around the prodigy. Patient and meddlesome, they 
raised high above great iron casting nets to fish out my car 
that lay like a great mired shark. It emerged slowly, leaving 
behind in the ditch like scales, its heavy body of common 
sense, and its padding of comfort.
While studying this contradiction we must take into account that the passive emergence of the car which is figuratively a 
metal part of Marinetti’ futurist body in a sense undermines the art-
ist’s strength of action and makes it “weak” as Friedrich Nietzsche 
would say.
After this avant-garde ancestor let me jump forward in time 
and read a short part of an interview with Tibor Hajas whose 
“lightning” story about his birth as an artist is no less impressive 
than Marinetti’s story. I ask the reader to listen to the mythical 
foundation story delivered with a massive existential vocabulary. 
Rudolf Ungváry (Interviewer): Could your intention be 
outlined? Do you have any intention?
Tibor Hajas: I could make an attempt, but the outlining 
consists of things which I’m not interested in. It leaves the 
2 „The Foundation of Futurism” [”Manifesto of Futurism,” 1909], translated 
from the French by Eugen Weber, reprinted by permission of Dodd, Mead and 
Company from Paths to the Present by Eugen Weber. Copyright 1960 by Dodd, 
Mead and Company, Inc. (Web: http://www.english.upenn.edu/~jenglish/
English104/marinetti.html. (Date of Acces: 21.08.2006.) I call the attention to a 
coincidence that the first futurist serata happened in Triest, not far from the place 
of the 3rd Mediterranean Conference. 
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question open to which in a final approach we want to get 
an answer. That is to say what is this whole absurd, which 
is served as an axiom to man? What is this: to be? How 
can this be pushed as a given fact? It has been absolutely 
intangible to me since my early childhood! I vividly 
remember a scene, when I stared into the light of a lamp 
almost until it hurt: finally I perceived the glowing filament 
and when it is detached from the mass of the light, in that 
moment I understood all that had been incomprehensible. 
So in that moment the whole world itself became held 
in suspension and consequently the „light” also became 
uncertain. [Italics mine. M.A.] What is „now”? Why does it 
happen „in this way”? Why does it happen specifically with 
this light? Why does it happen specifically with this form? 
And that was the moment of clear consciousness compared 
to which all other form, all tangible things are absolutely 
intangible.3 
The existential vocabulary consists of terms like “to be”, the “absurdity” of being, “axiomatic” and “given fact”, or the 
“moment”. The questions based on these words are questions of an 
existing being determined and therefore laden by and “tuned in” 
to depression.4 And then as the story says, in a mythical moment 
something happened. That was the moment of clear consciousness 
as Hajas puts it and in this evoked “moment” he seemingly under-
stood as a child things otherwise intangible and incomprehensible. 
Therefore I call this a mythical foundation narrative of the artist’s 
birth told by the artist himself. In the very heart of this story there 
are light and pain, and this fact was pregnant with consequences 
at least according to the oeuvre of the artist. I mean all of Hajas’ 
performances or at least most of them could be connected to the 
evocation of this clear lightning moment. 
I call the reader’s attention to another term of the narrative, 
and this is “detachment”. As Hajas mentioned total understanding 
happened when the glowing filament was detached from the mass 
of light. This imaginative picture is important mostly in the context 
of existentialism since we can understand it as an allegory of be-
ing set free from the depressively tuned mass of “being-in-world” 
as Heidegger would say.5 There is no doubt that Hajas’ final aim 
was to become detached from the determinative context and his 
direct activity for the sake of understanding this intangible context 
was parallel to understanding existence as “being-toward-death” 
in Heidegger’s discourse. The expression of “being-toward-death” 
seems to be concrete or literal in the case of some performers and 
3 Rudolf Ungváry: Leopards sat by tigers. A discussion with Tibor Hajas in 1980. 
Transl. by Andras Müllner, in Tibor Hajas: Szövegek [Texts], Enciklopédia 
Publisher, Budapest, 2005.
4 „Being-in-the-world. In contrast to theories of human being as a self-contained 
theoretical ego, Heidegger understands human being as always “outside” any 
supposed immanence, absorbed in social intercourse, practical tasks, and 
concern for its own interests. Evidence for this absorption, he argues, is that 
human being always finds itself caught up in a mood -- that is, “tuned in” to a 
given set of concerns.” Thomas Sheehan: “Heidegger, Martin (1889-1976),” 
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, editor Edward Craig, London and New 
York: Routledge, 1998, IV, 307-323. http://www.stanford.edu/dept/relstud/
faculty/sheehan/pdf/Routledge.pdf. Date of Acess: 2006.08.22.)
 To learn more about the connection between performance art and existential-
ism see Peter Gorsen: The Return of Existentialism in Performance Art, in 
Gregory Battcock and Robert Nickas (eds.): The Art of Performance. A Critical 
Anthology, New York: E. P. Dutton, 1984, 135-141. 
5 Including artistic patterns and traditions. “From among his contemporaries 
[…] only Hajas was able to entirely separate himself from the dominant artistic 
traditions. He was the torch-bearer of the Hungarian anti-art, Fluxus move-
ment.” (Italics mine. M.A.) Vera Baksa-Soós: Emergency Landing. An homage 
to Tibor Hajas, in Exhibition Catalog, Ludwig Museum, Budapest, 2005.
RoseLee Goldberg would call Hajas’ acts “death-defying” as she 
calls Chris Burden’s acts in her work.6 Even if there are apparent 
differences between philosophical discourse and artistic action, let 
me say that there are similarities too: in Hajas’ case the anticipation 
of death was realized in allegorical performances or actions while 
Heidegger performs metaphorical and conceptual verbal events or 
punceptual/quasi etymologic performative speech acts.7
When at this point of my lecture I presented a half minute 
long performance called Psyche performed by Hajas from a film 
directed by Gábor Bódy and titled Narcissus and Psyche, I hal-
lucinated the audience whispering, and I felt it being justified in 
asking me why I cut this performance out from the film in which 
it is embedded in an organic way. I could refer here to art historian 
László Beke who writes about this event as an „independent insert” 
in the film, 8 but I must add that the question of the possibility (or 
impossibility) of cutting something out from its original context is 
more complicated in this case. According to Hajas’ art theory the 
(social, institutional, existential, medial or artistic) context is always 
depressing the art and the artist, so the “totality” or the “originality” 
as the absolute aim of his art can be reached only through the act 
of detachment from this alienating-depressing background. This 
absolute decontextualization could show the artist totally naked 
as at birth or before the eyes of God according to Hajas. In his 
opinion there is a right way to be totally enlightened both literally 
and figuratively, and this is the way of light with the help of which 
he could be detached from the depressing background. The light 
lasting only for a moment makes the moment clear and at the same 
time burns the picture in the viewer’s eyes.9 Or in other words the 
momentary light is able to be the metaphor of the passing moment 
and of existence itself.10 So by now we have seen how the light had 
transformed from the central theme of Hajas’ mythical foundation 
narrative into the central medium of his oeuvre, or conversely how 
he created a mythical and painful foundational event in his child-
hood by absorbing the metaphoric light from his oeuvre. 
If we want to make this aesthetical concept or project familiar 
to ourselves we can reflect on it as an original modernist myth 
discussed by Paul de Man in his essay titled Literary History and 
Literary Modernity. Reading Nietzsche’s On the Use and Abuse of 
History for Life (Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben) 
and analyzing the ambivalent relationship between modernism 
6 We can cite here István Hajdu art historian from a radio broadcast: „Here 
somebody decided to reach the point of no return: that is, the last moment 
before death. The greatest performances of Hajas always reflected that risky, 
self-torturing and immensely merciless situation when someone does not 
want to die but to show himself and others the last moment before death.” 
Emergency Landing; Tibor Hajas’ Oeuvre – an interview by Júlia Váradi on 
Radio Kossuth (22. jun 2005. Wednesday 14:33) http://www.radio.hu/index.
php?cikk_id=141801 (Date of Acces: 2006.08.23) Trans. by Peter Bocsor.
7 For more about this performance see pictures of Tibor Hajas after Psyche, in 
Image Whipping. Tibor Hajas’ (1946-1980) Photo Works with János Vető. Edited 
by László Beke, Research Institute for Art History of the Hungarian Academy 
of Sciences, Budapest, 2004, 134-139.
8 ”Tibor Hajas’ independent insert – a self-destructive performance, hara-kiri com-
bined with an explosion, a white flash of lightning in the darkness”. László Beke: 
Gábor Bódy’s connections, in László Beke – Miklós Peternák (eds.): Gábor 
Bódy 1946-1985. A presentation of his work, Palace of Exhibitions – Central Board of 
the Hungarian Cinematography, Ministery of Culture, Budapest, 1987, 135. 
9 In Hajas’ case the light was often produced with burning magnesium as in the 
early days of photography.
10 „He willingly applies flashing magnesium light, which he sees as the synonym 
of existence, as a short discernment (Conciliation, 1978; Chöd, 1979). The 
delusion of the blinding light is a sign of break in the long darkness, a mo-
mentary pain, the metaphor of redemption.” Bálint Szombathy or Karen 
Eliot: Redemption on the balk of death. Summarizing exhibition of Tibor 
Hajas’ art, Új Művészet [New Art], 2005. august. http://www.uj-muveszet.hu/
archivum/2005/augusztus/szombathy.htm (Date of Acces: 30.08.2006.) 
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and its history, between the artist’s utopian idea of reaching present 
time and escaping from a laden past, between presence and writing, 
between an absolute state of originality without antecedents and 
repetition, de Man uses a system of metaphors which relates imme-
diately to our subject I mean light or rather electricity. 
We are touching here upon the radical impulse that stands 
behind all genuine modernity when it is not merely a 
descriptive synonym for the contemporaneous or for a 
passing fashion. Fashion (mode) can sometimes be only 
what remains of modernity after the impulse has subsided, 
as soon – and this can be almost at once – as it has changed 
from being an incandescent point in time into a reproducible 
cliché, all that remains of an invention that has lost the desire 
that produced it. Fashion is like the ashes left behind by the 
unlikely shaped flames of the fire, the trace alone revealing 
that a fire actually took place.11 (Italics mine. M.A.) 
Let me make a little digression for the sake of reading a part of Nietzsche’s text. If we read it we can easily find some examples 
that support de Man’s reading. For instance after arguing that 
the only solution to being “men” is to reject being “human-like 
aggregates”, Nietzsche finally turns in an apostrophic manner to 
those young and “hopeful people” of whom until that point he has 
spoken of as “they”.
I refer these doubters [in brackets: who neglect his teachings 
– M.A.] so I refer these doubters to time, which brings all 
things to light, and, in conclusion, I turn my attention to 
that society of those who hope, in order to explain to them in 
an allegory the progress and outcome of their healing, their 
salvation from the historical sickness, and thus their own 
history […] they have become, at this final point of their 
healing, once again men and have ceased to be human-like 
aggregates – that is something! There are still hopes! Are you 
not laughing at that in your hearts, you hopeful ones!12 
After this Nietzsche tells in a few words the history of Greeks in an allegory. According to this allegory Greeks learned gradu-
ally “to organize the chaos” of their internationally influenced cul-
tural state by listening to the teaching of Delphic oraculum: “Know 
thyself.” Here we see developing the process of self-deconstruction 
which makes Nietzsche’s argumentation weak. How can we be 
hopeful listeners to Nietzsche’s teaching if we see that he is aggre-
gating examples from the past (“allegory”, as he says) rather than 
turning to us exclusively who are in the future? Here his apostrophe 
as he would say is “weak”, isn’t it? It is a kind of “death-defying act” 
which means that this textual performance executed by Nietzsche’s 
text executes Nietzsche’s teachings. We may say with de Man that 
“[m]odernity and history seem condemned to being linked togeth-
er in a self-destroying union that threatens the survival of both.”13 
Closing this textual excursion which was made not inno-
cently at all on my part I must confess that I took Nietzsche as 
an appropriate example (or allegory) for what happens in Hajas’ 
11 Paul de Man: Literary History and Litarary Modernity, in Paul de Man: Blind-
ness and Insight. Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism, Introduction by 
Wlad Godzich, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1983, 147.
12 Friedrich Nietzsche: On the Use and Abuse of History for Life, trans. by Ian 
Johnston, see http://www.mala.bc.ca/~Johnstoi/Nietzsche/history.htm 
(Downloaded: 29.08.2006.)
13 De Man, 151.
performances. I mean there is a self-deconstructing movement 
in Hajas’ performances too, an aporetical one which makes them 
“weak” in the Nietzschean sense. Hajas’ claim to originality is 
totally a modern myth implying a desire for being present and 
neglecting history or temporality, textuality or mediality in the real 
act of a lightning performance. And if I say that this project fails the 
question is how it fails in the case of the performance, specifically in 
the case of Hajas? Let me reflect these falls in evoking some of his 
performances. First I refer here to the performance called Psyche. I 
cited László Beke’s opinion about the performance as an absolute 
”independent insert” in the film called Narcissus and Psyche. Let me 
say that this assertion can be paired with an another one written by 
Vera Baksa-Soós, who was the curator of Hajas’ exhibition directed 
a year ago in the Budapest Ludwig Museum. “Hajas was able to 
entirely separate himself from the dominant artistic traditions”.14 
These opinions completed with the term detachment used by Hajas 
are supporters of the mythical picture of a death-defying and at 
the same time self-destructive performer, who really burnt himself 
when acting out the performance in front of cameras shooting 
the film in Czecho-Slovakia, Cervena Lhota. Yes, if we recall the 
film-scene, at first glance we can see the sky at night full of stars. 
The next picture shows the performer in white clothes sitting in 
the empty dark space as if he was independent of everything. That 
scene could be the relevant allegory of being absolutely separated 
from the world. But after a few seconds in which we see him 
manipulating something with his hands, the scene become enlight-
ened by explosions, and we realize that he is sitting in middle of a 
(battle)field. And than the matter burnt by him with a match ex-
plodes in his lap repeating the explosions behind him almost simul-
taneously. He collapses and the sequence ends. We must not forget 
that the individual magnesium-explosion by Hajas is a repetition of 
the explosions behind him in a fictive scene imitating real space and 
time of war as catastrophe.15 This is as if we saw a process of what 
always happens, i.e. the fable of becoming contextual, repetitive 
and associative or allusive, here paradoxically in the light of explo-
sions. So in my opinion this is neither an independent insert nor an 
absolutely separate action, and the total detachment as catastrophe 
which is in the centre of Hajas’ oeuvre will never arrive. 
I would like to mention two further performances by Hajas. 
In both of them he uses technical equipment and an environment 
with the help of which he paradoxically tries to detach himself and 
his audience from the actuality and this ambivalent gesture injects 
viruses of “weakness” into his strong that is living actions. Under 
the word “paradoxically” I mean that his being intensively in pres-
ence fails precisely because of the technical support. In both cases 
he speaks to his audience from a tape-recorder. In the performance 
called Conciliation Hajas’ body was tied up in one end of the stage 
in a dark room, and the flame which started from him ran through 
a firing-tape until it reached and burnt the magnesium at the other 
end of the stage. During this time the viewers heard the voice of 
Hajas speaking to them from a tape-recorder.16 And this voice 
without body speaks:
14 Dr. Vera Baksa-Soós: Emergency Landing. An homage to Tibor Hajas, in Tibor 
Hajas: Emergency Landing, Catalogue of the Exhibition of Tibor Hajas, Lud-
wig Museum (Museum of Contemporary Art) (16.06.2005. – 04.09.2005.), 
(Without numbering pages.)
15 I mean the II. World War because immediately preceding this scene we can 
hear Hitler’s hysterical voice speaking on radio.
16 Károly Szűcs: Body and picture. Tibor Hajas Exhibiton, Balkon Art Journal, 
http://www.balkon.hu/balkon05_06/02szucs.html
 For more pictures about ”Conciliation. Action in College Bercsényi (18.12.1978.); 
Magnesium Painting” see Image Whipping. Tibor Hajas’ (1946-1980)…, 96-99. 
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Here and now you have again done something for which you 
seem to have an innate need; you have suspended your fates 
for a while to participate in a hallucination, an event which, 
excitingly, happens to you, but only to your senses, not to 
your fates; […] it leaves no trace, just a faint glimmer. The 
time you spend here is not real; it is not measured by any 
movement or life; it is a black hole in which you disappeared 
[…] a single moment suffices for a catastrophe. I am 
deliberately taking my time; deliberately holding you up. 
Holding you up, to give catastrophe a better chance. I would 
like catastrophe to strike you while you are wasting your time 
here. I would make these moments valuable; significant, set 
apart, unique. It would give them weight. […] When you 
came here, you offered the chance to keep you here. I will 
take the responsibility for this now; I am keeping you all 
here. I want to make you feel cut off from the world, for your 
own good; I have had the doors locked, it is dark. This is in 
my power. What you participate in is a show of strength. 
[…] For catastrophe belongs to the select [few or picked 
men – M.A.]. And once again, you will not be among the 
select; once again you will get off. You will not get the time, 
the minutes you can count as your own. Nothing happens to 
you that you can claim as your own. The two shores of time 
between which you are now anxiously waiting will soon close 
in, like a wound. In recompense [or in a different translation: 
conciliation – M.A.] I can only offer what is mine. My own 
time. This. Here. Now. Here, whatever happens, happens 
only to me. My time really passes. Time that can be weighed 
and measured. I am losing something in earnest, instead of 
you. This must suffice. In this way your time can be measured 
too – if only through the moments of [my – M.A.] time.17 
In the case of an ideal presence of performance there are two conditions which should be completed at least according to 
Marco De Marinis’ definition. First “the real physical co-presence 
of sender and addressee”, second the “simultaneity of produc-
tion and communication”.18 But as far as we see in Hajas’ case the 
simultaneity and co-presence fail, and communication breaks 
down. To be honest with you I have to admit that I would be 
embarrassed if I had to count the possible realizations of the pres-
ence in the performance called Conciliation. Is it the presence of 
the performer’s body on the stage? Or is it the presence of the 
tape, i.e. the moment of sending sound-message? Or is it the mo-
ment of getting the sound-message? Do we have to calculate up an 
accumulation of different present times or an escalation of one? (Or 
aggregation in Nietzsche’s term.) Was there a moment which in its 
clearness wouldn’t have been contaminated by any trace or sign? 
Let me ask whether this is a concrete action ruled by the perfect 
presence of body and soul of the performer, or is it an abstract one 
in so far as it falls into different and inorganic montage-like parts? 
This latter seems to me true, since the consciousness finally ap-
pears in the form of an abstract and disembodied voice detached 
from its origin. From this point of view this realization of happen-
ing inevitably leads us from the symbolic and organic concept of 
17 Tibor Hajas: Coinciliation, trans. by. J.E. Sollosy, in Tibor Hajas (1946 – 1980) 
Memorial Exhibition, Székesfehérvár, István Király Museum, 1987. The Publica-
tions of István Király Museum, series D. n. 175. (Without numbering pages.)
18 Marco De Marinis: „The Performance Text”, in Henry Bial (ed.): The Perfor-
mance Studies Reader, Routledge, London – New York, 2004, 235. – I must add 
that what is strange is that De Marinis emphasizes his pragmatic approach, but 
I suspect that in case of the concrete performances this approach would be 
idealistic and therefore exclusive.
happening to the sign-like allegoric nature of it in sense of Walter 
Benjamin or even Nietzsche.
The same embarrassing event happened in the performance 
called Vigil, in which the performer attempted to overtake the 
presence in a modernist and extreme competition, and talked to 
himself lying on the floor unconsciously. In other words he posted 
his own voice from the past (or the present) to himself in the future 
(or in the present). The next passage is from the description of the 
performance: 
The performer, unconscious now, lies alone in front of the 
wall. Then suddenly the lights go up in the hall […] The 
speakers begin to operate; the voice of the performer can be 
heard from a tape. While he is talking, his assistants mop 
the water, uncharged in the meantime, from the floor with 
the helpless body. He is dragged about, he is laid down now 
and then. The voice falls silent; the body lies motionless in 
the light. The audience is sent out of the hall, the performer is 
brought round.19 
There’s no doubt that this is not a detachment in the original sense of Hajas’ intention, even if it was the artist’s aim. It 
seems that the absolute decontextualization which would mean 
the capability of being totally present is impossible just because of 
the performer’s own effort to be detached paradoxically by running 
“ahead” in time with the help of technical reproduction. This kind 
of detachment erases the living and organic corporealism and makes 
an inhuman montage of it. At this final point of my paper I refer to 
Antonin Artaud, whom we know as the prototype of performance 
art since he was intransigent in performing on the stage always in 
present time without any repetition. But in opposition to his in-
transigency he performed a radio-speech in 1947 entitled “To Have 
Done with the Judgment of God” which was broadcasted only after 
his death.20 In reference to this detachment Wolfgang Hagen says 
in his writing about Artaud’s radio work that “[t]he separation of 
the voice from the body is precisely what the technical reality of 
radio has always done”. From this point of view maybe we should 
speak about Hajas’ performances as “radio-plays” in which the 
artificial organ as a microscopic pest scratched out of the body 
itches the living performance to death as Artaud would say. In these 
actions Hajas is neither “toward-death” nor out of time and space. 
My thesis is that in these actions his image is “dead” from the very 
beginning even if he was alive, and his image could not be more 
dead if he committed suicide on the stage.21 
19 Tibor Hajas: Vigil, in Tibor Hajas (1946 – 1980)… (Without numbered pages. 
There is no translator signed.)
20 Wolfgang Hagen: Artaud and the Serialization of Radio, see http://whagen.de/
publications/2006/BremenArtaud/HagenEnglischFertig.htm (Date of Acces: 
03.09.2006.) “Man is sick because he is poorly constructed. / The decision 
must be made to expose him in order to scratch out that microscopic pest that 
itches him to death – God, that is, and with God his organs. / So tie me up if 
you want to / But there is nothing less useful than an organ. / When you have 
made man a body without organs, then you will have liberated him from all of 
his automatisms as well, and given him his true freedom back. / And then you 
will teach him to dance the other way round, as in the delirium of a bal musette. 
/ And this verso will be his true recto”. Antonin Artaud: To Have Done with 
the Judgment of God, translation by Judith Rosenthal.
21 I express my gratitude to the Artpool Archive which is an Art Research Center 
in Budapest for placing the Hajas-performances on DVD at my disposal. (For 
additional matters of Hungarian and international neo-avantgarde art see the 
website of the Artpool Archive: www.artpool.hu.) Special thanks for the as-
sistance of Thomas Hoover, who proofread the English text of my paper. I did 
my research on Hajas’ art as a scholar in the frame and with the help of OTKA, 
Hungary (Hungarian Scientific Research Fund).
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WHAT CAN ACT AS STIMULI  
IN THE CREATIVE PROCESS?
Ichiro MUraTA
Freie Universität Berlin, Germany
Introduction
No one will deny the diversity to be found in the art 
forms of the 20th century. Yet some say they are difficult to 
understand. Others go so far as to say that art has reached its 
limits and has no future. However, we cannot stop creating 
even should the concept of art disappear. In the following 
paper we are not dealing with a definition of art or discussing 
what exactly art is. Our aim is to come up with a model of the 
creative process from the point of view of the creator. It is not 
intended for interpreters but for those who create works of art. 
In this paper we shall lay emphasis on perception. Be-
cause the original meaning of aisthesis is perception, the model 
we shall try to form is called an aesthetic model of the creative 
process.
In order to arrive at the correct model we shall divide 
the creative process into three stages: 1st. Things that act as 
stimuli for creative work; 2nd. Selection of those stimuli; 3rd. 
Actual use of them at the constructive stage. We shall examine 
these stimuli from the point of view of the present: the “Now” 
is important in our model. We are not concerned with the 
psychology of the creator nor with the duration of the creative 
process itself. 
I.What can become a stimulus to create a work of art? The answers are varied. It could be a rose, painting ma-terials, techniques involved in perspective or a fugue. 
Then again it could be an event, swans for example flying in a 
beautiful sunset. Everything perceived can become a stimulus 
to create. Of course it is impossible to describe in words ev-
erything we perceive. Nevertheless, even if we cannot describe 
he scene which is in front of our eyes, we do indeed perceive 
it, and it can become a stimulus toward creating. These stimuli 
are limited to what we can perceive so we must first analyze 
the notion of perception.
Let us take the sense of sight as an example. According to 
current research, when we see an object, the brain processes 
its colors, shapes and movements, but the steps involved do 
not have the same time span. The processing speed for color 
is approximately 60ms –80ms faster than that for movement. 
All the information is integrated in the visual cortex. This is all 
part of the research now being carried out in the field of brain 
mapping.
However, not everything we perceived can be categorized 
as being grasped by one or other of the five senses. And by that 
we do not mean that there is such a thing as ESP or telepathy. 
Aristotle’s categories are not always precise from the neurobio-
logical point of view. For instance we have a sense of balance 
(Equilibrioception) or proprioception. In fact, scholars are still 
discussing how many senses we do have. 
Besides, it is still not clear how the pieces of information 
sent to the brain are interconnected. Certain people “feel” the 
color of an object while they smell it. (1) Such perception is 
called synaesthesia, and all babies have this way perceiving 
things. But the mechanism behind this has not yet been investi-
gated. The ground we stand on or the chair we sit on may vibrate 
when we listen to a pipe organ played in church. We feel not 
only the tones but also this vibration. Continuing research may 
explain these perceptions some day and they may then be stud-
ied as stimuli for the creative act, but we are not dealing with this 
mechanism in the present paper. 
Now, as we were saying, it is completely impossible to 
describe in words everything perceived. A painting, for example, 
may be so beautiful it defies any attempt to describe it. The 
picture is relayed to the brain as visual information, even if we 
cannot find words for it. According to the neurobiologist Semir 
Zeki, the reason is that the mechanism of seeing an object is far 
more complex than that employed in speaking. The length of 
time it took to develop the sense of sight is far greater than the 
time it took to develop language. What we perceive visually in 
a picture can be a stimulus toward the act of creating, indepen-
dently of how the picture can be described in words.
II.The stimuli that lead an artist to create, are confined to things we perceive here and now. Let us say that you and a friend are gazing up at the stars and you 
look down for a moment, just as a meteor passes overhead. Your 
friend sees it but you miss it. The meteor cannot become a stim-
ulus for you because you did not perceive it. Likewise, if your 
friend says nothing about it, you will not be moved to create 
anything related to that event. Only in so far as your friend tells 
you about the meteor will you be able to grasp the occurrence.
Our powers of perception, therefore, are limited to things 
and events of the here and now. We cannot perceive past events 
or what is occurring in some distant place at present. But if the 
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information is stored in some form and transmitted to you, then 
it can become a stimulus for creative activity on your part.
This information about the past or what is going on in a 
distant place may be found in some storage media but not all of 
it will become stimuli for you. Only that information which you 
yourself perceive can become a creative stimulus.
Furthermore, the universe and everything around us is in 
motion: nothing remains static even for a moment.(Figure II-1) 
We should note, therefore, that changes in the storage media can 
affect the condition of the stored information. Let us take fossils 
as an example. The conditions for something to become fossil-
ized are so difficult that fossilization is a rare phenomenon. If a 
species has become extinct without leaving even one specimen 
in a fossilized state, then that species is beyond our ken. It is pos-
sible that a specimen is hidden in some earth layer somewhere 
but we can know nothing about it till it is excavated. (Figure II-2) 
The world is dynamic. A past event is grasped only in the 
form in which it is transmitted to us at this moment. If it was not 
stored somewhere or if the stored information was lost en route 
it cannot become a stimulus for creative activity.  
III.Here let us take some concrete examples.Try to recall what happened around you this time yesterday. If you have a clear memory 
of it, then it can become a stimulus for creative activity. Of 
course some of the details may not have been perceived and 
stored in your brain. In short, you may have lost the informa-
tion. And then again, even what we did perceive and store in 
our memory doesn’t always correctly reflect the happening. We 
often make mistakes and wrong guesses. But even these can 
become stimuli.
Memories are being constantly renewed. Whatever the in-
formation stored in the brain is recalled, it undergoes a change, 
to a greater or lesser degree. The information stored in the brain 
is not stable. The more time passes the greater is the possibility 
that the stored information has undergone a change.
Stimuli create are not confined to knowledge stored in your 
brain. Let us say you read an article in this morning’s newspaper 
describing an event that took place somewhere in the world. 
The correspondent heard of the event or actually witnessed it, 
stored it in his brain and then wrote his article. Then, although 
you were not present at the event, your reading of this article can 
become a stimulus for creative activity on your part. Or it could 
happen that the correspondent and you are at the same event 
at the same time. In this case the report written by the press-
man may not be the same as the information you have stored 
concerning the same event. Nevertheless, his article, when you 
come up to read it, can become a stimulus for creative activity 
on your part.
Consider the following example. You attended a party with 
your friends or family yesterday evening. You drank too much 
and cannot recall now what happened there. Your friends, how-
ever, have a clear memory of it all. The point to note here is that 
last night’s party can become a creative stimulus for you depend-
ing on the information your friends relay to you. Maybe one of 
them wrote it up in his diary and you read it there afterwards.
We cannot know how other people perceived an event, nor 
how it is stored in their memory, nor what changes the informa-
tion undergoes there. This whole process must remain in “the 
black box,” so to speak, until the experts complete their research 
on the mechanism of perception. At the moment we can seize 
only the information that has found expression in some way.
The information expressed by someone may not always 
reflect an event correctly, and yet it can become an artistic, 
creative stimulus. You can take it up just as it is and base some 
creation on it. Numerous artists, for instance, based their works 
on the geocentric theory of the universe, although it was quite 
wrong. The theory as it was given them had been their stimulus. 
We know now that the heliocentric theory is the correct one 
but there is nothing to stop us composing music based on the 
old geocentric idea. Either theory can be a stimulus for creative 
activity and we can choose one or both at will.
Gustav Holst composed The Planets between 1914 and 
1916. Pluto has not been discovered yet. Holst’s knowledge of 
the solar system was lacking something but that did not interfere 
with his creation. Later, even when Pluto had taken its place 
among the planets he did not compose a movement for it. The 
British composer, Colin Matthews (1946- ) commissioned by 
the Hallé orchestra, wrote a movement called Pluto, the Renewer 
in the year 2000. Then, in this august this year (2006) the Inter-
national Astronomical Union changed its definition of a planet 
and Pluto was demoted.
Now how do you indeed to use the planets in your work as 
an artist?
IV.Based on the arguments set out above we have listed here the things that can be stimuli for creative, artistic activity. 
The world which we perceive directly at this present 1) 
moment. (Figure IV-1) 
The content of our memory just as it stands now i.e. 2) 
the information stored there at the present moment. 
It may have changed, however, since the time you 
first stored it. (Figure IV-2)
The information an artist is here and now expressing 3) 
while he or she continues simultaneously to perceive 
some object or event directly; e.g. a sketch or a 
photo. (Figure IV-3)
The present state of something the artist perceived 4) 
directly in the past, stored in the memory and then 
expressed or exteriorized. (Figure IV-4) 
Present state of information expressed by someone 5) 
other than the artist, as they were simultaneously 
and directly perceiving an object or an event. (Figure 
IV-5)
The information which someone other than the artist 6) 
had acquired from perceiving something directly in 
the past and then storing it in the memory and later 
giving expression to it in some form. (Figure IV-6)
The present state of information which has been 7) 
stored automatically in a machine rather than in the 
human brain. (Figure IV-7)
Possible stimuli for creative, artistic activity are limited to 
these seven headings. All of them concern what we perceive here 
and now as we go about our work of creating. The concept of the 
“here and now” is vital to our model of the creative process.
 
V.Here let us take some more examples.Let us assume that you went on a trip to the Pi-azza San Marco (Venice) ten years ago. Because you 
have a talent for painting, you not only took up photographs, 
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you also made some sketches. The Piazza San Marco impressed 
you deeply. You have had, however, no opportunity to visit this 
place since then. And now you wish to create a work based on 
the Piazza San Marco. What will become the stimuli for your 
creation in this case?
Your present memories. Your memories may have a) 
changed over the ten years but the stimulus for your cre-
ation will be your memory as it now stands.
You found some of your sketches in the cellar. They are b) 
partly discolored probably because they were not well 
preserved. In this case the discolored sketches could be 
your stimuli. The lost photos cannot. But you might find 
a booklet you bought there at the time in the Piazza. The 
photos in that could become your stimuli.
The Piazza San Marco may have changed during those ten c) 
years. If you do not stand now on the Piazza, the present 
condition of it cannot be a stimulus for your work.
If you watch a live broadcast of the Piazza San Marco, it d) 
can be a stimulus.
During the ten years you may have read books concerning e) 
the Piazza. If so, your memory of those books can become 
stimuli for your creative activity. If you read them again, 
the refreshed information will become an added stimulus.
Let us say you have recorded on DVD a documentary f) 
made five years ago. Some parts of the documentary are 
not up to date but it can become, nevertheless, a stimulus 
to create. The DVD recording will not be as faded as on 
VHS. 
Let us say you took a trip to Washington D.C. three years g) 
ago and visited the National Gallery of Art. By coinci-
dence you had the opportunity of admiring works by 
Canaletto (1697-1768) on view there. His Painting, Pi-
azza San Marco, was completed sometime between 1735 
and 1740. Now you cannot experience directly what took 
place more than 200 years ago in the Piazza San Marco, 
and the condition of the painting may have changed over 
that period no matter how well it is preserved. The condi-
tion of the painting you admired three years ago cannot 
be compared to the original state of the painting as it 
came from Canaletto’s brush. Nevertheless, the informa-
tion stored in your brain can become a stimulus toward 
creative activity.
VI.The earlier works of art are a veritable store-house of stimuli for new works of art. Artists find stimuli in the works of former masters. 
Lord Burlington, for instance, modeled his Chiswick House 
(1725-1729) on Palladio’s La Rotonda (1566-69). Picasso found 
stimuli for much of his work in Velasquez’s Las Meninas (1656). 
Goya and Dali also found ideas in Las Meninas.(2) Tolstoy 
wrote his novel The Kreutzer Sonata (1889) on the basis of what 
he felt in the violin sonata (1803) which Beethoven composed 
for Rodolphe Kreutzer. Later, Janáček composed the string 
quartet Kreutzer on the basis of Tolstoy’s novel.
The standpoint of the artist, the creator, is completely dif-
ferent from that of the viewer and critic. If the viewers, admires 
or critics see only a copy of a certain work of art, their activity 
cannot generally be called “appreciation” or “understanding” 
of the original work. On the other hand, Utrillo painted many 
pictures relying only on postcards of scenes in Montmartre. 
Rembrandt drew sketches based on Da Vinci’s The Last Sup-
per, but he added a dog, something that does not appear in the 
original. According to Kenneth Clark, Rembrandt’s sketch is 
based on the reproduction someone executed in Venice in the 
16th century.
In 1870 the Vienna librarian, Carl Pohl, showed Brahms a 
certain Divertimento. At that time it was thought to be the work 
of Haydn. In 1873 Brahms composed Haydn Variations based 
on the Divertimento. Current research, however, has found that 
this Divertimento was probably not composed by Haydn but by 
Ignatz Pleyel (1757-1831). 
These examples show that it is not always necessary for 
creators to interpret and analyze earlier works correctly. The 
important point is that earlier works can become stimuli for 
creative activity independent of a correct analysis or interpreta-
tion of them. What you perceive now might be discolored post-
cards, poor copies of masterpieces of masterpieces or pictures 
with a counterfeit signature. In as much as you are perceiving 
them “now,” they can become stimuli for creative activity on 
your part. (3)
 
VII.Where do artists find stimuli for their creations? There is no simple answer to this question. The examples cited above 




I wish to thank Professor Gunter Gebauer (Freie Univer-
sität Berlin) for his valuable advice. I am also indebted to Profes-
sor Emeritus Takashi Fujimoto (Tokyo University) and Sean 
Blanch Field for their advice.
(endnotes)
1 Kandinsky is an example of this kind of perception.
2 Goya’s Las Meninas was completed in 1778. In 1957 Picasso painted 
58 works related to Velasquez’s Las Meninas. Dali also produced a 
work he called Las Meninas in 1985.
3 Their own earlier work also can become a stimulus for artists to 
create something new. For example, we might think of Rodin’s The 
Gates of Hell. Rodin put The Thinker (1880) into this gate. These 
examples show us what roles, sketches, drafts and manuscripts have 
in the creative process. Earlier steps in the creative process can 
themselves become stimuli for further steps in our creation. This is a 
very important aspect of the creative process, especially when we are 
dealing with a huge work such as Rodin’s “Gate” or Rubens’ pictures.
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F rench Personalist movement has had consider-ably less influence over Slovene literature as close French Existentialism did. In the 1930s the ideas of French Personalism were brought to Slovene cultural thought and to literature by E. Kocbek; 
in sixties and eighties they appeared in the essays of the 
prominent Slovene writer Marjan Rožanc (1930–1990). His 
thought, being revealed in plenty of essays and notes, shows 
many various philosophical impacts. One of them is French 
Personalism. 
To understand the fact why French Personalism was not so familiar in Slovenia we have to highlight some historical items. Before World War II this was partially 
the consequence of the fact that Slovene culture had been 
inclined towards the German and the Austrian ones. Namely, 
the Slovenian region had been an integral part of Austria and 
then Austro-Hungarian monarchy until the collapse of the 
monarchy in 1918.1 Their tradition could not just fade in a few 
years. The inclination to the German and Austrian cultures 
which had been lasted for centuries could not be changed in 
some years when in 1918 the majority of present-day Slovenia 
became a part of the new-established Monarchy of the Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes (the SHS Monarchy).
The ’20s brought the first breakthrough of the Person-
alist thought into the Slovene region, in accordance with 
the above-mentioned from Germany, not from France. The 
so-called crusader movement was influenced by the German 
youth movement, led by the German philosopher and theo-
logian Romano Guardini.2 The catastrophe of the World War 
I had led Guardini up to the idea of the moral renovation of 
Germany and of the role of a Christian as well. The Slovene 
crusader movement was also a cultural, social and politi-
cal one; its core was the magazine of the Slovene Christian 
youth Križ na gori (The Cross on the Mountain, first pub-
lished in 1924), or simply Križ (The Cross) as the magazine 
1 From 1809 to 1813 some parts of present-day Slovenia (and Croatia as well), 
named Les Provinces Illyriennes, were under French jurisdiction. After this short 
intermezzo the territory was occupied by the Austrian troops again. 
2 Cf. Peter Kovačič Peršin: “Uveljavitev personalistične filozofije pri Slovencih”, 
in: P. Kovačič Peršin (ed.): Personalizem in odmevi na Slovenskem, Ljubljana: 
Društvo 2000, 1998.
was re-named later. From its very beginning it was Christian 
and Socialist at the same time. Its aim was to entirely and 
wholly improve a human, society and Christianity. In 1928, 
when The Cross on the Mountain was re-named into The Cross, 
its editor became Edvard Kocbek. From 1938 to 1943 he was 
the editor of the cultural, Christian-Leftist orientated maga-
zine with the characteristic name Dejanje (The Act). Because 
of their rather progressive ideas both crusader movement 
and The Act circle were occasionally coming into conflicts 
with the then Catholic Church and the clerical politics. In 
the thirties Kocbek met Emmanuel Mounier, one of the key 
personalities of French Personalism, in Paris. The friendship 
between him and Mounier marked him intensively. In the 
following years Kocbek revealed his cultural and social-
political thought in such way that he was later considered 
as one of the main Slovene thinkers, influenced by French 
Personalism.3
 After the World War II, the victorious Communist re-
gime in Yugoslavia was not in favor neither of French Personal-
ist thought nor of near French Existentialism. Furthermore, 
official position was very negative. Nevertheless, in the late 
fifties and in the sixties, more ambitious and progressive cur-
rents in Slovene literature were strongly influenced by French 
Existentialism. Existentialist themes were included and devel-
oped in the literary works by the main Slovene writers of the 
second half of the twentieth century. Among them, literary 
history often quotes Rožanc, especially with his early works 
(plays and short stories). 
The Slovene reception of French Existentialism in a wider 
sense can thus be observed in two phases. The first are the 
thirties, when the ideas of Christian Existentialism dominated, 
and the second is the period after the World War II with the 
domination of the non-teistic Existentialism. In both periods 
the new ideas were raised in the young intellectuals’ and art-
ists’ circles which deliberately tended to transcend the insti-
tutionalized and ossified values. In the first phase these were 
the values of clerical Catholicism, whereas in the second of the 
dogmatic Marxism.4 
3 Matija Ogrin: “Kocbek in Mounier”, Primerjalna književnost, XX, No. 1, 1997, 
pp. 1–20.
4 Marjeta Vasič: Eksistencializem in literatura, Ljubljana: Državna založba Sloveni-
je, 1984, p. 66.
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French Personalism is often understood within the wider context of contemporary philosophy beginning with Kierkegaard. In general we can say that these 
philosophical investigations were interested in human person 
and were trying to define its position in the new conditions of 
the world. Originating in Latin word ‘persona’ which meant 
a theatrical mask and later an actor himself, the term ‘person’ 
had been asserted itself firstly in the Christian theology. In the 
Modern Times-philosophy (for example at Kant) the concept 
of person was often linked with the ethical problems. Ethical 
component has gained its importance in French Personalism 
movement, too. 
Distinguishing between French Personalism and other 
ideas of contemporary philosophy can be a very ungrateful job. 
The ideas of some thinkers are covering with others, therefore 
distinguishing can be very demanding and we can also ask 
ourselves what is the point of doing this. Often raised problem 
is also the dividing line between Personalism and Existential-
ism (especially the teistic branch of it) that has not come to an 
agreement yet. This is important for understanding of Rožanc’s 
ideas, too. It is often almost impossible to track them to their 
philosophical sources, because in his thought many ideas from 
different sources are intertwining.
French Personalist movement, as we are interested in, is 
considered to be a particular movement in France between 
the World Wars. It was influenced by the philosophers Mar-
cel Blondel, Henri Bergson, Jacques Maritain and the poet 
Charles Péguy. Its origins can be seeked in the left wing of 
French Catholic culture. It was split into several groups, among 
them the circle around the magazine Esprit, led by Emmanuel 
Mounier (1905 –1950), was the most famous and powerful. 
The following key features were common to the different 
groups: firstly, the concept of person, deriving from the Per-
sonalism of the Catholic Church, but much more dynamical in 
French Personalism: a nature of a person is not given before-
hand but the person is realizing itself as the person through 
his acts and choices.5 The second feature can be recognized in 
the huge interest of French Personalism for social, economic 
and political problems. Furthermore, French Personalism was 
inclined towards radical changes and in its social applications 
often close to socialism or to the left wing parties.6
Mounier’s Personalist movement was formed around the 
magazine Esprit which was issued from 1932. The magazine 
reacted directly to the current social and political events and 
ideas, circulating in contemporary Europe. The movement was 
a philosophical, social and a cultural one. During the war, the 
magazine was prohibited by Vichy’s government, but after the 
end of the war Mounier’s Personalism has become one of the 
leading formers of social and spiritual life of the then France.7
In Slovene literature Marjan Rožanc (1930–1990) is considered as one of the notable writers in the twentieth century, especially by his essays. He began writing them 
in the sixties and then continuously till his death in 1990. The 
thematic was wide, extending from the culture, politics, ethics, 
religion, to sport. But in the center of his interest he always 
placed an individual person, his position in the world and his 
5 As we can see this characteristic is similar to the Existentialist view. 
6 Ogrin, “Kocbek in Mounier”, p. 3.
7 Edvard Kovač: “Personalizem Emmanuela Mounierja”, in: E. Mounier: Oseba in 
dejanje, Ljubljana: Društvo 2000, 1990, p. 240. 
attitude toward the transcendence. Rožanc was influenced 
by many philosophical ideas; French Personalist movement 
appeared just as one of them. The others were: Kierkegaard, 
Unamuno, Berdyayev, Dostoyevsky, Pascal, French Existential-
ism, Kocbek, Gabriel Marcel, Nietzsche, Manichaeism, Teil-
hard de Chardin, Protestant thought, etc.8 Dividing the ideas 
of French Personalism from the other ideas is quite difficult 
because many of them are deriving from the similar spiritual 
atmosphere.
Rožanc got in touch with the ideas of French Personal-
ism over Kocbek, who was a friend of Mounier. But inclina-
tion to the Personalist ideas was not in the beginnings of 
Rožanc’s writings. As he wrote, he was firstly a communist 
follower. His faith was not a religious one; he believed in 
the Socialist Revolution, not in God. His turn apart was due 
to the political and cultural situation in the sixties. Let us 
explain this. In the beginning of the sixties Rožanc was the 
member of the circle around the magazine Perspektive (The 
Perspectives) which was socially, politically and culturally 
engaged magazine. After 4-year-issuing it was prohibited 
and abolished by the Communist regime, which had found 
its activity as a threat to it and began with police investiga-
tions and persecutions. In the following years the Slovene 
cultural and social area was almost closed for the ambitious 
intellectuals. The disillusion with the public sphere was 
very strong. Rožanc searched a publishing space abroad and 
found it in the Italian magazine Most (The Bridge). He pub-
lished there some essays, which can be seen as the necrology 
to his past faith into the Revolution. He recognized it as the 
self-deception. The ideas about the Revolution fell down 
not because of violent intervention of the regime that broke 
up Perspektive, but because of the very nature of the reality 
itself. In the following years he revealed this fragmentary 
thought further. His doubt into the “redemptive history”, as 
he called both the Marxist and the Christian faith into the 
redemption somewhere around the future, was summed 
up in his concept of “self-abolition of humanism”. Since the 
Modern Times a man has been tending to get more and 
more freedom from God. Finally he has managed to become 
Human-God. He has proclaimed himself as the creator of the 
world, believing only in himself, respectively in the different 
incarnations of himself, i.e. ideology, institution, humanism. 
But the consequences of the freedom are different as he was 
expecting. The solid foundation, given to the man by the 
confessional religion, has been broken. The man is turned 
upside down by something, which is reliably stronger than 
him. In his first essays Rožanc named this force as the hidden 
principles of the nature itself, later he wrote about the god 
and the devil as the two equivalent forces, manipulating with 
a man. As we can see, this is Rožanc’s first step to his reli-
gious faith, deriving therefore from the disillusion of his faith 
into the Revolution and action. 
The exits out of the condition of the weakened man can 
be two: the first is that the man tries to keep the self-deception 
about his own control over everything; example of this atti-
tude is belief into an ideology. The second exit, which is ethi-
cally much more worthy, is the man who has acknowledged 
8 Cf. Marjan Rožanc: Roman o knjigah, Ljubljana: Slovenska matica, 1983, p. 
150; Marjan Rožanc: Manihejska kronika, Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, 1990, 
pp. 116–117; France Pibernik: Čas romana. Pogovori s slovenskimi pisatelji, 
Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, 1983, p. 194.
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and admitted the paradoxical inner structure of the world 
and of his own insufficient nature. The man is continually and 
dialectically crucified between two extreme positions. One 
is static, contemplative, of despair, the other is alive, active 
and changeable. Such incompleteness is even his deep moral 
imperative, he should persist in it, i.e. in the open gaze of the 
pretentious truth of the reality itself. 
After revealing some basic Rožanc’s ideas, let’s return to French Personalism. As Mounier defined in his writings, Personalist movement derived from the 
ascertainment of the economic and spiritual crisis in the mod-
ern society. The crisis was discovered as the crisis of the social-
political structures, as also of a man. The solutions, offered by 
Marxist Materialism and, on the other hand, by spiritualism, 
made appear that were not sufficient. Both attitudes were 
exclusive for a man, since they forgot important parts of his 
personality. The concept of the person, as Mounier developed 
it, seems to offer a better solution: it unites physical and spiri-
tual part of human being together. At the same time Mounier 
stressed the role of such individual persons: they should unite 
with each other in a community and therefore transcend their 
individualism and self-containment. Individualism is criticized 
very sharply at Mounier; in his opinion it signifies the chief 
ideology of western bourgeois society, therefore it links it with 
Capitalism. According to Mounier, such individualist sees 
himself as God. He does not care for the other person, i.e. for 
the society. Upon influence of Gabriel Marcel (Rožanc was 
also under direct influence of Marcel) he exposes “to be” in-
stead of “to have”. The true position is the existence in the co-
operation with other people and with God, not in objectifying 
the people, the world and himself. Objectified people are not 
socially engaged, concludes Mounier upon Marcel’s thoughts. 
The basic concern of Personalism is therefore to decen-
tralize an individual and prepare him to create the society with 
others. This is the process that should be won somewhere 
in the future. A man should open himself to the others, offer 
himself to the society. Personalism, as Mounier understands 
it, is therefore individual and collective at the same time: his 
person has to be responsible for himself and for the other 
persons, too.
Rožanc’s salvation for the human in the decayed contem-
porary world also tends to the connection of people. “Creatura 
dei”, the creature of God, as he names the realized person, 
tends to exist in a symbiosis with other persons. Only in their 
direct contacts with other people a full variety of possibilities 
can open. Availability for the other persons is a kind of a res-
cue for a man, who has become conscious of self-confidence of 
the humanism. In this kind of the world, in which the place for 
God is empty now, the values are emerging directly in people’s 
relations, here and now. 
Rožanc’s communities are always small: the smallest one 
is of two. Lovers are searching the way to each other in a sexual 
act; during this process a lover is trying to escape from himself 
– his own insufficiency and mortality – and approach to the 
other. But the attempt to unite with the other lover – in fact, 
to become God – is something that never can be fully won. 
The other example of community is a collective sport game, 
i.e. a football game. This is an example how community should 
function: as in Mounier’s community of free and responsible 
persons the persons in a football game are free and creative. 
Rožanc’s ideas of person are close to Mounier’s, but some differences seem to appear in the problem of social engagement. Rožanc’s ideas were rooted in his 
distrust for any institution and society-improvement projects. 
After his (and collective) disappointment in cultural life the 
very ground of his new-revealed thought became the paradox 
appearing in every single thing in the world. The duality deriv-
ing from the paradox is also something morally valuable: it 
means an aspiration to democracy, pluralism, etc. These were 
the deep values of Rožanc’s thought. He was strictly against 
direct social engagement which tended to change the face of 
the society to improve it because he didn’t believe in it. In his 
background his negative experience of the Yugoslav socialism 
lay. Mounier’s and French Personalism’s experience was dif-
ferent: a bourgeois society was the society they lived in, and 
their ideas of the improvement of the society were much more 
utopian. 
But this is not everything. Rožanc’s attitude towards 
engagement in fact does not separate him from French Person-
alism as it appeared to be at first glance. Let me explain this. 
Rožanc’s engagement in current problems of Slovene society 
and politics was of different kind. It was different in a sense 
that he was appearing alone, not organized in a group. Like 
Mounier, he recognized the crisis in contemporaneity but it 
appeared to him to be more a spiritual one: he reproached 
to Slovenes their spiritual emptiness, lack of values and com-
munication between people, scramble for consumer goods, 
etc. His purpose was in fact moral engagement. Democratiza-
tion in the widest sense of the word is a positive big value for 
Rožanc because it understands a human being in all his com-
plexity. This attitude corresponds to his critique of any uni-
formity, in fact, any oneness. His recognition of a man and of 
the nature of the world which is paradoxically structured can 
be viewed as against any reduction into any system. He wants 
to show the true structure of the world although he knows all 
the time that it is constantly looping and dynamically falling 
into the paradoxes, so it cannot be shown because it is not a 
structure. From this point of view Rožanc’s moral engagement 
has to be observed.
But we have to claim that even Mounier did not believe 
very deep in social engagement. He was aware that the goals of 
the politics are limited (as he described them in his manifesto 
Révolution personnaliste et communautaire, 1930). The Revo-
lution is not something we can believe it. According to the 
Christian moment of Personalism Mounier emphasized also 
meditation and humility of a person. These can hardly be a 
part of the Revolution. 
We can conclude that Rožanc was aware of Mounier’s 
ideas but they were put into different conditions he was deriv-
ing from, and intertwined with the impacts of other philoso-
phers and thinkers. 
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Introduction
The exceptional preservation status of several single-family 
houses in ancient Pompeii and Herculaneum provides an oppor-
tunity for studying the architecture and spatiality of the ancient 
Roman houses in various thematic frameworks. The plan layout 
and the architectural characteristics of some recurring spaces 
in these houses have been discussed and published extensively, 
especially in the last few decades; more recent studies focused 
on conceptual themes like privacy and gender.1 This well pre-
served ancient housing stock can be fruitfully studied in other 
perspectives including aesthetics. In this paper, respectively, I 
will address and make a preliminary discussion of the design and 
use of Roman domestic context from the perspective of ‘spatial 
aesthetics’ and ‘visual pleasure’ by focusing on the spatiality of 
two types of courtyards, the atrium and the colonnaded garden 
which are found together in several houses in Pompeii and 
Herculaneum.2 The ancient Romans organized these frequently 
trespassed domestic spaces according to a set of design principles 
and tools which taken together, indicate the preference of differ-
ent attitudes to spatial aesthetics in both courtyards. 
Roman Atrium House: Context, Content  
and Basics
A brief description of the basic plan layout of the ancient 
Roman single-family house exemplified in Pompeii and Hercu-
laneum is useful for introducing the courtyard scheme, which 
is applied in a variety of ways in houses of different scale.3 This 
house type is often called also the atrium-house in reference 
to a semi-open hall placed centrally beyond the entrance vesti-
bule. In the earlier version of this plan all the rooms were lined 
around and entered from the atrium which also gave access to a 
small garden at the back (Fig. 1). This was actually a semi-open 
courtyard with a roof opening at top and a corresponding shal-
Fig. 1: Schematic ground plan (top) and reconstruction  
of the earlier version of the atrium house (left)
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morning greetings which provided an opportunity of commu-
nication and conversation in between the owner of the house 
and his visitors that took place in a decorated and large room, 
tablinum, located opposite the entrance door and accessed from 
the atrium.5 In addition, the atrium was also portrayed as the 
place where, at least in the earlier periods, the family had their 
meals and where the rituals accompanying the rites of passage 
such as birth, death, marriage and coming of age were held.6 
These rituals which incorporated a religious performance at the 
domestic altar that could be found in the atrium also included 
the participation of visitors. This space used especially to host 
public occasions such as greetings, business meetings and family 
celebrations, then, functioned like a spacious guest-room for ac-
commodating household members, friends or visitors on a regu-
larly basis. As a semi-closed and introverted hall with its center 
marked with water and light the atrium was a spacious, shady, 
cool and adequately lit setting suitable to be used as the center of 
activity for more publicly participated and short-term activities. 
In its developed version this plan was modified to be ar-ranged sequentially in reference to two courtyards (Fig. 2). 
The atrium remained as the first courtyard in this scheme. It 
was still accessed immediately after the entrance vestibule and 
functioned as the public and the welcoming space in the house. 
A second spacious courtyard however, was situated at the back 
of the house and replaced the earlier modest garden.7 This new 
courtyard was foremost more private due to its distance from 
the main entrance and in addition it was also more airy and well 
illuminated; it was designed as an open and colonnaded garden 
surrounded with rooms of various use.8 Different than the paved 
atrium the colonnaded garden displayed an informal character. 
Filled with light and greenery this was a more lively area serving 
as a setting of visual pleasure to the surrounding living and recep-
tion rooms. The dining-room which was a lavishly decorated re-
ception and banqueting room for entertaining respected visitors, 
for example, was often placed such that it was both entered from 
a portico of this courtyard and also had a view of it. Other private 
spaces, decorated but not necessarily ceremonial in context, or 
open sitting alcoves found in this part of the house also had a 
similar physical connection and spatial and visual extension to 
the courtyard. The notion of visual extension to an open space, 
and its bodily experience, indeed, gained primacy in the planning 
of the Roman house after the incorporation of the colonnaded 
courtyard, the design of which illustrates best the Roman atti-
tudes towards tuning the spatial aesthetics of domestic setting.
Colonnaded Courtyard: Design, Visuality  
and Perception
The colonnaded courtyard, different than the atrium, was 
actually designed as an ‘aesthetic object’, as a spatial focus of 
visual pleasure, to be viewed from different angles and in differ-
ent ways. This spatial object was composed of two elements: the 
portico and the central garden area. Each of these two areas had 
a distinctive spatial character.9 
Portico
A colonnaded courtyard by definition is designed foremost 
with rows of columns forming porticos either on two, three 
or four sides (Fig. 3). Composed of columns often built with 
expensive and luxurious materials like marble the porticoes first 
of all, presented an impressive image to the person stepping into 
low pool beneath. The walls of the atrium were adorned with 
frescoes applied on stone masonry while its floor was paved, 
either with mosaics or stone, thus transforming this inner court-
yard into a finely decorated domestic space. The spaciousness 
and decoration in the atrium could be enriched by statuary, 
fountains and columns as well.4 Receiving daylight only from 
the roof opening and the entrance vestibule, the atrium was an 
adequately lit space suitable to function as an entrance lobby 
and hence to absorb and organize the traffic and circulation 
within the house. The spatial character of this tall, dim, painted, 
paved and semi-open space was formal; the design of the 
atrium, planned differently than an open and unpaved domestic 
courtyard which is airy, well illuminated and thus suitable to 
serve more comfortably as a setting for landscaping and pastime 
activities, does not suggest a leisurely use. 
According to the ancient literary evidence, the atrium was used as a gathering and waiting area during the traditional 
Fig. 2: Schematic ground plan of the modified version 
of the atrium house with the colonnaded garden
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this area from the dim atrium even in the smaller houses. The 
portico was actually arranged as a linear space delimited with 
a row of columns on one side and the walls of the surrounding 
rooms entered from the portico on the other. A portico was 
actually a shady walkway providing access to the rooms around 
but it was wide and spacious enough to grasp and enjoy the view 
of the central area while walking or standing in it (Fig. 4). This 
linear space which functioned as a passage, as a walkway, was 
indeed no less decorated than the spacious reception and living 
rooms around. The walking experience in a portico was en-
riched with a paved floor, and with wall-paintings that adorned 
the exterior walls of the surrounding rooms. 
The floors in a Roman house were usually paved with plain or figural mosaic compositions. A portico likewise, 
often received a colored mosaic pavement as well. In the col-
onnaded courtyards, it is not infrequent that the pattern of 
the plain mosaic pavements in a portico could be interrupted 
in front of a room to incorporate a figural panel and hence to 
designate both the entrance and the importance of the room. 
Treated like a symbolic threshold these figural mosaic panels 
actually were intended to be viewed like wall-paintings with 
the exception that they were placed on ground and hence 
looked at from above. The frescoes applied on the exterior 
walls of the rooms surrounding the portico on the other 
hand, embellished this long and narrow space in a different 
way.10 These frescoes were meant to be viewed from the 
porticoes, that is, they were specifically placed on the wall 
surfaces for the view and vision of the walkers. The porticoes 
could be further embellished by marble reliefs, round shields 
or masks hung on the flanking walls.11 Protected underneath 
the roof of the porticoes the wall-paintings, displayed acces-
sories and floor mosaics were indirectly illuminated with the 
light coming only from the center of the courtyard which 
thus provided a changing perception that depended on the 
movement of the sun and the person. Respectively, three 
features made the walking experience underneath a portico 
a little nuanced than walking through the center of a court-
yard. First, this experience included and aimed for viewing 
and looking at surfaces that defined a narrow and horizontal-
ly stretching space in a dynamic and moving mode. The sur-
rounding wall and floor surfaces in a portico were conceived 
and treated as display items but on a larger surface and in a 
planar and continuous way; thus prompting to perceive them 
efficiently not from a single or static position but by bodily 
movement. Second, this experience was based on perceiving 
the context as a whole in the sense that the displayed items 
were either at the eye level as in the case of wall-paintings or 
below it as in mosaics which meant that the viewer, either at 
a standing or walking mode, was actually exposed to an inte-
grated design that intended to present this linearly stretch-
ing, semi-open area as a space in its own right; hence the 
viewer was also expected to appreciate and experience this 
total design by looking at all the surrounding surfaces ex-
posed to his/her perception in terms of color, pattern, figure 
or line (column) as in many other decorated spaces in the 
house. Third, the portico bordered by a colonnade, which is a 
porous surface-delimiting element, also offered framed views 
and vistas to what has been displayed beyond the colon-
nades, thus enabling to capture different angles and glimpses 
of the central part of the courtyard. 
Central Area
The central area in a colonnaded garden, unlike the por-
tico was arranged not so much to be walked through but rather 
to be looked at. This area was composed of a number of ele-
ments arranged in a certain composition (Fig. 5). Various sorts 
of greenery, water elements, (a fountain or a pool or both), 
marble or bronze sculpture and other domestic accessories 
could constitute the repertoire of this composition.12 Each of 
these elements had a complimentary role in contributing to 
the perception and visuality of the composition and thus pre-
senting it as a designed décor. 
Surrounded with porticoes the central area was arranged as a garden and became the main visual focus of the Roman 
atrium house in its enlarged and modified version: 
“The interior gardens characteristic of so many Pompeian 
houses show considerable variety in their architectural settings, 
decoration, and plantings, but even here the model was very 
much a governing factor. At the time of the city’s destruction, a 
rectangular area of planting surrounded by a peristyle was clearly 
the most desirable form which the interior garden could take. So 
desirable was this form that there three were created in the Casa 
del Citarista and one in the Casa della Fortuna at the sacrifice of 
a considerable amount of potential living space”.13 
A common trend was to place various types of sculpture, most preferably original or copies of well-known Greek 
pieces, within the greenery, in which case, the original and 
thus the more expensive item/s might have acted as a second-
ary focus in the composition.14 Herms, free-standing statu-
ettes, sun-dials and rectangular pinakes situated on ornamental 
pillars could be used as garden accessories.15 Natural and 
agricultural deities such as Bacchus, Mars, Venus, Apollo and 
Diana are among the most preferred free-standing garden 
statuettes. Satyrs, putti and animal statuettes could be used to 
complement the compositions. Arranged like a private park 
these gardens could be small or more impressive in scale, but 
they were often enriched also with a water element that could 
act as another visual and auditory focus. 
The spatiality of the central décor in the colonnaded court-yard was more pronounced than the atrium and the re-
maining spaces as it was the most illuminated and brightest spot 
in the entire house. So taken together, it is plausible to suggest 
that the central area of the colonnaded courtyard was designed 
in the manner of an exhibition item to be seen both from the 
porticoes and the rooms around. What is more, anyone standing 
in the dim atrium or even at the entrance vestibule, in fact, could 
have had an opportunity of catching a glimpse of the brightly 
exposed back garden and the displayed central décor as well:
The scene that met the eyes of the visitor who entered 
the home of a Roman of means must have been an interesting 
one. Immediately confronting him was the atrium. Here he 
would be struck by the contrast of light and shade, the bril-
liant light entering by way of the compluvium and streaming 
down upon the pool beneath with its playing fountains and 
miniature statues. But the sides of the atrium were in shadow, 
refreshingly cool in the middle of summer. Standing out from 
this dark background gleamed monolithic columns and an oc-
casional marble figure. Between the columns shrubs in boxes 
cast islands of still deeper shade…16
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Seen in this perspective it is also possible to approach the colonnaded garden as a private gallery, as a private exhibi-
tion space in which the porticoes functioned as circulation and 
viewing venues while the central part as a displayed object, 
an ‘installation’. This display, in fact, could be viewed in two 
ways. It could be viewed and looked at foremost from various 
spots in the porticoes, from the eye level of a person standing 
or walking. Second it could be viewed from the eye-level of 
a person sitting or reclining in the rooms around. In the lat-
ter the gaze of those confined in the surrounding rooms was 
Fig. 3: Colonnaded courtyards in the Pompeian Houses: House of the Meleager (left); House of the Tragic Poet (right)
Fig. 4: Porticoes in the Pompeian Houses: House of the Golden Cupids (left); House of the Labyrinth (right)
Fig. 5: Colonnaded courtyard and the pool in the 
House of the Colored Capitals, Pompeii (bottom left)
(photos on this page published with the permission 
of Ministero per i Beni e le Attività Culturali – 
Soprintendenza Archeologica di Pompei).
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limited only to the visual extensions allowed by the opening 
of the doorways and to the situations when these doors were 
preferred to be left open; though limited such vistas were 
often arranged also to focus on a specific element, mostly to 
a water element or a sculpture, in the central area best seen 
from a privileged corner in the room, thereby emphasizing the 
spot chosen by the house owner as a special display within the 
central composition for his visitors.17 
Atrium and Colonnaded Garden: Formal and 
Casual Attitudes to Spatial Aesthetics
The colonnaded courtyard was treated differently than 
the atrium which was also a decorated courtyard arranged 
with a central installation. The rich variety in the central 
arrangement of this back courtyard was in sharp contrast 
to that of the first, the atrium, where the central area was 
marked with a shallow and rectangular pool. This differentia-
tion seems to reflect the functional distinction of these two 
courtyards. The atrium located immediately after the entrance 
vestibule was easily accessible and hence more public in 
character. Therefore it was more suitably located for public 
oriented events such as business and greeting for which the 
owner could come together with a group of visitors whose so-
cial status and number could vary. In the ancient era work and 
home were not sharply separated as different spheres of activ-
ity and the house was used both as the dwelling and work-
ing place which served to reflect and maintain social status. 
Several outsiders therefore could visit the houses of politically 
and economically influential citizens to ask for their help, 
advice, financial support or make political and business deals 
and arrangements. Although intended as short visits the flow 
of callers necessitated the presence of a voluminous public 
space that would accord with the prestige of the owner and 
that, at the same time, was conveniently located for an easy 
and short access which would help in controlling the privacy 
of the remaining areas. Its placement and spatial connection 
both to the vestibule and the master room (tablinum) indeed, 
suggest that the atrium was an ideal setting to be used for 
public events. It was spacious and received enough light and 
air; it had a formal and representative appearance. The central 
pool in the atrium imposed an ambulation but unlike in the 
colonnaded courtyard the walking experience in the atrium 
was not enriched with a central garden installation, and also 
elapsed and framed with porticoes. Respectively it could 
efficiently function as a suitable and comfortable welcoming 
and waiting lounge for short-term visiting or as a spacious 
family-gathering area for performing domestic rituals rather 
than as a livelier quarter for accommodating long-term stay 
and relaxed use. 
The colonnaded courtyard on the other hand, was located at the back, relatively less accessible and hence more 
private. Large and decorated rooms suitable to be used as 
living rooms for the household or as reception rooms for host-
ing visitors, as well as semi-open sitting and relaxation niches 
are generally reserved to this courtyard. Of these the lavishly 
decorated banqueting-room is often located at this part of the 
house, usually at the center of one side of the courtyard. The 
banqueting-room was an important reception space for host-
ing and entertaining friends, intimates and respected visitors 
with long and festive banquets. Banqueting, unlike business, 
was conceived as an activity of longer duration, often occupy-
ing the whole afternoon until sunset. The visitors who came to 
dine and entertain with the master of the house were expected 
to stay and hence to share the visual pleasures offered in the 
house for a longer period of time. The colonnaded garden in 
this sense, served as a lively theatrical backdrop for the diners 
who could experience it in different modes and from different 
angles by walking in the porticoes before and after the banquet 
or by extending their gaze from their dining couches, through 
the colonnades, towards the central décor. The visual contact 
of the diners therefore could well continue, though in a limited 
manner while they were eating and drinking on their banquet-
ing couches in the dining room as well. 
Conclusions
Both the fully open colonnaded courtyard and the semi-
open atrium were not considered merely as spaces of move-
ment, circulation, light and air in the Roman houses exempli-
fied in Pompeii and Herculaneum. They both received spatial 
emphasis in different ways for they were used in connection 
to culturally significant domestic activities such as morning 
salutations or evening banquets which involved participation 
of visitors coming from different social groups. The spatial 
and functional significance of these two courtyards was also 
emphasized and made manifest by means of elaborating their 
central areas with special arrangements and daylight. As the 
brightest spots in the house, the shallow pool in the atrium 
and the decorated garden in the colonnaded court not only 
provided spatial focus but also a visual one for both the house-
hold and the visitors. Of these the back courtyard gave access 
to rooms which were used more for relaxing, resting and 
banqueting or in other words for some time-consuming leisure 
and pastime activities for which it created a visually pleasing 
atmosphere, an artistic assemblage of colonnade, greenery, 
water, painting, mosaic and sculpture. Movement along the 
shady porticoes in this area, for both the visitors and house-
hold members, included a visually pleasing vista of the central 
décor and the surrounding painted surfaces. 
Acourtyard which is foremost utilitarian for practical pur-poses in domestic architecture in general, such as provid-
ing privacy, circulation, light, air and an open area suitable to 
be used for various domestic tasks assumed a further meaning 
in the ancient Roman domestic context. As an ‘everyday space’ 
the courtyard in the ancient Roman context, besides fulfill-
ing the practical needs served to visually please those using 
these spaces either to access the different parts of the house 
or else spending time in them. To create this visual pleasure 
the ancient Romans made use of light, water, color, sculpture, 
greenery and column in various combinations. These are 
used to create a particular spatial and visual focus that acted 
as a backdrop for the receptions and domestic activities and 
enhanced the spatial experience, for both the visitors and 
residents. Depending on its location, requirements of privacy, 
the type of domestic tasks, rituals, events and associated 
rooms, the courtyard was arranged either as a decorated for-
mal area, or else, as in the case of the colonnaded garden, as an 
exhibition space for visual and bodily consumption from many 
angles and modes. 
* I thank to Pelin Yoncacı for preparing the drawings in Figures 1 and 2.
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(Endnotes)
1 On the architecture and decoration of Roman house: Wallace-
Hadrill (1994); Gazda (1991); Clarke (1991); Laurence (1994); 
Laurence and Wallace-Hadrill (1997); Bon and Jones (1997).
2 This paper presents some initial views and observations on this topic. 
A comprehensive and more thorough discussion of this topic needs 
further elaboration supported with theoretical background and case 
studies in a longer format.
3 Wallace-Hadrill (1996); Riggsby (1998).
4 George (1998) 85-93 for statuary (portraits, portrait-herms, 
statutes) and fountains found in the atria. For a detailed study  
of the fountains found in a Pompeain house, see Andersson (1990). 
In few houses atria were converted also into planted areas,  
George (1989) 93-94. For columns in atria, see George (1989) 
94-96.
5 Morning greeting (salutation) and patronage in ancient authors: 
Mart. Ep., 5.22, 6.88, 4.8.1-6; Sen., De Brevitate Vitae 14.4; Sen.,  
Ben. 6.34.5; Tac., Dial. 6; in modern authors: Saller (1982) 128-129 
with the footnotes; Wallace-Hadrill (1989) 63-87; Flower (1996) 
217-220.
6 For the rituals associated to the domestic divinities, birth, coming-
of-age, marriage and funeral, see Harmon (1978) 1592-1603; Dixon 
(1992) 64-65, 133-59; Flower (1996) 200-202, also the footnotes 
for ancient references; Clarke (1991) 10-12; Scullard (1981) 18; 
Ogilvie (1969) 102-104.
7 The colonnaded courtyard was derived from the Greek courtyard 
house; the more lavish and grand examples from Greek public 
architecture, Wallace-Hadrill (1994) 20-21. It was first introduced in 
the late Hellenistic period, and became a recurring element in atrium 
houses in the 1st c. AD, George (1998) 84. Also see Dickmann 
(1996) for the introduction and development of colonnaded 
courtyard in Hellenistic Pompeii.
8 See Jashemski (1979) 89- 140 for the life in the colonnaded 
courtyard.
9 The most detailed study on Roman private gardens is Jashemski 
(1979). Also see Zanker (1998) 156-189 for differently arranged 
examples of courtyards and gardens in Pompeian houses.
10 Vitruvius 7.5.2. mentions that long promenades were painted with 
natural scenes in earlier times, an application adopted to domestic 
courtyard ambulatories in later periods as well. Jashemski (1979) 55- 
73 for paintings found in gardens.
11 Dwyer (1982) 118-119, 129-134.
12 Jashemski (1979) 34-54 and Zanker (1998)168-174 for the items 
that embellished the private gardens at Pompeii and Herculaneum.
13 Dwyer (1982) 116.
14 For an inventory of contents of some domestic gardens in Pompeii 
see Dwyer (1982) 38-48, 71-78, 88-98. 
15 See Dwyer (1982) 123-128, for a short overview of sculptural 
compositions found in a group of Pompeian houses.
16 Lawson (1950) 102.
17 See Bek (1980) 164-203.
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HISTOIRE-MéMOIRE-IMAGINATION
Panayiotis PAGAlOS
Architecture Department, University of Patras, Greece
»Imagination et mémoire sont deux noms de la même 
chose, nommée différemment pour diverses raisons«
Thomas Hobbes
I l n’y a pas d’histoire sans intention, pas de référence au passe qui ne pourra affleurer une action dans le présent. Selon le mot celèbre de Nietzsche, dans toutes les époques la connaissance du passé était désirable si, et seulement si, « elle servait l’avenir et le présent ». Ainsi 
la réalité vécue devient histoire, elles se fragmente en plusieurs 
versions, histoires et mémoires imaginaires. 
Dans La société du spéctacle Debord qualifie la réflexion sur l’histoire comme « réflexion par rapport au pouvoir ». 
Et en effet l’histoire devient un outil efficace aux mains de tout 
pouvoir qui par la transmission « construite » et l’éducation 
élargit sa souveraineté. Toute trace matériel serviable de ce 
but, tout fragment d’une histoire « construite » participe aux 
en-jeux de la « mémoire collective imposée » : bâtiments, ves-
tiges, textes, œuvres d’art sont perpétuellement choisis comme 
« preuves » de cette histoire.
Mais si l’histoire est construction quelle sera sa différence par rapport au mythe ?
Seulement l’imagination peut lutter contre un mythe 
construit qui, par le biais de la répétition est devenu une mémoi-
re collective, seulement un mythe nouveau peut résister au my-
the déjà établi. Puisque, la plus profonde contribution du mythe 
se trouve dans la libération de la pensée vis-à-vis de la réalité, 
chose que Platon n’ignorait pas : dans les œuvres platoniciennes 
l’« imagination » est, en tant que pensée philosophique, la voie 
de contourner la réalité mensongère des choses sensibles et 
des opinions intéressées, tout le miroitement du sensible, pour 
approcher à la « vérité ». Son élève Aristote reprend, d’ailleurs, 
dans sa Poétique, ce fil de pensée: ce qui caractérise le bon poète 
ce n’est pas de nous réciter ce qui est arrivé mais ce qui pourrait 
arriver selon l’ordre du « possible et du vraisemblable ». La 
philosophie platonique est, dans ce sens, une poétique du mythe.
Exactement comme Platon parle de la réalité à partir de son modèle idéal qui se reflète dans le réel, le peintre et graveur 
italien Giovanni Antonio Canal, connu comme Canaletto1, 
représente une Venise idéale, cité céleste. Sa grandeur, sa vertu et 
son régime doivent être représentés par son architecture. Dans 
sa peinture, Capriccio con edifici palladiani (1759), apparaissent, 
au cœur même de la Venise, trois bâtiments de Palladio (deux 
déjà faits à Vicenza est un projet pour le pont de Rialto). Cette 
« altération » de la mémoire manifeste le désir pour une autre 
réalité : Canaletto nous voyage dans une lieu et un temps que 
1 Venise, 1697-1768.
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chacun peut comprendre mais qui reste imaginaire. Aldo Rossi, 
qui connaît profondément l’histoire politique de la Venise et le 
rôle de l’architecture paladianne, trouve dans ce mythe de Cana-
letto deux éléments fondamentales: (a) la méthode rationnelle 
à travers laquelle il trompe notre mémoire et (b) la signification 
politique de cette méthode. La formule de la Renaissance pour 
la recherche d’une « autre vérité » assumée par Palladio, consis-
tait une grande menace pour les hommes forts de l’Etat de veni-
sois. C’est pour cela que les portes de la Venise resterons fermées 
pour toujours au discours architecturale paladien.
Rossi examine attentivement l’action de Canaletto, analyse les structures idéologiques de ce mythe, comprend la force 
active de l’imagination. Au rétablissement du théâtre Fenice2, il 
choisit de mettre dans l’intérieur de la nouvelle salle l’aspect de la 
basilique de Palladio à Vicenza, en réduction,. Rossi, exactement 
comme Canaletto dans son Capriccio, introduit Palladio dans 
le « lieu-intérdit », à l’intérieur de la Venise, en lui conférant la 
place qui lui vaut à travers une reconstitution de l’architecture qui 
est une relecture de l’histoire. La proposition de Rossi à Fenice 
montre que l’histoire n’est pas pour lui un passé revolu, mais un 
domain ouvert aux interventions et renveresements diachroniques. 
Son vocabulaire architécturale épouse les mouvements de la pen-
sée analogique qui essaie, en mobilidant l’imagination, de trouver 
quelques réponses relevant des fragments d’hier. 
L’ouvrage-symbole de la pensée analogique est 
son œuvre La città analoga, un 
collage de mémoire et d’imagi-
nation présente par Rossi et ses 
amis3 à la Biennale de Venise 
en 1976 et accompagné d’un 
texte au même titre a été publié 
par la revue italienne Lotus4 en 
décembre de la même année. 
Le lecteur de ce texte verra 
comment, pour Rossi, l’imagi-
nation a le pouvoir de recons-
tituer la mémoire : une ville 
vivante et humaine se nourrit 
continûment de l’imagination. 
L’ennemi de celui-ci n’est autre que l’idéologie qui soumet l’archi-
tecture aux exigences de la reproduction du pouvoir politique. 
Différentes combinaisons analogiques d’objets imagi-
naires et réels, apparaissent aussi 
dans nombreux projets de Rossi : 
des monuments, textes, morceaux 
autobiographiques de mémoire, 
voyages, symboles, images par la 
vie de gens et des animaux, objets 
hors échelle, fragments diachro-
niques d’un théâtre architecturale 
en mouvement, incessamment 
2 Projet qui était réalisé après la mort de Rossi. 
3 En collaboration avec Eraldo Consolascio,  
Bruno Reichlin και Fabio Reinhart. 
4 Lotus International, n.13, Dicembre  
1976, p. 4-13
renouvelé. Les projets de Rossi ressemeblent aux rebus, ces jeux 
énigmatiques où la proposition recherchée est indiquée par 
différentes figures, lettres et notes. Pour arriver à deviner il faut 
imaginer, rapporter, re-articuler ces correspondances partielles, 
c’est-à-dire composer les fragments dans un ensemble sensé, 
« construire » une histoire, son histoire, son mythe. C’est 
pour cela qu’il est impossible pour des projets comme la città 
analoga d’être interprétés seulement selon le mode analytique: 
l’quintessence de l’analogie se love dans le jeux des correspon-
dances temporelles produites à tout moment par les fragments 
représentées. J’ajouterais simplement que la città analoga est un 
ensemble d’« interaction » et en même temps un surcroît d’in-
formation, c’est-à-dire exactement ce qui, selon les recherches 
récentes d’Umberto Eco, constitue un ars oblivionalis, l’art d’ou-
blier5. La pensée analogique, très poétique en cela, est en effet, 
un outil d’oubli, une façon d’oublier l’aujourd’hui pésant et de 
vogager, par l’imagination et les fragments, dans le temps.
Les mythes de Platon, les mythes de Canaletto et de Rossi, mettent la réalité en situation d’oubli en vue de remplacer le 
réel par l’imaginaire. Le mythe est une description historique, et 
en tant que telle, il a le pouvoir d’exclure de la mémoire tout ce qui 
ne revient pas de cette description même, comme un livre capti-
vant qui nous entraîne en tourbillon vers lui-même. Quand je cite, 
je me souviens de ce qui m’empêche à se souvenir dans le présent. 
Quand j’imagine je libère ma mémoire des idoles présents et je 
recommence à me souvenir ce qui dans le monde des sensibles 
est occultée: les « idées », dirait un Platon. L’imagination comme 
« oubli du réel » ou « mémoire de l’idéal ». Cet idéal est pour-
tant constitué de tout aspect humaine de la réalité : fragments 
de vie, de pensée et de civilisation que l’Histoire officielle à très 
souvent offusqué, dans son passage triomphale. Nous avons be-
soins de nos mythes disséminés dans le passé et reconstitués par 
l’imaginaire, mais porteurs de tout l’humain de l’humanité, afin de 
résister au grand Mythe de l’Histoire homogène, Moloch réel qui 
écrase tout ce qui ne se transforme selon ses voeux. 
Quand nous imaginons nous oublions, nous nous libérons de l’emprise du temps construit, nous faisons6 à nouveau notre 
histoire en reconstituant incessamment passé, présent et avenir.
* Work supported by the Carathedory Programme of the University of Patras
5 Eco, Umberto, voir la conférence Come perdere la memoria, Istituto Italiano di 
Scienze Umane, Firenze, Palazzo Strozzi, 19/05/2006. Toute la conférence a 
été publiée dans La Repubblica, 20/05/2006, p. 42. 
6 En grec ancien poioume, qui est le verbe du nom poiesis, poésie.
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THREE PAIRS  
OF SHOES
Introduction
Art as an experience is immediate. It cannot be replaced, 
or substituted, by anything else than the immediate experi-
ence. Yet, reproduction of the artwork has brought art into our 
houses. And although it cannot replace the actual action of 
experiencing art, it can actually bring the work closer to us; it 
can make the artwork familiar. As Walter Benjamin writes in 
The Work of Art in the Epoch of its Technical Reproducibility:
“The work of art has fundamentally always been 
reproducible. What human beings have made, could 
always be copied by human beings. Such coping was 
practiced by students as art exercise, by masters to 
disseminate works and finally from profit-minded third 
parties” 1
Consequently, this is the way that a student in the School of Fine Arts becomes familiar with most artists work: 
through reproductions, books and nowadays through video 
documentation. With the exception of visits to local galleries 
and museums, and few trips to some major museums, the aver-
age student, will use reproduction as a means of study. And 
although “something is missing in even the most perfect reproduc-
tions: the here-and-now of the work of art-its unique existence at 
the place where it is located”2, there are some artworks, so vivid, 
(even in a reproduction), that a mere photo, or a description 
can provide the viewer with an idea of what the work is about, 
it can inspire him/her and make them think, dream, imagine. 
This is partly due to the fact that 
“…technical reproduction proves to be more independent 
in regards to the original than the manual kind. In 
photography, for example, it can highlight aspects of the 
original inaccessible to the human eye by means of lenses 
and shot angles of its own choosing, or capture images 
with the help of certain procedures, such as the zoom or 
the slow motion, which utterly elude natural vision”3
1 The Work of Art in the Epoch of its Technical Reproducibility [Reproduzierbarkeit], 
by Walter Benjamin 1938, translation by Dennis Redmond, 2006, page 2 
http://www.enf.org/~dredmond/ReproducibilityTrans.html
2 Ibid, page 2
3 Ibid, page 2-3
And
“…it can furthermore bring the copy of the original into 
situations, which are not accessible to the original. Above 
all it makes it possible for the original to come closer to 
the consumer…”4
Such work is Marina Abramović’s Shoes for Departure pre-sented in a reference book titled Public Body, Installation 
and Objects 1965–2001. It is an installation piece, showing 6 
pairs of shoes, carved on amethyst stone.
The photos present Shoes in various installations around the world and throughout the years. The impression given 
by the photographic reproduction of this work is very strong. 
It is almost inevitable but to connect it with Heidegger’s The 
Origin of the Work of Art [Der Ursprung des Kunstwerke] and in 
particular the part that described Van Gogh’s Shoes. Also the 
rough way that these shoes were carved on amethyst recalled 
images of harsh crude objects, presented in fairy tales, as instru-
ments of pain and punishment. The icon of the shoes / stone or 
iron shoes is very often encountered in bedtime stories. Usually 
these shoes were worn by the evil woman as punishment, or 
by the kind and beautiful young girl, as a period of trial – the 
transcendence from adolescence to maturity. The example we 
shall examine here will be the story of Snow-white written by 
the Grimm brothers. At the end of the story, Snow-white’s evil 
stepmother is punished to wear a pair of burning hot iron shoes 
and dance in them until she drops dead.
4 Ibid, page 3
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Heidegger uses the language as a means of approach to the concept of space as space. It is an old method that 
belongs to the ontological tradition, initially used by Plato and 
Aristotle.15 He projects the concept of [embodiment of place]16 
in sculpture. Sculpture is the embodiment of truth within the 
artwork, and also the [embodiment of truth as a means of estab-
lishing places].17 
To support the concept of Räumen [make-room-for], Heidegger introduces the word einräumen [(I) grant] 
and attributes to this word two different meanings. He ex-
plains einräumen [(I) grant] as [arrange] and also as [allow]. 
He claims that through this double concession takes place the 
establishment of place.18
The embodiment of departure
Abramović’s work can be viewed under this context. Shoes 
for Departure is a work that presents a distinctive sculptural 
aspect, and therefore the concept of einräumen can apply 
very well in this case. In the book Public Body, Installations 
and objects 1965-2001, interviewed by Germano Celant, she 
describes, the frame within which she creates (not only perfor-
mance work but sculpture as well):
“So I’m always coming up against construction 
restrictions, but in the end, for me, the utility of the object 
is the most important”19
The question of utility in Marina Abramović’s work brings us back to the utility of the artwork, as Heidegger de-
scribes it. It is through the use of the object that one can realize 
- understand its utility. It is a question of definition of Being of 
the object. Being is enlightened, by serviceability / by the use 
of. In the case of Van Gogh Shoes, Heidegger reveals the world 
that is under the painting. As instruments / objects these 
shoes are connected with their actual utility/serviceability. 
These instruments are made not only to help us walk, but also 
to assist us in our “world of daily labor”.20 
This serviceability is claimed in the work Shoes for Depar-ture. Using Abramović’s words:
“Let’s call them transitory objects rather than sculptures. 
They are not separate from life; you can enter them. They 
are small settings that have to be used…” 21 
Marina Abramović, insists that spectators should use the sculptures she makes. She produces her objects in se-
ries, so that a great number of people can use them. She rejects 
the idea of making one – unique piece, and accompanies her 
work with fundamental – almost basic instructions for use. Be-
15 Ibid, page 39, note 9
16 Ibid, page 48
17 Ibid, page 52
18 Ibid, page 41-42
19 Marina Abramović Public Body, Germano CELANT, editions CHARTA, Milano, 
Italy 2001, page 10
20 Η Προέλευση του Έργου Τέχνης, [The Origin of the Work of Art] Martin 
HEIDEGGER, translation, introductory notes and comments Yiannis Tza-
varas, editions ΔΩΔΩΝΗ [DODONI], Athens, Greece, 1986, page55, note 61
21 Marina Abramović Public Body, Germano CELANT, editions CHARTA, Milano, 
Italy 2001, page 11
The embodiment of earth /  
The establishment of space
The Origin of the Work of Art is a fascinating philosophical 
approach. In this study Heidegger address the thingly character5 
of all artworks. He writes:
“There is something stony in a work of architecture, 
wooden in a carving, colored in a painting, spoken in a 
linguistic work, sonorous in a musical composition. The 
thingly element is so obstinately present in the art-work 
that we are compelled rather to say conversely that the 
architectural work is in stone, the carving is in wood, 
the painting in color, the linguistic work in speech, the 
musical composition in sound.”6
But the artwork reveals something more than its thingly character. “In the work of art something other is brought 
together with the thing that is made” 7 When we encounter an 
artwork we encounter “the sense of presence”8. The artwork as 
a thing, “is perceptible by sensations in the senses belonging to 
sensibility”,9 and indeed bares a thingly character. Moreover, 
it can also present an “equipmental / workly character”,10 but 
these are not its main features. So, what exactly the work of art 
reveals to the viewer?
To answer this, Heidegger uses as an example a paint-ing by Vincent van Gogh titled The Shoes. He notes 
that “the equipmental being of equipment consists in its 
serviceability.”11 In the case of the real peasant shoes their 
serviceability can be found in their use. It’s only “a pair of 
peasant shoes and nothing more”.12 But what happens in the 
case f the artwork? 
Heidegger sets the concept of truth that is embodied in 
the work of art. This, is not related with mimesis or with rep-
resentation, but rather is connected with the basic essence of 
things. As he quotes:
“In the work, therefore, it is not a matter of the 
reproduction of a single entity present-at-hand at any 
given time, but rather of the reproduction of the universal 
essence of things.” 13
The idea of truth that is embodied within the artwork, and the concept of appearance of the basic essence of things, 
in art, is essential to our approach. More over in his book 
Die Kunst und der Raum; L’ Art et l’ espace, (St. Gallen: Erker-
Verlag, 1969-1983), he introduces the concept of Räumen 
[make-room-for].14 
5 PHILOSOPHIES OF ART AND BEAUTY, Selected Readings in Aesthetics from 
Plato to Heidegger, edited by Albert HOFSTADTER and Richard KUHNS
 The Origin of the Work of Art, Martin HEIDEGGER, page 651, Modern Library 
Edition, September 1964, NY, USA
6 Ibid, page 651
7 Ibid, page 652
8 Ibid, page 654
9 Ibid, page 656
10 Ibid, page 661
11 Ibid, page 662
12 Ibid, page 663
13 Ibid, page 665
14 Ο Χώρος και η Τέχνη, Martin [Art Space] HEIDEGGER, translation, introduc-
tory notes and comments Yiannis Tzavaras, editions ΙΝΔΙΚΤΟΣ, Athens, 
Greece, 2006, page 39
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ing very specific on the way that she expects viewers to use the 
work, the instructions she gives, are usually connected with 
“basic body positions”.22
In the work we examine here the instructions were the 
following:





This work embodies the very idea of space – departure – movement and constant change among its users. Al-
though heavy to lift or to move, these shoes make room for the 
concept of departure. The establishment of space takes place in 
this work in a dual way. It is the space of the art work as it is 
described in Heidegger’s L’ Art et l’ espace, and also is the meta-
phor of departure, the metaphor of the place of destiny. This 
new world, that is revealed, consists of movement. The con-
stant change among the ones that ‘use’ this art piece, transform 
its rigid and heavy physical form into something light, that can 
almost lift the viewer into another destination. It is a striking 
image of contradiction, among the rigid and motionless shoes, 
and the constant change and movement of the users.
Without moving the viewer can experience/imagine move-ment. With eyes closed and bare feet, one departs of a 
‘new place’, were ‘new destiny’ is established. These shoes, stand 
there, heavy and roughly carved on amethyst, mere holes on 
stone, expect the new ‘user’ to take them into a new mental space. 
By wearing these shoes, each viewer establishes each time a new 
space and a new destination. Their utility can be found in the meta-
phor of departure to the place of destiny that is embodied into them.
 
“…Of all my objects, the ones that have had the best 
reception are the Shoes foe Departure, 1991. They are 
impossible shoes, because they weigh 65 kilos (143lbs) 
and nobody can move them, but nevertheless they are 
described as being “for departure”. They suggest a kind 
of mental journey rather than a physical one …”24
Heidegger approaches art as a philosopher, and uses the apparent object (artwork) in order to establish a new 
world. Abramović approaches art as an artist. She creates 
artwork with the same goal: to establish a new world. In both 
cases the apparent object has a double use. It exists there, in 
real time and real space, evidence of the artist’s craftsmanship 
and genius, but also the artwork slips gently to another world. 
It can be the world of truth that Heidegger points, or a mental 
world that Abramović suggests, or the world of imagination 
the domain of the fairy tales.
The embodiment of transcendence (from old 
to new) / the embodiment of contradiction 
(among good and evil)
There is nothing more connected to imagination than 
fairy tales and myths. Fairy tales are by definition fictions, 
22 Ibid, page 10
23 Ibid, page 162
24 Ibid, page 21
products of imagination. The world that one perceives from 
fairy tales, may bare some resemblance to reality, but it is a 
completely different world both in terms of time and space.
In his book The Fantastic. A Phenomenological Psychology of Fantasy, Jean-Paul Sartre describes the imaginary world:
D’une façon générale ce n’est pas seulement la matière 
même de l’objet qui est irréelle : toutes les déterminations 
d’espace et de temps auxquelles il est soumis participent 
de cette irréalité25
[Generally speaking it is not only the matter of the object 
that is not real: all definitions of space and time that are 
attributed to the imaginary are not real]
Furthermore
“Ce n’est pas que toute détermination d’espace fasse 
défaut … Mais les déterminations topographiques sont 
incomplètes ou manquent totalement”26 
[It is not because (the imaginary world) lacks 
definition of space … but it is because spatial definitions 
are incomplete or sometimes completely absent]
Sartre defines the imaginary space as [a space without parts]. He writes:
“L’espace de l’objet irréel est sans parties. Mais, dira-
t-on, ne faut-il pas dire que pour tout objet irréel la 
formule de Berkeley « esse est percipi » est vraie sans 
réserves, et, dans ce cas, ne doit-on pas remarquer que 
la conscience ne confère pas expressément à l’objet irréel 
cet espace sans parties ? A vrai dire, de l’espace irréel 
la conscience n’affirme rien expressément : c’est l’objet 
qu’elle vise se présente comme une totalité concrète qui 
enveloppe, entre autres qualités, l’extension. L’espace de 
l’objet, comme sa couleur ou sa forme, est donc irréel”27
Similar to the spatial definition of the imaginary, Sartre defines the imaginary time as non-real too:
“Ainsi le temps des objets irréels et lui-même irréel”28
“On admettra peut être plus difficilement que le temps 
de l’objet en image est un irréel …l’objet de la conscience 
diffère en nature de la conscience dont il est le corrélatif. 
Il n’est donc nullement prouvé que le temps d’ écoulement 
de la conscience d’image soit le même que le temps de 
l’objet imagé”29
“A la limite, le temps d’une scène irréelle doublant 
exactement une scène réelle qui se déroule présentement 
restera un temps irréel … le présent irréel st le présent 
réel ne coïncident pas …Entre ces deux présents il n’y a 
25 L’imaginaire. Psychologie, phénoménologique de l’imagination, Jean Paul SARTRE, 
Libraitie Gallimard 26e édition, Paris nrf 1948, France, page 163
26 ibid, page 164
27 Ibid, page 166
28 Ibid, page 170
29 Ibid, page 167
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pas simultanéité. L’appréhension de l’un coïncide avec 
l’anéantissement de l’autre.”30
[At the end, the time that takes place an imaginary 
event – replacing in every detail a real event that is 
actually happening – will remain an un-real time … 
the two presents, the un-real and the real present, do not 
agree … Between these two presents time is not equal. 
Perception of the one results the end of the other]
In fairy tales the heroes can look like you and me, spaces and buildings can appear like the ones we know, but there is 
always a door open to those creatures that don’t look like any-
thing we know – to those places that nobody has ever seen – to 
those buildings created in a magic way, in the middle of no-
where. Literature, and especially fairy tales and myths, present 
the truth that is embodied in the story, the appearance of the 
basic essence of things. In fiction exists the concept of Räumen 
[make-room-for as allow to exist]. Fairy tales [allow] imagina-
tive worlds [to exist]. Also, when entering the imaginary world 
of the story, a different space and a different time take place. 
During in the story the real world ceases to exist.
In the story of Snow white the iron shoes appear at the very end. These shoes are not the basic element of the story. Yet 
their use at the end of narration makes them a powerful im-
age. In Bruno Bettelheim’s The Uses of Enchantment, there is a 
detailed analysis, of the fairy-tale. Bettelheim argues that the 
death of the evil queen symbolizes the end of all inner passions 
contradictions and self-destructive aspects of one’s personal-
ity. Only after the evil-self is destroyed, one can be free and 
happy. 31 The very notion of the evil queen makes room for the 
existence of Snow-white. There is a connection between the 
two that lies exactly on this contradiction. Snow-white exists 
as the antithesis of her stepmother; the latter could not appear 
without the former. The evil stepmother as a model in chil-
dren’s imagination makes room for the “inadequate mother”. 
The mother appears “inadequate”, even “evil”, when she denies 
fulfilling the child’s needs. Imagination and reality blend into 
each other, and growing up is connected with realizing the 
borders among them. Allowing the existence of the “evil step-
mother” into imagination, the child makes room for the contra-
diction to exist in the real world. Creating the “evil stepmoth-
er” allows the child to destroy her finally.32 For psychoanalysis 
shoes represent female sexuality.33 The death of the evil queen 
makes room for Snow-white to live34. It cannot be any other 
way. It is the old way of life that needs to be destroyed, so that 
the new life can take place. The old ways disappear and make 
room for the new to come.
Conclusion
The artwork as it is presented by Heidegger aims to reveal 
the basic essence of things to embody truth and to establish 
30 Ibid, page 169
31 Η γοητεία των παραμυθιών. Μια ψυχαναλυτική προσέγγιση [The Uses of Enchant-
ment] Bruno Bettelheim, translation Eleni Asteriou, editions Γλάρος, Athens, 
Greece, 1995, page 300
32 18 ibid, page 99
33 The Annotated Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs
Part of the SurLaLune Fairy Tale Pages by Heidi Anne Heiner, annotation 30
http//:www.surlalunefairytales.com/sevendwarfs/notes.html
34 Ibid, annotation 32
space. It is a transformation that occurs to the object through 
the process that is called art. Art as action brings these features 
to the object that otherwise would be the ordinary thing, and 
therefore an empty shell of mere craftsmanship. In the case of 
fairy tales, these carry in them the images of the subconscious. 
These images are the vast and general icons, of what is recog-
nized by all as good – evil – beautiful – ugly etc. The world of the 
fairytales also reveals the basic essence of things, and reveals 
truth in its outmost shape. Fairy tales are about the general 
truths of civilization, the general images of good and evil, the 
general distinctions of mankind. Using once more Heidegger’s 
quotation that we used previously:
“In the work, therefore, it is not a matter of the 
reproduction of a single entity present-at-hand at any 
given time, but rather of the reproduction of the universal 
essence of things.” 35
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L’ érotique est l’étude et la philosophie des con-duites amoureuses. La poïétique est l’étude et la philosophie des conduites créatrices. Quels sont les rapports entre ces deux approches du comportement humain ? Op-
position ? Rivalité ? Collusion par multiplication logique des 
deux extensions ? La présente note, vu sa brièveté, n’évoquera 
que quelques points, tributaires d’un clivage théorique général 
entre nature et culture. 
Notons d’abord que ces deux disciplines, à la fois em-
piriques et conceptuelles, comportent des secteurs internes 
qu’on ne saurait confondre. 
I.L’érotique englobe, au bas mot, les sciences 
physiologiques et médicales de la procréation, avec une 
copieuse spécialité de pathologie érotologique, l’examen 
des facteurs sexuels de la formation de la personnalité, donc 
une grande partie de la psychanalyse, l’énumération des af-
fects spécifiques de la rencontre amoureuse chez la femme et 
chez l’homme, la psychologie des conduites d’affrontement 
ou de connivence entre les sexes, la distinction des niveaux 
de plaisirs éprouvés lors des conduites sexuelles, érotiques 
et amoureuses, notamment l’examen des spécificités de la 
jouissance où édonè ne saurait se confondre avec aisthèsis 
(donc l’hédonisme avec l’esthétique), le tout couronné par 
une philosophie du bonheur intégrant les arts du plaisir et le 
sensualisme à un eudémonisme où l’orgasme voisinerait avec 
l’extase et l’illumination, dans l’expérience, souvent mystique, 
de la perte de soi. 
Bref, le Kama sutra, le Cantique des cantiques, Sade, Laclos, Krafft-Ebing, Freud, Pascal Pia. Pauline Réage, Catherine 
Millet, Thérèse d’Avila et Platon risquent de se disputer cet 
univers, arbitré finalement par ceux que Bachelard rangeait 
dans la mouvance du pansexualisme. 
II.La poïétique, de son côté, subsume 
toutes les spécialités pratiques et théoriques, opératoires, 
pédagogiques, politiques et éthiques, par lesquelles l’homme 
se fait constructeur, depuis le modeste bricolage d’une chose 
jusqu’aux constructions philosophiques et mathématiques les 
plus abstrai-tes. A l’éros, elle oppose le poïein. Au ressentir, elle 
oppose le faire. Pour elle, l’homme, fût-il un être jouisseur, ou 
raisonnable, ou adorateur, ou joueur, etc., est surtout un être 
créateur d’oeuvres. Et, bien sûr, il peut être créateur dans le 
domaine du sexe, comme il peut-être érotique dans le domaine 
de la création. 
On le voit, notre problème est posé. Ses formes multiples 
semblent tourner autour du concept d’ART.
III.L’Art. La poïétique fait sienne la distinction 
clairement établie par Platon dans Le Sophiste1 entre ktétikè 
technè et poiètikè technè, la première limitant l’art à l’exercice 
d’une coutume technique, dite parfois artisanale : le pêcheur 
à la ligne n’invente pas la canne à pêche chaque matin ( c’est 
l’exemple que prend Platon), la seconde identifiant l’art aux 
opérartions créatrices. La distinction entre labor et opus se 
retrouve ici.
Le faire, dans l’expression « faire l’amour », en appelle à la 
poïétique, mais la copulation laborieuse et routinière ramène 
l’art à son niveau animal, voire à son degré zéro, la nature n’en 
demandant pas plus… L’art devient plus clairement autonome 
et inventif quand la libido vise, à travers l’acte sexuel, le plaisir 
dominateur de la séduction, de l’initiation, ou les satisfaction 
cruelles de la Schadenfreude.
Fut un temps, le mot art a été nettement péjoratif. Dès 
le Xe siècle, dans la Chanson de Roland, les males artz, puis le 
subtil art au XVe siècle, aggravent le sens du latin artificium, et 
désigne parfois la sorcellerie. L’allusion au Séducteur persiste 
au XVIIe siècle, chez l’abbé Prévost, par exemple, dans sa 
traduction de Clarisse Harlove. Dans ce livre, Lovelace s’écrie 
: « Je viens d’entendre son récit. Ruse, imposture, misérable 
artifice, dans une fille du caractère de Clarisse. Mais ce sexe est 
l’art même. » Ou bien : « Ne me blâme de ma vie pour avoir 
employé un peu d’art avec cette adorable fille. »2
Nous sommes alors dans une zone libidinale intermédi-
aire entre le sexe et l’amour, celle où prend place la passion à 
la fois charnelle et morale de ce que Freud appelait les « éro-
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tiques obsessionnels ». Dépassant parfois le rite vers la fête, 
ces obsédés de posséder et de jouir vivent une intensité diony- 
siaque analogue à celle de l’Amour fou,mais sans l’oblation qui 
couronne celui-ci d’une mystique de la personne aimée.
Laclos, dans Les liaisons dangereuses nous montre com-
ment un libertin, féru de la « souveraineté » arrogante dont 
parlera Roger Vaillant, découvre malgré lui l’amour oblatif, 
devant le sacrifice éperdu de la Présidente de Tourvelle, qu’il 
a réussi à briser. Ce roman capital nous fait passer du XVIIe 
siècle libertin au Romantisme du XIXe siècle…
Un petit roman récent ajoute à cette structure du con-
sentement infini, une note poïétique plus explicite. Les rela-
tions d’incertitude d’Anne Walter3 brode sur l’impossibilité de 
voir clair dans la nature réelle des rapports amoureux, surtout 
si ce n’est pas le Désir qui instaure les rites du sexe, mais les 
valeurs supérieures de l’activité créatrice d’un artiste, qui 
semble alimenter la sublimité de la jeune fille qu’il peint, par la 
prostitution de son modèle. Est-elle, par essence, la prostituée 
qu’il fait d’elle, ou la jeune fille qu’il exalte dans ses tableaux ? 
L’humiliation de celle-ci s’allie au pur amour, elle lit Fénelon : 
« On est dévoré de zèle, on défaille, on s’humilie, on craint le 
courroux du Maître, et son indifférence nous ferait mourir. »4 
Et ce pur amour la livre à des brutes, elle n’ose refuser. Elle 
trouve dans sa soumission une sorte de sainteté amoureuse. 
« Asservie, humiliée, mal- traitée… sans doute, mais aussi 
chavirée », elle aspire à la perte de soi.
Anne Walter, comme Pauline Réage dans Histoire d’O, construit son roman sur le modèle structural du sacrifice, 
qui, selon Marcel Mauss « est comme animé d’un pouvoir im-
manent, d’une sorte de vertu spirituelle. »5 Ici, la jeune femme, 
immobilisée par la pose, représente la victime, les clients sont 
les prêtres qui officient, et le peintre, ordonnateur de la céré-
monie, est le dieu, qui a besoin, pour exister pleinement, du 
mana de la victime.
Plus subtil encore est la sacrifice de amour dans Histoire 
d’O, car c’est moins O qui est anéantie, dans ces rituels sado-
maso, que l’amour lui-même. L’amant d’O la plie à l’adultère 
en la soumettant aux caprices d’un « maître », Sir Stephen, en 
sorte que, finalement, la transfert de l’amour vers ce libertin 
triomphant fait de lui un dieu cruel, adoré sans espoir.
Bref, l’être humain en reste rarement à la simple nature du 
sexe. L’inven- tion de la Fin Amor, que Denis de Rougemont6 
place dans le roman issu du mythe de Tristan et Iseut, si elle n’a 
pas dépassé les rapports de vassal à suzerain, a ouvert à la lib-
erté de la personne le droit de refuser la loi du clan et l’autorité 
du Père. Cette liberté aura encore beaucoup de progrès à faire 
pour parvenir à l’égalité de l’homme et de la femme, dans le 
respect absolu de l’intégrité corporelle.
IV.Le sexe sans l’amour. Une co-
quetterie anti-humaniste (liée sans doute à la « mort de 
l’homme ») peut vouloir fuir les hautes sphères de l’éthique 
civilisée, et retrouver la sauvagerie naturelle du corps, libéré de 
tout carcan moral.
Car le sexe, anar enraciné dans les profondeurs de la 
nature, peut bien se passer de l’amour. Il fonctionne. C’est une 
« machine célibataire », comme le foie, la rate ou le poumon. 
Pire : ne s’occupant que du germen, géré pour son plaisir, il se 
moque bien de l‘économie générale du corps, et plus encore de 
la dignité de la personne, dont il ignore tout.
Mme Catherine Millet, dans La vie sexuelle de Catherine 
M7 a fort bien décrit cette sorte de purification libertine, censé-
ment dégagée (comme l’Art brut) de toute acculturation, par 
un retour hédoniste à l’animalité. Elle ne parle pas de sa « vie 
amoureuse », ni de sa « vie érotique » (elle affirme qu’elle ne 
danse pas et refuse de séduire)… C’est seulement l’histoire de 
ses organes génitaux, élargie aux émonctoires de son intestin.
Livre plaisant,mais sans mystère. Rien de violent. Pas 
d’onirisme. Rien de fou. Utopie zéro. Cath se porte bien. Elle 
ne subit pas, elle jouit. Elle ne refuse rien. Elle prend. Croit 
imiter les hommes ! Sa vie est-elle une œuvre ?
Elle n’instaure guère qu’un exemple à l’usage des femmes 
timides et coincées, qui, s’est-elle vantée, la félicitent. En fait, 
elle montre crûment que la femme naturelle, selon les affirma-
tions insistantes de Sade, serait un être « vulgivague », dont le 
bonheur animal serait d’être livrée à tous. Je cite La philosophie 
dans le boudoir : « La destinée de la femme est d’être comme la 
chienne, comme la louve : elle doit appartenir à tous ceux qui 
veulent d’elle. »
Mais cette louve a écrit un livre. Elle n’a pas pu s’empêcher 
de créer. Certes, l’érotique d’un naturalisme anti-culturel est 
déjà un fait de culture.
Mais elle se prolonge ici en une poïétique du roman, 
genre clé dans l’histoire de la notion de personne.8
La passion de créer dépasse alors celle de jouir ou de 
décrire l’inquiétante étrangeté de la jouissance des autres. 
Ceci, dans une ascèse, qui substitue ce que Bataille appelle une 
« dépense » mentale à la possible tribulation des viscères…
Valmont, dans Les liaisons dangereuses, a un sens aigü du 
haut-fait libertin, mais c’est le roman par lettres, écrit par La-
clos, qui devient un chef-d’œuvre de la littérature universelle.
V.L’amour sans le sexe. A l’opposé de 
ce libertinage, ou par un libertinage d’un autre ordre, voici 
les adeptes californiens du No sex.Amants platoni ques, ils 
s’abstiennent, non par respects des sermons du pape sur la 
chasteté comme seule défense contre le sida, ou par une réac-
tion contre la pornographie particulièrement développée 
dans les pays puritains, mais, sans doute, par une mystique 
individualiste du couple rêvant d’un retour à l’Amour absolu, 
et libéré des pulsions naturelles, comme des trivialités de la 
société de consommation.9 Culturalisme éthique qu’on pour-
rait croire porté à la limite du supportable, mais parfaitement 
supporté par les tenants de « l’identité A », qui se vantent 
d’être asexués… 
Or, si l’on est satisfait de la vie, quelle qu’elle soit, pour-
quoi irait-on créer ? Le fondement de la poïétique est dans 
l’invention d’un devant-être, par insatisfaction devant ce qui 
est. En outre, la dépense sexuelle et l’obsession du plaisir qui 
l’accompagne, retiennent souvent l’artiste dans la sensation, 
alors que l’activité créatrice gagne à la dépasser. Baudelaire 
le note crûment dans son Journal intime10, alors qu’il est loin 
d’être un A.
C’est son intense « vie poétique » qui le porte à la fois 
au dégoût de la chair et à une sublimation créatrice. On ne 
s’étonnera pas qu’il ait titré Le désir de peindre sa description 
d’une femme merveilleuse, texte clé, dont je cite la fin : « Il y a 
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des femmes qui vous inspirent l’envie de les vaincre et de jouir 
d’elles, mais celle-ci donne le désir de mourir lentement sous 
son regard. »11
VI.La création. Il semble bien que la créa-
tion artistique soit un dépassement de l’amour, comme amour 
est un dépassement du sexe. Dépassements dialectiques, qui 
intègrent ce qu’ils nient.
Pour le Surréalisme, sous l’influence de Freud, fuir le sexe, 
ou le nier, fera de la sublimation une sorte de tromperie.. An-
dré Breton oscille entre « l’in- fracassable noyau de nuit » du 
désir et L’Amour fou, comme invention magique marquée par 
le « signe ascendant » de la vie poétique. Pour lui, l’érotisme 
est « une cérémonie fastueuse dans un souterrain. » Et il 
écrit : « Amour, seul amour qui sois, amour charnel, j’adore, 
je n’ai jamais cessé d’adorer ton ombre vénéneuse, ton ombre 
mortelle. »12 Comme lui, Dali fera un éloge appuyé des per-
versions, si elles intègrent la liberté de l’esprit à « l’érotique 
voilée » de « l’amour sublime ». Ce sont bien les « implica-
tions érotiques » dans les œuvres les plus hautes qui qualifient 
le Surréalisme comme mouvement poïétique majeur du XXe 
siècle.
Et je ne saurais terminer cette brève mise au point sans citer le texte où Freud nous livre sa conception de l’artiste 
: « L’artiste, écrit-il,13 est un introverti qui frise la névrose. 
Animé d’impulsions et de tendances extrèmement fortes, il 
voudrait conquérir bonheur, puissance, richesse et amour des 
femmes. Mais les moyens lui manquent pour se procurer ces 
satis- factions. » Il se tourne alors, poursuit Freud, vers la « vie 
imaginaire ».
Grâce à des « circonstances favorables », il échappe tout 
de même au refuge de la névrose, et « retrouve le chemin de la 
réalité ». Il donne à ses rêves éveillés une forme qui fait passer 
au niveau de l’universel ce qu’il ressent et ce qu’il dit, en sorte 
qu’autrui va se retrouver dans l’œuvre produite et se libérer, 
grâce à elle, de ce qui est refoulé en lui. A quoi s’ajoute, écrit 
Freud, (et c’est là, pour la poïétique un point essentiel) que 
l’artiste possède « le pouvoir mystérieux de modeler des maté-
riaux donnés jusqu’à en faire l’image fidèle de la représentation 
existant dans son imagination. » Le névrosé fuit dans le fictif, 
et se cache ainsi les malheurs dont il souffre subrepticement. 
L’artiste ne s’évade pas dans l’irréel, puisque c’est dans le réel 
qu’il instaure son œuvre. Et Freud de terminer astucieusement 
son analyse en retrouvant son point de départ : l’artiste, qui a 
tant apporté à autrui, reçoit en retour « honneur, puissance et 
amour des femmes. »
On saisira, non sans plaisir, ce que peut avoir d’ironique 
un tel texte, puisque dans sa description d’un processus 
poïétique, Freud retrouve en fin de parcours, une valeur es-
sentielle de l’érotique, valeur considérée ici comme la cause 
finale et l’aboutissement de la conduite créatrice, « l’amour des 
femmes ».
Ce réalisme, légèrement cynique, a fort déplu aux sur-réalistes, pour qui l’amour ne saurait être un « profit 
symbolique » dû au succès mondain de l’artiste. Le désir est 
l’essence de la poésie « faite par tous », seule voie de « la 
grande promesse, celle qui persiste après avoir été tenue », 
seule voie du dépassement de la « vie sordide » vers « l’amour 
admirable », seule voie d’accès au surréel comme transfigura-
tion de l’être, enfin devenu « voyant ».
Si le Surréalisme doit se dépasser dans le Surrationalisme d’une synthèse ouverte, où les deux grands mythes de 
l’amour, celui de Tristan et Iseut et celui de Don Juan puissent 
cesser d’être contradictoires, c’est par la voie créatrice, qui per-
met à l’humain de se construire comme civilisation, à travers 
ses œuvres personnelles. Sortant de lui-même, l’homo creator, 
sort en même temps des fatalités qui liaient l’amour à la mort. 
Le mythe de l’œuvre jetée dans l’au-delà de la vie singulière, 
ouvrant sur l’universel, par dépassement du « moi haïssable », 
n’est pas une voie de la névrose, mais la VOIE d’une accession 
à la raISON ARDENTE, comme valeur poïétique, visée par 
une érotique du sublime.
(endNOTES)
1 Platon, Le Sophiste,219 d, repris en 255 a.
2 Samuel Richardson, Histoire de Clarisse Harlove, trad. de l’abbé 
Prévost (1751), Paris, Desjonquières, 1999, 2 vol. Cf. t.II, p 179, 310, 
351, etc.
3 Arles, Actes sud, 1997.
4 Fénelon, Correspondance, cité p. 62.
5 Marcel Mauss, Œuvres, t.I. Les fonctions sociales du sacré, Paris, éd. de 
Minuit, 1968, p. 406.
6 Denis de Rougemont, L’Amour et l’Occident, Paris, Plon, 1939.
7 Paris, éd. du seuil, 2001.
8 Cf. Ignace Meyerson, Les fonctions psychologiques et les œuvres, Paris, 
Vrin, 1948.
9 Cf. Le Monde 2, n° 74, 1er au 22 juillet 2003, p.18 sq, et Libération, 6 
août 2006, p.21.
10 Mon cœur mis à nu, in Journaux intimes de Baudelaire, Paris, Nicéa, 
1944, p. 74 : « Plus l’homme cultive les arts, moins il bande. »
11 Petits poèmes en prose, Le spleen de Paris, XXXVI.
12 L’Amour fou, p.1O8. O.C., Pléiade, t. II, p. 744.
13 Introduction à la psychanalyse, Paris, Payot, 1921, p.403-404, repris en 
1925 dans Ma vie et le psychanalyse, Paris, Gallimard, 1960, p. 80-81.
155
Imaginacija, čutnost in umetnost / Zbornik referatov III. sredozemskega kongresa za estetiko
THE MINIMUM TEXT OF THE PERFORMANCE  
AND THE INTERTEXTUAL BINDINGS
George P. PeFAnIS
Department of Theatre Studies, University of Athens, Greece
A number of contemporary performances, as well as the theories that accompany them, demand the self-reference and self-existence that will allow them to be perceived by the public, without any reference not only to a 
previous text or to the “outside” world in general, but even to 
the past of the theatre itself. This way, each time that certain 
spectators watch performers, an act of communication takes 
place without, supposedly, contexts and environments, and 
the importance and the content of this communication are 
drawn from the act itself and its contributors, and are rede-
fined at each meeting. Here, the principle of the singularity 
of the theatrical event is confirmed,1 of the event that Artaud 
noted that “the theatre is the only place in the world where 
a gesture that has occurred cannot occur a second time”,2 of 
its non-reproducible substance,3 but in a more inclusive way. 
Not only does the performer not know exactly who he is 
representing, but the postmodern performance itself is not 
differentiated from the other arts so much in its liveliness and 
directness, as in its persistence to fight against representation 
itself.4 Given the fact that there is an absence of a text and 
its predetermined meanings, there is not even the slightest 
repetition which characterized a theatrical representation, 
since all of the elements of a performance are never stable, 
they appear and disappear with an uninterrupted transitivity, 
representing this way only the failure of the representation.5 
It could be considered that the postmodern viewpoint 
is greatly influenced by two attitudes. The first has already 
been formulated by Antonin Artaud since 1938: “the poetic 
images in the theatre constitute a mental power which takes 
full flight within the area of the senses without needing real-
ity in the least”.6 For this reason the theatre has the power 
to awaken “all the latent conflicts which live hidden deep 
inside of us” and through this awakening a symbol is born, 
the non-feasible, the impossible.7 The second viewpoint was 
opposed by Jacques Derrida, regarding the binary struc-
ture of metaphysics of the West, according to which in the 
theatre a speech is developed which imitates nothing and 
is not supervised by anyone, it follows no one, because it is 
produced directly from the actor, whose gestures do not have 
a previous source of reference, while his movements create 
a figure, which does not foresee and is not accompanied by 
any speech.8 However, should imitation exist in the theatre, 
it does not imitate anything and it does not portray any 
archetype. The signs of the theatre do not have any referent 
object and for this reason they can not be included in a pro-
cess which seeks the truth, but on the contrary they include 
the truth themselves.9 In general, the truth of a performance 
is not found in the produced meanings, but in the process 
of its production. The postmodern theatre does precisely 
this: it focuses “on the very process of semiosis and not on 
its results”.10 
Fischer-Lichte recently supported that one of the main 
characteristics of theatrical performance is the fact that it 
does not convey given meanings, but it creates the meanings 
itself during the performance.11 Such a position is already 
referenced in the work of Max Hermann, in which Fischer-
Lichte finds the prelude for the epistemological shift towards 
the performative dimension of theatre,12 noting that “the 
emergence of what happens is more important than what 
happens, and in any case more relevant than any meaning 
that may be attributed to it”.13 Many scholars have formulated 
similar views, such as Judith Butler regarding performances 
of daily life and specifically performances of the sexed body.14 
The sexed body is not a stable materiality, predetermined by 
a previous substance, but a constant and relentless material-
ization of possibilities, which are not external or preexisting, 
with regard to the act of materialization, but are born during 
the time of this materialization.15 Although Butler supports 
that “gender is an act which has been rehearsed, much as a 
script survives the particular actors who make use of it, but 
which requires individual actors in order to be actualized and 
reproduced as reality once again,”16 she wants to emphasize 
the presentness of every preventative action of every repre-
sentative act. According to Chantal Pontbriand the postmod-
ern performance «presents; it does not re-present”,17 it does 
not have any referent besides itself,18 it does not encode any 
kind of message, but it offers “a continuous movement, relo-
cation or change of places”.19 Josette Féral claims that a per-
formance does not speak of anything nor does it imitate any-
thing; it escapes from every delusion and representation and 
takes place without having neither a past nor a future,20 «as a 
machine working with serial signifiers: pieces of bodies…as 
well as pieces of meaning… bits of objects joined together in 
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multipolar concatenations”.21 Nick Kaye combines the post-
modern with the “accident-what accompanies”, with what 
simply happens, supporting that this happening produces its 
own forms and its own theatricality,22 leaving out every refer-
ence, except the reference to itself and denying the process of 
representation itself —as Philip Auslander will also write.23 
David George argues that “performance offers a rediscovery 
of the now; relocation in the here; return to the primacy of 
experience, of the event; […] a reassertion that things ―and 
people― are what they do” and he adds that “performance 
itself is a strange reality, its qualities radically different from 
those we experience in other realities”.24 Anthony Howell 
differentiates representation from repetition, attributing a 
conscious goal to the first and an unconscious function to 
the second. Thus, «representational theatre is a theatre of 
the conscious mind: it uses imitation to reflect the social will. 
Repetition, on the other hand, is often unconscious… . In its 
non-representational, repetitive mode, performance art is an 
art of the unconscious”.25
But Fischer-Lichte, herself, in a previous work regard-
ing theatricality, describes the characteristics of postmodern 
theatre by focusing a.) on a displacement of linear time by 
a discontinuous sequence of independent moments, struc-
tured rhythmically, b.) on the domination of the uncoded 
theatrical sign systems, which, in this way, emphasize the 
materiality of the actor’s body and c.) on the deconstruction 
of the theatrical space and on the invitation of the spectator’s 
eye to wander between different points in space.26 The stage 
loses its uniform character and the collectiveness of the pub-
lic is lost with it: the subjective conditions of participation 
of each spectator separately are now in the main goals of the 
stage production, so that each spectator would proceed to a 
subjective creation of theatrical reality, to a continuous game 
of partial points of view, none of which are stable, secure or 
complete.27 In the postmodern theatrical environment, the 
function of representation is idle and the expressive and cor-
relative function prevails.28 The stage act does not represent, 
it does not imitate, it does not project another given and 
pre-existing reality, the stage is not the model of a different 
place and a different time, in which spectators must take 
part without differentiations and important deviations. The 
stage does not convey any kind of reality to the spectators, 
but shows them how “realities” are created. The spectators, 
while participating in the scenic action, learn to create reali-
ties, each one following his or her own path of creativity. 
This means two things: firstly, that the theatre is art, as well 
as an experimental process of knowledge and secondly, that 
the theatre is an adequate reality, an adequate entity of refer-
ence and as a result, it does not need to refer to anything else 
outside of itself. But this change is not without consequences 
for the gnoseological background of the theatre as well, 
and for its broader epistemological standard: the subject of 
knowledge can not be separated clearly from its object. The 
spectators and the performers are the cognitive subjects, 
while the processes of creating reality and the on stage reality 
are the cognitive objects. The cognitive process consists in 
the creation of individual realities on behalf of the spectators 
and no longer in the re-cognition of a re-presented reality. 
Fischer-Lichte calls “theatricality” this capacity of the theatre 
to trigger such processes29 — a very interesting meaning 
as it opens the discussion towards the theatrical metaphor, 
the theatralization of the social life and the largest range of 
theatrical art. 
However, such an approach of the representative pro-
cess, apart from the questions provoked regarding the sub-
jectivity of knowledge and the dangers it is exposed to from 
its relativistic program, implies that the scenic reality itself is 
unmediated, that what the spectators see has no precedent, 
that the theatrical act does not substitute anything previous, 
that the established cultural markers are not important for 
any pre-activation of a certain anticipation, of a horizon of 
expectations in the audience”,30 that behind the performance 
there is not this minimum “text” which penetrates it and 
gives it meaning, and that, lastly, the spectators come to the 
theatre or elsewhere without being drawn by something 
which pre-exists to their arrival, but with their encyclopedia 
neutralized, their memory inactive, with a void in their ho-
rizon of expectations and with the reservoirs of their experi-
ences empty. Though, as Herbert Blau has noted, “there is 
nothing more illusory in performance than the illusion of the 
unmediated”, since what is discerned every time is a com-
bined total of stored experiences.31 
In their understandable effort to deal with the “hyper-
contextuality”32 of performance and to accentuate the true 
theatricality, these theories seem to suppress the obvious: 
that the communication between performers and spectators 
is not a communication of angels, but of people, social hu-
man beings that is, with given memories of history and social 
experiences, with given cultural origins and knowledge, with 
inalienable values, beliefs, interests and objectives, namely 
with references. There is no spectator or performer without 
a minimum “text” in their starting point of action. And be-
cause “I participate in something” it means “I interpret this 
something” and at the same time “I interpret myself inter-
preting this something” that is to say I am conscious of my 
interpreting and participative action, my starting points are 
always called upon to play an important role when I go up on 
stage or when I watch from the audience.
However, which starting points are activated in a body 
that is being operated on or that is brazenly demystifying its 
erotic zones? Is there is a minimum text here which supports 
these performances? The answer is obviously positive. Not 
even Orlan’s operations33 or the sexual displays of Annie 
Sprinkle34 can be perceived without this minimum text. The 
bodies of the two performers constitute, to some degree, 
given meanings, since they are culturally branded. There are 
of course, those opinions which consider the scenic body as 
neutralized from the culture meanings, relieved of meanings 
and significances, with other reasons: transformed to a blank 
surface, on which “new” meanings can be recorded, “new” 
energies can be engraved and “unprecedented” glances can 
be developed. But this body must be artificial and not alive; 
it must remind us of a type of anthropoid, an embodied 
marionette because the human body can never be completely 
emptied from the meanings it embodies. (Even in the Nazi 
camps, the prisoners’ bodies came to know pain, humiliation, 
injury, illness, even emaciation, but they never ceased mean-
ing something.) 
From the moment that the body is exposed on stage it 
can only be a sign. It may not refer to a fictional person, or 
a mythical body, it means however the corporeity, is a sign 
with multiple signifieds. The body declares the sex, the age, 
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the race and the biological condition of the subject. The 
body declares a relationship with cultural norms, a position 
of divergence or convergence towards them: it is lean or 
overgrown, muscular or scrawny, well-shaped or disheveled, 
beautiful or ugly, alluring or repulsive. The body moves, 
strikes poses, dances or ostentatiously stands still, gestures or 
exercises: in motion, in a stylized stance, in dance, in motion-
lessness, in gestures, and in exercise, we cannot overlook the 
social content, the historical indication, the cultural attribute, 
the stereotypical forms and the prototypes that are activated 
during the communication with the spectators. Therefore, 
Fischer-Lichte’s phrase, “the body is simply present onstage, 
going through the motions without meaning anything.”35 is at 
risk of remaining without meaning especially if we accept an-
other one of her positions, that “the human body never exists 
as pure nature, apart from history.”36 The “simple presence” 
leads us back to a pure nature, unmediated, inaccessible even 
in cultural meanings. But the cultural and historical pro-
cesses occupy human life from the moment of birth until the 
moment of death. That is to say, in every moment the body 
is culturally and historically determined. Hence, “at the most 
basic level, everything in the theatre and the theatregoing 
process has meaning.”37 
Let us take a look at the bodies of the performers of 
Jan Fabre that move with an identical reiteration or those 
in the performances of Robert Wilson, that move in slow 
motion: none are “simply” on stage; they all constitute a 
reservoir of meanings through memories, which are stored in 
our theoretically “sign-less” bodies and are modified during 
the performance into different meanings.38 There is a con-
tradiction in the attempt to convince that “the actor’s body 
is not used… as material for an art(ificial) figure, but in its 
materiality itself as an art work,”39 from the moment that we 
consider that this body is not a sign of culture. Of the two 
one must prevail: either it is a sign and activates, through the 
spectators eyes, meanings and significances from the huge 
cultural reserve or it is not a sign and is used as material for 
the scenic “construction”.
The experience of the performance, just like every hu-
man experience, is an ambivalent experience and is torn 
between the mental process and the physical participation, 
the explanation and the understanding, the freedom and 
the restriction, the attention of others and the concern 
with oneself. The average situation, in which conscience 
is conceived during its theatrical experience, presupposes 
this minimum text, this minimum thematic-empirical unit 
of oneself and of the other. In the transcendence of subjec-
tivity or objectivity, an initial presence of the subject and 
object is implied, a presence which will be transcended. The 
ambivalence ceases to exist from the moment that the two 
poles of the theatrical experience are cancelled. And ambiva-
lence is the threshold of historical dimension. Herbert Blau 
will tell us, “A theatrical audience without history is not a 
theatrical audience”,40 but the same applies on stage as well: 
an actor without history is not an actor, but an angel, the 
performance itself without history is not a performance, but 
a strong abstraction.
We reach the same conclusion if we examine the two 
major performance’s functions, which Jean Alter discerns, 
the referential and the representative. We could elaborate 
satisfactorily on the range of the referential function, so that 
is does not only include “the reference to a story that takes 
place in a mental space outside the stage”,41 in a text, theatri-
cal or not, which pre-exists with regard to a performance 
and which either directly or indirectly is related to it, but any 
other “text” that is latently developed in the starting points 
of the performance, whether it is expressed or unexpressed. 
In other words, the referential function of a performance 
also includes the latent ideologies of the contributors of the 
performance and the spectators, as well as the aspirations or 
the desires which arise from these ideologies, the attitudes 
towards life, the ideas and formed behaviors, the experiences 
of other performances, the aesthetic preferences and the 
theoretical orientations, the mnemonic content, the specific 
mental and physical characteristics, the broader knowledge 
of individual and collective relationships, of the historical 
past or the social present, that which we name minimum 
“text” of a performance. On the other hand, the representa-
tive function focuses on the here and the presentness of the 
theatrical event, it re-locates and chronologically re-arranges 
all of the elements of the performance to the here and now, 
to the characteristic of the directly experienced, the direct 
contact of the actors (or the performers) and of the specta-
tors and it includes the demonstration of capabilities and 
abilities, the presentation of talent, the resourcefulness, the 
power of imagination, the projection of artistic choices on 
the stage scenery, the music, the stage direction, the lighting 
and the costumes, the make-up, etc.
The two functions co-exist and interact with various 
ways and to different degrees each time. However, co-exis-
tence does not mean synchrony, as noted by Alter. Usually, 
the absorption in one function excludes or at least signifi-
cantly limits the other. For example, the actor who focuses 
on the display of his motional abilities will be obliged to take 
his attention away from the dramatic character or the imagi-
nary “figure” that he is depicting or presenting on stage. The 
spectator who pays a great deal of attention to the actors’ cos-
tumes or the scenery will distance himself to a certain degree 
from the fictional world of the play or the performance. But 
one function cannot, by any means eliminate the other. Their 
internal rivalry can not hide the reciprocal support that one 
provides to the other.42
Even at such spectacles, (e.g. dancing, the circus or 
athletic events) where the representative function seems to 
completely dominate, the support of the referential function 
exists. On the other hand, referentiality would not be pos-
sible if it was not supported and strengthened by the repre-
sentativeness of the event. I understand a hidden or apparent 
reference, I decode a message, I detect an ideological trace or 
a philosophical core, I visit mnemonic or unconscious places 
through the performativity of the spectacle which unfolds 
before me. The referential world of a performance has its 
roots in the representativeness of the spectacle, at the very 
moment that the representative world of the spectacle gains 
its meaning through its references. 
The reciprocity of performance’s functions also places intertextuality in the center of the discussion. We should return to the concept of intertextuality and 
consider it in an extended version, in which not only do the 
texts stricto sensu take part, but also all of the intentional 
and unintentional, expressed or sub-expressed correlations43 
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between the multiple and heterogeneous “material” of a 
specific performance and the theatrical (or non-theatrical) 
sources of the past, which this performance recalls, activates 
and constitutes as a theme to various degrees and in vari-
ous ways. Just as the memory of the texts transfers elements 
from one text to another, bridging the past with the present, 
comprising a “mine” of references and excerpts, in the same 
manner the rest of the scenic systems disclose a mnemonic 
function which connects them to the relevant systems of past 
performances. The “guidelines” of stage direction leave the 
thoughts of a stage director with great difficulty, even when 
he changes his perspective and moves on to other types of 
performances and other categories of work. The same applies 
to a stage designer or a costume designer: the aesthetic codes 
of their “style” are present, either through the repetition of 
specific choices of the past in newer works or through the 
opposition to these choices.44 Many objects of scenery ap-
pear and reappear on stage identical, attributing not only to 
the space, but to the entire production meanings and memo-
ries from past performances of the same and different works 
in which they had “participated”. The stage area itself, as well 
as the theatrical area, in which it is recorded, often project 
strong mnemonic fields, so that a completely empty area is 
inconceivable.45 A memory of a sign which, as Ann Ubersfeld 
would say,46 is not limited only to the framework of a specific 
performance, but it stretches back to the past, to signs and 
systems of signs from past performances. Memory activates 
the past in the present and with another formulation: it acti-
vates the present through the past. Just like the texts speak to 
each other, with an internal dialogue, the systems of scenery 
of the performances are always sharing a dialogue between 
themselves as well, in a -at times visible or other times invis-
ible- network of dense or scarce references or self-references. 
The younger actor, consciously or unconsciously converses 
with shis older, alive or dead colleagues based on the 
embodiment of a common role or a similar interpretive at-
tribute, since “even in death, the actors’ roles tend to remain 
with them”.47 
The spectator, on his end, is always an open Εrwartungs-
horizont and a rich “encyclopedic” world, ready to spring 
into action, to influence and be influenced by the action 
on stage. The spectator becomes the binding object of an-
other, equally important dialogue, between the memory 
of the performances he has attended in the past and the 
experience of the performance he has in the present. From 
a general point of view, he is never a spectator of just one 
performance, but he also experiences the reverberations and 
shadows, even the ghosts of past performances. Therefore, 
the understanding of the performance is not the result of a 
reflection of the action on stage on him, but presupposes a 
mutual designation of the spectator by the performance and 
of the performance by the spectator. In addition, during the 
comprehension, the spectator carries with him the entire 
load of his theatrical (as well as the non-theatrical) “ency-
clopedia” surpassing by far the role of the simple spectator, 
who is watching almost passively a performance being given 
by others and becomes the potential coordinator of many 
performances, the orchestrator of many memories and expe-
riences, the stage director of disparate knowledge, ideologies 
and emotional contents. Even in the post-modern version 
of the performances, during which the spectator “has an 
experience of Self as a decentralized subject”,48 the spectator 
can only direct himself as a decentralized subject, in other 
words to perceive himself in a process of decentralization, 
where the “center”, the encyclopedic load, the ideological 
references or the intertextual underlying layer is, one way or 
another, present. 
Therefore, the production and the comprehension of a 
performance are constituted by elements, forces, forms and 
actions which reappear from the past to the present, with 
various ways and at different degrees of intensity. Marvin 
Carlson states it expressly, by saying that “the theatre has 
been obsessed always with things that return, that appear 
again tonight, even though his obsession has been mani-
fested in quite different ways in different cultural situations. 
Everything in the theatre, the bodies, the materials utilized, 
the language, the space itself, is now and has always been 
haunted, and that haunting has been an essential part of the 
theatre’s meaning to and reception by its audiences in all 
time and all places.”49 
Of course, this extended intertextuality that weaves the 
web of each theatrical or representative action should not, in 
any case, be perceived as a restriction of the authenticity of 
this action. No human action is purely repetitive. Even when 
there is repetition of an idea, of a form or of a relationship, 
the repetition is never exact or “pure”, since the subject (per-
former or spectator) that does or engages in the repetition 
is never the same, nor does he receive the repeated, or even 
the repetition itself, the same way each time. There is always 
something that surpasses our knowledge and experience. A 
performance, even though it assimilates elements from other 
performances, creates experiences which can only partially 
be interpreted from the experiences of past performances, 
the elements of the other performances are placed in new 
contexts, the illocutionary and perlocutionary intents change 
during the speech acts, while even the reception of a perfor-
mance, (and not just the performance itself ), can be consid-
ered as a new work, to the degree that the interpretation is an 
analytical component of the significance of the work of art.50 
But the interpretation presupposes, implicitly or explicitly, a 
support of the theory. Without an “atmosphere” of a theory, 
without knowledge of the history of the theatre, the theatri-
cal space simply remains a common place and nothing more. 
Therefore, every performance maintains its independence, 
its unique character, but this does not mean that it can be 
described or interpreted without a produced or an ‘under 
production’ meaning. As different as a performance can be 
considered from one cultural or social context to another, 
it does not cease to refer to certain meanings, as well as to 
past performances that are associated with these meanings. 
Basically, the non-repetitiveness does not conflict with the 
intertextuality, to the degree that the spectator is the final 
recipient: since the performer addresses his thoughts and 
memory, his glance, his imagination or his ideological ori-
gins, the support on the under layer of the encyclopedia for 
the establishment of a new meaning is a given fact, as well as 
the recording of the performance, in history: in the history 
of theatrical performances and the personal “history” of the 
spectator.
* This study has been accomplished thanks to the support of the research 
programme “Pythagoras”, University of Athens.
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O ne would live a rather limited life should one aspire to a concept of the world belonging to the past, comfortable and familiar as it were but less challenging and fitting in with a rather limited expanse of imagination than the one 
prevalent in one’s own era. By daring to live in a world formed 
on the basis of concepts at the forefront of human knowledge 
and sensibility one places himself in a position that grants him 
access to “sensing” and “experiencing” the kind of life that this 
world entails and circumscribes.1 This applies especially to the 
concept of space. 
It is the contention of this author that it is specifically 
architecture, being an art that employs space as its foremost 
tool, which must and does seek to unveil the relevance of 
the concept of space of each epoch to human life. This paper 
endeavors to reveal evidence that, in critical moments in 
history, architecture has in fact attempted either in theory or 
in built form to present a new conceptualization of the world 
whenever new philosophical conceptions or relevant discov-
eries in physics have led to significant transformations of the 
concept of space. Clearly, architecture is not influenced by 
this concept alone but by various other concerns and aspi-
rations. The concept of space is, however, one of the most 
fundamental, although it often remains less pronounced 
among the multiplicity of issues tackled by major architec-
tural movements, and our aim is to discuss some of its salient 
manifestations.
Since antiquity the concept of space stood at the basis of 
the development of architectural ideas and exerted a signifi-
cant influence on their formation. At that time, there was hard-
ly any differentiation between philosophy, mathematics, and 
the observation of natural phenomena. The ideas developed by 
the Presocratic and particularly the Pythagorean philosophers 
in the 5th and 4th century B.C. held that space and void were 
two distinct entities.2 The void enveloped space, while space 
itself generated some kind of pressure or tension by virtue of 
which it formed boundaries to the physical bodies and did not 
1 This sums up a basic idea developed in Carl G. Jung, Modern Man in Search of a 
Soul, New York: Harvest Books, 1933.
2 See the Pythagorean philosophy of Philolaus (5th c. B.C.) and Archytas (4th c. 
B.C.) Max Jammer, Concepts of Space, (Greek), Panepistimiakes Ekdoseis Kritis, 
1997, p.12-13.
let them become infinitely great or small.3 Void was thought as 
equivalent to chaos which inspired awe and fear.4
These notions seem to have formed the psychological 
basis that lead to fundamental decisions for the planning 
of sacred sites. The planning method was clearly anthropo-
centric and was based, according to a theory, on a system of 
polar coordinates emanating from the point of view of an 
observer in standing position at the site’s main entrance. This 
system placed the various buildings in an angular spatial rela-
tionship to each other and even remote landscape formations 
were calculated to partake into the system while no view of 
a remote void was ever permitted to penetrate it.5 Thus, a 
powerful concentration of internal relationships between 
spaces and forms was protected from any intercession of the 
void within the formation which might threaten to cause its 
disintegration. 
Certain philosophers regarded space as possessing an 
anisotropic character, that is, it varied in quality depending 
on orientation and location content.6 Correspondingly, it can 
plainly be observed that the spatial arrangement of build-
ings within a sacred precinct exhibits a distinctly anisotropic 
character of orientation, size, and weight as well. This absence 
of clearly distinguishable regularities of arrangement has lead 
modern scholarship up until recently to the conviction that 
sacred precincts were but enclosures of randomly or freely 
placed buildings (Fig.1).
Around the same time, a diverse philosophical system was developed by the Atomists7 who thought that void and 
space did not differ in nature and the void was necessary for 
the existence of the atoms of matter and consequently it was 
3 Jammer, 1997, p. 13. Also see Simplicius, Physika 108 a.
4 Hesiod’s “chaos” the earliest known expression of the concept of universal 
space was emotionally charged, Jammer, p.10. Also see Hesiod, Theogonia, 116.
5 This ensues from the study by K. Doxiades, Architectural Space in Ancient Greece, 
MIT Press, Boston, 1972.
6 Plato (5th c. B.C.) and Epicurus (4th c. B.C.) clearly express the idea that space is 
anisotropic. However, these ideas appear to also originate in Pythagorean phi-
losophy. Jammer, 1997, p.16, 18-9. See also Plato, Timaeus, 52 d and F.M. Corn-
ford, Plato’s cosmology, Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1937, p. 198. The anisotropic 
concept persists even in Aristotle (4th c. B.C.). Aristotle, Physica, 211 a, Loeb 
Classical Library, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1929, v.1, p. 303. 
7 Among the Atomists were Leucippus (5th c. B.C.) from Miletus, and Democri-
tus (4th c. B.C.) from Abdera. Th. Pelegrinis, Lexiko Philosphias (Greek).
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equivalent to space not filled with matter. 8 Since all atoms 
were considered to be identical the only variation permitted by 
the atomic theory was that of arrangement. Apart from that, 
space and matter were each in its own right essentially homo-
geneous. The idea of homogeneous space seems to have found 
its equivalent in city configurations that became expansive fol-
lowing a repetitive pattern such as the new city of Miletus (5th 
c. B.C.), designed after the Hippodamian system.9 The same 
idea seems to be advocated by Euclidean geometry (developed 
at the end of 4th c. B.C.) as well which, however, dealt mostly 
with planar forms whereas its solid geometry did not address 
the greater problem of spatial expansion remaining focused on 
the form of solid bodies.10 
A kind of rectilinear grid pre-existed in Egypt and Mesopo-tamia which was, though, of quite different character. It 
was linear rather than rectilinear and was not systematic in any 
way. The systematic grid appears to have been an Ionian break-
through11 and to have been connected to certain philosophical 
principles and social theories.12
The concept of isotropic and infinite space became more 
powerfully expressed in Roman times. The homogeneity and 
infinity of space is strongly advocated by Lucretius (1st c. B.C.). 
The idea of its anisotropic nature still remains being limited, 
however, to the vertical direction.13 Respectively, in that period 
the city grid becomes the planning norm which even though it 
constitutes an evolution of older linear systems acquires now 
a clear philosophical basis.14 While the grid system, as used in 
Miletus and other Greek cities, was placed on a predominantly 
flat area in Roman cities often appears to develop in spite of 
the topography.
During the 17th century, in attempting to draw the faithful away from the reformation and back into the arms of 
the Catholic Church, Baroque architecture adopted a more 
energetic vocabulary which would capture the attention of the 
congregation in an almost magnetic fashion. For this purpose, 
and since the classical vocabulary could not be abandoned, the 
new architecture assumed an attitude most clearly expressed 
in Guarini’s phrase: “Architecture can correct the rules of 
Antiquity, and invent new ones”.15 What became of paramount 
importance during the Baroque period were the optical issues. 
This becomes evident as early as Teofilo Gallacini’s (1564-
1641) theoretical work titled Trattato Sopra gli Errori degli 
Architetti where he discusses the apparent proportion of St. 
Peter’s dome from the observer’s point of view.16
Francesco Borromini, one of the foremost architects of 
8 Jammer, 1997, p.13-4. 
9 Named after Hippodamos, ancient Greek sophist, architect and urban planner 
of the 5th c. B.C. from Miletus. Apart from his own city he also planned the city 
of Piraeus, Rhodes, and Thurium in Magna Grecia. Sturgis’ Illustrated Diction-
ary of Architecture and Building, New York: Dover Publ., 1902. For a detailed 
account see Spiro Kostof, A History of Architecture, Settings and Rituals, 2nd ed., 
New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995, pp. 141-3. It may not be a coincidence 
that Leucippus, considered as the founder of Atomism, was also from Miletus.
10 Jammer, 1997, p. 32-3.
11 Kostof, 1995, p. 141.
12 Aristotle, Politics, VII, 10, 4 in Kostof, 1995, p. 142.
13 Jammer, 1997, p. 16-7.
14 Jammer, 1997, p. 19
15 Guarino Guarini was one of the most important Baroque architects and theo-
reticians, Kruft, 1994, p.106, also see Nino Carboneri, Bianca Tavassi La Greca, 
(eds.), Guarini, Milan, 1968, p.15f
16 Kruft, 1994, p. 103.
Fig. 2: Hippodamian grid, city of Miletus, Asia 
Minor, 5th c. B.C. (source S. Kostof, fig. 7.5)
Fig. 1: Acropolis, Athens, 5th century B.C., Plan (after 
K. Doxiades)
Fig. 3: Cosa, Italy, 3rd c. B.C. The grid develops in 
spite of the ground relief. (Kostof, 1991, fig. 109)
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this period experimented with optical issues as most of his 
contemporaries did. He did so fervently, however, seeking at 
the same time the sanctioning of his designs in ancient prec-
edents. He discovered, for instance, in Montano’s published 
drawings17 of ancient Roman buildings proof that the optical 
effects he was trying to achieve in his Palazzo Spada colon-
nade had a precedent in Roman architecture18. To be solidly 
based in terms of precedents was as important to him as to 
use for a guide the constructive principles of Nature19, since if 
this condition had not been he could be accused of volatility. 
But what was in his mind when speaking of nature? During 
the Renaissance, Leon Battista Alberti related nature to ge-
ometry, while Palladio to simple arithmetical relations.20 By 
the 17th century the identification of nature with mathematics 
had become a widely held belief clearly expressed in the writ-
ings of the physicist Galileo Galilei (1564-1642). He wrote 
that “the great book of nature . . . is written in the language 
of mathematics, and its characters are triangles, circles, and 
other geometrical figures without which it is humanly impos-
sible to understand a single word of it”. Galileo’s writings were 
much studied in intellectual circles in Rome and it is from 
him that Borromini derived his conception of nature.21 Bor-
romini stated, for his Villa Pampili design, that “. . . the whole 
building would be a study in applied mathematics”.22
He also observed the relation of the building to the human body, an ancient conviction which, however, 
acquired a new perspective in his mind in which the similar-
ity of the building to the human body should not confine 
itself to the upright standing position but should be seen as a 
living body that could even make a gesture to the passer by.23 
Such an attempt seems to have taken visible form in several 
of his designs (Fig. 4). 
Through Galileo he probably learned about Kepler’s 
(1571-1630) discovery of the elliptical planetary paths, 
announced in 1609,24 an idea which Borromini seems to 
have attempted to incorporate into his design for San Carlo 
alle Quattro Fontane (1634)25 even though Galileo himself 
opposed Kepler’s findings.26 According to a modern art histo-
rian and critic the ellipse had already been used in the Man-
nerist period.27 In his plan, Borromini attempted to reach the 
generation of an ellipse through the combination of more 
regular shapes such as the ones described by Galileo.
The experience generated within that church would have been truly unique to the visitor of that era. The 
eye cannot truly cope with the presence of the ellipse and 
17 The architect Giovanni Battista Montano (1534-1621) published reconstruc-
tions of Roman buildings in Li Cinque Libri di Architettura, (between 1624-
1664), displaying perspective effects of which Borromini made use. Blunt, 
1979, p.41, and Kruft, 1994, p.105. 
18 Blunt, 1979, p. 43-45
19 Kruft, 1994, p. 105, Blunt, 1979, p. 46.
20 Blunt, 1979, p. 47.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., p. 50.
23 Ibid., p. 51.
24 John Garraty and Peter Gay (eds.), The Columbia History of the World, New 
York:Harper and Row Publishers, 1981, p. 687
25 Kruft, 1994, p. 105, Blunt, 1979, p.47.
26 Rudolf Arnheim, Visual Thinking, Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1997, p. 277-8
27 Erwin Panofsky, Galileo as a Critic of the Arts, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1954, pp. 
20ff.
Fig.4: San Carlo alle Quattro Fontane, Rome, Half 
plan, 1634 (Blunt, 1979, fig. 48)
Fig. 5: San Carlo alle Quattro Fontane, 1634, 
diagram of plan (Blunt, 1979, fig. 39)
Fig. 6: San Carlo alle Quattro Fontane, plan, 1634 
(Blunt, 1979, fig. 38)
Fig. 7: San Carlo alle Quattro Fontane, Rome, dome 
(Blunt, 1979, fig. 52)
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by confusing it with a circle is lead to experience fluctuat-
ing forces drawing it toward its depth and more so into its 
height. These undulating lines generate a flux in the senses 
that produces a sharp contrast to the clarity and soberness of 
Renaissance space. At the same time, even though it exerts a 
magnetic influence to the eye it has nothing in common with 
the sharpness and inevitability of the converging linear pat-
terns of Gothic architecture which aims at drawing the eye 
in a similar magnetic fashion. Borromini’s undulating curves 
gently entice the passer by into a journey of the senses rather 
than brusquely directing him.
In the 18th century the French visionary architect Ettienne Louis Boullée became fascinated by the achievements 
of Isaac Newton (1642-1727).28 Physics had revealed once 
more, and in a most powerful manner, the form of a new 
world. 
Thus, Boullee attempted to envision an architectural 
feat of equal greatness in his honour. He designed Newton’s 
cenotaph, as a hollow sphere of vast size representing the 
Earth and Newton’s discoveries. This sphere was to bear 
numerous perforations so that in daytime an effect of a starry 
night sky would be reproduced inside the sphere. At night 
the interior would be lit up by a huge lamp. Boullée summed 
up the effect of his design as follows: “the effects of this great 
picture are, as one sees, produced by Nature”.29 This was, of 
course, an iconographic concept which could not be built at 
the time. It exerted, however, a disproportionate impact in 
following periods. 
Newton’s cosmology comprised a theory of space which 
has remained in history as the concept of “absolute space”. 
For the first time space was considered infinite, homoge-
neous and isotropic. It is a vast new world with no differen-
tiation among its parts, no particular tendencies. A space that 
holds each and every object in any position that this may 
be found. Similarly, Boullée’s design presented an entirely 
new experience of architectural space which surpassed by far 
anything that had been designed to that date. It presented a 
truly new world in seeking to reach an entirely new architec-
tural spatial experience both in scale and quality. While the 
homogeneity of the atomists may have found an equivalent 
in the subdivision of land in identical orderly parts, the infin-
ity, the homogeneity and the isotropic character of the new 
space proposed by Newton was represented by the vastness 
of scale, the lack of subdivision and the feeling of a universal 
unity. As one moved in the interior the point of view changed 
but it did so imperceptibly because of the vastness of the 
space in relation to the speed of locomotion. Furthermore, 
the lack of spatial subdivisions made it impossible to sense 
the change while at the same time the psychological impact 
of the minuteness of man in respect to the vastness of the 
universe was dramatically brought to the fore. The essential 
character of the Newtonian “absolute space” had found an 
architectural realization. 
In early 20th century the formations that appear during the period of German expressionism, are more related to 
form rather than space. Especially Erich Mendelsohn’s work 
is based on Albert Einstein’s theory of relativity and his field 
theory of space. Mendelsohn, in his attempt to incorporate 
Einstein’s theory in the building he designed in his honour he 
becomes formally descriptive of the fluctuating spatial field 
forces generating a building which seems formed as it were by 
the interpenetration of such forces. The relationships of spaces 
within the building, however, provide an interpretation of the 
mystical concerns identified with the German expressionist 
movement rather than attempting an expressive demonstra-
tion of the Einsteinian concept of space.
28 Kruft, 1994, p. 161
29 Jean-Marie Pérouse de Montclos (ed.), Ettienne-Louis Boullée. Architecture: Essai 
sur l’ art , 1968, p. 140. Also see Helen Rosenau (ed.), Boullée’s Treatise on Archi-
tecture, London, 1953, and Helen Rosenau, Boullée and Visionary Architecture, 
London, 1976 (with French-English text of the Essai).
Fig. 8: Newton’s Cenotaph, 1783 (Trachtenberg & 
Hyman, 1986, fig. 669)
Fig. 9: Newton’s Cenotaph, 1783, interior 
(Trachtenberg & Hyman, 1986, fig. 670)
Fig. 10: Einstein Tower, near Potsdam, Germany, 
1920 (Trachtenberg and Hyman, fig. 806)
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Johannes Itten’s design theory, assuming a quite different viewpoint, appears to have incorporated prevalent con-
cepts of space in physics of his time. Itten was a Swiss painter 
who taught extensively in Germany and Switzerland and was 
the master mind that introduced the new ideas and design 
methods in the celebrated Bauhaus art school. Einstein’s theo-
ry of relativity was published a decade earlier (1905) than the 
time in which Itten began his art teaching career. Itten’s system 
was based on a system of gradations of intensity between polar 
opposites and the spatial interconnections of forms based on 
variation of their number, size and proximity. It incorporated 
brilliantly the field theory of space while it attempted to bring 
it into union with ancient philosophies and religious teachings. 
In his teachings, ideas of forces of attraction and repulsion 
were explored in shades of grey or colour or between various 
assemblies of shapes. Poles of concentration and poles oppos-
ing each other were thus established in the visual field.
Ludwig Mies van der Rohe’s architecture followed a simi-
lar path although he was not too eloquent about his ideas. He 
created spaces which exerted dynamic, almost magnetic forces 
while he placed obstacles, such as water, in strategically se-
lected areas in order to create empty fields and in this manner 
to ensure the presence of void in the visual field. Intense fields 
of vistas were generated through narrow vertical openings or 
pausing vistas generated through the absence of whole walls.
In later 20th century, there has evolved a greater con-
sciousness among architects of the inevitable connections 
between physics, philosophy and architecture. Concepts of 
spatial warping and spatial inflections found in the work of 
architects such as Rem Koolhaas, Zaha Hadid and Van Berkel 
and Bos draw on various philosophies relating in turn to corre-
sponding theories in physics. As a last example I will cite, here, 
the Moebius house by UN studio (Van Berkel and Bos) near 
Amsterdam which I regard as particularly important from the 
outlook of this paper.
The images that Van Berkel and Bos create are parts of 
narrative in which identifiable images or fragments are brought 
into play in an unfamiliar way by means of abstract forms. 
While, following this line of thinking, some of the earlier 
buildings have turned out to be clearly iconographic in char-
acter their later work delves deeper into philosophical issues 
and draws on Gilles Deleuze’s reading of the work of Michel 
Foucault, in which Deleuze interprets the idea of the diagram, 
prevalent in deconstructivist problematics, as a characteristic, 
schematic map depicting a specific interpersonal and social 
force-field.30 In these terms, Van Berkel and Bos reach a view 
of the city as a dynamic force field in which a multiplicity of 
parties and interests can have an impact on the design process: 
various specialists from structural engineers to building con-
tractors, influence their designs and are labelled “mobile forc-
es” which when brought into mutual synthesis, constitute the 
design. Einstein’s field theory is represented here not as a gen-
erator of form per se but being incorporated in various aspects 
of human life that play a role in the form making process.
The diagram on which the Moebius house (1993-98) is 
based is the Moebius strip, a loop that is twisted to form a con-
tinuous surface. This topological spatial paradox is attempted 
to be connected with physical space by organizing the house 
30 Bart Lootsma, Superdutch: New Architecture in the Netherlands, London: 
Thames and Hudson, 1993, p. 55.
Fig. 12: Moebius house, Amsterdam, 1993, interior 
(Lootsma, fig. 63)
Fig. 11: Moebius house, Amsterdam, 1993, plan 
(top) and exterior (Lootsma, fig. 62, 65)
along a single lengthy route and by incorporating into it a 24 
hour diurnal rhythm of sleep, work and meals for the inhabit-
ants. Here a unique attempt is made to integrate the contem-
porary concept of space as force fields expanded to include 
fields of similar nature but different pattern, such as fields of 
process and fields of use, to a theoretical mathematical model 
of space unleashing yet a new dimension of spatial experience.
165
Imaginacija, čutnost in umetnost / Zbornik referatov III. sredozemskega kongresa za estetiko
Iakovos POTAMIANOS: CONCEPTS OF SPACE IN PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY AND THEIR TRACES ON ARCHITECTURAL THEORY AND DESIGN, 160-165
Every collective concept of space is instrumental to the architect’s imagination for the generation of ideas and the 
envisioning of compositions that give expression to a universal 
spirit of the age surpassing his limited personal outlook.
Relevant spatial formations can, in turn, cause sensations 
that incite the imagination into perceiving the world in a new 
way, because just as physics attempts to discover the world 
we live in and philosophy strives to render it comprehensible, 
architecture endeavours to unveil the relevance of these ideas to 
human life and challenge us into envisioning our place in them. 
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IMAGINING  
THE IMPOSSIBLE
The imagination is one of the highest prerogatives  
of man. By this faculty he unites former images  
and ideas, independently of the will, and thus  
creates brilliant and novel results …
Charles Darwin
What is most human is not rationalism but  
the uncontrolled and incontrollable continuous  
surge of creative radical imagination in  
and through the flux of representation,  
affects and desires.
Corneluis Castoriadis
Introduction: A Critique  
of the Computationalist Reason
I want to believe that in the recent dynamic develop-
ment in the domain that aims at providing scientific account 
of the nature of the mental we have advanced beyond the 
computational metaphor (stating that the mind is a com-
puter), and so have come to realize that cognition is not 
reducible to computation, and that mental phenomena are 
not the same as information processing; that mathematics is 
a tool in the mind of investigator, not the nature of the mind 
we are investigating; that algorithm may be a powerful form 
of analysis* but not necessarily an adequate means of repre-
senting the mental1. There are other features that uniquely 
characterize human mind and cognition, such as conscious-
ness, intention, and emotion, and one of them is certainly 
also imagination. Though these features of the mind are not 
accessible to the ‘third-person perspective’ and cannot be 
fully naturalized in terms of scientific language, contem-
porary neuroscience is ambitious to explain “how matter 
becomes imagination”2 Be it as it may, I want to claim that 
either as a matter of phenomenological introspection or an 
object of neurobiological inspection imagination is a crucial 
and constitutive trait of all cognition, and all the mental phe-
nomena alike, including aesthetic experience.
1 “I join with many other critics who have also observed that algorithms cannot 
account for thinking in images or phantasy, for error and novelty, or for the fact 
that the mind can imaginatively bootstrap itself from within,” Modell, 2003: 
xii)
2 The subtitle of Edelman’s and Tononi’s (2000) book. 
In spite of the strong current tendency to ‘de-humanize mind’ (that is to equal thinking with computation and in-
formation processing) there is a possible opposing option that 
can affirm what is most human in our mental world, and that 
is our capacity of bringing to mind what is not provided by the 
senses (to use the old Aristotle’s definition of imagination). 
In order to provide the support for the primacy of imagina-tion an extensive elaboration is required which cannot be 
done within this contribution; however, an attempt will be 
made here within a reduced scale, and I’ll do so by focusing 
on some basic processes such as creation of meaning (whereby 
‘meaning’ is not only used in linguistic terms but refers to 
visual and emotional contents as well. I.e. something can be 
meaningful on an implicit subconscious imaginary level)). 
My first, and most fundamental, premise is fully in ac-cord with the following: “The mind/brain does not 
represent or mirror reality; it constructs a virtual reality of its 
own” (Modell, 2003: 13). That again is very much on the truck 
of Vico’s philosophy in which a statement can be found that: 
“meaning is constructed through imaginatively entering into 
the mind of others” (quoted in Modell, 2003: 15; emphasis 
added).
In order to make it less general or abstract let me pinpoint to some basic features of the process of articulation of mean-
ing, particularly metaphorical one.
1.  The Lesson from Metaphor
After what I have called the “metaphorical turn” we have 
sufficient theoretical support for the claim that fixed and stable 
reference is a myth as it is the idea that words have well defined 
and strictly delineated semantic fields. Instead, we realize that 
metaphorical reference is open-ended, and also that semantic 
domains of words are rather indeterminate. However, open-
endedness and indeterminacy (usually closely associated with 
vagueness and ambiguity) are not to be negatively classified 
for they are the very prerequisite for metaphor-making, as well 
as for interpretation and understanding of metaphors. Due to 
such a capacity we can make an interpretative leap beyond the 
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literal, and beyond the sensual, due to which deciphering of 
incongruent terms is possible at all. More than that, metaphor 
becomes an intellectual tool capable of bridging the familiar 
and unfamiliar, the known and unknown, and in the final in-
stance of making “impossible” juxtapositions intelligible. It can 
justifiably be recognized as a means of semantic creation. The 
metaphorical man can successfully get along with it only if s/he 
is ready to extend the range of inference as to include merely 
possible, as well as impossible, significations. 
Let me try to illustrate that by taking into account following examples. By talking about “brain fitness”, “gym for intel-
ligence” or “mental metabolism”, “labyrinths of mind” etc. we 
conjoin the mental and the physical in a way which requires 
departure from the first (literal) meaning and also from the 
elementary logical principles. What we do in these and similar 
cases is a disregard of identity on which literal meaning is 
based. A competent language-user in principle does not even 
consider the literal interpretation for it cannot help and thus 
does not count. The only way to understand metaphor is to 
interpret it metaphorically. My view is in this respect in full 
accord with that of Eileen C. Way when she says: “Either you 
understand the metaphoric interpretation or you don’t under-
stand the utterance at all. (…) either it (a literary passage) is 
understood metaphorically or it is incomprehensible” (1991: 
14). This implies that it is only by means of imaginative read-
ing (the one that goes beyond the literal and the obvious) that 
can grant adequate meaning and understanding. A path from 
the literal to the metaphorical, from restricted reference to 
extended denotation, is a road to the concept of open-ended 
meaning or interpretation, which in turn cannot do without 
imagination.
Looking for the cases where semantic incompatibility is pushed to the extreme (where “A is B” is most unlikely), 
that is, where a need for semantic extension is best pro-
nounced, we may end up with oxymoron. According to OED, 
oxymoron is a rhetorical figure by which contrary or incon-
gruous terms are conjoined as to give point to a statement or 
expression; in its literary meaning it is self-contradictory or 
absurd, yet it makes a point. Couple of examples: “irrational 
logic”, “passionate reason”, “rational emotion”, “live dead”, 
“wise fool”, “the logic of the heart”, “embodied mind”, “festina 
lente” (hasten slowly), etc. 
Now the question: how is it possible that something obvi-ously contradictory, absurd or “impossible” can still be 
intelligible and meaningful? To say that it is possible by means 
of metaphorical interpretation is but a partial answer because 
we re still left with the dilemma: how can this be achieved? We 
realize that if we literally and logically stick to the exclusive-
ness of the relation between the coupled terms we are unable 
to bridge them meaningfully. In other words, if we claim that 
the reasonable stays in an opposition to the emotional, there 
is no possibility of creating an intelligible link between the 
two (as for instance in the “passionate reason”). Similarly, if 
what is attributed to the ‘heart’ can by no means be logical (so 
that authenticity of both is defined in their mutual exclusive-
ness) there will always remain two separate spheres, that of 
the ‘heart’, and that of logic, which then cannot speak in any 
understandable form to each other- However, if we extend 
sufficiently semantic fields of the contrasting terms, we might 
come to the outer limits of standard denotation, and then 
also to start to search for modes of overcoming exclusiveness 
(which anyhow proves to be inadequate). Instead of perceiv-
ing the polarized terms as incommensurable we might tend to 
see them more and more as mutually interconnected.
In overcoming ‘impossible’ junction between the compo-nent parts in an oxymoron, one realizes that apparent in-
commensurability is also interpretable, that contrasting exclu-
siveness can be bridged, that the opposites are not irreducible.
Astep from the initial absurd to final understanding is not an insignificant one. To be able to make an intelligible 
link between incompatible components, and be able to over-
come something as basic as contradiction, and accept that 
things can at the same time be and not be, be positive and be 
negative, be complex and be simple, etc. (as is the case in oxy-
moron) is indeed an act of imagination in which a language- 
(or metaphor-) user has to engage mental power in order to go 
beyond the confines of propositional thinking.
Initial “impossible” crossing of two elements in an oxymoron is thus a result of conventional meaning or understanding 
of these two composite parts. This very “impossibility” is 
measured against the set of habitual or stereotypical thinking. 
If an interpreter succeeds in parting from that level created of 
meaning**** s/he can at another level of interpretation meet a 
potential to go beyond the seemingly impossible. 
From what has been just said follows that the gap between the parts* which appear incompatible is not given but 
created (or rather inherited), and thus can also be revised and 
reread. What seems “impossible” at one time, on one level 
of interpretation, or from a particular point of view may turn 
out to be possible, if appropriate standard of competence is 
achieved, at another time or on another level of interpretation.
This very act requires mental and imaginative leap which skilled speaker practices naturally and without effort, 
provided, however, that his/her cognitive standard is high 
enough. 
The lesson we can learn from what is expounded above is important for both linguistic and cognitively oriented 
theorist of metaphor. This ability to neglect literalness and 
ignore the given or apparent, and even to disobey elementary 
logic, and in spite of that reach a level of understanding which 
can not only be meaningful, but also illuminating is worth of 
theoretical consideration.
2.  Structured Indeterminacy
It is essential for our symbolic system in general that it be 
indeterminate, that is flexible to a necessary extent. As we can 
learn from Hubert L. Dreyfus: “This indeterminacy plays a 
crucial role in human perception” (1979: 240). This is perfect-
ly applicable to language, but also to other forms of cognition.
In language-comprehension we seem to be less ready to attribute such an importance to indeterminacy though, I am 
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certain, semantic indeterminism is no less productive than the 
visual one. For instance, in deciphering a metaphor we cannot 
do else but take the meaning in the sense other than the literal 
one. Yet, this ‘otherness’ is in no way given or determined but 
has to be sought out within the field of possible signification 
that requires imaginative projections.
Iam also certain that adaptability is no less an important feature of language as it is of perception. By allowing 
flexible scanning throughout the field of possible meanings 
a speaker or listener, as well as a perceiver, practices adapt-
ability according to which, to put is somewhat provocatively, 
“words can say more than they mean” (E. T. Gendlin, 1995), 
and, analogously I could say, pictures can mean more than 
they depict. 
Indeterminacy, vagueness, ambiguity, adaptability, fuzziness o similar alone cannot provide full explanation of how this 
inference beyond the literal (and actually beyond the possible) 
in language and perception is achievable. Most theoretical 
talk about these concepts is satisfied with mere stating that 
there exist phenomena of the sort and at best suggest that they 
need not be perceived as something negative. However, there 
is more to this aspect of language than the suggestion above 
signalizes.
The mechanisms of meaning, or rather processes of mean-ing, are such that most modern accounts cannot cope 
with them in an adequate way, because the schemes they offer 
are too strict and static as to successfully model the dynamic 
and indeterminate fluctuation of meaning, which in addition 
should be open toward possible signification. It is exactly this 
latent or implicit potentiality of meaning that seems to me to be 
so crucial not only in metaphor-making and language-usage, 
but also for cognition in general.
I t is justifiable to say that we live in the world of possible meanings more than in the world of actual (literal) mean-
ings, the same way it is possible to say that we rely more on the 
imaginary (or unseen) than on the presently given (actually 
seen). Yet we still feel uneasy in admitting the relevance of 
these elements, as if their acceptance and implementation in 
a theory would automatically mean a betrayal of objectivity 
and disappearance of exactness. However, this is a profound 
mistake for the ‘exact’ or so called ‘hard’ sciences have already 
deconstructed such a myth. (Because of that scientific rigor 
did not disappear; it has only changed its character – and 
maybe became more humane.)
Scientific models are a prototype, philosophically 
speaking, for imaginative creation of schemes based on 
natural language and experience, but they go beyond it 
by metaphorical extension to construct symbolic worlds 
that may or may not adequately represent certain 
aspects of the empirical world. (Arbib and Hesse, 1986: 
161; emphasis added)
Asupport for the assumption that even science, habitually considered to be the realm of brute facts, is not freed 
from the sort of imaginary projections, or imaginary idealiza-
tions, could be found in Cassirer’s An Essay on Man: 
The facts of science always imply a theoretical, which 
means a symbolic, element. Many, if not most, of those 
scientific facts which have changed the whole course 
of the history of science have been hypothetical facts 
before they became observable facts. When Galileo 
found his new science of dynamics he had to begin 
with the conception of an entirely isolated body, a body 
which moves without the influence of any external 
force. Such a body had never been observed and could 
never be observed. It was not an actual but a possible 
body – and in a sense it was not even possible, for the 
condition upon which Galileo based his conclusion, the 
absence of all external forces, is never realized in nature. 
(Cassirer, 1964: 58-59; emphasis added)
The idealization of the sort could have only emerged within scientist’s imagination, contrary to the empirical 
evidence. The imaginary turned out to be primary; the observ-
able had to conform to the idealized projections that rooted in 
the scientist’s imaginary projection of the “impossible”.
In this context Cassirer speaks of “indirectness” (75), and a necessity of man to lift his gaze “above the sphere of imme-
diate needs” (75). He brings the point further in that he says: 
Instead of being moved immediately by an actual 
stimulus, he looks to possible needs, to the satisfaction 
of which he prepares the means in advance. (…)  
The impulse does not derive solely from the force of  
the present; instead it belongs also to the future, which 
must be anticipated in some fashion in order to become 
effective in this way. The ‘pre-presentation’ of the future 
characterizes all human action. We must set before 
ourselves in ‘images’ something not yet an existing 
thing, in order, then, to proceed from this ‘possibility’  
to the ‘reality’, from potency to act. (1974: 75)
Now, to be clear, the future exists only within the act of imagination. The potential is not evident in the actually 
given or observable; it can only be constructed by the power 
of imagination.
3.  Making Inference About  
the »Impossible«
It was already Descartes who explicitly stated that what is 
imaginable is also in a way possible. Hume put the same idea 
in somewhat other terms: “Nothing we imagine is absolutely 
impossible” (1965: 32) 
Applied to the current discussion it means that there are no metaphors, no unobservable data, and no forms of 
aesthetic expression that are too radical, too unlikely or actual-
ly impossible. Certainly it does not mean that “anything goes” 
in metaphor-making, perception and art; that any arbitrary 
juxtaposition will do, or that meanings can be always success-
fully imposed. However, for the present purposes it is impor-
tant to stress that (1) meanings are not in any sense given or 
predetermined. (2) If it is so than deciphering of meanings 
(verbal and other) is a sort of inference that is to be perceived 
as a dynamic process opened to the realm of potentiality. (3) 
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A precondition for any such mutation of meaning is semantic 
flexibility and indeterminacy that could be productively used 
only by an active engaging of imagination. 
What seems to be purely speculative may turn out to be rewarding for understanding of the most down-
to-earth things. The imaginary may prove to be an explana-
tory mode for understanding of empirical reality. As Nelson 
Goodman puts it: “Possible worlds of fiction lie within actual 
worlds. Fiction operates in actual worlds in much the same 
way as nonfiction.” (1978: 104) 
Scientific inquiry, far from being a collection of facts or even a problem-solving activity (as understood by philosophers 
at the beginning of the past century) is to a great extent is an 
enterprise of applying concepts beyond immediate experience 
or experimenting with possibilities which exceed the threshold 
of the empirical, and that exist only within the confines of the 
imaginary.
According to Janet M. Soskice and Rom Harré: “Most sci-ences are (…) inclined to include assertions about those 
features of the world that are beyond all possible experience.” 
(1995: 290; emphasis added) Indeed, describing modern 
science as a “play of possibilities” (le jeu des possible) molecular 
biologist François Jacob confirms the view spelled out by the 
philosophers of science, and says:
Scientific advances often come from uncovering some 
previously unseen aspects of things, not so much as 
a result of using some new instrument, but rather 
of looking at objects from a new angle. This look is 
necessarily guided by a certain idea of how so called 
reality might be. (1982: 11; emphasis added) 
In other words, it is an imaginary reality to which the science advances rather than the one erected on the bedrock of hard 
facts. And that – says Jacob quoting Peter Medawar – always 
involves a certain representation of the unknown, that is, of 
what is beyond that we have logical or experimental reason to 
believe. Scientific investigation begins by inventing a possible 
world, or a small piece of a possible world ( Jacob, 1982: 11-
12; my emphasis). 
In a sort of free paraphrase one could say that it is not the in-strument alone and not measuring in the first place that can 
bring science a significant step toward progression but rather 
‘opening’ of novel vistas which in its turn enables ‘opening’ of 
new worlds. And, as we are instructed: “For science, there are 
many possible worlds” ( Jacob, 1982: 12)
A mode of opening up a possible world in literature and art, according to Paul Ricœur, is to be found in metaphor-
usage. Ricœur is chiefly concerned with analysis of a literary 
text, and says:
What has to be understood is what points toward a 
possible world thanks to the non-ostensive reference of 
the text. Texts speak of possible worlds and of possible 
ways of orienting oneself in those worlds. (1974: 106; 
emphasis added)
In creating possible worlds of science, literature and art through the “play of possibilities” we are constantly initiat-
ing new “mutations of meaning”3 that require radical leap of 
imagination capable of confronting even the impossible. How-
ever, experimenting with the impossible is fully legitimate and 
is present everywhere where there is a creative impulse to beat 
the cannons of common-sense, habits of thought, and stan-
dards of convention, be it in the domain of science or art. Even 
the ‘impossible’ appears as a form of possibility4. The path to 
possible world often makes its way through all kinds of impos-
sibilities, and that is a work of imagination. Thus, the “ruling 
out of impossible worlds is a serious liability in its own right. 
For semantics needs impossible worlds.” (Lycan, 1990/91: 224; 
emphasis added). But impossibility (das Unmögliche) has an 
unstable status. Much or even most, of revolutionary scientific 
discoveries, and artistic innovations alike, have been labeled as 
revolutionary because they denoted the break with tradition in 
a drastic way and were all considered impossible to be true or 
aesthetically relevant. from the ‘impossibility’ that the Earth is 
spherical, or the ‘impossibility’ of displacing it from the centre 
of the solar system, to he newer paradoxes of quantum physics 
that are not in accord with what counts as scientifically pos-
sible, the history of science, and no less that of art too, is but a 
long report on the cases initially conceived as evidently ‘false’ 
that later proved not to be so. 
The man of science and the man of art pass through the same process of maturation as the “metaphorical man” 
does, who realizes that at some time impossible metaphorical 
juxtaposition turns out to initiate new perspectives and so 
achieve a fresh cognitive shift. He too (for, after all, it is the 
same human being) realizes that what is at some time possible 
as a fiction can at some other time be acknowledged as a fact.
The parallelism between scientific and aesthetic world-views and shifts of metaphorical meaning speaks about 
the evolutionary process that they all undergo. As initial absur-
dity of a metaphor or oxymoron proves to be interpretable, so 
actual impossibility that the scientist or artist meet turns out 
to be fictionally possible, due to the power of imagination. And 
as today’s vital metaphor is a candidate to be accepted tomor-
row as ‘dead’ so can today’s ‘impossible’ scientific, literary or 
artistic world become a future possible, and indeed actual, one. 
Concluding Remarks
Metaphor does not state what seems to be empirically 
evident, but uses cross-fertilization of disparate meanings in 
order to shape new perspectives and so outline what could be 
the case, even when it contradicts the known and the logical. 
It bridges the gap between the given and the projected, the 
evident and the probable, the conventional and the hypotheti-
cal – which all requires an engagement of imagination. Thus the 
difference between the literal and metaphorical use of language 
is not just the one between the straightforward and ambiguous, 
the plain and possible, but touches on a more profound rela-
tion between repetition and innovation, between imitation and 
creation, and also affirms imagination as a constitutive part of it.
3 See Radman, 1995b.
4 Here echo Goethe’s words: “In der Idee leben hiesst, dass Unmögliche so behandeln 
als wenn es möglich wäre.”)
170
Imaginacija, čutnost in umetnost / Zbornik referatov III. sredozemskega kongresa za estetiko
Zdravko RADMAN: IMAGINING THE IMPOSSIBLE, 166-170
In metaphor we exercise imagination so that we can make things appear otherwise. Metaphor enables us to depart 
more radically from what is immediately present toward de-
signing what is imaginatively possible. A leap from an initial 
indeterminacy to projected or fictional possibility of meaning 
represents a cognitive shift from initial puzzle to articulated 
pattern.
Strange enough, in the era when both the so-called hard sciences and mathematics have accepted in-determinacy, 
in-certainty, dis-continuity, imaginary and irreal numbers as 
their fundamental concepts, there is still scepsis and resistance 
toward recognition of analogous notions in philosophy of lan-
guage and philosophy or art. It seems that there is an implicit 
fear that introduction of such negative terms would necessarily 
mean departure from certainty, lawfulness and consistency. 
Such fear is, however, unfounded for where there is indetermi-
nacy in language and thought there is also flexibility, and with 
it there is increased variability, which is a precondition for new 
matching and new combinatory structuring, as well as fresh 
associative links. An apparent lack of certainty proved to be 
proved to be able to open up new possibilities of reading and 
interpretation, and in that sense also to create new imaginary 
alternatives for existing order of things.
In the process of metaphor-making (both in science and in art and literature) we mobilize the potentiality beyond the 
frontiers of “cool reason” that might prove to be cognitively 
relevant. In ignoring the logic, and in neglecting empirical 
evidence and truth we are not acting irrationally, and are not 
telling deliberate lies, but are first of all fighting stereotypes of 
convention and habits of thought in order to create new imagi-
nary but meaningful spaces. This is a mode of achieving novel 
cognitive perspective on new and possible – and, yes, even the 
‘impossible’ – worlds. 
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UNE APPROCHE ESTHéTIQUE  
DE WALTER BENJAMIN À L’œUVRE DU PEINTRE 
SURRéALISTE NIKOS EGONOPOULOS
L’  œuvre surréaliste de l’artiste grec est directe-ment liée au contexte historique et socioculturel de la génération grecque de la période entre les deux guerres mondiales.
Le surréalisme en Grèce est présenté par les artistes issus de la bourgeoisie mais aussi de la haute bourgeoisie. 
Même si ces artistes se déclarent marxistes, ils gardent 
leur distance par rapport à la partie communiste grecque. 
D’ailleurs, le rôle du surréalisme en Grèce se restreint au 
domaine artistique, puisque les circonstances particulières 
des années trente (la dictature de Metaxas) n’ont pas favorisé 
son aspect politique1.
Pendant cette période le mouvement du surréalisme de l’ouest fut manifesté d’une part comme une révolution 
contre la tradition et l’idéologie prépondérante, et d’autre part 
comme un symptôme de l’impasse de cette époque – celle 
d’entre-deux-guerres – qui a vécu les conséquences de celle qui 
fut probablement la plus profonde des ruptures dans l’histoire 
politique et sociale occidentale.
Ce qui est le plus important est qu’à travers ce mouve-ment - pour la première fois dans l’histoire de l’art et 
des recherches concernant les arts plastiques - le hasard, le 
désir, l’inconscient et la transcription des procédures du rêve 
devinrent les éléments primordiaux de la création artistique2.
Le peintre et poète Nikos Egonopoulos – dont l’œuvre on analysera pendant cette présentation – étant influencé par 
le mouvement surréaliste et en particulier par le peintre italien 
De Chirico, il essaierait d’une part d’accentuer l’imaginaire, 
la sensualité et l’absurde et d’autre part de créer son propre 
style d’art, fondé sur des valeurs irrationnelles tout en utilisant 
les normes plastiques ou esthétiques de la tradition grecque, 
influencées par la Mythologie et l’art Byzantin.
1 Cf. Référence à Nikos Egonopoulos (1907 - 1985), dans les anales Chartis, no 25/26.
2 Cf. Bréton André, Genèse et perspective artistique du surréalisme, ed : Gallimard, 
Paris, 1965,
 Cf. Passeron René, Histoire de la peinture surréaliste, ed : Bibliothèque Générale 
Française, Paris, 1968.
Un deuxième point qu’on doit souligner est que son œuvre fut moins basé sur l’esprit de l’utopie européenne et plus 
sur la tradition grecque.
On devrait donc examiner à quel point l’artiste grec parvint à combiner le besoin de retour à la tradition 
grecque avec l’esprit iconoclaste et les positions révolution-
naires, idéologiques et théoriques du surréalisme.
A la fin, l’approche esthétique de Walter Benjamin à l’œuvre d’Egonopoulos nous aidera à découvrir s’il s’agît d’un 
peintre surréaliste qui, selon l’avis du philosophe, fait apparaî-
tre une conception radicale de liberté, et encore plus s’il s’agît 
d’un mouvement grec lié au caractère irrationnel et tragique 
qui marque l’aventure de l’utopie surréaliste.
L’approche que je viens de mentionner présente une grande difficulté parce que quand Walter Benjamin, dans 
son œuvre « Œuvres II »3, se réfère au mouvement surréal-
iste, il souligne le fait que les surréalistes redonnent vie à une 
conception de la liberté absolument radicale. Il se réfère, bien 
évidemment au trajet artistique et idéologique du mouvement. 
D’un mouvement qui tente de mettre entièrement en question 
un héritage affaiblit par ses contradictions internes.
I l est évident que Benjamin se met d’accord avec le fait que la tradition n’est plus accessible, vue sa rupture avec le progrès, 
qui lui, il apporte tant d’espoir. Ce qui est, tout de même, con-
solant, est qu’il était convaincu de l’existence d’une vérité et 
d’une union classiques du monde.
Réciproquement, en ce qui concerne Egonopoulos, la tradition fonctionnait comme une source de renouvel-
lement. La Mythologie grecque, dès le 20ème siècle, fit part de 
la vie de tous les jours et devint une incitation à la critique du 
statu quo de l’époque. Cela fonctionnerait comme un moyen 
de visionner irrationnellement l’avenir.
3 Cf. Benjamin Walter, « Le surréalisme. Le dernier instant  
de l’intelligentsia européenne », Œuvres II, ed : Gallimard, Paris, 2000,  
p : 113 – 134.
 Et Ibid. : « Sur la peinture, ou signe et tache », Œuvres I, ed : Gallimard,  
Paris, 2000, p : 172 – 178.
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A.  L’articulation surréaliste de l’image
On verra maintenant si et à quel point l’artiste grec adopte 
les déterminants constituants prépondérants de l’image on-
irique en termes de surréalisme et s’il avance à un point de 
écriture automatique expérimentale.
C’est bien connu que l’écriture automatique fut utilisée comme moyen, aussi bien de délivrance psychique, que 
de culture du potentiel, inné de la personne au niveau création. 
D’ailleurs, les surréalistes occidentaux étaient dans l’embarras, 
ne sachant pas comment appliquer l’écriture automatique à la 
peinture et surtout à l’image, d’autant plus quand la peinture 
n’est pas exprimée à travers des formes absurdes mais de façon 
plutôt descriptive4.
Ainsi, aussi bien qu’au domaine de l’art plastique, l’expérience de l’automatisme de la pensée et du geste 
graphique pratiqué par les surréalistes a bouleversé les rap-
ports que la tradition représentative avait établis, depuis la 
Renaissance, entre l’artiste et la société mais aussi entre l’artiste 
et sa propre création plagiant par des processus fort similaires à 
ceux qui se manifestent dans le rêve.
4 Bréton, lui-même, en parle dans son œuvre Le surréalisme et la peinture, Paris, 
1928.
1. Est-ce que l’artiste grec utilisa 
l’écriture automatique dans son œuvre ?
Je considère que les conceptions surréalistes les plus 
osées de l’artiste grec sont rencontrées approximativement 
entre 1938 et 1950, c’est-à-dire pendant sa précoce et première 
période surréaliste.
Dans ses œuvres de cette période, on constate une fabulation riche et inventive, enrichie d’un humour qui est caractéris-
tiquement corrosif et ambigu. On constate également la coexistence 
des symboles et types de l’art byzantin à des emblèmes métaphy-
siques de De Chirico5 ou bien à des éléments purement surréalistes.
Ces créations sont caractérisées d’une expression artistique plus libre, touchée par l’émotion des vécus multiples et 
encore frais, en provenance aussi bien du domaine de l’art et 
de la tradition grecs, que du domaine de l’avant-garde occiden-
tale et surtout du surréalisme6.
5 Le contenu mythologique de l’œuvre de De Chirico, pendant cette période, est 
une revitalisation de divers époques culturelles de l’Ouest (Antiquité, Moyen 
Age, Renaissance).
 Cf. De Chirico G., Mémoires, ed : Editions de la Table Ronde, Paris, 1965, aussi, 
Courtion P., Le rêve : Giorgio De Chirico, Panorama de la Peinture française 
contemporaine, Paris, 1927.
6 Notre source principale en ce qui concerne l’œuvre du peintre grec est le livre 
de Niki Loizidis, Le surréalisme dans l’art grec moderne, Le cas de Nicos Egonopou-
los, ed : Nefeli, Athènes, 1984.
L’esprit de la solitude, 1939
Poète et la muse, 1938 Dedales, 1949
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L’inscription « A louer » fonctionne ici comme un 3) 
signal autonome qui obéit, cependant, à l’esprit de la 
syntaxe libre et irrationnelle de l’image. Le peintre, 
à travers l’image de l’annonce locative, il tente de 
donner l’impression du collage.
Il serait utile d’ajouter que le cours corrosif du temps 4) 
qui est ici symbolisé à l’aide de l’élément marin, est 
à l’opposé de la décoration élégante, surprenante et 
attrayante de la chambre.
A travers l’œuvre « Dioscures », Egonopoulos s’approche plus directement à la problématique de la notion de la 
«surprise», liée à l’œuvre de Magritte. 
Les Dioscures apparaissent en portant l’un, un costume chique de promenade et l’autre un maillot de bains, en 
contradiction profane avec le chapeau noir, le monocle et la 
médaille.
La description rhétorique de l’œuvre surprend le spec-tateur.
Cependant, dans la plupart des cas, tandis que l’image s’articule à travers d’éléments idiomatiques ou purement 
surréalistes, l’expression, seule, ne peut pas être caractérisée 
purement surréaliste. Il est probable qu’Egonopoulos ne vou-
lait pas que son œuvre soit étranger à l’espace grec comme une 
complète et aveugle application des principes du surréalisme 
international. 
I l utilise pourtant des techniques connues dans l’espace des arts plastiques.
La technique du collage, par exemple, est la technique a) 
qui correspond le plus et qui reflète le plus fidèlement le 
caractère hétéroclite et fragmenté du mythe moderne et 
de l’espace imaginaire contemporain. 
Des images et des éléments isolés de la réalité émanant 
de la civilisation technocratique et industrielle contem-
poraine – que la conscience de l’artiste lutte à cartog-
raphier – coexistent à des images et des fragments de 
mémoire du passé.  
Selon Benjamin, comme nous l’explique dans son œu-
vre « Sens Unique »8, les mots, comme les facettes, sont 
des fragments, violemment arrachés de la réalité, qui en 
même temps conserve leur mémoire. 
Le surréalisme a, en effet, identifié le collage à un vé-
ritable élément de «métaphysique» des rencontres 
imprévues et surprenantes. C’est-à-dire que cette tech-
nique a été utilisée comme un catalyseur des valeurs 
traditionnelles et du statu quo, comme c’est le cas dans 
les œuvres de Réné Magritte.  
C’est un fait qu’Egonopoulos, refusant d’être en rup-
ture avec la tradition, n’a pas assez expérimenté avec 
la technique du collage ou la lithographie puisque 
son écriture est plus symbolique qu’onirique et 
puisque l’espace et les formes ne sont pas soumis à 
des interventions violentes de dérèglement ou de 
déformation. 
8 Cf. Benjamin W., Sens Unique précédé de l’enfance berlinoise, trad : Lacoste J., ed : 
Les Lettres Nouvelles, Paris, 1978, p : 147 – 243.
Un autre élément proéminant de ces créations est qu’Egonopoulos fonctionne des fois d’une articula-
tion statique de l’image – clairement influencé de De 
Chirico et de l’art byzantin – et des fois il avance à un 
mouvement vif et agité des formes dans l’espace mais il 
garde presque toujours l’équilibre à l’aide d’un cadre scé-
nographique austère. 
L’œuvre « Hora Ruit », (1939), est par exemple un de rares œuvres qui donnent l’impression d’un espace «sur-
réaliste» qui vibre des fictions oniriques et des projections 
hallucinatoires.
A  Hora Ruit7, on peut constater : 
L’interpénétration de l’espace intérieur et extérieur. 1) 
Il s’agît d’une des déterminantes de la topographie 
emblématique des surréalistes et en particulier de 
De Chirico. 
On peut également distinguer la formation du 2) 
mélange de deux formes féminines et l’usage 
surréaliste de types symboliques de l’art byzantin.
7 De même, le cours de l’élément marin dans la chambre aux meubles blancs, la 
forme surprise de la femme dont les mains poussent, comme des tentacules, les 
yeux “vigilants” qui ressortent de la crinière onduleuse, forment un espace agité 
qui semble être électrisé d’une envie de vigilance et d’un sentiment de panique.
Hermes en attente, 1939
Argonautes, 1970La guerre civile, 1940
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Cependant dans les images d’Egonopoulos on distingue b) 
la technique du montage. Il s’agît de la coexistence des 
éléments hétéroclites, d’une frustration des objets de tous 
les jours ou du symbole poétique dans un espace qui n’est 
pas familier. Cela ne veut d’autant dire que cette concep-
tion soit appliquée à l’articulation violente et partielle de 
l’image.  
Dans l’œuvre « L’esprit de la solitude », (1939) par ex-
emple, l’articulation hétéroclite et irrationnelle de l’image 
au premier niveau (coexistence du salon bourgeois irra-
tionnel avec la nature morte et l’inscription) est encadrée 
d’un décor paysagiste qui se trouve en accord avec les 
règles de la figuration traditionnelle. 
Néanmoins, on ne constate ici ni les dérèglements 
violents de la perspective ni les artifices d’illusion, systé-
matiquement utilisés par De Chirico et qui se retrouvent 
dans la plupart des œuvres d’Egonopoulos.  
Dans l’œuvre « Le phonographe au bord de la mer », 
(1940), on constate le caractère mélancolique de l’image 
à travers la couleur du ciel noir et surtout à travers l’ombre 
du spectre qui se dresse derrière la femme nue qui a un 
poisson entre les mains. Dans son autre ouvre, « La guerre 
Civile », (1949), nous voyons deux femmes à moitié 
nues, encadrées d’un paysage industrialisé 
L’artiste a créé ces œuvres à une période envahie de pres-
sions au niveau psychologique. 
Dans l’œuvre « Hermès en attente », (1939) 
d’Egonopoulos, qui est d’ailleurs très intéressante, l’artiste 
crée une alchimie attirante de formes et de symboles qui 
ont leurs origines dans l’emblématique mélancolique de 
De Chirico mais aussi dans la déclamation corrosive de 
Magritte. 
Il est, pourtant, tout aussi difficile de parler d’une écriture 
onirique ou de l’usage subversif du code de la représenta-
tion «réaliste» que Magritte applique systématiquement 
dans ses œuvres. 
Quelqu’un pourrait affirmer la même chose pour 
« La synthèse », (1964), - œuvre de la période mature 
d’Egonopoulos – qui attire l’attention du spectateur à 
l’aide de son utilisation agile mais aussi énigmatique des 
symboles.
On constate aussi que la confrontation – pleine c) 
d’insinuations symboliques – de l’archaïque aux «man-
nequins» contemporains, placée dans le cadre d’un décor 
avec un rideau lourd, semi fermé, révèle une approche 
byzantine du paysage avec un temple antique. La colonne 
antique qui se trouve à coté d’un mannequin portant un 
casque et la vielle lampe qui se trouve en premier niveau, 
fixent la dimension poétique du «dépaysement» des 
objets dans un espace mystérieux et non déterminé. Cet 
espace fonctionne en tant que caméra obscure, à travers la 
quelle se dressent les mannequins, des symboles d’une ère 
et des périodes culturelles du passé.
On peut constater que l’articulation statique de l’image, sa fonction symbolique –méticuleusement étudiée – 
l’articulation pure et non troublée de l’espace, ont tous comme 
résultat la formation d’une écriture qui s’éloigne constamment 
de l’aventure de l’automatisme psychique. D’ailleurs, pendant 
cette période-là des années 60, cela ne se produit pas qu’à 
l’œuvre d’Egonopoulos.
2. La forme humaine dans l’œuvre 
d’Egonopoulos 
La forme du mannequin apparaît dans la peinture 
d’Egonopoulos comme un alliage d’influences de la littérature 
et du théâtre d’avant-garde mais aussi de la métaphysique 
de De Chirico. Elle n’est pourtant pas exprimée d’une façon 
extrême, catalytique ou eschatologique. Les premières formes 
de mannequins d’Egonopoulos ont un creux énigmatique au 
visage et restent debout à côté des trappes ouvertes qui don-
nent l’impression d’endroits menaçants.
L’œuvre « Le poète et la Muse », (1938) est l’œuvre d’Egonopoulos qui présente, du moins morphologique-
ment, beaucoup d’éléments communs aux œuvres strictement 
géométriques de la peinture métaphysique et surtout de celle 
de la période des mannequins de De Chirico (p.ex. : « Le 
Prophète », 1915).
a. Les formes mentionnées ci-dessus sont influencées de a) 
l’art plastique grec byzantin et archaïque. Elles sont tout 
à fait muettes et sans les caractéristiques d’un visage, elles 
rappellent la formation des Kouros et des saints byzantins 
à des positions en face.
D’ailleurs, la formation habituelle des mannequins b) 
d’Egonopoulos, rapportant à des statues, présente plein 
de caractéristiques communs au développement plas-
tique des formes de la dite «période romaine» de De 
Chirico. Il s’agît d’une période de retour aux racines, à 
la vision aussi bien de la Grèce antique que de Rome 
antique, qui s’effectue après l’aménagement de l’artiste 
italien à Rome en 1918. 
Malgré cela, «le mannequin métaphysique» de De 
Chirico fut adopté des mouvements suivants qui recher-
chaient un symbole contemporain de révolution contre 
la civilisation technocratique et les idéaux du statu quo. 
D’ailleurs, on doit souligner le fait que les formes 
d’Egonopoulos subissent des influences flagrantes de 
surréalistes. Ces influences ne se repèrent pas seulement 
au caractère imaginatif et irrationnel de ses concep-
tions excentriques (des figures zoomorphes, des corps 
acéphales avec des pots des fleurs, des bouquets ou 
bien des masques à la place du visage), mais aussi à 
l’atmosphère fort érotique qui y règne (par exemple son 
œuvre « Hermès en attente »). Le moyen de représenta-
tion du sexe est assez caractéristique. Il s’éloigne de la 
nature androgyne idéale du mannequin métaphysique 
de De Chirico. 
D’autant plus que l’apparition provocante de la forme 
féminine, surtout dans les œuvres surréalistes tardifs de 
ces derniers vingt ans, constitue un écho de la révolu-
tion surréaliste qui utilisa l’érotisme comme un élément 
catalytique mais aussi comme un outil d’attaque contre 
les contrats sociaux et les préjugés bourgeois. Son œuvre 
« Dioni », (1949), constitue un hymne surréaliste à la 
beauté féminine. 
Les seins du mannequin sont la partie qui attire le plus 
d’attention, tandis que sa tête a la forme d’un pion. Le 
mannequin, en lui-même, constitue probablement une 
référence péjorative aux mœurs contemporaines. Il 
paraît d’incarner le mythe – aussi bien ancien que mod-
erne – de la femme-amazone, avec un humour, on dirait 
plutôt corrosif. On peut ajouter aussi quelques autres 
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œuvres dévoués aux femmes : « La muse méditer-
ranéenne », (1957), « A la plage », (1976) et « Iro et 
Léandros », (1981). 
On peut remarquer que dans l’œuvre d’Egonopoulos la 
femme apparaît comme une présence énigmatique mais 
en même temps fort sensuelle.  
Au surréalisme, en général, les transformations de la 
forme féminine «insultante» sont assez nombreuses. La 
femme-automate, sans les distinctifs de son sexe, ap-
paraît souvent dans l’œuvre de De Chirico, de Max Ray, 
de Max Ernst etc. 
Comme le cite Benjamin dans « Le triomphe de 
l’allégorie » : « la femme chez Baudelaire est le butin le 
plus précieux, dans le «triomphe de l’allégorie». » La 
vie qui signifie la mort9.  
Au contraire, les origines esthétiques et mythiques de 
la femme-»hybride» chez Egonopoulos, sont en rela-
tion directe avec les déesses, les nymphes, la Vierge au 
Byzance mais aussi avec la femme-hétaire, symbole de la 
provocation sociale à caractère catalytique et irrésistible 
des surréalistes.
3. La fonction symbolique de l’objet 
dans l’œuvre d’Egonopoulos
La philosophie de l’art de Walter Benjamin exprime 
surtout une sensibilité exacerbée aux contradictions de la 
modernité qui n’est pas étrangère à notre époque. Il aperçoit 
ces contradictions à travers le contact avec les «choses» et 
les événements les plus banals de la vie de tous les jours (par 
exemple : une flânerie dans les rues de Berlin ou de Florence 
ou même les noms des rues, etc.). Il parle du monde des objets 
qui entoure l’homme et qui prend de plus en plus des expres-
sions implacables de la marchandise. Il pense à une politisation 
de l’art. Ses analyses sont des immersions qui visent à instaurer 
une sorte d’intimité, de sympathie avec l’objet10.
En ce qui concerne Egonopoulos, on pourrait dire que la fonction symbolique de l’objet est étroitement liée à la 
problématique de De Chirico tout en conservant suffisam-
ment d’éléments du domaine de surréalisme.
L’artiste grec ne paraît pas se complaire au jeu avec le hasard mais il cherche des résultats intelligibles à travers 
la culture consciente de l’esprit de l’absurde. Les anneaux qui 
remplacent la tête de la femme dans l’œuvre « Statue crépit 
d’une manière livide », ou le pot des fleurs qui couronnent la 
forme féminine imposante dans l’œuvre « Hermès en attente », 
(1939) constituent des trouvailles qui s’approchent beaucoup 
à l’esprit de Magritte.
De même, la forme de monstre du complexe de l’homme et du cheval dans l’œuvre « L’amant de Lady Chaterlay » 
ou dans « Plus ou romantique » est un caractéristique du 
secteur surréaliste de l’imaginaire qu’on retrouve dans l’œuvre 
de Ernst ou de Dali. Nous pouvons donner comme exemple 
l’œuvre de Marx Ernst « Une semaine de bonté », (1934)11.
9 Cf. Benjamin W., « Zentral Park » (14), Revue d’Esthétique, numéro spéciale, 
No 1, 1981, p : 16.
10 Cf. Benjamin W., « Paysages Urbains », Sens Unique, op. cit. p : 245 – 302.
11 Voir aussi l’ouvre de Marx Ernst « Au-delà de la peinture », Cahiers d’Arts, 
Paris, 1936.
D ans l’œuvre d’Egonopoulos nous remarquons :
Le dépaysement de l’objet de tous les jours dans un espace a) 
qui paraît déplacé – comme par exemple la présence d’un 
moule du café en pleine campagne – constitue un caracté-
ristique de l’écriture de De Chirico et des surréalistes mais 
qu’on retrouve en même temps chez Egonopoulos. Cer-
tains objets symboliques qu’on retrouve dans les œuvres 
d’Egonopoulos se référent à l’esprit de la tradition grecque.
L’utilisation montage. Le surréalisme fut le premier mou-b) 
vement à découvrir la force révolutionnaire émanant de 
«l’ancien», à travers des objets dont l’éclat se fane petit 
à petit, ou des objets qui ne sont plus à la mode. Paris fut 
pour les surréalistes le centre d’un monde de ces objets. 
A l’aide de telles corrélations, les rues, les places et les 
arcs de la ville nous incitent d’y penser d’une manière 
complètement différente quand on songe aux événements 
auxquels nous défèrent. La force révélatrice du montage 
que Benjamin reconnaît à ces corrélations, est adoptée 
comme moyen de reconnaissance de la ville. 
Pourtant, Egonopoulos n’utilise que très peu la logique du 
montage, contrairement à d’autres méthodes qui donnent 
l’opportunité pour une autre reconnaissance. Il utilisa la 
coexistence des espaces intérieurs et extérieurs.
4. Dialectique de l’image  
(intérieur – extérieur). 
Dans son œuvre « Le poète et la Muse », (1938), les formes 
se trouvent dans un décor ouvert, isolé du reste du monde. 
De tous les objets stéréométriques qui se trouvent sur le sol, ce qui nous attire le plus l’attention est un rectan-
gulaire. Sur l’une de ses côtés, on distingue la peinture d’une 
partie d’une cours ou d’un intérieur à des conques et dont le 
sol a la forme d’un échiquier élevé en perspective. 
I l s’agît d’un artifice de l’espace illusionniste qui est déjà connu des fresques romaines du 1er siècle A.C. Cet artifice 
illusionniste de «la peinture à l’intérieur de la peinture» con-
stitue la thématique fondamentale de la « Métaphysique des 
intérieurs », (1915 - 1917) de De Chirico. Plus tard, cela passe 
aux surréalistes comme un élément fondamental de la forma-
tion et de l’articulation de l’espace onirique.
Pour De Chirico, «la peinture à l’intérieur de la peinture» prend un sens plus symbolique – métaphysique, en 
dénotant la nature illusionniste des phénomènes du monde 
intérieur, tandis que pour les surréalistes, cette question illu-
sionniste prend un caractère plutôt idéologique et social.
En ce qui concerne Egonopoulos, on constate que dans son œuvre « Le poète et la Muse », il tente une confron-
tation du décor métaphysique – illusionniste avec la réalité 
du «monde extérieur» qui y est représentée d’une maison 
néo-classique, du couleur bleu de la mer et du couple des 
vacanciers.
En plus, dans son œuvre « L’esprit de la solitude », (1939), Egonopoulos adopte avec succès certains des détermi-
nants de l’image surréaliste. Plus particulièrement, il tente une 
coexistence d’espaces intérieurs et extérieurs.
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B.  Reviviscence de la Mythologie Grecque 
dans l’œuvre d’Egonopoulos
Le surréalisme continuait librement son cours jusqu’au 
noyau originaire des mythes12. Au 20ème siècle la mythologie 
grecque s’implique à la vie de tous les jours contemporaine ; 
elle devient une stimulation pour la critique du statu quo ; 
elle se transforme en un revêtement merveilleux aux slogans 
sociaux les plus abatants ; elle fonctionne comme un moyen de 
vision irrationnelle de l’avenir.
Le mythe du labyrinthe n’a pas laissé Egonopoulos indif-férent, qui a dessiné « Dédales » en 1949, reconstituant 
ainsi l’Homo Faber. En 1960, nous avons son œuvre « Thésée 
et Minotaure ».
En Grèce, l’antiquité grecque et ses mythes inspirent Parthenis, Gounaropoulos, Tsarouhis et tant d’autres 
artistes de la génération de la période d’entre-deux-guerres.
Egonopoulos est celui qui forme, comme on en a déjà parlé, une nouvelle mythologie.
Beaucoup d’œuvres d’Egonopoulos sont dominées par la personnalité polymorphe et pittoresque du dieu Hermès. 
La personnalité de ce dieu a aussi attiré l’attention de De 
Chirico, surtout à cause de ses qualités d’agitateur de rêves et 
de dormeur.
Le rêve, ainsi que la situation catatonique semi-consciente qui incite les expressions de l’âme les plus lucides et mys-
tiques, inspire aux autres surréalistes la création artistique la 
plus authentique. 
Toutefois, l’Hermès d’Egonopoulos est une forme am-biguë qui contracte toutes les qualités du dieu archaïque, 
de manière charmante et parodique.
Dans l’œuvre « Hermès en attente », le dieu, une épée dans la main, à moitié nu mais en portant un chapeau de 
bourgeois européen, a l’air pensif tout en attendant les signes 
des temps. Tandis qu’au premier niveau de l’œuvre, deux mus-
es surréalistes à l’air inquiet, l’une archaïque et l’autre portant 
une toilette de l’époque, montrent l’une à l’autre d’un geste 
hiératique de la main et de l’index. Ce geste nous rappelle 
fortement les icones byzantines.
Dans cet œuvre d’Egonopoulos, l’impression de l’énigme et de l’inquiétude qui provoque «l’attente» pensive et 
non déterminée du dieu, s’équilibre et elle est partiellement 
affaiblie à travers l’envie couvée de l’humour «sacrilège» et 
catalytique. Cela est au bénéfice de la fonction poétique et 
plastique de l’image. Voir aussi son œuvre « Hermès et le 
poète », (1957).
Nous avons par la suite des couples qui représentent le dévouement conjugal ainsi que les rencontres des dieux 
12 De Chirico, et par la suite les surréalistes et peut être partiellement Egonopou-
los, redonnent vie aux mythes grecs à travers les influences directes et indi-
rectes de la pensée de deux des plus grands fondateurs de la pensée moderne 
occidentale : Nietzsche et Freund.
ou des héros avec des nymphes (« Hector et Andromaque », 
1969).
Ce caractère ambigu des «mythographies» d’Egonopoulos – qui est en même temps pieux et catalytique, nostal-
gique et péjoratif – constitue plutôt une caractéristique de la 
pensée sur les mythes formée, du début du 20ème siècle.
L’espace scénique présente une légère déformation per-spective, tandis que, par terre, aussi bien à gauche qu’à 
droite, les symboles anciens et modernes du «mythe» qui 
encadre «l’action» des héros, y sont placés. Bien évidem-
ment, le mythe, le décor et les formes des héros ont subit 
multiples déformations et dépaysements dans l’espace et le 
temps.
1. Retour aux racines
Ulysse en tant que symbole du retour au pays, de 
l’aventure et du retour aux racines, inspira à Egonopoulos une 
série d’œuvres.
Dans l’œuvre « Le retour d’Ulysse », (1947), l’héros légen-daire célèbre le retour en jouant au violon tandis qu’un 
oiseau chante assis sur sa tête. L’oiseau est symbole des événe-
ments joyeux et de l’euphorie érotique.
En même temps, le retour aux racines, c’est-à-dire à Ithaque, de l’Ulysse surréaliste constitue, lui aussi, un 
dépaysement multiple dans le temps et l’espace, puisque le 
drapeau grec à la fenêtre, en tant que décor de l’intérieur, 
constitue un amalgame hétéroclite d’éléments sociaux qui sont 
encadrés au niveau de la profondeur de l’image, d’une plage et 
des ruines d’un temple antique.
Le retour aux racines constitue un message culturel, étroite-ment lié au «mythe de la grécité» qui est passé dans 
l’œuvre d’Egonopoulos, non seulement à travers les revivis-
cences de la mythologie, mais aussi à travers les réformes sur-
réalistes des paraboles bibliques et les légendes et événements 
de l’histoire moderne.
On doit souligner le fait que l’espace surréaliste dans l’œuvre d’Egonopoulos ne coïncide pas entièrement avec 
l’espace onirique surréaliste. Il n’y a aucun doute qu’il préserve 
des origines en provenance de surréalisme et surtout de la 
topographie surréaliste-scénique de De Chirico. Le modèle 
psychologique d’iconographie de l’artiste grec, est la vaste 
topographie mnémonique des œuvres de la période méta-
physique. Par exemple son œuvre « Alexandre et Bucéphale », 
(1971) : dans le décor de la plage avec le temple antique qui 
est plus proche morphologiquement aux modèles byzan-
tins, on constate une connexion avec la période de jeunesse 
d’Alexandre le Grand.
I l ne faut pas omettre le fait que la vision de la «ville ou-bliée» qui conserve des mémoires inexpugnables de la 
Grèce antique et du Byzance, tient une place très importante 
dans l’esprit et l’âme du poète et peintre N. Egonopoulos.
I l s’agit de la réminiscence nostalgique de la grandeur du passé : ce crève-cœur inavoué du réfugié déraciné. 
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Il s’agit également d’une nostalgie du passé et d’un vision-nement de l’avenir, encouragés tout d’abord par les décors 
de la période métaphysique de De Chirico. Des éléments qui 
«hébergeront» par la suite les plans inspirés et les projections 
fantasmagoriques de l’utopie surréaliste.
I l s’agit finalement de la topographie onirique chez la plupart des artistes surréalistes. Rappelons-nous des errances mé-
lancoliques de Tanguy dans le monde des archétypes les plus 
éloignés dans la sphère de la mémoire.
2. Comment est-ce que l’imaginaire est-il 
exprimé dans l’œuvre d’Egonopoulos ?
En ce qui concerne l’expression imagée d’Egonopoulos, la 
tentative de créer un art fondé sur des valeurs irrationnelles, se 
heurte à la difficulté d’associer celles-ci aux normes plastiques 
ou esthétiques de la tradition grecque.
Sa notion de l’imaginaire s’ouvre à un jeu des rapports con-trastés entre, d’une part l’irrationnel et l’imprévu, et d’autre 
part la solidité de certains principes traditionnels qu’il essaie 
de maintenir. 
C’est pour cette raison que dans l’œuvre surréaliste de l’artiste grec, le dérèglement des normes traditionnelles 
s’effectue, non pas à travers une syntaxe purement onirique, 
mais par le biais d’une ordonnance souvent statique et maîtri-
sée, qui n’est pas sans rappeler certains caractéristiques de l’art 
byzantin. 
Benjamin, au contraire, se réfère à l’imaginaire surréaliste qui a construit une scène suspendue dans le vide, c’est-à-
dire un décor théâtral illustré d’architecture et d’ombres fan-
tomatiques ; un décor de Théâtre de l’Ambigu prêt à recevoir 
les acteurs du drame de la modernité contemporaine. Il nous 
dit : « Si c’est la fantaisie qui offre au souvenir les correspon-
dances, c’est la pensée qui lui dédie les allégories. Le souvenir 
fait se rencontrer les deux. »13. 
En fait, Benjamin croit à la possibilité de montrer que les œuvres sont des condensations d’expériences passées, 
capables d’éclairer l’avenir si l’on parvient à déchiffrer leur 
signification symbolique et allégorique.
Benjamin, dans son étude pour le Trauerspiel affirme que l’allégorie baroque fut le moyen de perception qui con-
vient à une époque de bouleversement social et de guerre 
prolongée, dès que la souffrance humaine et le délabrement 
matériel furent l’essentiel de l’expérience historique. D’où 
émane le retour de l’allégorie – à son époque – comme une 
réponse à la destructivité effroyable de la 1ère guerre mon-
diale14.
I l s’agit des figures païennes qui avaient survécu au baroque. C’étaient des objets tellement éloignés de leur sens origi-
naire qu’ils sont devenus des points allégoriques des mémoires 
mélancoliques du poète. 
13 Cf. Benjamin W., « Zentral Park » (17), Revue d’Esthétique, numéro spéciale, 
No 1, 1981, p : 18.
14 Cf. Benjamin W., Origines du drame baroque allemande, ed : Flammarion, Paris, 
1984.
Benjamin dit que « L’allégorie s’attache aux ruines. Elle offre l’image de l’agitation figée. »15.
3. Est-ce donc possible que l’allégorie 
puisse mobiliser ou même réveiller les 
mémoires dans l’œuvre d’Egonopoulos ?
Ce n’est pas facile de répondre à cette question, 
mais ce qu’on peut dire est que la songerie mnémonique 
d’Egonopoulos est diachronique mais pas anhistorique. Il 
conçoit l’histoire – même dans ses œuvres statiques – comme 
une action de mythes et d’héros «sur scène», encadrée des 
symboles hétéroclites et des fétiches culturels, tout en visant 
au retour aux racines.
Walter Benjamin, au contraire, repêche – avec la manie d’un vrai collectionneur – des restes du passé de la ville 
qui ont perdu leur éclat, tout en sombrant dans l’obscurité. Il 
est bien conscient du fait qui ne s’agit pas des signes – tâches 
qui amèneront à une reconstruction du passé.
Je vais finir cette présentation avec quelques mots de Walter Benjamin :
« Il est fort probable qu’à travers la citation des trou-
vailles, la connaissance apocalyptique qui sera née, éclairera le 
passé et le présent et donnera un sens au moment actuel. » 
15 Cf. Benjamin W., « Zentral Park » (13), Revue d’Esthétique, numéro spéciale, 
No 1, 1981, p : 15.
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PERFORMING REPRESENTATION:  
FROM COURBET TO CéZANNE1
A hallmark of Modernist painting has always been its display of process, to the point where Jack-son Pollock was called an “action painter.” It was as if the performance of the bodily gestures of making art were the content of art itself, with 
the traces of the performance bearing indexical witness to it on 
the canvas. Modernist theory, exemplified by Clement Green-
berg, read such concerns back into the art of the first avant-
garde, from Gustave Courbet to Paul Cézanne, taking them 
to embody a purification meant to cure art of its domination 
by subject matter. In the past thirty or more years, however, 
art historical scholarship has rehabilitated the importance of 
subject matter in Realist and Impressionist painting. What has 
not yet been done convincingly is to theorize and historicize 
the relationship between that highly diverse subject matter and 
the avant-garde’s process-oriented style.1
Modernist theory de-emphasizes the specifics of subject 
matter in favor of universals such as freedom and individuality—
the drive of artists to free themselves from traditional conformist 
teachings and to express their feelings or unique visions. This 
theory has little to do with subject matter except to make it another 
aspect of freedom of choice. Themes taken from the contemporary 
world were simply the antidote to the classical mythology and 
historical emphasis imposed by the Academy. Taking his cue from 
Charles Baudelaire, Walter Benjamin pointed out that with the 
increasing technical ability to represent reality accurately, as in 
photography, artists would feel forced to distinguish their work 
from it as well as from each other by imprinting it with marks of 
individuality. Emile Zola’s definition of art as “a corner of nature 
seen through a temperament,” exemplified this idea, and Zola 
was a leader in downplaying subject matter in favor of discovering 
“the man” behind the painting as its true content. In this theory, 
the artist’s display of process is a performance of the self, the latter 
understood as a transcendental value.
Yet Zola also hinted at a historicizing factor when, in the late 
1860s he repeatedly referred to artists as “workers.” Indeed, the re-
lationship between art and labor became a prime area of discussion 
for the first critics of Impressionism. For Louis Leroy, the satirical 
1 This paper outlines a new book project I expect to bear the same title. I would like 
to thank Catherine Soussloff for the opportunity to present this paper at the Third 
Conference of the Mediterranean Society of Aesthetics in September, 2006.
critic who coined the term “impressionism,” the craft of Impres-
sionist painting was shoddy, lacking in seriousness. For Armand 
Silvestre, a well-known writer on the arts, the Impressionist style 
was a “clumsy … worker-like manner.” Silvestre was well aware 
of the pre-history of Impressionism in the work of the recently 
exiled Realist painter Courbet, with whom many associated the 
Impressionists. In his Stonebreakers (1849), Courbet was the first 
to represent workers in a style that echoed the physical efforts of its 
protagonists. Shortly thereafter, his landscapes made spectacular 
display of his technical gifts, while at the same time effectively 
conveying the materiality of the world he represented. Through his 
relationship with the anarchist philosopher Pierre-Joseph Proud-
hon, Courbet accepted the notion of art as the highest form of 
labor, and he became known as a “worker-painter.”
Labor, of course, is an activity performed over time. Rep-
resenting labor raises the question of how visual art, which for 
reasons of verisimilitude is limited to a moment in time, can repre-
sent labor performed over time. Must it always be through subject-
matter, such as Courbet’s workers? How does the artist represent 
his or her labor? And what is the nature of the artist’s labor in the 
first place?
I will propose that the avant-garde style of Realist and Impres-
sionist painting is a performance of representation. Representation, 
uncontaminated by narrative composition, is the labor of the 
naturalist artist; it is at the heart of the enterprise of artists com-
mitted to images of their own world. The philosophy of Arthur 
Schopenhauer suggests a relationship between representation and 
the world through Will. Reality for Schopenhauer, is perception 
processed by the Will as interpretive intelligence, as instrumental 
reason; it is an ever variable process rather than a static object. 
Representation is the work performed by the mind to produce 
what it calls reality. Although Schopenhauer wrote long before 
Emile Zola, he became popular in France in the 1870s. His theory 
seems like a dialectical restatement of Zola’s definition of art, but 
one that emphasizes the individual and creative activity of mind 
as an element of reality itself. If that is the case, then artists who 
leave traces of their representational process on their imagery are 
in fact performing both the willful self and reality at once. Early 
avant-garde painting is a performance of such a dialectic, in which 
perception and interpretation are merged in the hand of the artist. 
It thus merits the claim made by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon that it is 
the noblest form of labor. 
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new society. Surely, Courbet’s position at the center of his famous 
Studio of the Painter, is related to these ambitions. The political 
dimension to such a position was clear to Courbet, encouraged 
by his friend Proudhon, who believed that representing nature 
truthfully, without the support of idealization, would free men 
to see for themselves. Courbet’s artistic freedom, as expressed by 
performances that left the imprint of his artistic originality for all to 
see, exemplified the freedom of everyman, who in seeing the world 
truthfully would be liberated from delusion and ideology and thus 
able to shape his own destiny, much as the politically conscious 
composer-performer-entrepreneur Berlioz had done.
Emile Zola’s best known view about Courbet’s friend Proud-
hon was his attack on Proudhon’s definition of art as a vehicle for 
social and political reform. For Zola, art had nothing utilitarian 
about it; to use it as propaganda debased its aesthetic essence. It 
was indeed in response to Proudhon that Zola offered his own 
definition of art as “a corner of nature seen through a tempera-
ment.” Yet in an essay in which Zola praised Courbet as a “worker-
painter,” thus employing a term directly associated with Courbet’s 
Proudhon-inflected beliefs, Zola at the same time referred to the 
young impressionists as honest workers. Such words echoed the 
utopian socialist, anarchist terminology associated primarily with 
Proudhon. Zola’s argument with Proudhon was about art, not 
politics.
The artists to whom Zola was referring in his articles of 
the late 1860s included not just Edouard Manet, but the as yet 
unknown impressionists, Camille Pissarro, Claude Monet and 
Paul Cézanne, among others. At the same time as he praised these 
artists for their labors, Zola supported their depiction of modern 
subject matter. In his famous defense of Manet, he wrote:
The wind is blowing in the direction of science; we are 
propelled in spite of ourselves towards the exact study of 
things and facts. Thus, every strong personality who reveals 
himself does so in the direction of truth. The movement 
of our time is certainly realist, or rather, positivist. I am 
therefore forced to admire men who seem related to one 
another, related by the time in which they are living.2
Zola called the young Impressionists “Actualists” when he saw 
their works at the Salon of 1868, and he asserted that “I need not 
plead the cause of modern subjects here. It has been won for a long 
time.”3 He also noted Monet’s preference for steamboats and en-
thusiastically described the noise and smoke his painting evoked.4
It was indeed at this time, in the late 1860s, that Monet, Pis-
sarro, Cézanne, and Armand Guillaumin in particular took an 
interest in overtly industrial subject matter. They seem to have 
been responding not only to Zola’s support but to the general call 
2 “Le vent est à la science; nous sommes poussés malgré nous ver l’étude exacte 
des faits et des choses. Ainsi, toutes les fortes individualités qui se révèlent, 
s’affirment-t-elles dans le sens de la vérité. Le mouvement de l’époque est cer-
tainement réaliste, ou plutôt positiviste. Je suis donc forcé d’admirer des hommes 
qui paraissent avoir quelque parenté entre eux, la parenté de l’heure à laquelle ils 
vivent.” Zola, “Les Réalistes du Salon,” L’Evénement, 11 May 1866, in Mon Salon 
(1866), Oeuvres complètes, Henri Mitterand ed., Paris, 1969, v. 12, p. 807.
3 “Je n’ai pas à plaider ici la cause des sujets modernes. Cette cause est gagnée 
depuis longtemps.” (Emile Zola, “Les Actualistes,” L’Evénement illustré, 24 
May 1868, in Mon Salon (1868), Oeuvres complètes, op. cit., p. 870 and ff.)
4 “Il y a en lui [Monet] un peintre de marines de premier ordre. Mais il entend le 
genre à sa façon, et là encore je retrouve son profound amour pour les réalités 
présentes. On aperçoit toujours dans ses marines un bout de jetée, un coin de 
quai, quelque chose qui indique une date et un lieu. Il paraît avoir un faible pour 
les bateaux à vapeur…. Ce qui me frappe dans cette toile, c’est la franchise, la 
rudesse même de la touche. L’eau est âcre, l’horizon s’étend avec âpreté;… nous 
entendons la voix sourde et haletante de vapeur, qui emplit l’air de sa fumée 
nauséabonde. J’ai vu ces ton crus, j’ai respiré ces senteurs salées.” (Ibid., p. 871.)
The final, and most original, aspect of my argument will be 
to historicize such performances by linking them to the values of 
nineteenth-century modernity (as differentiated from Modern-
ism). Baudelaire recognized that the essence of modernity was 
change, even while he feared the rise of industry. Others celebrated 
change as driven by technological innovation and productivity. 
How artists responded to this historical situation may perhaps be 
exemplified in a statement by a friend of the young Cézanne and 
Zola: “Let us wish only one thing, to produce. With production, 
success is certain …” Forces and ideologies similar to those driving 
modernity drove the performances of artists, too.
The rest of this paper gives examples and is necessarily 
abbreviated. It is based on my own work, both published and 
unpublished. Gustave Courbet, for example, admired the example 
of musical performers. Friends of his were musicians, both profes-
sional, as in the case of Alphonse Promayet, and amateur, such 
as the novelist Champfleury, who was a great admirer of Haydn, 
Mozart and Beethoven. Courbet even represented himself as a 
cellist in the self-portrait Man with Violincello, though there is no 
other evidence that he actually played an instrument. The appeal of 
music to Romantic thinkers was that it communicates directly to 
the senses on an abstract level, without the use of words. It leaves 
everything to imagination. Baudelaire’s take on Wagner was that 
the German composer’s compositions were expressions nature 
itself. Of course, in Delacroix’s comparisons between the several 
arts, he gave the advantage to painting. For painting could not only 
communicate abstractly through color and line, at the same time 
it could represent the specific objects of nature materially. The 
similarity between the musician and the artist can be understood 
if one posits that both are giving representation to what one might 
call a text. The difference lies in the nature of that text. A musician 
performs a series of notes put down by a composer. The composer 
and his text are an intermediary between the object of interpreta-
tion, such as nature or feeling, and the performer. Visual art elimi-
nates the intermediary. Through his representation, the artist may 
be said to attain the august role of performing nature itself.
The musician-performer most commonly compared to 
Delacroix is Hector Berlioz. Courbet made an un-commissioned 
portrait of Berlioz that he included among the paintings he showed 
at the Salon of 1850-51. His main exhibits were The Stonebreakers, 
A Burial at Ornans, and Peasants Returning from Flagey, accompa-
nied by five other paintings, which included landscapes and por-
traits. This exhibition was the first in which Courbet was entirely 
free to show whatever he wanted. He was allowed to bypass the 
jury thanks to the prize he won in the previous exhibition, which 
was held under the left-wing Second Republic. His exhibit as a 
whole was understood at the time, as it is now, to harbor a radical 
political message. Each painting had something of a personal and 
political statement, and the rarely studied portrait of Berlioz was 
no exception.
Courbet was attracted to Berlioz for three reasons. First, 
Berlioz had acquired much fame not only as a composer, but as a 
performer and orchestra conductor. Second, Berlioz displayed an 
independent, entrepreneurial spirit Courbet shared. Berlioz had 
organized a philharmonic society and orchestra in opposition to 
those supported by the state, thus paralleling the anti-state mo-
nopoly position Courbet hoped to establish through the entrepre-
neurial pursuit of his painting. Third, Berlioz was the man of music 
most associated with avant-garde politics, thanks to his direct 
association with the Saint-Simonians, who believed that artists, 
along with industrialists and scientists, would be the leaders of the 
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for modern subject matter by another supporter of both Courbet’s 
Realism and his politics, Jules-Antoine Castagnary. As early as 
1863, the year of the Salon des Refusés, Castagnary sweepingly 
declared:
The goal of painting is to express the society that has 
produced it.… Every epoch is known solely by the events 
that occur in it: political events, literary events, scientific 
events, industrial events, artistic events, each of which is 
marked by its particular character distinguishing it from 
the previous epoch and the one that will follow.…5
Similar statements can be found in other writings of his during 
the 1860s. Of course, there was a political element to his position, 
for his inclusive aesthetic was a celebration of French economic 
progress, which Castagnary identified with the democratic impulse 
he believed was the true nature of French society. In the 1860s, a 
republican movement was gaining strength within the autocratic 
Second Empire. Not only did reform seem necessary, it seemed 
possible. The same was true in artistic circles, where, following the 
Salon des Refusés of 1863, the government had liberalized the Sa-
lon’s judging process. Its success is witnessed by the inclusion of a 
number of early impressionist works in the Salons of the late 1860s, 
for example, in 1868, where Zola commented on them.
In my book currently in press at University of California, I 
argue that there is a connection between the performance of pro-
ductive processes in works by the Impressionists, visible especially 
in works celebrating industry, and the forces driving modernity.6 In 
just one example of a commentary on how industrial production 
exemplified the interaction of man and nature, I cite Julien Turgan’s 
encyclopedic Grandes Usines de France, which began in 1860 and 
reached 20 volumes by 1895. Turgan’s short preface is a strange 
mixture of evolutionary theory and pride. He claimed that since 
humanity was the last species to develop on Earth, it seemed as if 
all other strategies of survival had been attributed to animals. Man 
was forced to adapt through intelligence. Industry was the result of 
the struggle between man and nature:
Led by study and inclination to the s pectacle of the human 
battle [for survival], [the author] attentively examines those 
fortresses that man has erected against his original misery, 
those vast factories where the skillful direction of the chief, 
the activity of the foreman and the courageous toil of the 
worker combine to produce the marvels of our civilization.7
Impressionism’s disconcerting innovation was to disconnect 
the work ethic in art from the tidy, smooth, labored performances 
of academic art, substituting the free, innovative and, in their inde-
pendent exhibition strategy, entrepreneurial spirit of the modern 
economy. Paralleling images of modernity with a display of forces of 
pictorial creativity, Claude Monet’s Gare Saint-Lazare series is per-
haps the most perfect embodiment of the ideology of modernity. 
5 “La peinture a pour objet d’exprimer ... la société qui la produit.... Chaque époque 
ne se connaît que par les fait qu’elle agit : faits politiques, fait littéraires, fait sci-
entifiques, faits industriels, faits artistiques, qui tous sont marqués au coin de son 
génie propre, portent l’empreinte de son caractère particulier, et la distinguent tout 
à la fois de l’époque antérieure et de l’époque à suivre.” ( Jules-Antoine Castagnary, 
“Salon de 1863,” in Salons (1857-79), Eugène Spuller, ed., Paris, 1892, I., p. 102.)
6 James H. Rubin, Impressionnism and the Modern Landscape: Productivity, 
Technology and Urbanization from Manet to Van Gogh, University of Califor-
nia Press, Berkeley, forthcoming 2007.
7 “Attiré par notre goût et nos études vers le grand spectacle de la véritable bataille 
humaine, nous avons curieusement étudié ces forteresses de l’homme dres-
séscontre sa misère originelle, ces vastes usines où l’habile direction du chef, 
l’activité du contre-maître et le courageux travail de l’ouvrier concourent à 
produire les merveilles de notre civilisation.” Julien Turgan, Les Grandes Usines: 
études industrielles en France et à l’étranger, 20 vols, Paris 1860-95, I, p. viii.
Yet the majority of Monet’s paintings are representations of leisure 
and the enjoyment of nature. Still, I argue that even those paintings 
perform the values of modernity by foregrounding Monet’s produc-
tive processes. In some sense, then, they are a reminder that leisure 
was the fruit of a modern economy driven by productivity.
How the ideology of modernity turned into modernism may 
best be discovered in the painting of Paul Cézanne. For Cézanne, 
the freedom obtained through the financial success of his father’s 
entrepreneurial enterprise, namely the local bank, afforded him 
the leisure to enter a protracted dialogue with nature uninflected 
by the need to sell works to support his family. For lack of time, 
I will focus on only one motif in Cézanne’s work: the village of 
L’Estaque, adjacent to Marseilles. One may follow the development 
of Cézanne’s landscape through his three extended stays in the vil-
lage, first in the early 1870s in order to escape both military service 
and the surveillance of his father over the son’s clandestine new 
family, second in the later 1870s, then in the mid 1880s. L’Estaque 
was rapidly industrializing. The main railroad line from the North 
pierced the gray stone mountainside via the Tunnel de la Nerthe 
and traversed the village on its way to Marseilles. L’Estaque had 
been a center of brick and tile manufacture, but in the early 1880s, 
the Rio-Tinto Company established it as a major chemical produc-
ing town. In combination with the expanding tourist industry, the 
effect was to double L’Estaque’s population from 1874 to 1880. 8
Virtually all of Cézanne’s landscapes until the end of the 
1880s are of places inhabited and molded by man. In L’Estaque, 
the evidence was everywhere, from hilly landscapes with houses 
to images of the railroad viaduct seen against the steep cliffs that 
keep the village pressed against the sea. In even the most ostensibly 
classical images, balanced and framed as in landscapes by Pous-
sin, human constructions give evidence of continuity through 
time. It is as if the juxtaposed factory chimney and church tower 
embody different epochs and ideologies in the human interaction 
with the environment. Through L’Estaque’s rapid evolution, in 
other words, Cézanne maintains the sense of continuity between 
the past and present, enabling him to keep modernity in perspec-
tive. Simultaneously, Cézanne’s performance of representation 
becomes less engaged with the particular moment and the specific 
object, becoming more self-consciously contemplative and inward. 
In the end, the performance of representation becomes itself his 
subject, ultimately opening the possibility by the end of the 1880s 
of painting landscape in places removed from the human presence. 
In such places, representation evolves to what some consider a 
phenomenological practice. At the same time, this possibility re-
newed Cézanne’s interest in figure painting, within which he chose 
themes that synthesize modern and traditional subject matter, such 
as his Bathers and his Card Players, both of which have well-known 
precedents in the art of the Old Masters.
Modernism is certainly modern in its self-consciousness, as 
exemplified by Cézanne. But in the brief time allotted to me I have 
tried to outline an argument that historicizes the performance 
of representation as its own subject matter, suggesting it became 
possible only within an ideology directly rooted in the historical 
circumstances of nineteenth-century modernity. In calling forth 
performances of artistic drive and creativity, the ideology of pro-
ductivity and conditions of the modern economy ultimately gave 
rise to modernism’s focus on performances of representation for 
their own sake.
8 Véronique Serrano, “Repères chronologiques et morceaux choisis,” L’Estaque, 
op. cit., pp. 217-220.
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Préliminaire
Je voudrais tout d’abord faire connaître la façon dont ce 
panel sur le thème de la performance a été établi par Cath-
erine Soussloff et moi-même.
Le thème nous a été proposé par Ales Erjavec que nous 
remercions de la confiance qu’il nous a accordée. Nous 
l’avons immédiatement accepté, de même que nous avons 
accepté avec joie l’idée de travailler ensemble, par mail, bien 
sûr !
Le cahier des charges comportait une durée générale du 
panel (9h-13h) et une répartition des temps de parole (30 
mn pour chacune des deux introductions et 20 mn pour les 
interventions ultérieures). Nous avons considéré qu’il fal-
lait à la fois réintroduire une égalité des temps de parole et 
permettre au maximum d’intervenants intéressés de prendre 
la parole. Ainsi chacun disposera de 20 mn et vous compren-
drez la nécessité de ne pas dépasser ce temps pour ne pas 
léser les derniers orateurs. 
Deux mots du point le plus délicat pour nous : un 
certain nombre d’interventions nous ont été proposées 
rapidement, soit directement à Catherine ou à moi, soit par 
l’intermédiaire du secrétariat du Congrès. Les propositions 
reçues nous ont semblé intéressantes et nous avons fait en 
sorte de les garder toutes. Assez vite donc, le panel a été 
«trop rempli». Or nous avons continué à recevoir quelques 
propositions. Sans que leur intérêt soit en cause, nous avons 
dû les refuser, étant dans l’impossibilité de leur trouver une 
place dans le temps imparti au panel (à moins de ne pas 
ouvrir d’espace de discussion ou de procéder à une sorte de 
«concours» à partir des résumés, ce que nous avons exclu 
!). Il nous reste à présenter nos excuses à celles ou ceux dont 
l’intervention n’a pas pu être programmée dans cette matinée 
et à redire que les interventions, à partir du moment où elles 
répondaient au thème de façon intéressante, ont été retenues 
en fonction de leur date d’arrivée.
Ces précisions me permettent d’enchaîner directe-ment sur mon «introduction» à ce panel.La question qui me préoccupe est celle de 
savoir quelle est la fonction, aujourd’hui, en 2006, de la per-
formance comme catégorie esthétique, au même titre que la 
peinture, la danse, le cinéma, la vidéo, la photographie ou le 
théâtre, toutes disciplines artistiques avec lesquelles de toute 
évidence la performance interfère, par rapport auxquelles 
on peut considérer tout à la fois qu’elle en est issue, qu’elle 
les conteste et qu’elle les renouvelle. Je pars du fait que cer-
taines pratiques artistiques s’adressent à un public au titre 
de «performances», je suppose connue l’histoire de la per-
formance depuis les avant-gardes jusqu’à sa reconnaissance 
comme catégorie esthétique dans les années soixante-dix 
et son développement ultérieur. Depuis plus d’un siècle, la 
performance a secoué le paysage artistique dans une grande 
partie du monde ; depuis plus de 30 ans, elle a droit de cité, 
avec quelques réserves, si l’on tient compte du fait qu’elle ne 
trouve pas toujours aisément les lieux qu’elle souhaite inve-
stir, et que sa position, entre event et proposition artistique, 
reste quelque peu indécise. Sa fonction critique indiscutable, 
tant à un niveau artistique qu’à un niveau politique, en tant 
que pratique née au cœur de la contestation opérée par les 
avant-gardes, est-elle encore avérée en 2006 ? En quoi ce qui 
se donne comme performance ne peut-il se réclamer d’une 
pratique relevant des arts visuels ou des arts vivants dans 
leurs caractéristiques actuelles, après les avant-gardes, après 
l’effervescence dans les arts tout au long du XXème siècle, 
après donc également l’apport de la performance et des tech-
nologies nouvelles que tous ces arts, à moins de n’être que la 
trace désuète de pratiques dépassées, ont assimilé ? je pourrai 
aller jusqu’à poser la question de l’appartenance de la per-
formance, aujourd’hui, au régime de l’art, et ce d’autant plus 
que je jette un regard outre atlantique, où les «performance 
studies» ont étendu leur champ bien au-delà de l’histoire de 
l’art. Je me contenterai de lier la question de la Performance 
comme genre artistique à la reconnaissance du performe(u)
r comme personnage de la scène artistique. Je vais ainsi 
resserrer ma problématique en me situant dans l’entre-deux 
de la performance et du théâtre, là où précisément la perfor-
mance a secoué le théâtre de sa léthargie jusqu’à l’investir, 
le déconstruire comme genre et provoquer la déception de 
spectateurs qui ne cessent de vitupérer que «ce n’est pas du 
théâtre»; c’est à partir de là que je livrerai quelques questions 
de philosophe aux spécialistes de la performance, autour 
du «performer», de l’agir devant ou pour un public et de 
l’apparition du performe(u)r comme personnage à part en-
tière dans le champ de l’art. 
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Lorsque la performance interpelle le théâtre et tourne quasiment en ridicule cette forme d’art dont elle an-nonce la disparition, elle met en avant le fait d’être 
un art vivant qui déploie son action hic et nunc, dans un lieu 
faisant place à une assistance, laquelle suit ce qui se passe 
en temps réel, et peut donc interagir. Les artistes sont les 
personnages présents sur ce qui tient lieu de scène, ils n’ont 
plus de raison d’être considérés comme des «comédiens» 
mais comme des acteurs ou sens où ils sont «actants», sans 
être intermédiaires ou passeurs de quoi que ce soit, mais en 
vivant une expérience qu’ils ressentent dans tout leur être et en 
s’adressant directement à nous qui sommes là pour écouter, re-
garder, éventuellement prendre part ; d’ailleurs, tous les signes 
qui manifestent qu’il s’agit de quelque chose qui se déroule au 
présent, en temps réel, en présence d’une assistance effective, 
sont accentués, l’intérêt étant plus ou moins implicitement 
stimulé par la curiosité, le suspens lié au fait que quelque chose 
arrive, se passe, devant nous ; on renoue avec le plaisir du 
«direct», ou le caractère intriguant du fait divers, qui fait appel 
à la dimension de risque inhérente à toute action et à l’émotion 
qui lui est liée. On pourrait s’arrêter sur la façon dont la routine 
et l’ennui sont rompus par le fait qu’un événement nouveau 
est annoncé et que l’expérience va en être faite, et relire à la 
fois Freud lorsqu’il remarque que le plaisir de la scène est lié 
à cet espoir, et Benjamin lorsqu’il déplore la disparition de 
l’expérience dans le monde contemporain, mais cela déborde 
mon propos d’aujourd’hui. 
J e m’intéresse aux caractéristiques de l’»agir» dans le cas de ce que j’appellerai désormais le «théâtre-perfor-mance». Si je propose de parler du théâtre-performance, 
c’est pour échapper à la quasi fatwa aristotélicienne qui 
condamnait la réalité scénique en tant qu’elle relève de l’opsis 
ou déplace l’attention vers le spectacle : l’»agir» scénique 
n’était pas indispensable à l’»action» propre à la tragédie et la 
pratique de l’acteur ne retenait pas l’intérêt en tant que telle. Je 
considérerai l’œuvre scénique éphémère comme une œuvre à 
part entière, à l’instar du secteur des «études théâtrales», qui 
s’est affranchi du joug de la littérature pour acquérir une auton-
omie dans les institutions éducatives et culturelles françaises. 
Mais même à partir de là, il semble encore très difficile de 
traiter de l’acteur ou du jeu dans le contexte de l’œuvre scénique 
dans la mesure où le théâtre reste prisonnier d’une esthétique 
de la représentation, au sens général du terme. La façon de 
parler de l’acteur montre à quel point le théâtre est isolé dans le 
paysage artistique du XXème siècle ; Sartre systématise à mes 
yeux les conceptions majoritaires qui ont provoqué la révolte 
des avant-gardes, puisque selon lui, tout élément scénique réel 
est reçu en tant qu’analogon de ce qu’il représente et non pour 
lui-même. Le jeu est donc écartelé entre ce à quoi il renvoie et 
ce qu’il montre ; ce qui appartient à l’acteur en tant que per-
sonne est neutralisé par un contrat-fictionnel accepté par tout 
spectateur dès qu’il franchit le seuil du théâtre. On est en droit 
d’objecter de nombreux disfonctionnements de ce modèle, ne 
serait-ce qu’à travers le phénomène de starisation qui touche 
le théâtre et remet en cause la neutralisation : dès que le nom 
d’une star prend trop de place à l’affiche, on ne cherche plus à 
voir que la star pendant la représentation. L’attention se focalise 
sur la personne au détriment de ce au profit de quoi on attend-
rait qu’elle s’irréalise. Cela vaut pour La Berma, comme Proust 
l’a remarqué, aussi bien que pour Jean-paul Belmondo.
Ce que j’appelle théâtre-performance, c’est un théâtre qui 
assume, voire revendique le fait qu’un acteur vit au présent de 
la représentation et est perçu comme tel par les spectateurs, 
même dans le cas où l’acte théâtral passe par la profération 
d’un texte ou le jeu d’un rôle qui préexiste à ce qui est montré. 
Ma question est alors de situer l’acteur par rapport à celui qui, 
dans le contexte de la Performance comme genre spécifique, 
est devenu le performe(u)r. Jusqu’à quand sera-t-il possible et 
au nom de quels critères, de distinguer l’acteur du performe(u)
r ?
Je crois qu’il est temps de prendre un exemple. Je vais évo-
quer très brièvement ce qui est annoncé comme un «projet» 
de François-Michel Pesenti : Les Paésines : auparavant nous ne 
savions que chanter sous la forme prise au théâtre de Gennevil-
liers en 2004 : Le jardin des délices1. Jean-Louis Perrier décrit 
ainsi le spectacle dans le journal Le Monde (sous la rubrique 
«théâtre») : «Entre les rangs des spectateurs, placés face-à-
face, une longue estrade laquée sang frais, fermée d’un côté par 
un jeu de miroirs, de l’autre par une cloison de bois qui retentit 
au moindre choc. Huit créatures prostrées (quatre femmes et 
quatre hommes), assaillies de tics et de tremblements, bavent, 
geignent, se grattent et râlent, ricanent et hurlent, avec le 
regard de bêtes au seuil de l’abattoir, avant de ramper comme 
serpents ou marcher comme crabes pour tenter de s’accoupler, 
une heure durant, le temps d’épuiser les combinaisons pos-
sibles». Comme on peut en trouver la confirmation dans le 
journal Libération, «quelque chose s’est rompu. Les conven-
tions qui règlent nos gestes et tempèrent nos comportements 
n’ont plus cours. (…) C’est le metteur en scène François-
Michel Pesenti qui est à l’origine de ce spectacle hors normes. 
Ni danse ni théâtre : des corps de comédiens lancés dans 
l’espace, livrés à eux-mêmes, sans filet ou presque.» Hugues 
Le Tanneur explicite moins sa désapprobation dans Libération 
que, dans Le Monde, Jean-Louis Perrier, dont on sent bien les 
réticences et la façon dont il a été touché. Lui aussi précise à 
quel point le «jeu» ne respecte plus les conventions du théâtre 
: «La déformation des sons n’a d’égale que celle des visages et 
des corps, difficilement contenue dans les frontières du simu-
lacre théâtral. Le premier sang est signe que l’acteur sort de son 
rôle. Pour le reste, bleus et bosses sont bienvenus et sont signes 
du travail accompli.» 
Je relève un premier point qui va m’amener à réfléchir : 
l’acteur n’en est plus vraiment un aux yeux du critique, en ce 
sens qu’il ne se réfère à aucun rôle, dramatique ou issu de la 
culture ou de la mythologie, qu’il réagit en temps réel de tout 
son être, qu’il se met en danger, parle et agit «pour de vrai», 
en son nom propre et assume les conséquences. Un autre 
point m’intéresse particulièrement par rapport à celui que je 
viens d’énoncer : chaque soir, cette «dramaturgie sauvage» 
pour reprendre l’expression du metteur en scène, se confronte 
à des intervenants nouveaux qui maintiennent «un principe 
d’incertitude», qui déstabilise le théâtre. C’est ce principe ini-
tiateur d’une d’improvisation qui enracine la proposition dans 
le temps réel, promet un event renouvelé «en direct» chaque 
soir et explique le terme «Paésines» : «chaque représenta-
tion, écrit Pesenti, soumettra les acteurs à un système de 
contraintes et d’incitations élaboré en direct par le metteur en 
scène, les assistants et les techniciens de façon à ce que, sur 
le modèle géologique des paésines – qui produit des paysages 
1 théâtre de Gennevilliers du 29 janvier au 15 février 2004
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variés (ruines, désert, mer en furie, etc.) – chaque soir s’écrive 
notre paésine théâtrale dont nous exigerons qu’elle soit, ce soir-
là, soit intime, soit métaphysique, soit politique.» Le docu-
ment remis au spectateur à l’entrée dans la salle précisait que 
les acteurs seraient ainsi mis sous pression par «des artistes 
venus d’horizons artistiques divers (performance, musique, 
arts plastiques, danse).»2 Le protocole fut respecté. Selon 
les soirs, des personnes se sont présentées ensemble à partir 
de positions très différentes, puisque les invités temporaires 
n’étaient pas impliqués au même titre que les acteurs présents 
lors de chaque mise en œuvre du projet ; aux invités revenait la 
fonction de «perturber les certitudes» auxquelles les acteurs 
voudraient s’accrocher. Dans la présentation de son projet, 
Pesenti indiquait que le spectacle convoque «l’insurrection 
des acteurs» pour «refonder le geste poétique de ceux-ci et 
la responsabilité du public jouissant qui, nous l’imaginons, les 
glorifie et les condamne.» Comment, dans un tel contexte, un 
performe(u)r se distingue-t-il d’un acteur ?
Pesenti avait francisé par l’orthographe le mot anglais 
«performer». Celui qui «perform» ou performe si l’on fran-
cise encore, c’est, selon les usages du terme en anglais, celui qui 
parle, exécute un mouvement, accomplit une action, remplit 
une fonction, «joue» , chante ou danse, l’accent portant sur 
l’accomplissement plutôt que sur sa teneur. Le verbe anglais 
to perform couvre à la fois le caractère performatif de toute 
interprétation ou de toute action dans le contexte traditionnel 
de ce qui demande une actualisation et le fait de se montrer 
en train d’accomplir un acte, au sens faible de faire quelque 
chose, même s’il ne s’agit que d’effectuer certains mouvements, 
voire d’être là pour ce que l’on est, en revendiquant sa propre 
identité. La langue anglaise dispose d’un terme pour désigner 
le caractère performatif, quelle que soit la performance accom-
plie, ce qui est une manière intéressante de découper la réalité 
en construisant la pure catégorie de l’agir (d’un agir éventuelle-
ment faible, équivalent de faire). Cela me conduit à remarquer 
que lorsqu’il y a performance, il y a quelqu’un qui perform(e) 
et que même s’il ne fait qu’être là, ce qui est le degré zéro du 
performer, il perform(e) encore du seul fait de se présenter-à-
une-assistance, d’être présent devant un public. Je suis donc en 
train d’avancer que le fait de «performer» et la performance 
qui englobe toutes les modalités de cette attitude, impliquent 
un sujet, renvoient à une subjectivité, qui intervient au titre 
d’auteur à défaut de toujours intervenir au titre d’artiste, et 
implique également d’autres sujets qui savent, à travers la 
présence du performe(u)r, poser la question du sujet. Je me 
demande donc si la fréquence avec laquelle la performance 
comme genre pose la question de l’identité n’est pas liée à ce 
qui la fait surgir comme telle dans l’horizon de la langue et par 
rapport à un Réel où la problématique du sujet est à construire. 
Cela permettrait de lier l’existence même de la performance 
aujourd’hui à cette fonction de maintenir l’horizon d’une 
subjectivité.
J e reviens au théâtre pour interroger le jeu de l’acteur, à partir du performer qu’il partage avec le performe(u)r . Que fait l’acteur dans le contexte le plus traditionnel ? 
S’il endosse un rôle, joue un personnage, il prend des at-
2 Avaient alors confirmé leur participation Andreas Pronegg (Kombinat théâtre, ac-
teur, Vienne/Autriche), Eric Houzelot (acteur, Marseille), Nicolas Primat (perfor-
meur, Marseille), Dalila Khatir (chanteuse, Paris), Edmond Hosdikian (musicien, 
Marseille), Yann Marussich (danseur, Genève), eRikm (musicien, Marseille).
titudes, montre des actes qui crédibilisent la présence de celui-
ci sur la scène et sont attribués, donc, au personnage plutôt 
qu’à celui qui l’incarne ou qui s’irréalise en lui (pour retenir 
la leçon sartrienne). Dans ce contexte, il est amené à en faire 
trop pour renforcer l’illusion et il se dépossède de son titre de 
sujet au profit d’un sujet fictionnel, d’une figure inscrite dans 
le patrimoine culturel et souvent psychologisée au maximum. 
Le sur-jeu est donc l’autre versant d’une dépossession de soi 
et l’on comprend bien ce que l’irruption d’un performe(u)r 
à ses côtés peut induire. D’ailleurs, le théâtre l’a compris tout 
seul et depuis qu’il y a des traités à l’usage des gens de théâtre, 
on trouve la recommandation de chercher le «naturel», de 
ne pas en faire trop, de rapprocher l’acteur du personnage ou 
de ce que serait celui-ci s’il vivait vraiment parmi nous. Si l’on 
prend les formes de jeu qui ont renoncé à la simple illustration 
redondante du texte ou du rôle (j’entends par là par exemple 
le fait de ne pas se courber pour faire vieux ou parce que le 
texte dit qu’il y a courbure), on y trouve encore une habitude 
étrange consistant à sur-agir, en quelque sorte gratuitement, 
pour occuper le corps ou passer le temps. Je songe à ces com-
portements si fréquents sur une scène, consistant à parcourir 
plus ou moins fébrilement l’espace, à s’asseoir et se lever sans 
nécessité, à boire ou manger sans raison ou à accentuer cer-
tains mouvements physiologiques, à se livrer à une occupation 
comme déplacer/ranger des objets, plier du linge, etc, sans que 
ces gestes ne puissent se constituer en signe ou prétendre à une 
quelconque signification. De tels choix de jeu résultent encore 
de l’interdit d’être soi, d’agir en son nom propre, qui pèse sur 
l’acteur dans ce contexte. La logique de ces actions machinales 
est pourtant non seulement de permettre à un acteur de ne pas 
être le pur instrument de profération d’un texte, mais de faire 
exister son corps et sa propre identité pendant qu’il est visible 
sur scène, même si c’est par le biais de gestes involontaires ou 
mécaniques que l’on pourrait désigner comme des mouve-
ments, qu’ils soient plus ou moins instinctifs ou mis en forme 
et transmis par un groupe social ; le «performing act» qu’est 
l’interprétation d’un texte dramatique ou de n’importe quel 
texte proféré sur une scène, ne devient pas pour autant une 
performance. Il est même relativisé et négligé en tant que tel 
par tout public au fait de ce qu’est l’art contemporain, qui at-
tend de l’œuvre scénique qu’elle se développe comme œuvre 
sur le terrain qui lui est propre. 
Il reste que dans certains cas limites, lorsque le public 
loue la «performance» d’un acteur (performance étant en-
tendu au sens de manière d’accomplir sa tâche), parce qu’il 
en apprécie donc la prestation, le performing act d’un acteur 
pourrait être considéré comme très proche de ce que propose 
un performe(u)r. J’en prends pour exemple la façon dont 
Marcial Di Fonzo Bo a joué, sous la direction de Claude Régy, 
Paroles du sage. Il s’est interdit tous les artifices du métier que 
je viens de rappeler : il n’a pas surjoué un texte, n’a rien illustré 
ni signifié, il ne s’est pas donné pour un autre que lui-même, il 
n’a tout simplement rien joué ni rien fait d’autre que de laisser 
les mots l’affecter et surgir de son corps. Les seules manifes-
tations irrépressibles qu’il a produites étaient liés au fait de 
laisser le texte le traverser : son corps aussi inexpressif que 
possible ne laissait s’exprimer au sens étymologique du terme 
que la bave, la transpiration, la morve, les larmes. Chaque soir, 
cette manière d’être se reproduisait ainsi que les écoulements, 
mais jamais à l’identique. Si l’acteur ne se dévoilait pas en tant 
qu’individu dans cette présence, son corps néanmoins était 
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suffisamment proche (du fait du dispositif global instauré) 
pour être senti physiquement par le public et sa personne 
offerte «en direct». Face à cette mise en rapport en public 
d’un être et d’une écriture, beaucoup se sont plaints de ne pas 
trouver de théâtre et, de fait, on était peut-être confronté à une 
performance, dans tous les sens du terme. Il était indiscutable 
en tout cas que la rencontre de cet «acteur-performe(u)r» 
et d’un public posait immédiatement la question du sujet, de 
l’identité de ceux qui se faisaient face ! 
Or c’est précisément l’effet recherché par Pesenti lorsqu’il 
«lance» sur la scène un performe(u)r au milieu des acteurs, 
pour les déstabiliser. L’irruption du performe(u)r troue la 
continuité du propos des acteurs, interroge au présent, avec 
le contrat fictionnel, tout ce qui constituait leur passé com-
mun lors du travail d’exploration et de recherche préalable à 
la présentation à un public ainsi que les conventions qui pro-
tègent le jeu. Il est là pour faire tache, pour offrir le spectacle 
de sa personne. Par sa simple présence, il force à s’interroger 
sur ce que font les acteurs dans le cas du Jardin des délices ; il 
remet en question aussi la notion même d’acteur qu’il renvoie 
à son histoire, de manière critique. Tout le malaise ressenti 
par les spectateurs et stigmatisé par la critique vient de cette 
interrogation sur l’identité et le sujet que le projet pousse 
au-delà des limites généralement admises, pour faire paraître 
cet «inavouable» dont les acteurs témoignent. Théâtre ou 
Performance ? Pesenti d’une autre manière que Régy rend 
manifeste ce qui permet à un individu s’adressant à d’autres 
d’exister à la première personne, d’être soi-même, de chercher 
une subjectivation, une fois déconstruits les discours ou les 
rôles faussement inculqués comme «naturels» par la société 
ou offerts dans le cadre des conventions régissant l’art théâtral. 
Quoi qu’il ait été effectivement montré, dans aucun de ces 
deux exemples, performer n’implique un «agir» au sens fort 
du terme. Par rapport à la question de la nature de l’agir en 
présence d’un public, tout se passe comme si, tant du côté du 
théâtre que du côté de la performance, la part d’activisme lié à 
l’idée d’agir était inadéquate. Performer, c’est être-avec, à la fois 
dans les limites de l’aire de jeu et au-delà, dans ce qui l’englobe. 
Moins il est fait de part au spectaculaire et à l’activisme, plus 
la question que pose le seul fait de performer, c’est celle du 
sujet qui performe, de son identité. Désigner l’acteur par le 
terme de performe(u)r serait donc indiquer de quelle manière 
l’art théâtral aujourd’hui se situe au même niveau de réflexion 
que l’ensemble des arts, à travers le médium qui lui est propre, 
c’est-à-dire la personne vivante confrontée en temps réel au 
risque de l’autre et à la recherche de soi. 
Mais alors l’omniprésence du performeur aujourd’hui, 
liée au développement de la Performance comme genre, signe-
t-elle à long terme le déclin de la vertu de la performance, 
indique-t-elle qu’elle a déjà rempli sa fonction, du moins dans 
le champ de l’art ? Incite-t-elle à ne plus l’utiliser comme caté-
gorie esthétique ? Je laisserai bien sûr la question ouverte.
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Reality offers, like a landscape, infinitely many 
perspectives, which are all equally true and have equal 
rights ... the only perspective which is wrong is the one 
which claims to be the only one.
José Ortega y Gasset
E urope – the saying goes – is made: now we have to make the Europeans. That is: as economic and (partially) political European integration are completed, the debate has shifted from the rhetoric of integration to that of identity1. Con-
tinents, it has been noted, tend to become metageographical 
concepts: metaphors for cultural, rather than ‘just’ geographi-
cal units; this can be seen as a distortion of reality (Lewis and 
Wigen 1997), but also, on the contrary, as a space for new 
meaning (Ifversen 2002). This is particularly true for Europe, 
that not only is more and more identified with the fast devel-
oping EU institution (rather than with the continent, only 
partially comprised) but also, being in search for an identity 
legitimating the institutional developments, increasingly 
prompts new formulations of its specificity as an idea and cul-
tural unit, one however that has to keep an equal emphasis on 
the constitutive diversity of the European nations and peo-
ples. This peculiar combination of the protection of diversity 
and promotion of unity, which has provided European institu-
tions (both EU and Council of Europe in particular) with the 
main narrative of European identity so far, finds an extremely 
clear and explicit formulation in the recent European land-
scape convention (ELC). In this recent convention (signed in 
2000, and entered into force in the first ten ratifying countries 
in 2004)2 landscape is conceived of as the experience of the 
unity of the nature/culture dynamics emerging through a 
plurality of specific characters. Indeed, what the many disci-
plines that deal with it, from its aesthetical definition to more 
intervention-oriented disciplines such as geography and plan-
1 If academically and institutionally this substitution is three decades old (as 
testified by the 1973 EC Declaration of European Identity), it is more recently 
that the concept has become increasingly mobilized in a wider public debate, 
as the heated controversy about the inclusion of a reference to the Christian 
heritage in the European Constitutional treaty shows. 
2 As of January 2007, 34 countries have signed the ELC, of which 26 have also 
ratified it, see Annex 1.
ning, share is the idea that landscape perception entails the 
capacity to see a plurality of elements that are, and stay, differ-
ent as a unity (Mitchell 2002). Through the idea of landscape, 
the ‘diversity of common heritage’ – a recurring expression 
in Euro-rhetoric – is articulated, because, according to cur-
rent definition diversity is an element of all landscapes, and 
not only between landscapes, but within landscape. Indeed, 
we could affirm that the current way of speaking of European 
identity resonates with the aesthetic definition of landscape, 
and this prompts a consideration of European identity with 
an aesthetic approach, exploring the distinctively aesthetic 
solution of the combination of integration and differentiation, 
or universal and particular, that so worries European identity 
builders. A solution, that is, that does not sacrifice the particu-
lar diversities to the universal, but instead finds the latter in 
the particular, as a form of exemplary rather than generalising, 
universalism (Ferrara 1998). 
Therefore the discursive field that the ELC emerges from 
and that it creates provides a viewpoint on metageographical 
representations of Europe and their use in its construction as 
an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1983). A critical consid-
eration of the ELC implied assumptions and function is the 
focus of this article, grounded on an analysis of its rhetoric and 
emerging implementing practices, with particular attention to 
the Mediterranean area. 
The European Landscape Convention (ELC): 
Europe as identity, identity as landscape, 
Europe as Landscape
Let me begin with a brief presentation of the ELC. The 
rationale informing this recent convention and laid out in its 
Preamble, is expressed in some key passages: 
[T]he landscape contributes to the formation of local 
cultures and … it is a basic component of the European 
natural and cultural heritage, contributing to human 
well-being and consolidation of the European identity 
[Preamble]. 
“Landscape” means an area, as perceived by people, 
whose character is the result of the action and interaction 
of natural and/or human factors [ELC; Article 1a]
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[Each Party undertakes] to recognise landscapes in  
law as an essential component of people’s surroundings, 
an expression of the diversity of their shared cultural 
and natural heritage, and a foundation of their  
identity [Art. 5 a].
These statements carry a strong claim for the existence 
of both a specifically European attitude to landscape as a 
cultural construct and process, and of this attitude itself as 
being one of the main components of contemporary ‘Eu-
ropean’ identity, thus deserving fostering and protection3. 
However the connection between landscape, identity and 
Europe is all but evident, and scholars have tended to stress 
how landscape, especially as conceived as a sub-category 
of natural and cultural heritage, is a strong component of 
national, if not local, identity. David Lowenthal, for instance, 
famously stated that landscape is a «compelling symbol of 
national identity» (Lowenthal 1993, 6). This is not only due 
to the fact that in general «as a modern endeavour, the ques-
tion of identity found its answer in the idea of the nation 
and in the national state as its political, social, economic, 
and cultural expression» (as social theorist Peter Wagner 
wrote, significantly, in a publication of the Council of Eu-
rope, cf. Wagner 2000, 17), but even more specifically to 
the fact that «landscape is poorly placed to perform the role 
of consolidating European identity, because, of all types of 
heritage, it is one whose significance is regional rather than 
pan-European» (Last 2006, 10). Indeed this seems con-
firmed also by the fact that studies on landscape perception 
or appreciation tend to focus on very small scale ethnogra-
phies, on the assumption that what counts as landscape for 
some may not be so for others (Voisenat and Nottheghem 
1994). The existence of national, as well as disciplinary, dif-
ferent and sometimes contrasting traditions reinforces these 
objections4.
However these critiques are all based on a particular 
definition of heritage, and indeed of identity; a definition, 
to put it shortly, of which precisely the nation – and the 
national monument – are not only a manifestation but also 
the dominant blue-print. This paper attempts at exploring 
another possibility, that of considering the ELC as part and 
parcel of a different conceptualization of both heritage and 
identity, thus indicative of a paradigmatic shift that finds in 
these recent landscape rhetorics and practices at the same 
time a cause, an effect and a symbol. This approach thus 
aims at being relevant both for the understanding of the 
ELC impact in the field of landscape policies and for the 
interrogation of the rhetorical and practical function that 
concepts such as landscape and identity are called to fulfil in 
the debate on Europe. This will be attempted here through a 
contextualization of the ELC in its discursive field and then 
3 For a critical consideration of the intellectual tradition based on the European 
‘invention’ of landscape in modernity see Venturi Ferriolo (2002) and Milani 
(2001). For a social history of landscape in art see A. Cauquelin (1989), 
along with the ‘classic’ essay by Gombrich (1966) and its problematisation by 
Mitchell (1995). See also, in English, Lowenthal 1993, 1994 and Olwig 1993; 
and in French Luginbühl 1989. 
4 For an updated account of the multidisciplinary debate on landscape, high-
lighting its relevance for social theory and detailing in particular the material 
culture perspective developed in the UK (within archaeological and geographi-
cal approaches informed by cultural studies in particular) see the recent special 
issue on Landscape, heritage and identity, of the «Journal of Material Culture» 
(2006, July issue).
trying to follow the concepts as they are put into practice in a 
few examples of implementation of the ELC.
Landmarks of European identity:  
from monuments to landscapes
An enlightening way to contextualise the ELC is to com-
pare it with other, previous Conventions in the field. Reading 
the ELC’s full text and explanatory report, which carefully 
details its gestation with the contribution of several institution, 
and in an ideal dialogue with a series of previous conventions 
in the field, we can articulate the identity element in a few 
shifts that the ELC introduces in relation also to other interna-
tional European agreements quoted in its preamble5. A paral-
lel reading of these instruments highlights how landscape is 
instrumental to some relevant shifts in the heritage discourse. 
In extreme synthesis, the increasing emphasis on heritage as 
landscape means: 
a shift from a list of specific items or sites towards 1) 
more comprehensive definitions, 
a shift from outstanding to everyday value and, finally, 2) 
a shift from mere protection to management, 3) 
planning and promotion. 
Of course, these three interrelated passages are particu-
larly evident in the ELC, but they do not appear in it out of the 
blue, rather they gradually emerge at least since the end of the 
‘80s. It is in particular the role of the list that makes this readily 
visible: many of the initiatives that are quoted in the ELC as 
its forebears do require lists, either directly attached or left to 
the signatory states. Here the ELC is particularly significant, as 
the list is not only avoided, but positively rejected, as demon-
strated by the fact that a drafted Article 12 of the ELC on the 
nomination of a “List of Landscapes of European Significance” 
has been eventually dropped. 
We could also summarize these shifts by saying that the 
ELC more consistently requires territorial rather than secto-
rial policies in this field, and that a move has been made from 
a monumentalist approach to what I call an experiential one. 
By this I refer to the consideration not of single elements, but 
of all the framework, and moreover not a sense of property 
towards highly charged monuments, for which a special status 
or ‘essence’ is claimed, and claims in return a sense of ‘innate’ 
belonging, but emphasis on quality of life and thus ‘everyday 
value’, appreciated for the type of multifaceted experiences 
that are enabled by it. It is a difference of emphasis, towards 
a more active and open space for subjects: indeed we could 
say, borrowing from geography, that landscape can become 
the meeting ground of space – conceived of as a malleable 
‘field of relations’, and place – as a fixed and culturally charged 
and bound territory. It can thus both avoid the emptiness of 
the space (as in the Castells’s «space of fluxes», or Auge’s 
non-lieux), and the rigidity of space, becoming what we 
5 These are: the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natu-
ral Habitats (Bern, 19 September 1979), the Convention for the Protection of 
the Architectural Heritage of Europe (Granada, 3 October 1985), the European 
Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage (revised) (Valletta, 
16 January 1992), the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-oper-
ation between Territorial Communities or Authorities (Madrid, 21 May 1980) 
and its additional protocols, the European Charter of Local Self-government 
(Strasbourg, 15 October 1985), the Convention on Biological Diversity (Rio, 
5 June 1992), the Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural 
and Natural Heritage (Paris, 16 November 1972), and the Convention on Access 
to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice on 
Environmental Matters (Aarhus, 25 June 1998).
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could define, following De Certeau’s «activated places» (De 
Certeau 1984; Clifford 1997)6. This is because emphasis is 
on continuous transformation, and on memory as process 
rather than as (invented) tradition. It goes without saying that 
landscapes are not, per se, essentially, linked to this different 
approach, indeed a landscape can be conceived as a national 
symbol or monument (see Lowenthal 1994, but also Shama 
1995, Muir 1999), but the fact that this is not the case is all the 
more relevant. What is significant is the statement the ELC 
is making by choosing this approach, and on the more wide 
ranging reflections it prompts on European identity.
This can be substantiated further considering the words 
of Riccardo Priore, the COE official that has followed the 
ELC from its very beginning. During a recent workshop on 
landscape, having made a net distinction between the concept 
of Landscape or landscape as an asset, and particular, actual 
landscapes, Priore replied as follows to the question of how 
indeed landscape is connected to European identity:
European identity is linked to the concept of Landscape 
(with a capital L), and not to specific landscapes (in the 
plural), for the time being. For the time being there is no 
memory, common experience which can contribute to 
a common identity; it is impossible to build European 
identity on that, but it is possible on Landscape, 
Landscape (with a capital L) as an asset. There is a 
widespread social demand for landscape. Of course when 
one refers to specific landscapes then it is local identity in 
connection to landscapes.
So, the idea of landscape is European, landscapes are many and local. I would specify: the European idea of Landscape is that, in its very definition, landscape im-
plies diversity – and a sense of belonging to this diversity – and 
thus can be envisaged as a peculiar attitude towards landscape, 
and as a social demand for the protection for diversity as rich-
ness. Already in his speech Priore had said:
The demand that a growing number of European 
citizens is addressing to public authorities so  
that everyday landscapes are properly protected, 
managed and planned clearly indicates that these 
landscapes represent an essential part of people’s local 
identity but also, conceived as a common assent,  
of their sense of belonging to the European community 
(Priore 2006, 47).
 
The general implication is that to enlarge the traditional notion of heritage to integrate that of landscape means also to reformulate in terms of the latter the connection 
of heritage to a group’s or community’s identity. In other words, 
6 This perspective can be connected also to Ingold’s heideggerian «dwelling 
perspective» of landscape, see Ingold 1993. However here the emphasis is on 
contemporary landscapes, thus rather than on landscape as «constituted as an 
enduring record of …the lives and works of past generations who have dwelt 
within it» (ibid, 152), it focuses on the active, present experience of dwelling 
rather than on its crystallized result. See also Mitchell 2002, vii-xii, and for 
an attempt at integrating phenomenological (Bachelard and Heidegger) and 
Marxist (Lefebvre, de Certeau and Foucault) approaches to the related con-
cepts of place and space (without direct thematization of landscape though) 
see Harvey 1996, 291-326.
not only landscape changes being included in a new discursive 
field, but also the specificity of landscape feeds-back on what 
can be said and done within the policies that now include it, 
and that this becomes possible is only interpreted in the wider 
rhetorical and relation context of the ELC, or, in its own word, 
in the context of the growing ‘social demand’ for landscape. 
This convention promotes an Europeanization that carries at 
the same time a common form and diversified local contents. 
The policy of landscape aims at being European, and thus com-
mon, as far as some framework principles and methodologies, 
but does not go as far as producing a common definition of 
European landscape. In the expression European landscape 
convention, ‘European’ is a specification of Convention, and 
not of landscape. As official documents, academic text and the 
words of involved experts confirm, the ELC, in this early phase, 
is above all about exchanging expertise and creating networks at 
European level, so that landscape becomes a common concern, 
however diverse definitions and traditions might be, and stay. 
This is why we will now concentrate on some local exercises 
of implementation of the ELC], because it is there that we can 
look for the content that fills this new conceptual framework. 
The ELC towards implementation:  
notes from fieldwork
I will now refer to the result of interviews and document 
analysis on some first attempts at implementing the ELC, that 
have taken place in the first years of 2000 and mainly within EU 
framework funding schemes. This meant that implementation 
is still mainly realized at the level of pilot actions, that differ-
ent actors are proposing across Europe. These seem to address 
mainly the creation of international networks, the identification 
of transfrontier landscapes (object of a specific disposition in the 
ELC), the promotion of awareness campaigns and public par-
ticipation in landscape issues, as well as sharing a focus on the 
identification of apt methodologies, as implied by their nature 
of pilot actions. This should be connected to the mentioned 
fact that it is in particular in the framework of EU programmes 
that actions inspired by the ELC find place. Let’s consider two 
examples, taken from the Mediterranean area, of pilot projects: 
European Pathways to the Cultural Landscape and Landscape Op-
portunities for Territorial Organization. 
European Pathways to the Cultural Landscape is a three year 
project (2001-2003) funded by the EU Programme Culture 
2000. It is a network of 12 partners of ten different European 
countries, and one of the aims is precisely to render the network 
and partnership permanent through projects. In synthesis, it is 
the creation of a common forum for discussion and co-opera-
tion with regard to landscape, in particular through meetings, 
staff exchange and shared projects. The specific objectives are 
the understanding of cultural landscapes, marginal landscape in 
particular. In the final report of the project, entitled Pathways to 
Europe’s Landscape, the ELC is explicitly recalled, together with 
a claim that: ‘we believe that landscape is a central part of the 
European common heritage and culture, and that it “belongs” 
in a very real sense to all citizens of Europe’ (Clark et al., 2003, 
n.n). It is worth citing as this common and ‘distinctly European’ 
character is explained in the following:
Our regions are all very different: from mountain to 
marsh, from the Atlantic to the Baltic, from forest to 
farmland. Yet we have found that this variety (and the 
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even richer diversity of our cultures, languages and food, 
or ‘taste-scapes’) is matched by an equally rich common 
heritage that unites our landscapes and makes them very 
recognisably and distinctively European. We discovered 
that this combination of diversity and unity was a 
powerful force for increased mutual understanding, respect 
an friendship, just as too was our exchange of experience 
and expertise. We firmly believe that the landscape can be 
a strong and vital part of European unity, and we think 
that our project … is a symbol of European partnership 
and shared culture (Clark et al., 2003, n.n).
Asked to elaborate further this theme of European identity as reflected in landscape, one of the creators of this project has replied during interview: 
Landscape is the place where people live, therefore by 
definition it is linked to identity. But identity has become 
more complicated than in the past, due to the greater 
mobility of people […] It is not as simple as it used to be 
(or at least was thought to be) only one or two generations 
ago. It is not any longer sufficiently described with terms 
like Heimat, as it used to be in the past in Germany. It 
has become more complicated and multi-layered. But a 
sense of identity is crucial for the sustainable management 
of landscapes. Only with a sense of ownership and pride 
will people care for the landscape and work for it. Only 
with a good knowledge about the specific aspects of a 
certain landscape can it be managed in an intelligent way, 
preserving individual aspects in landscapes undergoing 
rapid and deep change. The European aspect to me is a 
necessary anchor point within globalization, building a 
Europe which has not only common economic interests 
but a common cultural, social and political framework. 
Europe in all its diversity nevertheless has a relatively well 
defined geographical outline and more important common 
historic and cultural denominators. These are reflected in 
the landscape, which is a result of human influence and 
therefore a cultural entity which cannot be separated from 
its history and cultural background […] [T]he projects 
and their European integration helps to strengthen the 
sense of identity, ownership and pride in the people living 
in the landscapes. First of all this is the sense of identity on 
a very local and regional level, but to some extent even a 
European identity is formed through the pride people take 
in the European interest stated in their landscape.
The point is thus not whether the Europeanist rhetoric is used instrumentally, but the fact that as well as a lobbying instrument the new language of landscape 
promoted at European level is, to use again the revealing words 
of the interviewee, ‘a platform to meet like-minded people’7: 
landscapes are many and different, but it is in an attitude to 
7 This means that both approaches to EU programmes and their rhetoric, in-
strumental and otherwise, are present, as my interviewee stressed very openly: 
‘The reference to identity in general and to a European identity particularly 
are real and important parts of the project. But of course they are also used 
to secure funding with the EU and phrasing is prescribed by the application 
guidelines. I do not see that as a contradiction or a problem, as our own inter-
ests and those of the EU meet here without any need to force the matter. In our 
own regional project Europe plays a very important role for the identification 
of the local people with their own landscape as well as our project’.
them and towards diversity itself as a constitutive part of 
them that one can envisage a common element, which can be 
referred to as an element of identity. Obviously, this does not 
refer to any essence of specific landscape (or identity), that 
is local, but to relations of recognition, between individuals, 
territories and institutions.
Similar themes emerge and are specified in my other 
example, the project Landscape Opportunities for Territorial 
Organization (LOTO). This is a three year project (2003-
2005) funded by the EU initiative Interreg III B. This is inter-
esting because Interreg is aimed at territorial development, is 
financed under the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF) and is, allegedly, designed to ‘strengthen economic 
and social cohesion’. It does so charting a map of Europe that 
delineates specific areas, thus promoting the formation of 
large groups of European regions, that at the same time tran-
scend the national context and valorise specific local features. 
Interreg III is a territorial, rather than sectorial, programme, 
based on the strategic relevance given to natural and cultural 
heritage for territorial development, as expressed also in the 
European Spatial Development Perspective (Potsdam 1999). 
For instance in the Central Adriatic Danubian South-Eastern 
European Space (CADSES), under priority 3.3, projects are 
financed aimed at ‘Protecting and developing landscape’. It is 
in this framework that the project LOTO is being carried out8. 
The project provides this self-presentation:
As emphasized by the ESDP and the European 
Landscape Convention, the different landscape 
characterization of the territories is a resource to 
safeguard. Given that the territory is constantly 
developing, transformations of the landscape cannot 
be avoided, but it is important for them to be guided 
with awareness. On the other hand, whoever designs or 
plans the territory does not easily have access to tools 
that can be used to resolve the problem. The project 
intends to provide tools that govern the evolution of 
the landscape through the knowledge of the dynamics 
of transformation, intending the landscape itself as 
a reference framework for any project of an accurate 
and territorial scale, aimed at directing the territorial 
planning/design tools in a complementary manner. 
So, we propose identifying a method of interpreting the 
landscape that could be a shared operative reference to 
guide and verify the territorial transformation choices.
But again, it is in the direct words of one of the involved individuals, responsible for the project on behalf of the region Emilia-Romagna, that we see the real expected 
and desired outcome of the project, that is, networking itself: 
LOTO has been conceived to start experimenting the 
implementation of the ELC at the level of some regional 
experiences. Especially through the construction of a 
methodology for interpreting the landscape that can 
support planning and project-making. The different 
8 The project leader is the Regione Lombardia (Italy). The partners are: Min-
istry for Cultural Heritage and Activities; Regione Umbria, Regione Marche, 
Regione Emilia Romagna, Regione Veneto (Italy), Regione Istria (Croatia), 
Ministry for environmental and spatial planning (Slovenia) Technical Univer-
sity of Munich (Germany), Istituto Urban Project (Romania).
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partners have chosen different areas of investigation and, 
as far as we are concerned we have addressed the issue 
of valorisation. […] The idea is to exchange different 
visions with the European partners. As I said, the 
experiences at European level are the most diverse, there 
are countries that participate in LOTO that have never 
dealt with the management of landscape, I’m thinking 
here of Romania, or instead that do it in a particular 
way, such as the University of Munich, that deals 
with landscape in terms of landscape ecology. Because 
another problem with landscape is multiplicity, and thus 
each discipline tends to appropriate it and develop it 
according to a certain vision. With LOTO we wanted to 
contribute to the reflection with regard to which activities 
should be tried out, activities that would not be confined 
to planning and regulation. We think this is one of the 
elements that have to become key in the new policies of 
landscape. 
In this type of project the European rhetoric of the ‘construction of a common European space’ is realized de facto, although that space acquires its legitimisation 
only by allowing diversity. Vice versa, each specific, diverse, 
instance finds a place there only if it accepts to be one among 
many, that is, if it accepts the form of ‘unity in diversity’. The 
scenery of European landscape policies is thus one character-
ised by a Europeanization that carries at the same time a com-
mon form and diversified local contents. This does not mean 
or imply acritically accepting the EU’s own rhetoric that makes 
everyone a ‘partner’, denying power struggles and differentials 
of forces, but it does point out the windows of opportunities 
that are open to different subjects, but it does point out to the 
windows of opportunities that are open to different subjects, 
something that is best appreciated at the local (but interna-
tionally networked) level. 
This is why Europeanization is something that is at the 
same time very much widespread and possible to observe only 
taking into consideration local contexts. Introduced as a rhe-
torical gimmick or not, the ‘unity in diversity’ seems to be the 
landscape that regions and cities are outlining in Europe. 
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european landscape convention: signatures and ratifications, as of january 2007
States Signature Ratification Entry into force
Albania 
Andorra 
Armenia 14/5/2003 23/3/2004 1/7/2004
Austria 
Azerbaijan 22/10/2003
Belgium 20/10/2000 28/10/2004 1/2/2005
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Bulgaria 20/10/2000 24/11/2004 1/3/2005
Croatia 20/10/2000 15/1/2003 1/3/2004
Cyprus 21/11/2001 21/6/2006 1/10/2006
Czech Republic 28/11/2002 3/6/2004 1/10/2004
Denmark 20/10/2000 20/3/2003 1/3/2004
Estonia 
Finland 20/10/2000 16/12/2005 1/4/2006






Ireland 22/3/2002 22/3/2002 1/3/2004
Italy 20/10/2000 4/5/2006 1/9/2006
Latvia 29/11/2006
Liechtenstein 
Lithuania 20/10/2000 13/11/2002 1/3/2004
Luxembourg 20/10/2000 20/09/2006 1/1/2007
Malta 20/10/2000
Moldova 20/10/2000 14/3/2002 1/3/2004
Monaco 
Netherlands 27/7/2005 27/7/2005 1/11/2005
Norway 20/10/2000 23/10/2001 1/3/2004
Poland 21/12/2001 27/9/2004 1/1/2005
Portugal 20/10/2000 29/3/2005 1/7/2005
Romania 20/10/2000 7/11/2002 1/3/2004
Russia 
San Marino 20/10/2000 26/11/2003 1/3/2004
Serbia
Slovakia 30/05/2005 9/8/2005 1/12/2005




the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 15/1/2003 18/11/2003 1/3/2004
Turkey 20/10/2000 13/10/2003 1/3/2004
Ukraine 17/6/2004 10/3/2006 1/7/2006
United Kingdom 21/2/2006 21/11/2006 1/3/2007
[Source: Council of Europe]
Annex I
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DU SENSORIEL AU SENSUEL, PraTIQUE ARTISTIQUE  
ET PraTIQUE PéDAGOGIQUE
Mahsouna SellAMI
Université du 7 Novembre, Carthage, Ecole Nationale d’Architecture et d’Urbanisme de Tunis, ENAUT, Tunisie
L’ enseignement de l’art plastique ne peut pas tourner le dos à l’environnement personnel, social et culturel où l’étudiant a vécu ni à celui où il évoluera. « Les écoles d’art n’existent pas dans l’espace raréfié des idées. Elles sont au 
cœur de la réalité, d’une réalité faites tout à la fois de désirs, de 
fantasmes, de vocation, de tradition, de métiers, de marché, de 
débouchés et d’argent.»1 (Y. Michaud ) 
En Tunisie, de la maternelle jusqu’à l’université, la pratique 
de cet enseignement a subi à plusieurs reprises des change-
ments tant au niveau du contenu et des objectifs, qu’au niveau 
de la terminologie. En effet, cet enseignement est passé par 
diverses appellations : dessin d’art, éducation artistique ou arts 
plastiques. Actuellement, cette dernière appellation semble être 
de moins en moins satisfaisante et de moins en moins adaptée 
dans certains ateliers d’enseignement artistique. Ce changement 
terminologique dénote et confirme en quelque sorte la relation 
étroite qui existe entre la réalité culturelle, la pratique artistique 
en mutation continue ainsi que la pédagogie artistique. 
Un des objectifs de cet enseignement est de faire épanouir 
chez l’individu la subjectivité et la sensualité souvent étouf-
fée par le contexte socio-éducatif qui, généralement, favorise 
plutôt l’objectivité et le conventionnalisme. Ainsi, la formation 
artistique s’inscrit inévitablement dans une dimension de 
trans-formation, une formation et sa transgression dans une 
pédagogie adaptée à l’enseignement en atelier.2
Par ailleurs, dans un atelier d’enseignement de l’art plastique, 
l’étudiant a la possibilité d'une pratique personnelle mise en 
relation avec le champ artistique très vaste et à géographie de plus 
en plus variable. D’une part, cet enseignement permet les acquisi-
tions techniques et méthodologiques nécessaires à la création et 
d’autre part, il conduit l’étudiant à s'approprier certaines formes et 
attitudes artistiques, en les identifiant et en les actualisant. 
1 Cf. Enseigner l’art, Y. Michaud , Editions Jacqueline Chambon, Nîmes 1993. P11
2 Dans cette transgression, comment le surmoi du pédagogue et celui de l’étudiant 
se comportent-ils l’un par rapport à l’autre ? P. Ricœur dans son analyse de 
l’œuvre de Freud, disait en le citant « [Le surmoi de l’enfant ne se forme pas 
à l’image des parents, mais bien à l’image du surmoi de ceux-ci ; il s’emplit du 
même contenu, devient le représentant de la tradition, de tous les jugements de 
valeur qui subsistent à travers les générations.] Il serait donc vain de chercher 
dans l’explication génétique une justification de l’obligatoire comme tel, du vala-
ble comme tel : celui-ci est en quelque sorte donné dans le monde de la culture. 
» Cf. P. Ricœur, De l’interprétation, Essai sur Freud, ed. du Seuil, Paris 1965, p. 200. 
Depuis quelques temps, la rapidité du rythme de 
l’apparition des nouveautés technologiques et artistiques fait 
qu’il s’établit nécessairement et ponctuellement un décalage 
entre la réalité institutionnelle, la réalité sociale et la réalité cul-
turelle et artistique. Le pédagogue est alors redevable d’assure 
l’articulation et l’interaction entre les trois réalités. Si je pars 
du principe qu’en chaque individu somnole un artiste, je dirai 
que l’enseignement prépare le terrain qui pourrait favoriser sa 
proclamation ou sa renaissance chez l’étudiant. Ainsi l’école 
d’art ne forme pas systématiquement des créateurs, mais plutôt 
des individus qui pourront le devenir un jour. 
Dans quelle mesure l’enseignement de la pratique de l’art 
est en soi une pratique artistique ? Aujourd’hui, comment 
l’art par des frontières de plus en plus floues et des pratiques 
croisées, qui agissent par glissement plus tôt que par rupture, 
intervient-il dans la pratique éducative et pédagogique? 
L’objet de ma communication est de faire part d’un 
regard poïétique sur la pratique de formation en référence à 
ma propre expérience d’enseignante d’art plastique à l’Ecole 
d’Architecture de Tunis. Je mettrais l’accent sur l’encadrement 
dont bénéficie l’étudiant dans sa démarche créatrice, en y 
observant des interstices divers comme lieux d’interaction 
du sensoriel et du sensuel, favorisant alors l’émergence, 
l’événement et aussi la création. 
En plus de l’apprentissage de techniques et de la trans-
mission d’un savoir faire par la stimulation du sensoriel, 
l’enseignant plasticien est, aussi, redevable d’une formation 
artistique qui touche la propre imagination et la propre 
sensualité de l’étudiant. La pédagogie devient un art, l’art 
d’aider l’étudiant à percevoir son environnement, l’art de 
l’aider à accéder à la connaissance plastique et au plaisir es-
thétique. Le plus difficile c’est d’arriver à préserver la propre 
sensibilité de l’étudiant et la singularité de son identité. Il 
faudrait pour cela le mettre en situation de connaître plus 
amplement ses capacités sensorielles en vue de les conjugu-
er et en vue de stimuler sa sensualité et sa perception.3  
3 « Elle (la perception) est le résultat d’une interprétation des informations 
sensorielles. Elle nécessite l’intégration de plusieurs sensations sur lesquelles 
l’individu effectue un choix, prend une décision en fonction de ses connaissan-
ces antérieures, de ses attentes… de ses motivations cognitives et affectives, des 
coûts et des gains éventuels liés à sa décision perceptive. » p14 , cf. Information, 
sensation et perception, J-D Bagot, ed. Armand Colin, Paris 1996. 
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Cet étudiant acquiert petit à petit une attitude de quête ar-
tistique et développe en lui un regard autre, un regard actif 
et un regard critique. Comme disait S. Dali : « Regarder, 
c’est inventer. »4 
Pour définir la sensualité E. Souriau disait « On a 
depuis longtemps remarqué que des impressions sensori-
elles ne suffisent pas pour qu’il y ait impression esthé-
tiques, et que la sensibilité esthétique ne se réduit pas à 
l’agrément sensoriel. Mais cependant un certain plaisir 
sensoriel y entre. Et il est une manière esthétique de con-
templer le monde. »5 
Enseigner l’art plastique n’est sûrement pas une trans-
mission des connaissances à sens unique. L’enseignant se 
met alors dans une disposition de communication, c’est à 
dire une situation de transmission à double sens : prendre 
en vue de donner et donner en vue de prendre. Quel que 
soit le contexte, l’artiste pédagogue ne peut ignorer ou faire 
abstraction totale de son être et de sa subjectivité. Il doit 
sa compétence à sa capacité d’être ce qu’il est , mais sans 
déborder de la juste place qu’il peut occuper. Il est, avant 
tout, tenu de transmettre les connaissances consignées 
dans le programme de l’institut dont il fait partie. Mais ce 
programme, ne précise ni les modes de leurs transmissions 
ni les références pour les asseoir. La didactique, dans ce 
cas, reste artistique, cependant, il ne suffit pas toujours 
d’être un artiste socialement reconnu pour pouvoir être un 
pédagogue. 
Etant dans un cadre d’atelier et non dans celui d’un 
cours magistral, l’enseignement n’est efficace qu’à travers 
une certaine maïeutique qui impliquerait directement 
ou indirectement l’être de l’étudiant. A travers les divers 
exercices, l’enseignant doit intentionnellement investir 
une dimension artistique appelant celui-ci à impliquer 
sa propre sensibilité. Si cette dimension est absente dans 
l’enseignement en atelier, nous risquons de le transformer 
en un atelier de fabrication d’objets selon une recette com-
mune.
 Il s’agit d’un encadrement individuel et à la mesure 
de chaque étudiant, il est adapté à sa motivation et lui 
permet d’agir et de réagir en prenant les différentes 
décisions qui ponctuent le processus de conception de 
formes et d’espaces dans son exercice et son projet. Ces 
décisions sont prises suite à l’interaction que l’étudiant 
effectue entre les objectifs et les consignes de l’exercice, sa 
perception et sa sensibilité aux références artistiques, son 
histoire personnelle, ses propres intentions et le discours 
éclaireur, parfois intentionnellement perturbateur, de 
l’enseignant. Ici, la perturbation est, évidemment, prise au 
sens positif et stimulateur. Il s’agit de troubler l’étudiant 
pour le faire réagir et pour lui faire quitter une attitude 
passive, le poussant, alors à se questionner sur le com-
ment et le pourquoi de sa perception, de son émotion et 
de son action. 
« L’art est fait pour troubler, non pour rassurer… 
Ce trouble ne doit pas se traduire par un rejet né 
de l’incompréhension. L’institution scolaire ne peut 
4 Cf. Information, sensation et perception, J-D Bagot, ed. Armand Colin, Paris1996, 
p145.
5 Cf. E. Souriau, Vocabulaire d’esthétique, éditions Quadrige Presse Universitaire 
de France, 1999.
se satisfaire de l’écart qui se creuse dangereusement 
entre le créateur contemporain et son public » 
Georges Braque6. 
En effet, en atelier, le doute ne doit pas instituer une situation déstabilisante. Dans un souci heuristique, il permet plutôt, un moment de fertilité favorisant 
l’étonnement et la jouissance esthétique. 
Dans ses manipulations de matériaux, d’outils et 
de techniques graphiques et plastiques, l’étudiant ap-
prend et désapprend à la fois. Il gère une situation 
d’expérimentations et de recherches personnelles et par-
ticulières qui restent chargées d’une certaine dimension 
esthétique. M. Merleau-Ponty disait « Il est vrai à la fois 
que le monde est ce que nous voyons et que, pourtant, il 
nous faut apprendre à le voir »7. La séance d’atelier se veut 
aussi comme une possibilité de liberté pour l’étudiant et 
une occasion de connaissance, connaissance de soi, con-
naissance des matériaux et connaissance du monde. En 
effet, le suivi dont bénéficie chaque étudiant séparément 
se présente comme un accompagnement dans son propre 
cheminement tout le long de son processus de concep-
tion. L’enseignant devient comme un guide non pas pour 
lui montrer un chemin, mais comme un guide pour lui en 
éclairer plusieurs. Et il revient à l’étudiant de s’approprier 
son propre cheminement au fur et à mesure qu’il avance 
dans son travail. 
 Dans un groupe d’étudiants en atelier, il y a autant 
de sensibilités que d’étudiants, donc autant de démarches 
créatrices et autant d’encadrements singuliers8. C’est dans 
ce sens que le comment et le quoi transmettre sont si dif-
ficiles à concevoir et encore plus à maîtriser parfaitement 
dans l’enseignement de la pratique artistique. 
Il s’agit d’un travail sur le terrain, où le hasard ainsi que 
l’aptitude et les motivations de l’étudiant, jouent un rôle im-
portant. Il n’est pas possible de prévoir à l’avance les répons-
es à toutes les questions que poserait chacun des étudiants. 
Ainsi, l’efficacité de ses réponses non prévues, dépend de la 
qualité de l’attitude pédagogique de l’enseignant et de ses 
capacités d’éveil et d’écoute concernant le faire et le penser 
de cet étudiant. Cette attitude est similaire à l’attitude de la 
quête d’un artiste face au matériau. Dans ce cas, l’étudiant 
assimilé au matériau et l’artiste enseignant vise à lui donner 
l’occasion de tirer le meilleur de lui- même. 
En général, l’étudiant a peur de l’aléatoire et vit souvent 
diverses situations de blocages au cours du processus de 
conception de son projet. Par un mot, une phrase ou un 
simple geste l’enseignant est très souvent capable de stimul-
er de nouveau sa perception l’aidant ainsi à se détacher de 
certains savoirs, certains sentiers battus et à décoller en vue 
de produire de l’artistique. 
 Par ailleurs, et dans certains cas, l’étudiant n’éprouve de 
jouissance esthétique et ne prend conscience réellement de 
l’intérêt ou de l’apport positif de son travail qu’à la fin du pro-
cessus de sa réalisation. Ou encore, en ayant pris un certain 
recul relatif au temps et à l’espace, comme c’est le cas le jour 
de l’affichage de ce travail pour l’évaluation. C’est en cela que 
6 Cf. L’artistique, arts plastiques et enseignement, actes du colloque de Sait-Denis, 
ed. C.R.D.P. Académie de Créteil, 1997.
7 M. Merleau-Ponty, Le visible et l’invisible, éd. Gallimard, Paris 1964, p. 18.
8 Comme le montrent les différentes figures.
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l’enseignement de l’art plastique en tant que pratique de for-
mation peut être, en partie, assimilé à une pratique artistique. 
L’usage de la référence
Questionner la notion de référence dans l’enseignement 
de l’art plastique, est une façon de poser le problème des con-
naissances trop digérées et des réflexions utilisées comme « 
révérence » et non comme référence. C’est, aussi, une façon 
d’ouvrir un espace de dialogue, de confrontation d’idées et de 
croisement de regards. Le rapport au monde se passe par « 
co-naissance » d’événements différents et de réalités diverses. 
Se référencer, dans ce cas, est une façon d’être acteur, à la fois, 
dans sa propre histoire et dans l’histoire en général. C’est se 
placer dans une dimension où la dialectique entre l’objectif et 
le subjectif est continuellement en interaction. Etre soi n’est 
alors possible que dans une autonomie existante à travers une 
relation relative entre un singulier, un pluriel. 
La réponse proposée par l’étudiant comporte toujours 
une part reconnaissable et en référence à une situation ou à 
un événement plus ou moins objectif et une part qui tire sa 
source du subjectif, lequel n’est, d’ailleurs, jamais absolu. Ce 
subjectif doit son contenu et sa texture à des référents ex-
térieurs que chaque individu a croisés tout le long de sa vie 
depuis son jeune âge. J-F. Soro disait « sans aucun doute le 
parcours, ou si l’on préfère le processus d’identité de chacun 
dans ses sinuosités et dans ses aspérités l’amène à se con-
fronter à de multiples références et repères, c’est aussi ce qui 
génère la richesse et la complexité. En fait, penser, se penser 
en dehors de toute référence serait de l’ordre de l’absence à 
soi-même et aux autres, ce serait postuler hors de l’humain, 
hors de l’histoire, qu’il y a un devenir sans passé, ce serait 
avoir le désir- fou-, utopique et adolescent que du passé on 
peut faire table rase. »9 
Si en usant d’une référence, le pédagogue n’insiste pas 
sur la relation à établir entre elle, le thème de l’exercice et 
l’étudiant, une relation qui favorise la critique et l’analyse, il 
risque de faire de l’atelier un espace de conformation plus tôt 
qu’un espace de formation et de transformation, qui sont les 
objectifs principaux de cet enseignement. Sans l’approche cri-
tique et analytique, la référence devient une déférence regar-
dée comme un objet réifié et une connaissance visant à simple-
ment élargir l’horizon culturel de l’étudiant. Cette approche 
critique crée une dynamique dans le faire de l’étudiant et con-
stitue en lui un lieu mental, tout deux orchestrés par l’habilité 
du pédagogue à faire interagir la sensibilité de l’étudiant et le 
contenu de la référence. Une référence qu’il sélectionne pour 
nourrir et pour élargir le champ personnel de l’étudiant. 
Dans un champ référentiel artistique riche et divers, 
tant au niveau chronologique qu’au niveau géographique 
touchant des civilisations différentes et des mouvements 
multiples: le patrimoine tunisien, l’art du XXième siècle 
et l’art contemporain110. Comment amener l’étudiant à se 
motiver et à stimuler sa créativité, en lui évitant de tomber 
dans la déconstruction négative et en le poussant à décon-
struire pour pouvoir, à la fois, se construire et construire 
son environnement ? 
9 Jean-François Soro « Vers une éthique de la référence : la référenciation », 
Dans Arts plastiques… quelles sont vos références ?, ed. CRDP, Créteil 2004, p. 90. 
10 Les traces matérielles, dans le cas de l’art contemporain, paraissent souvent plus 
repoussantes que réjouissantes. Ainsi, elles risqueraient de mettre l’étudiant 
devant l’ambiguïté à distinguer ce qui est de l’ordre de la réflexion et de 
l’artistique et ce qui est de l’ordre de l’abus et de la facilité.
Quelques réponses plastiques, à certaines problématiques posées, élaborées par des étudiants 
(niveau 1 et 3) de l’Ecole Nationale d’architecture et d’urbanisme de Tunis.
Fig. 1, Fig. 2 et Fig. 3: Regards croisés: architecture de Sidi Bou Saïd (patrimoine tunisien) et architecture Moderne 
et contemporaine (Le Corbusier, B. Tschumi…)
Fig. 4, Fig. 5 et Fig. 6: Manipulation de matériaux et d’outils plastiques en vue d’exprimer l’accentuation  
ou la destruction d’un angle. 
Fig. 7, Fig. 8 et Fig. 9: A la recherche de spatialités inhabituelles et d’événements plastiques spécifiques  
aux matériaux 
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 Dans cet ordre d’idées la présence de la référence sous 
forme d’une image ou d’une pensée est nécessaire pour 
justifier ou pour permettre une assise, un point de départ 
ou un prétexte. Le pédagogue, dont la parole doit être dans 
ce cas mesurée et consciente, ne peut pas négliger la part du 
hasard, des rencontres fortuites et des divers croisements 
qui donneraient autant d’objets qu’il n’y a de sujets. Il s’agit 
de situer la référence à une distance juste nécessaire pour ne 
pas encombrer la sensibilité de l’étudiant. M. Merleau-Ponty 
disait « Si nulle peinture n’achève la peinture, si même nulle 
œuvre ne s’achève absolument, chaque création change, 
altère, éclaire, approfondit, confirme, exalte, recrée ou crée 
d’avance toutes les autres. »11 
Il s’agit donc de l’organisation et de la gestion d’une 
articulation subtile entre la pratique plastique et la culture 
artistique. Malgré le caractère extravagant choquant de 
certaines références, elle restent cependant, un moyen de 
stimuler l’étudiant et de connecter son travail avec le champ 
artistique en général. Par ailleurs, cela permet au pédagogue 
d’assurer la satisfaction de l’institution, d’établir une source 
perpétuelle d’interrogation pédagogique et de créer un es-
pace multiculturel favorisant l’ouverture. Le rejet ou le refus 
que manifeste l’étudiant pour certaines formes ou traces ar-
tistiques, semblent légitime et justifiable. Toutefois un péda-
gogue reste redevable d’un travail efficace et rigoureux pour 
développer chez cet étudiant une capacité à percevoir le non 
vu, à accepter la différence et à lutter contre l’intolérance en 
essayant de capter ce qui, en lui, pourrait la nourrir. 
E. Morin disait « Nous ne pouvons être autonomes qu’à 
partir d’une dépendance à l’égard d’une culture, d’un langage, 
à l’égard d’un savoir. L’autonomie est possible non pas en 
termes absolus mais en termes relationnels et relatifs. »12. Ce 
paradoxe mettant en relation l’autonomie et la dépendance 
est lisible dans la plasticité de l’être, dans sa capacité de pren-
dre et de donner ; qu’il soit étudiant ou enseignant. 
La conception et l’élaboration du projet. 
Dans l’élaboration de la réponse ou des réponses, 
l’étudiant passe par des moments différents et entrecroisés où 
sa perception, sa sensibilité et son sens de la rigueur sont mis 
en jeu. Il produit ainsi des esquisses : des graphiques et des 
expressions picturales et sculpturales visant à chaque fois à 
aboutir sur des éclaircissements de la question posée et sur sa 
motivation relative ou sur des préparations d’une éventuelle 
réponse, considérée comme un aboutissement possible. 
En présentant son projet devant un jury, l’étudiant 
néglige souvent la présence de ces esquisses qu’il considère 
comme des brouillons non présentables et sans aucune 
importance. Il faudrait régulièrement insister et lui rap-
peler continuellement que toutes les traces plastiques qu’il 
réalise en relation avec l’exercice ont de l’intérêt et qu’il 
doit les garder, en vue de les afficher et de les soumettre à 
l’appréciation et à l’évaluation globale et finale du projet. 
Dans ce processus de présentation, ce qui est mis en jeu 
c’est le trajet mental et les conduites créatrices qui accompa-
gnent le faire et le penser de l’étudiant, lisibles à travers les 
différentes mises en formes plastiques qui traduisent la nais-
sance de l’idée et de son aboutissement. Une façon de donner 
11 M. Ponty, L’œil et l’esprit, éd. Gallimard, Paris 1964, p. 92. 
12 E. Morin, La tête bien faite , ed. Seuil, 1999.
à voir cette expression non verbale et saccadée qui a été vécu, 
en silence, depuis le commencement de l’exercice jusqu’à son 
aboutissement. L’étudiant doit être capable de montrer ce vécu 
qui constitue, dans une certaine mesure, la démarche qui lui 
a permis la conception formelle et spatiale de son projet, en 
précisant ses choix des supports et des outils de conception et 
de communications adaptés à l’idée et à son élaboration. 
Comme il s’agit d’interroger cet étudiant sur sa capacité à 
saisir une problématique et à s’impliquer dans une démarche 
créatrice, dans ce cas, l’ordonnancement des dessins, des 
rendus en deux ou en trois dimensions, des rendus en audio-
visuel… devient comme un montage qui se construit au fur 
et à mesure et en conséquence. Ce montage devient le fil con-
ducteur révélateur de l’intérêt plastique et esthétique et de la 
logique interne du processus d’élaboration. 
Conclusion. 
En atelier, l’exercice est structuré et organisé de façon à 
répondre à des paramètres en relation avec une logique com-
municationnelle relevant de l’ordre institutionnel du contenu 
du programme d’enseignement. Cependant, tout cet aspect 
relatif à la fabrication ou à la production d’un identifié sous 
forme de réponse à la question posée, ne doit pas écarter tout 
ce qui peut advenir de l’altérité et de la sensibilité personnelle 
de l’étudiant fabricant et de l’enseignant l’encadrant, qui sont 
tous les deux incessamment invités à user de leurs connais-
sances techniques autant que de leurs imaginaires et de leurs 
conduites créatrices. 
L’objectif est d’aider le jeune étudiant tunisien à prendre 
conscience de la spécificité de son identité en perpétuelle con-
struction, à fructifier et à élargir sa propre culture en relation 
avec le patrimoine local, tout en accédant à la connaissance, à 
la compréhension et à l’appréciation d’œuvres telles que celles 
de Duchamp, celles de Buren, celles de Georges Rousse, de 
Frank O. Gérhy ou celles de Ieoh Ming Pei, et celles de bien 
d’autres plasticiens et architectes qui ont travaillé d’une manière 
singulière sur le lieu, l’espace et l’objet. Il s’agit de lui appren-
dre à percevoir autrement l’environnement spatial et formel 
qui l’entoure, pour que cet étudiant puisse établir en lui les 
glissements possibles entre le sensoriel et le sensuel et par con-
séquent, produire et créer plus tard, de l’espace architectural. 
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I n the paper I will examine, how gender as social con-struction and culturally produced identity has been conceptualized through visual representations of one’s own body in feminist artistic practices. The basic dis-tinction between sex and gender will be deconstructed 
through analyze of feminist art and visual culture to the ar-
ticulations of different gender identities.1 The concept of the 
artist’s own body will be explored through different attempts 
to establish the status of a woman artist as an autonomous 
subject. The main framework of my paper will be historical-
comparative and it will include representations of the body of 
a woman artist in several ways: from the classical self-portraits 
with brush and pallet or at easel; essentialist approach of em-
phasizing features specific to the female body (for example, 
features related to female sexuality, menstruation, pregnancy, 
abortion, birth, maternity...); to constructivist art projects 
repudiating any sort of representation of the female body and 
attempts in the lesbian and queer art to oppose the established 
binary structures of masculine and feminine. 
However, before we enter any further discussion about the representations of the female nude, we need to take 
a short sidestep into the history of questioning the category 
of ‘woman’ and the notion of ‘women’s art’. Namely, it is very 
problematic to speak about art or about women artists as sexu-
ally characterized. Such notions can in fact lead to essentialism 
or to purely biological determinism associating women’s ar-
tistic production with their biological sex. In other words, the 
works of women artists can hardly be united on the basis of 
their common ‘female’ characteristics.
Long since the first attempts at uniting the works of 
women artists on the basis of their sex, feminist theorists 
have started emphasizing that sexual difference is not to be 
understood as the function of sex with biological identity as 
its background, but rather as a historical construction which 
1 In her book Intimate Distance: Women, Artists and the Body, Rosemary Betterton 
has pointed out that the sex/gender distinction does not fit well with more 
recent attempts to theorize the fluid boundaries of gender and sexual identity. 
It is difficult to imagine a clear mapping of sex and gender differences after a 
decade in which transexual and transgender desires have been acknowledged 
and queer identity reclaimed.” (Betterton, R., An Intimate Distance: Women, 
Artists and The Body, p. 15.)
is still incessantly produced, repeated and consolidated within 
various practices of determination.
In one of the first feminist essay “Why Have There Been 
No Great Women Artists?”, Linda Nochlin has called to atten-
tion that no common qualities of ‘femininity’ would seem to 
link the styles of women artists generally and no subtle essence 
of femininity would seem to link work from Artemisia Gen-
tileschi to contemporary women artists. She wrote: “In every 
instance, women artists and writers would seem to be closer to 
other artists and writers of their own period and outlook than 
they are to each other.”2
Another issue that has received much attention within the last thirty years of feminist debates is the tension be-
tween women’s art and feminist art, because it is highly signifi-
cant to emphasize that women art is far from being feminist 
art. Simply put, while the notion of women art generally signi-
fies the art, which is produced by women artists, who are bio-
logically women, feminist art is perceived more ideologically 
and politically orientated because it focuses on anti-patriarchal 
and anti-sexist approaches. Lucy Lippard captured this when 
she wrote that feminist art reflects a political consciousness of 
what it means to be a woman in a patriarchal culture. “Femi-
nism is an ideology, a value system, a revolutionary strategy, a 
way of life. ... Feminist art ‘is a political position, a set of ideas 
about the future of the world, which includes information 
about the history of women and our struggles and recognition 
of women as a class.’”3 
On the early 1970s, art made by feminist women repre-
sented a radical new beginning. If the goal of feminism was to 
change the nature of art itself, twenty or thirty years later, such 
approach was seen as utopian vision. For example, Nourma 
Broude and Mary D. Garrard argue, “that there is no such thing 
as a singular female perspective; that not all art by women is 
feminist, not even all art made by women who are feminists.”4
•••
2 Nochlin, L., Women, Art, and Power and Other Essays, p. 149.
3 Lippard, L. R., The Pink Glass Swan (Selected essays on feminist art), p. 172.
4 Broude, N. and Garrard, M. D., The Power of Feminist Art: The American Move-
ment of the 1970s, History and Impact, p. 10.
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However, the representation of the female nude is one of the widespread topics inside the tradition of Western art 
practices, the main focus in this paper will not be on the analy-
sis of representations of the female nude within patriarchal 
tradition, but on the representations of women’s own bodies. 
As Lynda Nead has shown in her work Female Nude: Art, 
Obscenity and Sexuality, the female nude is “a particularly sig-
nificant motif within western art and aesthetics”.5 The “Nude” 
is for her “a territory traditionally occupied by male artists and 
female models: the assessor and the assessed”.6 
Inside the feminist art theory exists a long tradition 
of the critique of the female nude. From that perspective 
a woman has been understood as the passive object of the 
“male” gaze. John Berger was first, who has shown on the 
status of women inside the long tradition in history of art 
(especially inside the European oil painting). He wrote about 
the image convention of depicting women as objects of the 
gaze and men as lookers or viewers, spectators, collectors 
of art, owners of paintings, and spectator-owners. As nudes, 
women have been seen and judged as ‘sights’. His classic 
formulation, ‘men looked’ and ‘women appeared’, became al-
most anthological. In Ways of Seeing John Berger wrote: “One 
might simplify this by saying: men act and women appear. 
Men look at women. Women watch themselves being looked 
at. This determines not only most relations between men and 
women but also the relation of women to themselves. The 
surveyor of woman in herself is male: the surveyed female. 
Thus she turns herself into an object – and most particularly 
as object of vision: a sight.”7
Along with Berger’s Ways of Seeing, one of the key mo-
ments in the articulation of a binary split between women 
as passive objects of the look, and men as active subjects of 
their own desires, was the theory of Laura Mulvey. In her es-
say “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema”, she wrote about 
images of women in classical Hollywood cinema. She used 
psychoanalytic concepts of “scopophilia” and “voyeurism” to 
purpose that the conventions of popular narrative cinema are 
structured by a patriarchal unconscious. She demonstrated 
the power of the “male gaze” through the examples, where 
women were represented in films as objects of the “male 
gaze”.
•••
While feminist theorists criticized use of the female body as an object, women artists attended to do the 
same through their feminist artistic practice. They tried to go 
beyond the status of passive objects and attempted to estab-
lish the active and creative artistic subjects through the rep-
resentations of their own bodies. In order to understand this 
shift in theory and practice the examination of the women’s 
self-portraits is of great value. 
Through the whole history of fine arts, self-portrait has 
been one of the most frequent motives of women artists; 
in fact, it offers to the artist, more than any other genre, 
the possibility of questioning her own identities and her 
subjectivity. Through the very process of self-portraying, 
5 Nead, L., The Female Nude: Art, Obscenity and Sexuality, p. 2.
6 Ibidem, p. 86.
7  Berger, J., Ways of Seeing, p. 47.
women artists were able to establish themselves as subjects. 
In the internal relation specific to self-portrait, the artist is 
at the same time the model, assuming the double role of the 
portrayer and the portrayed, the observer and the observed, 
the signifier and the signified, the subject and the object in 
one person. 
In this paper the concept of the female body is explored through the diversity of feminist art practices using the 
broad range of media – from more traditional ones such as 
painting, sculpture and graphic art to the more contempo-
rary artistic practices such as installation, performance art, 
photography, video and other new media. This research is 
a comparative analysis of the politic of identities which are 
‘inscribed into’ the body of a woman artist in various repre-
sentations, which I sort out in three main categories: 
The classical self-portraits with brush and pallet  1) 
or at easel
The specific female body2) 
The lesbian body3) 
1.) The classical self-portraits  
with brush and pallet or at easel: 
Through the genre of classical self-portrait, I analyze the 
examples of women professional painters from the sixteenth 
century (from Sofonisba Anguisolla, for example, who paint-
ed one of the longest known series of self-portraits) to our 
time, who had attempted to establish the status of a woman 
artist as an autonomous subject.
2.) The specific female body: 
Here I examine images of the artist’s body that explore 
specific areas of female experience which had previously 
been ignored, for example, features related to female sexual-
ity, menstruation ( Judy Chicago, Eclipse), pregnancy (Paula 
Moderson-Becker, Gillian Melling), abortion (Frida Kahlo), 
birth (Cecile Walton), maternity (Melita Vovk)... These 
images are labeled as essentialist approach that emphasizes 
features specific to the female body and therefore signified as 
‘biological essentialism’. This is in contradiction to those who 
insist that femininity is socially and historically constructed. 
While the popularity of these images was evident among 
women, many feminists, especially anti-essentialists from 
poststructuralist heritage were wary of them. 
Because of that I analyze also the examples of “the un-
represented body”, which represent the opposite approaches 
of essentialist representations of the specific female body. 
The focus here is on the constructivists (anti-essentialist) art 
projects repudiating any sort of representation of the female 
body (the best example of the un-represented body is the 
project Post-Partum Document by Mary Kelly).
Through this category, I analyze also the images of the 
artist’s “pathological body” that expose ‘taboo’ themes of 
violence (for example, Ana Mendieta, Aprilija Lužar), ageing 
(Alice Neel), illness and death (Frida Kahlo, Hannah Wilke, 
Jo Spence, Nancy Fried). Another aspect I research in this 
section are the images of the artist’s body that deconstruct 
embedded masculine values, for example, dominant ideas of 
beauty. Some artists emphasize the materiality of the female 
body as a critique of the male objectifying gaze and related 
systems of institutionalized control ( Janny Saville).
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3.) The lesbian body: 
In this section I examine the attempts in the lesbian and 
queer art to oppose the established binary structures of mascu-
line and feminine through the concepts of visual transvestism, 
masquerade and drag king performances. I analyze a wide 
range of non-normative gender(s) and sexualities within the 
visual arts: for instance gender variations like female masculin-
ity, transgenderism, transexualism. 
The repressed lesbian body has become an important 
site within feminist art practice for acknowledging difference. 
However, there are very few examples of artworks on the femi-
nist or lesbian topic, especially on the local Slovenian artistic 
scene. For that reason, it is necessary to include more examples 
of so-called global art production, although this means mostly 
from Western cultural tradition.
On the other hand, lesbian and gay studies as well as queer theory (especially lesbian feminists, for example, Judith 
Butler, Teresa de Lauretis, Monique Wittig) bring to the field 
of feminist theory a new point of view about the category of 
woman, about the notions of female and feminine, about the 
distinction between sex and gender and about different gender 
identities. The best example of this was Monique Wittig’s 
radical and almost anthological statement that lesbian is not 
a woman.
•••
Through this paper, I tried to present some of feminist art practices where it has became obvious, how and in which 
way the visual representations of one’s own body stand in the 
opposition to the patriarchal or even heterosexist social order. 
Through the politics of representation I tried to show, how 
feminist artists use images of the body in order to make visible 
a range of their identities, connected not only to sex, gender(s) 
and sexuality, but also to ageing, nationality, race and class. 
From that perspective the most relevant are examples of 
those authors, who initiate new dialogues with feminist theory 
and introduce the issues of sex, gender and sexual difference 
within their art works. The art by authors who have been suc-
cessful in crossing the gender binary structures could animate 
the interdisciplinary concerns with gender and politic of iden-
tities in general. At the same time, I would like to stimulate 
new theoretical discussion of social visibility, presence and 
distinctiveness of marginalized identities (feminist, lesbian, 
queer) and promote their political affirmation in the socio-
cultural and artistic world. 
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T here is almost no doubt that such a record as photography or film represents a powerful means of verification of memory in almost any respect: historical, collective, and even individual or psychological. However, through 
the accumulation of various modes of audiovisual recordings 
– no matter what kind of objects we can think of, a memory, 
which is “stored” in various media (photographs, films, tapes, 
disks, etc.), becomes more complex as it becomes increasingly 
inaccessible in its totality. With regards, especially to film and 
other forms of audiovisual presentation, such presentation in 
a sense, “objectify” memory. However, there are many multi-
plying levels of reality and therefore memory itself becomes 
open and vunerable to manipulation. Nevertheless, due to all 
circumstances, memory as it is “materialised” in film, is un-
avoidably constructed. 
I n the midst of these time-images and time-space, which are inhabited by memory, the notion of identity is formed. This notion thus, brings us closer to the realm of culture 
since identity acquires its relevance in relation to the notion of 
difference. Each film is in one way or another related to these 
notions, which form its basic grammar. Since each instance of 
identity is a product of some course or process of identifying 
activity (or similarities of code and conduct within a cultural 
context), which works through the differences towards recog-
nising something or someone as being the same as it- or him 
or herself, the movement of representation, such as in the case 
of a film, enters the process of identifying. This is the point, 
where the aspect of aesthetics plays a big role.
Identity with a difference
As the bourgeois class society developed new forms of 
representation of a socially constructed reality, and as it deter-
mined a special place and role for aesthetic practices (usually 
known as art) in this reality, identity became a denominator of a 
lot of different uses and meanings. On the other hand, the term 
itself lost its “innocence” due to complex impacts of new forms 
of representation, which (as a necessary intellectual addition) 
contributed to the reproduction of the public. The role of pho-
tography and film in this sense was immense. Maybe we could 
say today that film after a period of developing different formats 
in different registers reached a point when we could almost 
determine subjectivity (in a psychological or sociological sense) 
in the social reality as a kind of “representation of representa-
tion,” meaning that the “real subjectivity” represents an imagined 
or a conceptual representation of subjectivity. In any case, in the 
age of television and digitalisation images, gestures, recognition 
patterns, representations of bodies and so on, are all bringing us 
closer to such consequences. However, as much as such supposi-
tions seem intellectually attractive, they should not be taken too 
far, but they should serve as an indication of some of the com-
plex effects of audio-visual production, which is woven in the 
fabric of society. Here we are talking, of course, about symbolic 
exchanges within any society. Therefore, there is no doubt that 
the identity in the framework of culture by and large functions as 
a recognition scheme, within which the audio-visual production 
provides many particular views, angles, objects, gazes, sugges-
tions and so forth, which modify ways of seeing things and also 
ways of “being seen.” And it should be added that the instance of 
“being seen” involves the being as such, which is the category of 
existence and of the existentialist philosophy. 
Lacan’s theory of gaze, that was developed in his most quoted seminar, can be quite helpful for comprehend-ing the extent of this. Lacan’s explanation of a little 
incident from his youth with a fisherman Petit-Jean has some 
methodological value for what we are trying to say here. Petit-
Jean’s claim that the can glittering on the surface of the water 
“doesn’t see you!” as we know, engaged Lacan’s thinking quite 
a lot: “To begin with, if what Petit-Jean said to me, namely, that 
the can did not see me, had any meaning, it was because in a 
sense, it was looking at me, all the same. It was looking at me 
at the level of the point of light, the point at which everything 
that looks at me is situated – and I am not speaking metaphori-
cally.” (Lacan. 1979, p. 95) Why Lacan finds it necessary and, 
actually, so prominent to stress that he “wasn’t speaking meta-
phorically?” Taking into account his relation with the group of 
fishermen, what we can characterise as a culturally structured 
situation, Lacan demonstrates how the subject, in a “form” of 
Lacan himself in this case, is thrown out of picture. Although 
in this chapter Lacan isn’t concentrating on identity, the pro-
cess, if I may say so, of gazing and especially being seen by the 
objects, could be apprehended as a kind of a process of identi-
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Suicide at the Adriatic
As in most other Central and Eastern European coun-
tries, which were liberated from Nazism in a flame of socialist 
revolutions, also in Yugoslavia, film production developed 
relatively quickly thanks to a high degree of support by new 
revolutionary authorities. In any case Yugoslav cinematogra-
phy eventually developed in many respects as the strongest 
film production in the Balkans. The initial period after the 
second world war was marked by a sub-genre of the war genre, 
namely so called partisan movies, and a number of adapta-
tions of the local canonised literature and drama for screen-
ing. Especially the latter sort of films, which were mostly a 
priori supposed to bear an “artistic value,” could be studied 
nowadays as an expression of tendencies to form a cinematic 
version of identity aiming at the collective aspect, the so called 
national (ethnic) self image. Hence, we can say that in a quite 
early period of the socialist Yugoslavia the constitutive parts – 
federal republics, which were founded on the ethnic principle 
– worked upon some aspects of their traditional, cultural and 
ethnic distinctions in film, as they did it as well in the other 
art forms in spite of the so called internationalist political and 
ideological rhetoric. Each of the federal republics was autono-
mous in its cinematic as well as all other cultural endeavours. 
Not all of these films could be easily dismissed regarding their 
aesthetics, cinema craftsmanship or sophistication, but never-
theless, they predominantly represented a pre-modern view of 
film in tune with signifiers of a belated romantic vision of the 
ethnic identity and occasionally with “obligatory” class mes-
sages. A matter of a discussion of another kind is a question 
on how much these Yugoslav movies could be contextualised 
in view of the post-socialist tragedy of the country.5 But, in 
between there was a period, when it seemed that a new urban 
culture, which transcended the attributes of an exclusivist eth-
nic identity, was emerging in this multi-cultural Balkan repub-
lics. Many cases of films could be found in almost all Yugoslav 
republics that in many respects shared a similar aesthetic 
codes and modernist views as some other European films at 
the time. But let me bring up my point by briefly presenting 
just one film: Sand Castle (Peščeni grad – 1962) by Boštjan 
Hladnik, the enfant terrible of the Slovene cinema. 
I n the sixties the Slovene cinema made first most recogn-isable and serious moves towards a modernist approach in film-making. As recently deceased director of the 
Slovenian cinematheque Silvan Furlan remarked in his article 
for a special issue of the review Ekran, dedicated to the cel-
ebration of the 100th anniversary of the Slovene film: “[The 
Slovene film] gained importance as the mass culture and as 
art as well. Why should our film be anything special in this 
regard? But it is certainly very special for our culture and art 
– it visibly co-created and it still co-creates an image of our-
selves.” (Furlan 2005, p. 42) The period of late modernism, in 
which a part of film production in Slovenia went on dutifully 
screening “national” myths and canonised literature, brought 
about also some of the most important films in Slovenia so 
far. Boštjan Hladnik contributed quite a big share of them. 
The film Peščeni grad maybe isn’t Boštjan Hladnik at his best, 
but still the film very well represents his role in the history of 
Slovene cinema. Already with his first movie Dancing in the 
Rain (Ples v dežju – 1961) Hladnik introduced the aesthetics 
of modernity in the cinema of Slovenia. And he did so very 
fying. Here we cannot but evoke one of the most impertinent 
and beautiful finales in film history, namely the end of Godard’s 
film Pierrot le fou (1965), in which the Belmondo character 
commits a very bizarre suicide at the sea shore. As the cords of 
dynamite sticks, that he wraps abundantly around his head ex-
plode, and the subject goes up in smoke, camera turns toward 
the setting sun on the line of seas’ horizon. It’s the intense light 
of this final shot, accompanied by Rimbaud’s verses1, which 
bear a resemblance to the scene of Lacan’s vision of a vision. 
The difference between Belmondo and Lacan was only this 
that the Belmondo character took the absence of the meta-
phor very seriously, and so he vanished into the light of the 
very bright sun. Lacan only recognizes the disappearance of 
subjectivity, Pierrot submits himself to the disappearance from 
the picture. Therefore, we can imagine Lacan as a viewer of 
this Godard’s film nodding approvingly to Godard’s perceptive 
visualisation of the productivity in a form of destructiveness of 
the identifying process. At the end of this we find nothing less 
than the obliteration of subject, not in just metaphorical terms, 
as Lacan very importantly remarked. 
The very notion of identity opens a field, where we en-counter a number of relevant meanings as far as films, which we have in mind, are concerned. These mean-
ings, needless to say, cannot be perceived out of context, which 
is always historical. “History and identity are probably the two 
amongst those concepts, with which the influence of hundred 
years of cinema could be assessed.” (Elsaesser 1996, p. 52)2 
The recent international theoretical discussion on a correlation 
between cinema and history, brought up quite clearly a defini-
tive realisation about the impossibility of recent history to avoid 
a deep impact of film. History is remembered, and it therefore 
exists through images, which were unavoidably taken at a certain 
point in time, and so in turn the point in time becomes an image 
open to interpretation, which always integrates the time-image 
in the context of a present. Without elaborating such complex 
assertions much further, we can claim that the European cinema 
in its most “articulated” products particularly reflected this 
correlation, in which the present is the point of becoming and 
vanishing of identity as it is produced and destroyed in the pro-
cesses of identifying. We could determine the roots of our un-
derstanding these processes in the classical European thinking, 
which is best represented by Fichte’s effort to formulate an abso-
lutely free subject, who reproduces himself in a form of his fa-
mous das Ich. The identity is a dynamic category of a productive 
subjective activity, through which differences that are in many 
respects defined as cultural attributes, contribute to the self-
recognition of the subject in the process of forming the identity. 
In this activity the subject triumphs over history as well, or in 
other words, the (abstract) subject’s freedom is manifested also 
in his freedom from the determinations of history. However, this 
triumph happens to be an illusory imposition of the subject: his-
tory, as a rule, strikes back in a form of “events.” In any case, films 
reacted to a correlation with history especially through their 
reflexive approach to identity. The notion of identity concerns 
a number of its enunciations that touch upon philosophical 
subjectivity, psychological subject, an ethnic entity, the political 
agent, and so on. All these different aspects of identity, which are 
naturally in most cases, but not necessarily so, inscribed in con-
structions of fictional characters, are manifested in films from 
different periods of cinematography. 
200
Imaginacija, čutnost in umetnost / Zbornik referatov III. sredozemskega kongresa za estetiko
Darko ŠTRAJN: SEASHORE SUICIDE IN VIEW OF MEMORY, REPRESENTATION AND IDENTITY, 198-200
much so that the film’s meaning still remains rather impene-
trable and ambiguous for most average viewers. Although the 
Dancing In the Rain immediately gained high acclaim among 
the cultured audiences, it looks like that Hladnik maybe felt 
a need to come closer to a less sophisticated moviegoers. The 
result was in many respects not much less accomplished film, 
which is in view of a presentation of an identity problem 
much more transparent than the first Hladnik’s film. As in 
the Sand Castle (which is a sort of a road movie or maybe 
more precise: off road movie) there is not much of a story, 
we just get a lot of fragments, which emit double messages 
of joy and anxiety. The story of the film begins in the city 
(home audiences of course recognise the capital Ljubljana), 
where one of the lead characters, named Ali, feels bad due to 
his failure at the university exams. So after a quarrel with his 
girl friend he hits the road in his deux chevaux, which was a 
quite popular car in Slovenia at the time. On his way out of 
the city he first takes in his car a hitch hiker named Smokey, 
and finally a secretive girl Milena. The three then travel to 
the sea, later they drive on cart tracks and totally off any road 
looking for a deserted beach. They find such beach and they 
spend their time there playing, bathing. Some hints about a 
love triangle are given but not much follows from it; it looks 
like that Milena is falling in love with the both boys, but the 
story doesn’t develop much further in any resolution of the 
love triangle. At the end Milena jumps from a sea cliff. For 
two of the three main roles in the film Hladnik engaged a pair 
of Serbian actors Milena Dravić and Ljubiša Samardžić, who 
became highly popular for their role in Branko Bauer’s come-
dy about life in so called “youth labour brigades” Prekobrojna 
(since there is no official English title this could be translated 
as “Over the Number”), which was shot in the same year 
just before Hladnik shot his movie. The pair of young actors 
represented already in the Prekobrojna, what seemed to be a 
much desired nascent Yugoslav identity. Hladnik made use 
of the two actor’s image of a young couple looking for “joys 
of life.” However Hladnik’s film isn’t any comedy in spite of 
the fact that what seems to be a love triangle is interwoven 
with many comic situations. On the other hand at the same 
time the characters fall over and over again in bursts of un-
motivated laughter, which becomes more understandable 
only at the end of the film. Joy and playfulness of the youths, 
who could have been just of any nationality or ethnic origin, 
is, as it seems in the carefully chosen moments, punctured 
by unexplainable relapses of the main female character in 
weird conditions of sudden fear and sorrow. So, Hladnik 
throughout the movie hints at some emptiness in a subjectiv-
ity, which makes the identity of characters quite ambivalent. 
At the end the trauma is revealed in a quite abrupt way. The 
explanation, which is given at the end of the movie, seems 
even too explicit and it is somehow not in tune with other-
wise generally “nouvelle vague” kind of atmosphere of the 
film. Nevertheless, the film is one of the first Yugoslav films, 
which reflects the emerging urban middle class and new val-
ues of a cosmopolitan part of the younger generation at the 
time. If we talk on a different level about this film, we should 
be reminded of Godard and his Pierrot le fou, that happened 
to be shot three years later than Hladnik’s “Castle.” Hladnik’s 
film is one of those black and white films, which gives an 
impression to a viewer that he has seen colours in the film. 
As Pierrot le fou also Peščeni grad is throughout the whole 
film permeated by very bright light, which in an inexplicit 
way suggests the instance of “being seen” for the characters. 
And as the Godard’s hero vanishes into the light at the end of 
the film, so does Hladnik’s Milena; only she vanishes from a 
high rock above the angry sea waves. But the effect of vanish-
ing is still the same in its suggestion of the non-metaphorical 
blunt standpoint on the subject’s identity, which is in the 
Lacanian view a tool of a production of subjectivity, which 
never can establish itself outside of a constant threat between 
desire and the total loss. At the end of Hladnik’s film view-
ers are told by a doctor from a psychiatric hospital that the 
traumatised girl was born in the concentration camp. So the 
character of the girl stands for an identity problem of the 
whole generation of the modernist period. However, nowa-
days, we can recognise Hladnik’s intuition that – maybe even 
unknowingly – got an insight into the destructive potential 
of such identity’s construction. What seemed for years as a 
too explicit explanation of the subject’s trauma in the film, 
cannot be interpreted today without any association to the 
concentration camps of the war in Bosnia, which functioned 
in the social imaginary of many ex-Yugoslavs as an upsurge 
of hidden forces of history. Therefore, as we know, after the 
political turmoil’s in 1989, that changed the map of Europe, 
the theme of identity emerged in a new context.
(endNotes)
1 Verses were taken from Rimbaud’s poem L’éternité (May 1872), 
which starts and finishes with this “dialogic” stanza: “Elle est 
retrouvée./Quoi ? – L’éternité. C’est la mer alée/ Avec le soleil.” 
2 I translated this quotation from the Slovene translation of the text. 
So, the responsibility for the meaning of the statement is at least in 
part mine.
3 The notion of alienation was largely used at the time in the 
intellectual discourses of existentialism and in some trends within 
the New Left, especially those, which were discovering the “young 
Marx” and which worked with ideas of the critical theory of the 
Frankfurt school. The term alienation itself could be a starting point 
for taking a deconstructive view of the period. 
4 The marginalisation as a critical and sociological concept, that also 
addressed the problem of identity of individuals in the context of the 
social order has been developed. 
5 In my view a research along such lines would shed some additional 
light on many reasons for fierceness of the ethnic conflicts in the 
Balkans after 1990. 
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P hilosophy can also be interpreted as material production, namely an opinion based on belief in philosophical tradition or philosophical history as well as an opinion based on the traditionally and historically presented concepts, terms and 
methods of pure philosophy outside and beyond everyday life. 
Philosophers who assume that belief in philosophy is a condi-
tion of philosophy build certain discourses and procedures of 
philosophically derived narratives and argumentation within a 
debate, which also means deriving clichés and jargon, opinions, 
speeches and writing within and about philosophy. For example, 
modern and enlightened assumptions about philosophy as of an 
ordered protocol about autonomous thinking by Kant, Scheling 
and Hegel proved to be certain philosophies. Certain philosophy 
can be denoted as thinking, speech and writing that serve to 
apologetically or critically affirm traditional, historical or current 
philosophy as recognizable and autonomous discipline with all 
its spans, achievements and, certainly, its hegemonies. The cer-
tainty of a philosopher can be understood as his/her positioning 
in philosophy as practice, institution or profession and then 
expecting a philosophical question and answer in the way it is 
put or assumed by philosophical tradition. The term ‘certainty’ 
does not denote validity in instrumental sense or truthfulness in 
epistemological sense, namely, the truth in metaphysical sense 
but a philosophical inclination that ‘validity’ and ‘truthfulness’ 
of philosophical arguments supporting an assertion should be 
confirmed on the basis of the relationship between the recalling 
of philosophical tradition and the history of derivation of philo-
sophical protocols. 
For example, Martin Heidegger is the philosopher of the phi-
losophy that presents itself as the one which has a certain philosoph-
ical foundation and thinking of philosophy and the philosophical. 
He designed almost each of his papers and lectures in such a way 
that would confirm his opinion within philosophy as philosophi-
cal thinking directed through philosophical tradition towards the 
source of philosophy in the Greek power of deriving abstract concepts 
by means of surpassing the individuality of everyday examples. The 
demand for constant and recurring founding of philosophy as 
the philosophy within philosophy is essentially fundamentalist. 
It is philosophical fundamentalism since pure philosophy is seen 
as the confirmation of the foundation of the philosophical and, 
consequently, the final reach of thinking in techno-procedural 
and metaphysical sense.1 Martin Heidegger draws attention to the 
importance of philosophical tradition and specifically to the origi-
nal one: the tradition of founding the philosophical, namely, the 
metaphysical in the assumed Greek thinking as an unconditional 
beginning. His ‘poetic’ suggestiveness is not only the recalling 
of the philosophical source, but also understanding philosophy as 
certain only if it is itself traditionally constructed in the sense of an 
assumed project or an allegory of Greek thinking. It could be said 
that ‘Greek thinking’ as a criterion of certainty is established as a 
protocol in all philosophical thinking and, above all, in German 
philosophical tradition and its areas of influence.
Nadežda Čačinovič in her essay “Benjamin, the treatise writer” 
introduces and emphasises the concept of uncertainty referring to 
the works of German philosopher Walter Benjamin. She points out: 
“Here, uncertainty does not denote philosophical irrelevance but 
only the consequence of the exposed, direct, unprotected, we could 
even say stupid, confrontation with the fact that all those who are in 
one way or another involved in philosophy have to deal with, and 
that is with the experience of ‘insufficiency of theory in relation to 
the mundane multiplicity of meaning and the multifaceted nature 
of phenomena’, with the experience of a deadly grasp of generalisa-
tion, reduction and levelling not longer protected by the Platonist 
heritage”.2 In other words, this instructive commentary focuses on 
the questions as to what happens with philosophy when it not lon-
ger refers to the clearly visible tradition of the Greek (for example, 
the Platonist) heritage but to the individualised and modernised 
speech of philosophers in the midst of the multiplicity of meaning 
of the contemporary world? If we pose this problem of ‘uncertainty’, 
then we pose a question, from Benjamin to Wittgenstein and from 
Nietzsche through Heidegger to Lyotard, Derrida, Foucault or 
Deleuze, about the drama of direct survival of great issues or themes 
or genres or protocol structures of concepts and terms from philo-
sophical heritage, above all, the projection of philosophical heritage 
as authentic source and transmission of values, meaning, and 
significance of Greek tradition. There, indeed, starts the drama of 
the ‘uncertainty’ and ‘failure’ of the assumed source and accordingly 
the condition of philosophical tradition as philosophy and tradition 
as the conditions of derivation of protocols of philosophical pro-
1 Martin Heidegger, “Polazište zasnivanja metafizike”, in Kant i problem metafizi-
ke, NIRO ‘Mladost’, Beograd, 1979, p. 15. 
2 Nadežda Čačinovič (2004), “Benjamin, the treatise writer”, in Parvulla Aes-
thetica, Antibarbarus, Zagreb, 2004, p. 95.
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cedures of argumentation. What in Benjamin points out to ‘uncer-
tainty’ is the confrontation with the limits of philosophical doxa as 
a general belief that philosophy is usually presented as science in 
the manner that nullifies the power of philosophy to present or to 
evoke/suggest or to provoke our knowledge within the complexity 
of life.3 Benjamin positions philosophical discourse as a collection 
of individual floating narratives and their functions as examples to 
present and suggest the critical problem of historical or modern 
subjectivity within culture and society.
Italian aesthetician and philosopher Giorgio Agamben is not 
a philosopher/theoretician with antiphilosophical approach but 
is, on the contrary, dedicated and acribic, philologically oriented 
philosopher who on the inconsistent maps of the Heideggerian 
reading, critical theory and postlacanian psychoanalysis4 demon-
strates the problem of heterogeneity, hybridity, and discontinuity5 
of Western, classical Greek and Roman philosophical tradition. In 
his book The Idea of Prose, which is constructed as a collection of 
concise philosophical narratives and quotations, Agamben com-
mits a seeming offence in relation to the critical philosophical work 
of interpretation in order to show that once repeated uncertainty 
of the fragmentation of philosophical narrative becomes new or 
different philosophical certainty. The repeated uncertainty of the 
fragmented narrative – which resembles Benjamin’s antiphilosophi-
cal writing in place of philosophical speech – gives the impression 
of wanting to show something else, different from modern provoca-
tion of the great tradition of classical philosophical process as the 
quest for wisdom. With assurance and in scientifically supreme 
manner, Agamben recalls European philosophical tradition of relat-
ing a narrative with the point as a projection from the past into the 
insecurity of synchronic comparisons of individual and localised 
short speeches on behalf of the ‘case’ of life itself (love, happiness, 
music, childhood, glory, death, narration, etc). Agamben’s narratives 
are offences of the Benjamin’s offences and, therefore, show not 
only the visible but also the hidden face of philosophy.6 Agamben 
projects the positioned diachronic narratives of Western philosophi-
cal and humanistic tradition into the discursive field of synchronic 
traces, thus laying stress on the logics of discontinuity, which are 
constitutive affirmations of the tradition of philosophical process. It 
turns out that the tradition of philosophy is not a non-problematic 
tradition, but the tradition of the ‘states of emergency’ which at the 
same time question and determine philosophical tradition, and that, 
without doubt, in the European sense of the history of philosophy. 
For Agamben, that history/tradition is the ‘text’ of philosophi-
cal reading, which constitutes an event, or evoking of the ‘state of 
emergency’, or ‘movement’7 which represents the potentiality of 
the ‘thinking about’ and ‘thinking in’. For that reason, Agamben, as 
someone who is familiar with the teaching of Jacques Lacan’s theo-
retical psychoanalysis, does not see the certainty and uncertainty of 
philosophy as ‘characteristics’ of thinking or of the identification of 
the effects of thinking but as building, which takes place around the 
place of safe uncertainty and that is the Lacanian Real. 
In academic circles, philosophers like Jean-Francois Lyotard, 
Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault or Gilles Deleuze were long 
3 Walter Benjamin, “Spoznajno kritički predgovor”, in Porijeklo njemačke žalobne 
igre, Veselin Maslesa, Sarajevo, 1989, p. 12.
4 Giorgio Agamben, Stanzas – Word and Phantasm in Western Culture, University 
of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1993.
5 Giorgio Agamben, Potentialities – Collected Essays in Philosophy, Stanford Uni-
versity Press, Stanford CA, 1999.
6 Giorgio Agamben, Ideja proze, AGM, Zagreb, 2004, p. 101.
7 Giorgio Agamben, “Movement”, in http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpag-
amben3.htm
considered as uncertain philosophers in the twofold meaning of 
uncertainty: 1) as uncertain philosophers in relation to the usual 
philosophical jargon, themes and solutions of Western tradi-
tion and 2) as uncertain philosophers in relation to institutional 
placements of non-pure philosophical practices according to ‘pure 
philosophy’ in its ideal traditional sense. These philosophers 
constructed completely different philosophical discourses, which 
are outside the usual field of academic philosophy but with the 
distinctive and pronounced emphasis that it is, nevertheless, phi-
losophy. Certain of their works8 were not formally, procedurally 
or in protocol similar to the works, which are according to habit 
or canon of academic philosophy assumed to be models for the 
creation of philosophical works and expressions of philosophical 
discourse. Previously mentioned philosophers used the possibility 
of hybrid discourse, poly-genre writing, and constructed ‘indi-
vidual’ non-systemic problematisations of incomparable examples 
of knowledge, representations of knowledge, and interpretation 
starting from scientific explanation through institutional and cul-
tural interpretations to textual production in specific cultural prac-
tices. On the other hand, they also wrote works that were explicit 
positioning of philosophy as canonical symptoms. This ambivalence 
is seen as the potentiality of late-modernist diversion from ‘pure 
philosophy’ as ideal and internal unity in posing problems, themes, 
narratives, protocols, and procedures of opinion concerning 
derivation issues of hybrid philosophical strategies about philoso-
phy and philosophical tactics within it or, even, those outside of 
philosophy in the very unnatural naturalness of writing (écriture). 
Philosophy, therefore, is not a collection of thoughts or representa-
tives of different ways of thinking but a collection of traces. Accord-
ing to Derrida, it is there that the production of a new concept of 
writing occurs. The new concept of writing is determined by the ideas 
of difference and distinctions of traces in the language game. The 
game of difference presupposes syntheses and directions, which 
forbid that at any given moment, in any sense, some simple element 
be present by itself and directed to itself. Derrida is totally explicit 
when he says that whether we speak about the order of oral or of writ-
ten speech none of its elements can function as a sign without directing 
to some other element that simply is not present by itself. 9 Every ele-
ment is built from traces of other elements belonging to the chain 
or the system. The process of making a chain, this tissue, is the text, 
produced only in the transformation of some other text. Philoso-
phy can be seen as a practice of textual relationships that are not 
simple pictures of thoughts but represent artificial constructions 
anticipating and suggesting potentiality for thoughts /thinking. 
Redirection of attention from philosophy as thinking to philosophy as 
writing can be understood as a demand for deconstruction of the 
stable architecture of Western philosophy. Who can move straight 
to philosophy when a winding path appears and we don’t know 
where it leads, when a fly unsuccessfully fights to find a way out of 
a bottle, when the thought fades from a text, which is a ruin of the 
embankment/dispersion of words separated from thoughts? It is as 
if philosophy couldn’t exist without indirect moves or representatives 
in relation to what it ‘seeks’ and ‘finds’: literature, music, painting 
or anything else: fashion, everyday life, boredom, food, sex, prison, 
mental hospital, entertainment, loneliness, etc? In order to be able 
to move straight to ‘something’, philosophy should carry out a lot 
8 Žil Delez, Feliks Gatari, Anti-Edip, Kapitalizam i sizofrenija, IK Zorana Stojanovića, Srem-
ski Karlovci, 1990; Michel Foucault (1982); or Jacques Derrida, Sablasti Marxa – Stanje 
duga, rad tugovanja i nova Internacionala, Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada, Zagreb, 2002. 
9 Jacques Derrida (1993), “Semiologija i gramatologija (Razgovor sa Julijom 
Kristevom)”, in Razgovori, Književna Zajednica, Novi Sad, 1993, p. 25.
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of revisions concerning the ‘rights on philosophy’ by protocols, 
namely, by differentiating and discriminating protocols: 
Game: refusal of scientific function in the name of arbitrary a) 
combining of possibilities in life activities,
Rhetoric: showing the skill of arranging multilayered traces/b) 
figures of speech: changing symbols into metaphors and 
metaphors into allegories of displaying the non-displayable, and 
Pure philosophy: thinking separately from writing or think-c) 
ing reflected in writing or thinking that becomes the ‘mem-
ory’ of writing (filling up, depositing and layering deleted 
traces) of what it is outside of it.
It can be concluded that Jacques Derrida solves the dilemma 
concerning ‘certainty or uncertainty’ of philosophy by pointing out 
that the relationship of certainty or uncertainty is a strategic and tac-
tical demand with consequences and not the current or achieved 
state of philosophy, since philosophy is not the state of mind but 
incessant differentiation of inscribed traces: writing and reading. 
The previous debate about ‘certainty’ and ‘uncertainty’ of 
philosophy was led by questioning the ‘status of philosophy’ as a 
metaphysical protocol about knowledge, as a tradition of knowl-
edge, as an institution and a discourse of knowledge, as a protocol 
and a platform of thinking, speaking, and writing about knowl-
edge, as a genre in writing, etc… Posing questions about ‘certainty’ 
or ‘uncertainty’ of philosophy stems from distrust:
in the certainty of knowledge as a metaphysical premise •	
about the pure knowledge outside individual conditions 
of the current world,
In the certainty of knowledge as safe and lasting tradition •	
or in ‘smoothly running communication channel’,
in the certainty of knowledge as institution and •	
discourse of limiting and founding competences for the 
access to the representation of knowledge,
in the certainty of knowledge as a protocol and a •	
platform for deriving safe knowledge, and
in the certainty of knowledge as a privileged genre of •	
thinking, speaking and writing.
And from here, generally speaking, can be derived three, 
roughly assumed, protocols for deriving ‘distrust’ in philosophy 
and philosophical legitimacy of safe and pure knowledge. 
Firstly, it is assumed that knowledge is not certain, that under-
standing is historically and culturally specific, that social processes 
are the basis of knowledge and that knowledge and social action 
are inseparably connected. This attitude is, very roughly speaking, 
the position of social constructivism.10 From the position of social 
constructivism, philosophy is not seen as a legitimate platform of 
safe and pure knowledge but as a socially, culturally, and histori-
cally determined institution whose discursive work serves to 
set possible platforms, protocols, and procedures of presenting 
knowledge, which is, nevertheless, the function or consequence of 
surrounding social, cultural or historic conditioning. If this posi-
tion is further radicalised, it can be said that scientific facts are not 
discovered but invented. Their usefulness for science, theory, and 
philosophy depends on the common perception of ‘facts’, namely, 
the determination of ‘certainty’ by consensus/contract and by 
determination of their usefulness for certain social purposes. 
Secondly, it is assumed that the knowledge of philosophy is 
legitimate and privileged insofar as the pure knowledge given by 
protocols, which can form individual social, cultural, and historical 
knowledge into the shape of general, abstract, and therefore trans-
10 Vivijen Ber, Uvod u socijalni konstrukcionizam, Zepter Book World, Beograd, 2001.
social, trans-cultural, and trans-historical presentation of knowl-
edge as the ideal criterion for every other individual knowledge.11 
Legitimacy and privilege of the pure knowledge is determined 
according to the criteria that are set as: 
metaphysical, for example, the issue of truth, then,•	
traditional, for example, the issue on traditional •	
philosophical and non-philosophical themes, protocols, 
and procedures, as well as of
protocol nature, for example, suggesting the protocols •	
of empirical, logical, or sceptical way of philosophical 
derivation of the procedures of thinking, speaking, and 
writing.
The schedule positioned in this way shows that philosophical 
pure knowledge is assumed as autonomous in relation to individual 
knowledge of social practices, and by the same fact as referential cri-
terion for all individual knowledge determined by social practices. 
Thirdly, it is assumed that there must exist for every kind of 
knowledge and, therefore, for philosophical knowledge as well, 
an outside criterion of ‘reality’, setting the limit of philosophical 
thinking, speech, and writing which can be checked. It is assumed 
that there is a ‘world’, independent from the protocols of human 
mind/thinking, theories, and interpretation. A philosopher and a 
theoretician is a realist if he/she thinks that the theories he/she ac-
cepts relate to something existing, namely, that they possess factual 
reference.12 Philosophical realism is, first of all, established after the 
model of positive scientific platforms of interpretation of the exist-
ing world. Contrary to pro-scientific realism defined in this way, 
it is possible to perceive influential conceptions of the Lacanian 
theoretical psychoanalysis, starting from the concept of the ‘real’ as 
of that, which eludes all symbolisation. In other words, the ‘real’13 is 
in the most primary sense crude pre-symbolic reality or, then, trauma 
is real in the sense of that real being a hard core that defies the pro-
cess of symbolising.14 However, the paradox of the Lacanian Real15 
lies in the fact that that does not exist in the sense of a ‘realistically 
existing object’, namely, the object which occupies a place in real-
ity, but at the same time, possesses a string of characteristics and 
results in certain structural consequences so that this object can 
produce a series of critical effects in the symbolic reality of the sub-
ject. It is also possible to see here one of the most exciting concepts 
of the confrontation between negative certainty and necessary 
uncertainty within the contemporary philosophy and theory, which 
shows that the Lacanian Real is at the same time a theoretical and 
a philosophical construct within theoretical psychoanalysis as well 
as that around which it is constituted, but also through which every 
symbolic system falls apart. That’s why the Lacanian Real is not a 
realist16 conception of reality but a theory about the fact that there 
is something potentially ‘dangerous’, destructive’, and ‘negative’ in 
the midst of reality, but which is indispensable so that symbolic 
reality could persist as reality in danger. 
* Translated into English by Dragana Starcevic.
11 Imanuel Kant, Kritika čistog uma, BIGZ, Beograd, 1990; G. V. F. Hegel, 
Fenomenologija duha, BIGZ, Beograd, 1974; Martin Heidegger, Bitak i vrijeme, 
Naprijed, Zagreb, 1988.
12 Jose Lopez, Garry Potter (eds.), After Postmodernism – An Introduction to Critical 
Realism, Continuum, London, 2001.
13 Jacques Lacan, “RSI”, Ornicar? No. 6, Paris, 1976.
14 Slavoj Žižek, “Antagonizam kao realno”, in “Koji je subject realnog”, in Sublimni 
objekt ideologije, Arkzin, Zagreb, 2002, p. 219.
15 Slavoj Žižek, “Antagonizam kao realno”, p. 220.
16 Radoman Kordić, “RSI struktura”, in Psihoanalitički diskurs, Naučna knjiga, 
Beograd, 1997, p. 93.
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TraCES OF THE PERFORMATIVE TURN  
IN CONTEMPOraRY THEATRE AND PERFORMANCE
I. The presentation’s starting point will be the 1960s with its performative turn from textual to performative culture with the Viennese actionist’s issues of violence 
and sacrifice, Rudolf Schwarzkogler’s violence to his own body 
and self sacrifice as well as Herman Nitch’s sacrificial ritual 
of committing violence to a victim’s body in Orgy mystery 
Theatre. In their actions the two artists involved the spectators 
and used them as performers. The infection of the participants 
with violence led to the transgression of the carefully watched 
and guarded confines of the taboo zone in public and should 
lead to the cleansing of the individual from violence. In their 
actions and happenings a provisionary community made up 
of individuals who dared to violate strong taboos publicly was 
established. In the act of symbolic dismemberment of their 
common cultural tradition Schwarzkogler and Nitch entered 
the domain of liminality and were transformed. 
As a second example of the performative turn I will take Richard Schechner’s performance Dionysus in 69, a spe-
cial fusion of theatre and the ritual that was supposed to bring 
about transformations both in the performers and the specta-
tors. Schechner’s understanding of the performative turn was 
linked to his critic of the textual culture and the contemporary 
industrial society. Thus it can be interpreted as a turn from text 
to performance, a deliberate opposition to the written tradi-
tion that has become a burden. As Erika Fischer-Lichte sum-
mons his views: “A new performative turn is needed that will 
transform the solid and fixed textual culture of the past into a 
fluid, ever-changing performative culture of the future that will 
grant the missing dimensions. Theatre can contribute to the 
performative turn required when it sets out to threat ‘the text 
as is it were part of an oral tradition’. The fixed text has to be 
dismembered in order to allow the ever-changing performance 
to emerge.”1 
Our presentation will try to locate some traces of the per-formative turn of the 1960-s and 1970-s in the theatre 
and performing arts of the last two decades. We will try to 
identify and describe the traces of this “cultural revolution” 
1 Fischer-Lichte, Erica. Theatre, Sacrifice, Ritual, London/New York: Routledge, 
2005: p. 224.
of the turn of the century in texts, performances and con-
cepts of selected contemporary theatrical and performing art 
practicians. Within their work we will attemp to detect some 
provisionary answers to the big questions the performative 
revolution of the turn of the century proposed. Namely open-
ing up the new possibilities for the theatricalization of politics, 
economics, law, arts and everyday life. Establishing theatre and 
performing arts as a cultural model. 
II. As we summoned up in the introduction, the specific turn from the referential to performative function resulted in various forms or explorations 
of physical as well as psychological limits in both the artist and 
the audience. Members of the audience thus found themselves 
in an in-between position, a state of liminality that produced a 
destabilisation of spectator’s perception of himself, the others 
and reality. But – as Marvin Carlson states in his Performance, 
a critical introduction, when describing the unstable position of 
the resistant performance – the idea that in such performances 
“‘real women, real presence and real time’ could be separated 
from their ‘representations’ could not easily be reconciled with 
the growing feeling that so-called ‘reality’ was itself experi-
enced only through representation.”2 
I f a classical performance artists strongly believed that their actions enacted an authentic provocation against tradi-
tional values in society and represented the very foundation 
of the value of art and at the same time made one believe in 
its political provoking potential, the 1990’s saw an increased 
disbelief in anything authentic. The 1990’s became more and 
more interested in the performative as related to new media. 
They stressed the fact Philip Auslander defines as follows: 
“Mediatized forms like film and video can be shown to have 
the same ontological characteristics as live performance, and 
live performance can be used in ways indistinguishable from 
the uses generally associated to mediatized forms. Therefore 
ontological analysis does not provide a basis for privileging 
live performance as an oppositional discourse.”3 Thus follow-
2 Carlson, Marvin. Performance, A Critical Introduction, London, New York: 
Routledge, 1996: p. 175.
3 Auslander, Philip. Liveness: Performance in a Mediatized Culture. London/New 
York: Routledge, 1999: p. 159.
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ing Benjamin, we can argue that live performance has today 
indeed been pried from its shell and became equal to other 
forms. Due to this fact it can no longer simply be understood 
as auratic or authentic. 
III. Let us consider some cases. For a start, Elfride Jelinek and Thomas Bernhard, two contem-porary playwrights that will represent the 
field of no more dramatic theatre texts (Gerda Poschmann) or 
postdramatic theatre (Hans-Thies Lehmann). Both dramatists 
constantly call attention to the performative nature of their 
plays and dramatize cultural and political institutions and 
events. By using various techniques (for example excessive 
repetition, sampling, quotations and misquotations, reapro-
priations of various texts and discourses, metatheatrical refer-
ences) they subordinate the referential mode of their theatre 
and point to a performative nature of the theatre event. With 
some similarities to Peter Handke’s play Der Ritt uber den 
Bodensee (namely the non matrix-representation, constant shift 
to the performative nature of a theatre event on one side and 
naming characters of the play after the famous actors of the 
German silent movies as Eric von Strocheim etc. Elfride Je-
linek uses in her piece Burgtheater the stressing of the fact that 
the actual actors are performing the roles of the Burgtheater 
actors from the Nazi 1940-s. Thus she produces allusions and 
references to the acting and performance and together with 
the play’s linguistic performativity symbolically enacts the An-
schluss and its results. The audience is thus forced to face with 
the inevitable self-reflection of their role in the contemporary 
post-Nazi Austria. 
In his play Heldenplatz Thomas Bernhard uses similar tech-niques and aims at the similar result Mark Anderson sum-
mons up in the following statement:
»The actual audience assembled for the performance, which no doubt included Austrians who had been 
part of the crowd welcoming Hitler, was thus forced to con-
front its own ‘voice’ when recorded chants of ‘Sieg Heil’ were 
piped onstage from the wings, as if this voice were coming 
from Heroe’s Square outside. The aesthetic sphere constituted 
by the theatre gives way to history and politics; audience 
members become actors in a play that takes them fifty years 
back in the past to confront what might be called the Urszene 
of Austrian politics: the body politics’ embrace of Hitler.”4 
Both plays take into account the fact stressed by the perfor-mative turn of the 1960-s, which Fischer-Lichte defines 
as body co-presence of actors and performers, the co-presence 
of the phenomenal as well as the semiotic body, which she 
considers a highly specific nature of a live performance in all 
its senses. More than this. They do not consider a performance 
as work of art in stricto senso but as an event that comes into 
being by way of interaction between actors and spectators, a 
process Fischer-Lichte defines as authopoetic in a sense that it 
exists only as event. As they write a piece for theatre they pre-
pare a scenario for a specific constellation between actors and 
4 Anderson, “Fragments of deluge: The Theater of Thomas Bernhard’s Prose”, A 
Companion to the Works of Thomas Bernhard, Matthias Konzett, ed. Rochester: 
Camden House, 20002, p. 132. 
spectators they would like the performance to enact. Their aim 
being also to disable the spectators to have a complete control 
over the event, to put them in a state of instability. They expect 
the performances of their text to produce a specific collaps-
ing of oppositions. The performers in it are supposed to live 
through the performance as an aesthetic, social and political 
process in whose course power struggles are fought and usual 
oppositions subject vs. Object, presence vs. Representation, 
art vs. Social reality collapse and dichotomies seem to dissolve. 
The spectators on the other hand are transferred into a state 
that alienates them from everyday life and norms of the soci-
ety. The result of this is the destabilization of the perception 
of the reality due to the liminality of the performance event, 
which has for a consequence a re-orientation of the individual 
(in most cases with a limited time of effect). 
What Jelinek and Bernhard are aiming at is a liminal expe-rience for the spectators and the performers, which is 
specific for the genre of the performance and contemporary 
theatre. And although aesthetic experience does not result in a 
socially accepted change of status of identity, it may well cause 
in individual participants a change of their perception of real-
ity, self and others. 
IV. As a second example of the destabilization of the perception of the reality due to the liminal-ity of the performance event we will take a 
performance We are all Marlene Dietrich FOR (2005) by Emil 
Hrvatin and Erne Ómarsdóttir, which deliberately refers itself 
to the performative turn of the 1960-s. The performance cre-
ates a platform for a dialogue with essential premises of per-
formance activism and oppositional art of Guillermo Gómez-
Peña and his artistic collective La Pocha Nostra. Both artists 
are more than aware that the traditional boundaries between 
politics, culture, technology, finance, national security, and 
ecology are disappearing. In this situation they propose a con-
crete artistic answer to the question Richard Schechner asks 
in his book Performance Studies, an Introduction: “If a globalisa-
tion was treated as performance, what kind of performance 
would it be?”5 
Among various competitive scenarios they choose one that undermines a postcolonial mimicry with its own human-
itarian jargon. They subvert today hardly existing and highly 
blurred borders between art and politics. If Gómez-Peña’s 
Newly discovered Amerindians exposed uncomfortable paral-
lels between international arts festivals, colonial expositions 
and tourist expeditions and thus created a parallel world of 
art commenting on the state of ethics in post-colonial society, 
Hrvatin/ Ómarsdóttir are trying to renovate the genre of the 
artistic program for soldiers on the front in order to change the 
potential public’s perspective on war. To achieve this goal they 
employ elements of dance, dance theatre, physical theatre, live 
concert and media event and constantly balance between the 
real and fictive event while using military binary system. 
We are all Marlene Dietrich FOR builds its form of “radical performance” on the extensive usage of “over identi-
5 Richard Schechner. Performance Studies, An Introduction. London/New York: 
Routledge, 2002: p. 223.
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fication”, a strategy practiced in all the consequences in the 
1980-s and 1990-s by “the post socialist politicised art” of 
Neue Slowenische Kunst (Laibach). Thus it stresses the per-
formative nature of a theatrical event and produces a feeling of 
“uneasiness”, raised in a spectator by various means. Firstly by 
hypertrophying the ideological impacts of the mechanism of 
the hybrid genre of the so-called “entertainment for soldiers”. 
Secondly by a deliberate bombardment with various signs, 
super saturation of various channels of a communication 
through representation. Performance thus creates a visible gap 
between signifier and signified. As a consequence new politics 
of the performance, understood in terms of Philip Auslander, 
are created, a live performance “exposing processes of cultural 
control”.6 
The strategies of the performance rise from a presump-tion that any cultural action is already inscribed into a 
global discourse of polis and therefore cannot exist outside the 
predominant cultural formations. The fact that meta-criticism 
is no longer possible and that no strategy of resistance can be 
employed outside this dominant system. In the performance 
all the rules are broken, public is exposed to the ‘violence’ 
of representation and repetition, which can be linked to the 
violence of the society of spectacle. The performative turn is 
re-enacted. 
V. To slowly conclude: The examples discussed are but a top of the iceberg of various strategies employed by artists as Einar Schleef, Sarah Kane, 
Frank Castorf, Societas Raffaelo Sanzio, Bojan Jablanovec, 
Jan Fabre, Christoph Marthaller, Forced Entertainment etc. 
In their works they trace, re-enact and reappropriate basic 
postulates of the performative turn. They point to the fact that 
the undeniable trace of the performative turn of the 1960’s 
in the contemporary performing arts is without any doubt a 
new kind of unity of spectators and performers that brought 
a change to both parties. If the performers are constantly 
exposed to the fact that they have to question and requestion 
their representative function and open up as possible the the-
atrical or performative event to the performativeness, the role 
of the spectators changed from the expected role of a passive 
hermeneutic process of decoding the performer’s articulation 
to something much more active, entering into a praxis, »in 
which meanings are not so much communicated as created, 
questioned and negotiated. 
The audience is invited and expected to operate as a co-creator of whatever meanings and experience the event 
generates.”7 And it is precisely this trace of the performative 
turn that can be identified in the work of some of the most 
prominent contemporary performance (theatre) artists of the 
last two decades.
6 Philip Auslander. “Toward a Concept of the Political in Postmodern Theatre”. 
Theatre Journal, 39, March 1987.
7 Carlson: p. 197.
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B y no means could we say that the conception of ‘the end of art’ as found in Hegel’s philosophy is simple. In addition we could claim that it is one of the marginal thoughts in his philosophy. Regard-less of this we should not consider this notion 
independently from his other conceptions. Nevertheless, we 
have to pose the question, asking what kind of the end and 
what kind of art is here concerned. Hegel mentioned that in 
his time art did not offer as much satisfaction of the spiritual 
needs as former times and people have searched and also 
found only in it. He also observed that the beautiful times of 
Greek art and the golden times of the late mediaeval period 
have passed. But can we truly conclude that Hegel did not see 
any future whatsoever for art in general? 
When discussed the famous Hegel’s end of art thesis was generally referred basically to his lectures on aesthetics (1820/21), therefore we should first of 
all draw our attention to his philosophy on art. In his lectures 
on aesthetics Hegel discussed three forms of art: symbolic, 
classical and romantic. He analysed them individually, but he 
also applied all of them to the history of art. If the symbolic 
form of art corresponds to the oldest era of art, the classical 
form succeeds it and in the last period we can observe what 
Hegel calls romantic art. Why and how the defined art form 
belongs to a certain period of history, Hegel explained in com-
pliance with the evolution of the ideal into individual forms 
of artistic beauty. In general Hegel understands the symbolic 
form as the one in which the meaning and expression can not 
suit each other completely, thus a sort of discrepancy can be 
found. 
On the contrary, in the classical form of art the meaning 
and its completely corresponding form are uniformed in an 
independent whole, which is perfect in itself. This form is the 
centre of art, because here reality fully matches the concept 
of beauty. If the symbolic art form has aspired to attain this 
and failed, the classical art form has yet to succeed in reach-
ing this goal. If we cast an eye on the history of art, Hegel 
was convinced that the classical ideal is realized within Greek 
antiquity. 
However, classical art has not reached the end of its task. 
It has not succeeded in finding the extreme oppositions, in 
which the absolute has its foundation, thus it has not suc-
ceeded in reconciling these oppositions. Classical art does not 
exceed the true ideal, it does not know that layers, which have 
to do with the contrary, subject as an abstract figure in relation 
to the ethics and the absolute, sin and evil on the one hand and 
the split and the non-continuance of the subjective interiority 
on the other; in general it does not know for the whole palette 
of that clefts, which bring what is not beautiful, what is ugly 
and repulsive in a sensual as also in a spiritual sense. 
To summarize Hegel’s review of art in history, first there 
was the power of fantasy that can be noticed in the tendency to 
rise from nature to spirituality, but this striving has remained 
nothing but searching of the spirit, which in such a manner 
was not yet a true meaning for art. It got its meaning merely 
as an external form for natural meanings and abstractions of 
substantial interiority. In classical art we can find spirituality 
that is a foundation and principle of meaning. The external 
form is also not superficial; on the contrary, in this example 
the spirituality is completely imbued with its external appear-
ance. Classical art has idealized the ideal and made it suitable 
to the reality of the spirit, thus classical art has reached the 
beautiful uniformity; it became the representation of the ideal, 
a perfect kingdom of beauty. Hegel stated that nothing can be 
and become more beautiful than classical art.
However, there is something more sublime than the 
beautiful appearance of the spirit in its direct sensual form. 
For this uniformity occurs in the element of the external and 
creates a sensual reality with its defined corresponding being. 
In such a manner it sets itself opposite the true notion of the 
spirit. The true totality of the ideal is now abolished and split 
into a two-sided whole, into the entirety of subjectivity and 
the entirety of the external appearance. The principle of the 
spirit is the reconciliation with itself and the uniformity of its 
notion and its reality, therefore the spirit can find its certain 
corresponding being only in its internal spirituality. The 
form of romantic art is defined on the basis of the internal 
notion of that meaning, for which art is called to present. The 
content of the romantic art form has the task of making itself 
beautiful, so that this beauty transforms itself into the spiri-
tual beauty of the interiority as a spiritual subjectivity, which 
is eternal in itself. Absolute subjectivity would abolish art 
and would be accessible only for the thought if it would not 
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– to be a true subjectivity corresponding to its notion – also 
enter the externally defined being. This moment of reality 
belongs to the absolute, therefore it is not presented as one 
god who abolishes what is human and natural, but as a true 
absolute is opening itself. 
The task of art in the romantic form is to express the 
absolute, i. e. the spiritual consciousness in the subject. Thus 
Christian art corresponds to the romantic form of art, as 
the human form is presented in such a manner that it is im-
mediately recognized as something that involves the divine. 
The second type of romantic art is connected to the separa-
tion of the spirit from itself. In order to gain its totality and 
freedom the spirit must raise itself as the finity of nature and 
at the same time in opposition to itself as the infinity. Hence 
the necessity occurs to reach the reconciliation between the 
natural, the finite and the kingdom of the truth. The spiritual 
reconciliation must be shown as an activity, a movement of 
the spirit, as a process, a development, in which battles and 
conflicts constantly arise. As the key moment pain, death and 
the painful feeling of nothingness of the spirit and body oc-
curs. The third kind of romantic meanings in Hegel’s belief are 
linked to the presentations of a human being, which remains 
in a human form. Here the spiritual aims, the world’s interests, 
passions, suffering, joy, hope and satisfaction are displayed. 
The romantic itself is a principle of abolishment of the 
classical ideal. In the classical plastic arts the subjective inner 
is tightly connected to the external, thus the external presents 
the shape of the inner. On the contrary, in the romantic form 
the meaning of the external world gains freedom to show 
itself and to preserve itself in its singularity and particularity. 
In a similar fashion the subjectivity of the soul can become 
the key element for the representation and this is likewise a 
kind of a contingency. The romantic interiority can therefore 
be shown in any circumstances, it can be partitioned in thou-
sands of situations, states, relations, conflicts and reconcilia-
tions. In romantic art there is a place for everything, from the 
most sublime to the most insignificant and trivial. 
The questions we could raise now is what kind of art can be found in the phase when the romantic form is on the decline, what does the end of the romantic 
form actually mean for art in general and what succeeds 
romantic art? Is this the end of art? 
I n Hegel’s opinion the first condition for art to still exist lies in the uniformity of the artwork and the artist, for the task of an artist is to make the true essence that he 
carries within himself objective, to present it and realize it in 
a form. The artist is in the process of becoming unified with 
the material in a pure thought, he is also unified with the 
object itself. Therefore subjectivity is entirely presented in an 
object and an artwork originates from the interiority. 
Hegel believed that the situation had changed and this 
did not happen accidentally, for it represents a progress with-
in art. By demonstrating the peculiar material as an object of 
representation, art is progressively becoming liberated from 
the contents that are presented. On the other hand, if we get 
something as an object for observing with our sensual and 
spiritual eyes in such a perfect way that its content is now 
exhausted, everything is externalized and nothing remains 
undefined and internalized, i. e. the absolute interest disap-
pears. This is because the spirit is at work on objects only 
until something mysterious remains within them. 
We should not forget that Hegel understands art as 
fundamentally engaged with its sensual appearance. In his 
opinion art of his times did not need to be related to some 
certain content and to a certain manner of presentation, 
corresponding merely to the content – this was something 
that belonged to the past. Thus art stands above its particular 
forms and presentations and moves freely and independent-
ly. For the artist whose talent and spirit have been liberated 
from the earlier limitation to a particular form of art, any 
form and any content are free to use. Anyhow, Hegel tried to 
define what kind of material could still be interesting for art. 
He ascertained that no matter how it is handled the spirit has 
to be shown as it is in those times. He believed that practic-
ing past art forms is not a solution, only the present remains 
fresh, everything else has turned pale. Hegel stated that the 
appearance and production of what is directly human in a 
multilateral sense and in an endless transformation is what 
can form the absolute content of our art. 
But Hegel emphasizes the importance of the reflection 
on art. He is convinced that an artist must be well educated. 
He analyzed the art forms in order to show their contents, 
from which also the manner of representation arises. He 
believed that the task of art is to express a certain internal 
value in an adequate sensual reality. Therefore philosophy of 
art also has a task to apprehend with the thought what these 
values are and the beautiful way in which they appear. 
However, considering Hegel’s analysis of art forms and their application within history of art, we can ascer-tain that Hegel spoke about the abolishment of the 
romantic art form and discussed the end of romantic art if seen 
as a historical art epoch, but we are still not able to claim with 
certainty that he believed in the end of art in general. 
Certain Hegel’s interpreters, e. g. Peter Szondi, stressed the problem of Hegel’s classicism, his setting of ro-manticism and his anticipation that it will pass into 
bourgeois-realistic art.1 Szondi emphasized that in Hegel’s phi-
losophy everything occurs as a process and everything has its 
specific place in the historical evolution. The system itself is a 
historical process and art is not equally legitimized each time, 
but it stands in simultaneous importance to religion and his-
tory, even if its own artistic conception has scarcely anything 
developed. Therefore, Szondi claimed, Hegel was strongly 
under the influence of the unique Greek art, thus all further 
development following it must be explained as a movement 
of the system towards art and beyond. Szondi also criticized 
Hegel’s theory on romantic essence as a negative answer to the 
classicistic tradition, as this was not a plan, but we should feel 
this answer in the unique widening of the historical knowl-
edge, for which we have to be thankful to romanticism. 
For instance, Georg Lukács2 demonstrated that in his 
Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) Hegel understood art merely 
as the Greek antiquity and that the period of art also came to 
its end with the decline of Greek antiquity, with its passing 
1 Peter Szondi, “Hegels Lehre von der Dichtung”, Poetik und Geschichts-philoso-
phie I, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1976 (1st edition 1974), pp. 267–513.
2 Georg Lukács, “Hegel’s Ästhetik”. W. F. Hegel, Ästhetik.
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over to the Roman state. In other words, Lukács claimed that 
Hegel explained oriental art (the symbolic form) as the one, 
in which the spirit has not yet reached the level of the prin-
ciple, however, in mediaeval and modern art (the romantic 
form) it has already exceeded it. We can encounter the prob-
lem of form in oriental art, and likewise or particularly within 
modern art. In such a manner the spirit has passed art by, and 
art has lost its philosophical importance. If we consequently 
think in this aspect also as regards the end, Lukács reached 
the assertion that the period of art is at its end.
However, some other interpreters claim that such crit-
ics of the Hegel’s end of art thesis fail Hegel’s intention. For 
instance, A. Gethemann-Sefert and B. Collenberg-Plotnikov3 
are convinced that such reproaches are too simplified and are 
a result of the later ’improvements’ of Hegel’s conception and 
its evoked ambiguity. In addition to the interpretations that 
criticize the classicism of Hegel’s theory, there are also other 
interpretations that emphasize the endless character of the 
future (H. G. Hotho, Th. Vischer, Th. Mundt). Some of the 
more recent explanations find the very critic of art of our times 
in Hegel’s conceptions. For example Karsten Harries is certain 
that Hegel’s thesis on the future of art caused the explosive 
development of modern art.4 Similarly William Fowkes claims 
the doctrine on the death of art is a caricature.5 Fowkes tries 
to show how the third act of the art drama still lasts today and 
is the most interesting of all acts. Fowkes is also certain that 
Hegel’s contribution brightens contemporary art.
On the other hand Gethemann-Sefert and Collenberg-
Plotnikov comment that Hegel refused the hope of Goethe’s 
times as in the only and the complex form, art in the modern 
age is just before its end. In such a manner art has lost its self-
evident, pre-reflective engagement in social life. Formally 
this end of art is also a break that offers endless opportuni-
ties. The subjective historicalness of the artists can serve any 
style and content. 
Each of Hegel’s art forms has a progress within itself, as has each historic nation. It always starts with the period of preparation, which is followed by the age of 
blooming and finally the period of decline arrives. However, 
if we apply these forms of art onto the history of art, we get a 
progressive model of art history. But a progressive structure 
occurs also at history in general. The triad of life occurs on 
the macro level of both histories – the history of art and the 
history of the world. There are stages such as the period of 
the childish spirit, followed by the period of the adolescent, 
which turns into manhood, and finally there is the senile 
period of the spirit. The progresses and structures of both 
histories coincide; actually it is the same history model, or 
to be more precise the same history. Hegel claimed that the 
progress of world history is an evolution of the notion of 
freedom. Therefore we could conclude that history should 
end when freedom is finally reached. Such realization would 
mean a termination of history. 
3 A. Gethmann-Siefert, B. Collenberg-Plotnikov, “Die These vom Ende der 
Kunst”, in: Ästhetik und Kunstphilosophie von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart, Stut-
tgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1998, pp. 373–375.
4 Karsten Harries, “Hegel on the Future of Art”, in: The Review of Metaphysics 27, 
No. 108, Washington: The Catholic University of America, June 1974, p. 678.
5 William Fowkes, A Hegelian Account of Contemporary Art, MI: UMI Research 
Press, 1980.
But art also passes through the three stages (the sym-
bolic, the classical and the romantic) and we could ask where 
does it rise to? The suggested answer could be – towards the 
end of art, of course. But by not means can we expect to find 
the notion of ‘the end of art’ in the sense of the slogan in 
Hegel’s philosophy. It is more likely that the famous ‘end of 
art’, that is often believed to be found in Hegel work, is rather 
‘something like a deduction from the premises of several 
conceptual schemes or models which are superimposed one 
upon the other,’6 as is believed by Frederic Jameson. 
Anyhow, if for Hegel the history of the world ascends 
to freedom, where does art ascend to? Is it designed to 
finally transfigure into something else, something suppos-
edly better than it is in its obligation to its sensual nature? 
Or does art similarly as the history of the world achieve its 
aim or the ‘end’, when it attains freedom? Hegel explained 
that art has reached a stage in his times (specifically in Ger-
many) where an artist is free to use any form and express 
any content. Regarding this aspect of the end of art, here is 
the key relation of ‘Hegel’s end of art’ and the contemporary 
thesis of the end of art as found in Arthur Danto, Hans Belt-
ing, Gianni Vattimo and other scholars who participated 
specifically in the aesthetic and art-historian discussions 
in the 1980s. The quite recently discussed ‘end of art’ has 
undoubtedly its origins in Hegel’s philosophy and is related 
to similar observations concerning the fact that the artists 
are finally liberated to use any form and any content, just as 
stated by Hegel. But the contemporary ‘end of art’ is es-
sentially involved with the specific atmosphere of the final 
decades of the twentieth century in the western world – not 
only with the topics related to postmodernism and with the 
ending of modernism as a style, but more generally with 
the observations that something huge is reaching its end, 
an entire epoch, in fact that modernity is coming to an end. 
Thus the ‘end of art’ as understood in the second half of the 
twentieth century in thereby related to a common western 
cultural feeling of the end of almost everything that was still 
obligatory ‘yesterday’. Significantly these discussions arose 
alongside the strong belief in the liberated society, also in 
the sense of the enfranchisement of the up to that time op-
pressed social groups. 
However, the discussions on ‘the end of art’ could be 
found in an atmosphere of belief in social liberation. It can 
also be noticed that the ‘Hegelian’ end of art and the ‘Hege-
lian’ end of history coincide. Both moments of historical 
termination actually signify the same stage in the develop-
ment of the spirit – it is the moment of attaining freedom. In 
other words: the aim of the spirit in achieving progress lies in 
its tendency towards self-realization in the world’s history. 
I have already noticed that for Hegel art has to be engaged with a sensual appearance and that he also emphasizes the importance of the reflection on art. Well, a specific 
aspect of Hegel’s thesis on the end of art can be found in the 
relation between art and the philosophy of art. Philosophy 
exceeds art, for art is occupied with the sensual appearance, 
while philosophy does not have this limitation and lays its 
priority on the use of pure thought, which is the most inter-
6 Frederic Jameson, “‘End of Art’ or ‘End of History’?”, in: The Cultural Turn, 
New York, London: Verso, 1998, p. 76.
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nal essence of the nature of the spirit. Hegel stated that when 
philosophy makes art its subject matter, what happens is that 
the artistically beautiful occurs in such a form that it stands 
directly opposite the thought and therefore the thought to 
make its own activity is forced to destroy it. But this is one 
of the hesitations Hegel discussed and commented – he said 
that this would also mean that the real would generally be 
disfigured and destroyed with observation, but however ex-
actly the opposite is the case, the thought should approach it. 
Another hesitation should be considered, namely that 
the spirit is calmed no earlier than it has imbued all the prod-
ucts with thought, it is only then that it has truly won. Thus 
art obtains its true confirmation only in philosophy. 
What should be emphasized is that this is not only 
about art inevitably needing philosophy as a mental reflec-
tion, but what is essential here is that art must be related to 
philosophy. Philosophy co-constructs art, in the same way as 
does religion. The relation of art and religion deserves special 
attention, however we do not have time to discuss this here. 
But we can notice that for Hegel art is in direct relation to 
religion – especially in times of romantic art when it became 
analogous to religion. A certain aspect of ‘the end of art the-
sis’ could surely be found also in the thought that art ceases 
to be art when it starts to become the most sublime and 
deep, for at that stage it is actually turning into a religion. On 
the other hand we could also raise the speculation that in the 
recent times the role religion has had in the past has trans-
posed to some other spheres of life, thus this shift should 
essentially also determine the nature and the role of art. 
For Hegel, art is fundamentally intertwined into a com-
mon circle with religion and philosophy. We should also 
not forget that philosophy is the highest form of the spirit, 
therefore it in itself exceeds art. In the past art has had a 
strong link to philosophy, but in the last stage of history it 
seems that this link could be dangerous for the existence of 
art. The reason this link seems so different now in compari-
son to the past is related to the maturity of the spirit on this 
level of evolution. Art in the romantic form is much deeper, 
the opposition between finity and infinity are extreme; thus 
it is not a coincidence that the relations between the three 
forms of the spirit (art, religion and philosophy) are far more 
complex. As stated by Hegel art passes into philosophy on 
one hand, but on the other art also has much more thought 
and reflection in itself. In Hegel’s opinion the type of art that 
corresponds to this stage of the spirit is poetry, namely that, 
which contains a great deal of philosophy. And because art is 
necessarily engaged with a sensual appearance, this is at the 
same time what prevents it from becoming philosophy. 
Hegel believed that art always needed philosophy. And 
if art will not have more philosophy in itself, it will need it in 
the philosophy about itself, namely in aesthetics. Therefore 
art obtains its true confirmation only in philosophy. On one 
hand philosophy is thus destroying art, while it is on the 
other co-constructing it, i. e. they are walking hand in hand. 
And this does not mean the end of art. Above all this means 
that art has changed in comparison to the former forms in 
which it occurred. The relations between art and philosophy, 
art and religion, are also present in a different mode. If art has 
now lost its independency, we must notice that it has not had 
it in the past; its co-dependence with the two other forms is 
still a part of its definition.
Peter Szondi7 emphasized that through the historical development of art the dialectical process of the beau-tiful does not have the achievement of beautiful for 
its aim, but the self-consciousness, the infinity that the spirit 
possesses. From the aspect of aesthetics the romantic epoch 
is a stage of decline, but from the aspect of philosophy of the 
spirit, it is a rise, an ascension beyond the limits of the artis-
tic beautiful. And this also means that Szondi believed that 
Hegel saw romantic art no longer as something that could 
still be valid as art. Szondi stated that already in romantic art 
reconciliation was not situated in it as the synthesis, but was 
already beyond the sphere of art. 
Szondi also explained that the reason the romantic form 
of art always grabs somewhere else does not originate merely 
from the art’s hastening for the element of pure thought, 
but in the fact that this form has already in its basis left the 
ground of art. If the transposition of the symbolic form to 
the classical form has taken place within art, romantic art has 
found its origin in another, non-artistic ground. Therefore 
Szondi is convinced that romantic art does not have a motive 
in itself and is not a medium into which the divine would 
enter. Instead the opposite is the case, it finds its reality in 
Christian events; then it is only secondarily valid as art. 
In other words this interpretation of Hegel’s aesthetics 
means that art after the classical era can merely ascend to its 
decline. Szondi sees the romantic form as a stage of declina-
tion. Such an understanding could be at least discussible, as 
Hegel considers that in romantic art the oppositions have 
deepened and on one hand the level of freedom is higher 
than ever before, while on the other the intertwinement with 
religion and philosophy is as complex as ever. However, we 
can directly object Szondi at least in the fact that for Hegel 
romantic art is not merely Christian art, but also the diver-
sity of the presentations of a human being, which remains in 
a human form. In the romantic form there is not only space 
for the divine, but also for the sublime in a far more extensive 
sense as well as for the trivialities of everyday life. 
As already mentioned there is something we may not skip when discussing Hegel’s end of art thesis; namely Hegel’s notion of the spirit, which makes 
progress and gains self-realization in the history of the world. 
I have already noticed that there is a certain concordance 
between the progress of art in history and the progress of 
history itself. As the three forms of the spirit art, religion 
and philosophy simultaneously progress through the history 
of the world, within which the spirit is actually the one that 
truly progresses. Art, religion and philosophy are merely 
forms of realization for the spirit on its journey. The aim to 
which the spirit progresses is the absolute. For the spirit is 
free and this is the essence it has to make real, therefore this 
is what the spirit strives for in the history of the world. 
Georg Lukács8, who understands Hegel’s aesthetics in 
fundamental relation to Hegel’s method and system, claims 
that if we consider the development of the spirit in Hegel’s 
sense, art is merely a preparatory stage for a better knowledge 
of reality. Anyway, this knowledge is philosophical; the result 
is an identical subject-object.
7 Peter Szondi, “Hegels Lehre von der Dichtung”, pp. 167–513.
8 Georg Lukács, “Hegel’s Ästhetik”, p. 28.
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It is not a mere coincidence that philosophy (as the do-
main of mental observation) is the one, which has, so to say, 
the last word in this progression. The spirit approaches the 
absolute through history, as well as through art – of course in 
the intertwinement with religion and philosophy. The com-
mon aim of all three is nothing else than the achievement of 
absolute knowledge. In The Phenomenology of the Spirit Hegel 
analysed the forms of the spirit in the process up to the point 
at which the consciousness cannot exceed itself anymore, 
because the conception fits the object and the object fits the 
conception. The necessary two-sidedness of all processes 
of reality is presented, for reality has its subjective and ob-
jective side. The phenomena of consciousness in all stages 
of the development from sensual perception to the self-
consciousness show the transformation from itself into the 
sphere of the object, in relation to which the consciousness 
is developing. The entire reality is thus understood as a dia-
lectical evolutional process of the absolute mind, which has 
its subjective and objective side. If at the beginning there is a 
direct spirit as a non-spiritual or sensual consciousness, the 
phenomenology of the spirit concludes with the being that 
is completely mediated. The consciousness thus progresses 
from the first direct opposition between it and the object to 
absolute knowledge.
The question we should raise now is whether this point 
of the absolute is truly attainable at all. Is the point of absolute 
knowledge not an empty point, as claimed by Mladen Dolar?9 
He stated that in absolute knowledge, to which we constantly 
ascend, the consciousness actually discovers nothing, but is 
directed back to its ascension and thus to the imperfection of 
its knowledge. As stated by Dolar at the end we merely dis-
cover that the truth can be found in the journey itself, there-
fore we were cheated in such a manner, that we had every-
thing we were striving for, already from the very beginning.
The question of the beginning is also fundamentally related to the question of the end. Hegel discusses the problem of the beginning already in The Phenom-
enology of the Spirit, as well as in his The Science of Logic. He 
claims that moving forward at the same time means return-
ing back to the foundation, to the origin and the real.10 At the 
end the world contains everything that has been contained 
within the progress that preceded the result. And everything, 
including the beginning, depends on the result as a principle. 
Therefore Hegel believed that it is necessary for the result to 
which the movement leads to be discussed as a foundation. 
The problems of the beginning and the end are essen-
tially connected to the problem of finity and infinity. In the 
Science of Logic, Hegel explained in great detail, why it would 
be unfounded to claim that content is something else than 
form, the interior something else than the exterior, as well as 
finity something else than infinity. In his dialectics he origi-
nated from the basic principle that identity (A=A) is a prin-
ciple of contradiction. The subject matter of the dialectics is 
a movement that shows a constant link of the oppositions, so 
that the negative and the positive become the total relation 
of the function. 
9 Mladen Dolar, Heglova fenomenologija duha 1., Ljubljana: Društvo za teoretsko 
psihoanalizo, 1990, p. 9.
10 G. W. F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik. Bd 1, Die objektive Logik : (1812/1813), 
Hamburg: Meiner, 1978. 
The finity and infinity are thus not only related, but also 
unified. Finity passes into infinity. Hegel claimed that the in-
finite is unreal and the unreal is unreachable. The representa-
tion of the endless progress is a straight line, which is infinite 
only in its two borders, which is always there, where it (and 
it is an existence) is not, and where it passes towards this 
non-existence, when infinity is true infinity that is bended 
back into itself, its representation becomes a circle, a line that 
reaches itself, is joined and present in a whole, with no begin-
ning and no end. 
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L’éPREUVE DE L’ART ENTRE IDéALITé  
ET CRUAUTé RéFLEXIONS AUTOUR DE LA PEINTURE  
ET DE LA PHILOSOPHIE DE R. PASSERON
rachida TrIKI
Université de Tunis, Tunisie
J e voudrais avant tout puisque nous sommes dans un panel de poïétique dire un mot de ce qui nous unit dans la démarche réflexive. L’approche poïé-tique n’exclue pas la dimension esthétique, mais elle porte l’intérêt sur les conduites créatrices. Elle tente 
d’éclairer l’œuvre à partir de sa genèse de production 
dans la double dimension de gratuité et de nécessité 
et dans sa capacité d’instauration de sens. 
Le travail de fondation et de clarification de la double 
opération productrice et esthétique qui se mue en instaura-
tion a été initié, comme on le sait par la philosophie de Paul 
Valéry qui a donné à penser l’art comme production à partir 
des modes d’investissement techniques et affectifs du créateur 
artiste et par la capacité de reconnaissance et d’adhésion du 
récepteur. 
René Passeron1 a développé les recherches en poïétique 
en élargissant la conception de Paul Valéry à plusieurs pra-
tiques artistiques. Il a développé dans ses écrits et dans les 
travaux pluridisciplinaires au CNRS un champ théorique 
où il reconsidère les notions de création, de répétition, 
de compromission et d’instauration. On peut qualifier ce 
champ théorique d’espace ouvert de la rationalité qui laisse 
aussi place aux éléments irrationnels interférant dans le faire 
artistique et respecte la singularité des oeuvres. Son objectif 
est de saisir sous le devenir des œuvres des régularités qui 
permettent de distinguer une création comme production 
remarquable.
La poïétique opère donc en transversalité (ou en 
horizontalité à travers des strates). En tant qu’interrogation 
théorique du processus de création, elle pense les techniques 
d’élaboration et de régulation des champs de production 
artistique et met en évidence leurs conditions de possibilité 
et leurs limites. Elle transgresse les différences de leurs objets 
et schémas opérationnels en dévoilant leur capacité historiale 
d’instauration de valeurs et de sens.
C’est en ce sens que René Passeron comme Paul Valéry 
ont mis en rapport la dynamique du geste, l’activité neu-
rologique et « la situation affective qui les accompagne » 
1 René Passeron, Pour une philosophie de la création, Klincksieck, Paris 1989.
 La naissance d’Icare, Aedcged, 1996 où il fait dans la quatrième partie un lexique 
théorique des différents problèmes et concepts de la poïétique.
dans « les modifications successives apportées à la mat-
ière »(Valéry, Cahiers, T 18, p.37). Cette activité créatrice est 
une situation de capture de force qui conditionne la sensation 
et rend possible une réception énergétique de l’œuvre.
La création artistique relève d’une poïétique où la sensu-alité et l’imagination sont des facteurs déterminants. Paul 
Valéry a pensé le lien dynamique entre le désir esthétique et la 
nécessité de la création en libérant la sensation de son état de 
passivité pour l’ouvrir à l’expérience sensible de la sensualité et 
la dynamiser par l’imagination. La sensualité devient produc-
tive (Valéry parle de « vertu productive ») dans sa transfor-
mation dans les formes de l’art. De même l’imagination créa-
trice porte en elle l’amplification du mouvement des épreuves 
du monde. Cette poïétique des sens et du monde est celle 
du lien co-naturel des choses et des hommes. René Passeron 
appelle cela une « respiration créatrice » et y découvre un 
souffle avec le bruissement du sensoriel. 
Je vais prendre comme champ d’applicabilité de cette 
poïétique la peinture de René Passeron et ses exclamations 
philosophiques
 
L’épreuve de l’art ou »l’obscénité ontologique«
Si on revient au dialogue platonicien du Phèdre où il est 
question du conflit des désirs dont le dépassement s’opère par 
l’orientation vers l’essence de la Beauté, on peut y déceler une 
figure augurale de l’épreuve de l’art entre idéalité et cruauté. Le 
mythe du Phèdre représente l’âme humaine par un char con-
duit par un cocher ailé, ce char est tiré par deux chevaux, l’un 
indompté, l’autre docile qui symbolisent le conflit douloureux 
des désirs terrestres et des désirs divins.
A la vue des essences éternelles, un tiraillement frénétique 
et opposé de l’attelage finit par une cohue qui fait perdre à 
l’âme ses ailes, la précipite sur terre où elle s’incarne dans un 
corps. Le souvenir des essences éternelles et de leur perte ne 
sera réveillé de manière sensible dans l’âme que par la ren-
contre terrestre de la beauté ; sa vision rappelle l’éclat éternel 
des essences et du bonheur céleste. Ce qui est intéressant, ici, 
c’est que parmi toutes les idées ou les essences, seule la Beauté 
Idéale se manifeste de manière sensible par l’épreuve des belles 
choses et de beaux corps et cette épreuve est plus forte que 
celle de toutes les autres qualités et vertus.
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De plus, l’émotion que nous éprouvons à la vue d’une 
beauté vient d’un sentiment de perte et de manque qui fait 
naître une sorte de désir violent ; il jette l’âme à la fois dans 
une douleur convulsive et une forme d’enthousiasme. En fait 
cette perte est d’ordre ontologique puisqu’il s’agit de la perte 
de l’essence éternelle de la Beauté avec laquelle l’âme était 
autrefois en contemplation. Elle est vécue de manière sensible 
comme une perte d’être puisque ce sont des essences qui don-
nent sens à l’existence.
Il se trouve que ce manque d’être ressenti dans l’épreuve 
terrestre de la beauté est occasionné notamment par la ren-
contre des beaux corps. L’âme de l’amant est érotisée,  « se 
sent saisi de fièvre, bouillonne » et « s’agite dans la fureur et la 
souffrance » mais est aussi habitée d’une sorte de joie qui lui 
vient du souvenir lointain de l’essence éternelle de la Beauté. 
« L’amour est une pensée voyante », (Murmures René Pas-
seron in Thèmes, p. 198.)
Ce transport d’une sensibilité blessée et convulsive est 
celui du « délire divin propre à la fois au poète, à l’amant et à la 
prophétesse ». On pourrait le lire comme la manifestation de 
l’excès qui préside à la création.
La dialectique du manque et de l’excès serait la matrice 
métaphorique de l’état initiatique de toute conduite créatrice, 
mais cet état est d’abord celui d’une émotion pure où, selon 
la version platonicienne, le désir demeure inassouvi pour 
identifier le désir d’idéalité ou d’éternité et se reporter ainsi sur 
l’objet idéal qui est l’Essence même de la beauté.
Le peintre René Passeron nous parle de la femme saisie 
au bout de sa mine de plomb en ces termes : « N’allais-je 
pas (….) bien au delà de la chair, en effet misérable mortelle, 
vers une transcendance où le désir -sans aliénation sublima-
toire- trouve la beauté et l’harmonie qu’on appelle, ici et là, le 
divin ? » Exclamation philosophiques, p. 85.
I l précise bien que cette transcendance n’est pas celle d’une fuite sublimatoire mais de ce qu’il appelle une « Scan-
daleuse hypostase  de la Beauté » qui pouvait être celle de 
« l’émotion absolue ».
Probablement est ce cette « scandaleuse hypostase » qui 
est à l’origine du traditionnel malaise philosophique devant 
l’épreuve de l’art. En effet, les diatribes platoniciennes contre 
les épopées et les arts plastiques et toute la postérité occiden-
tale de cette condamnation ne sont-elles pas liées à la scandale-
use inscription de la divinité ou de l’idéalité dans le sensible, 
autrement dit au paradoxal avènement qu’est l’art lui-même ? 
Comment, en effet, du non-être de la matière et du chaos où 
elle baigne, créer de l’être, de surcroît par le bais de l’émotion 
pure, celle où s’éprouve l’humanité de l’homme dans son désir 
d’éternité ?
La solution que préconise le mythe du Phèdre déplace 
le problème de ce qu’on pourrait appeler « une poïétique de 
l’être dans le sensible » ; elle le déplace du travail de l’oeuvre 
vers l’ascèse philosophique. Par ce déplacement, Platon s’écarte 
lui-même de son double et son rival qu’est l’artiste celui qui 
engage la question tragique du destin de l’homme directement 
dans le sensible et dans la matière du réel.
Le présumé « faux démiurge » qu’est l’artiste n’est-il 
pas en fait responsable du scandale qu’il dévoile parce qu’il 
donne corps à la situation paradoxale de la finitude et du désir 
d’éternité ? C’est dans l’épreuve même de l’art qu’il engage 
la question de « l’obscénité ontologique » au sens littéral 
du terme, c’est-à-dire la question de l’être qui surgit toujours 
scandaleusement devant les scènes illusionnistes du sensible 
esthétisé.
L’art autonome et vivant n’est-il pas comme il est dit 
dans Exclamations philosophiques de René Passeron celui qui 
donne consistance à la question de l’être fut-ce par le fait du 
scandaleux qui permet dialectiquement de transcender la 
cruauté du réel dans une conception nouvelle et créatrice de 
cette cruauté.
Le théâtre de l’Antonin Artaud nous offre ce cas de figure. 
L’analyse qui en fit Franco Tonelli dans l’esthétique de la cruauté 
est pertinente à ce niveau : « La cruauté, remarque-t-il, n’est 
pas nécessairement revêtue d’une rôle de sang, d’horreur ou de 
sadisme, mais de rigueur extrême, de mouvement implacable 
et irréversible ». Artaud en parle comme d’un appel de forces 
qui ramènent l’esprit à la source de ses conflits et si ces conflits 
dit-il, ces forces sont noires, c’est la faute non pas du théâtre 
mais de la vie » (Le théâtre et son double Gall. P.38).
L’artiste confronte l’homme à son destin, à des ques-
tions fondamentales qui mènent à une prise de conscience 
ontologique et métaphysique de son existence. On peut se 
demander à la limite si le Phèdre où se joue le mythe du drame 
humain n’est pas aussi, à son niveau, un théâtre de la cruauté ? 
Même si comme le pense René Passeron, la cruauté d’Artaud 
est menacée de théâtralité par le fait d’un seul vrai cri, serait-ce 
celui d’Artaud lui-même, elle rend sensoriel le tragique de la vie.
Sans aller jusqu’à la révélation ou la crise cathartique par 
laquelle il y a prise de conscience de sa condition, de ses pos-
sibilités ou de son destin à travers l’épreuve de l’art, on peut 
penser que c’est le travail de l’œuvre entre cruauté et idéalité 
qui nous met dans l’immanence d’un « devant être » au sens 
où l’entend R. Passeron c’est-à-dire ce qui préside à la création, 
une sorte d’impératif ontologique dans l’ordre du sensible.
En effet, « le vide ontologique » comme il l’écrit dans 
Exclamations philosophiques est celui « d’où part toute sortie 
créatrice hors de la suffisance ». Il est le foyer de l’expérience 
intime de l’épreuve de l’art, celle du désir de création qui est 
désir d’éternité dans la conscience cruelle que « tout art est le 
vecteur de la mort ! » Exclamations philosophiques p. 25.
C’est en ce sens que l’expiration ultime de l’humain qui 
est celle du cri de douleur (cristallisé ou explosé dans l’œuvre 
Le Cri 1981 Lavis et Paillette) ou de Nécropole I 1977 Au-
toportrait du peintre dans le ventre de sa mère morte sable 
–polystyrène et tissu sur toile) est un déchirement pur qui fait 
problème par son intensité même à la musique la plus tragique. 
C’est pourquoi « l’obscénité ontologique » que tente de ren-
dre la sublimité de la musique ou toute forme de picturalité est 
la tension entre la quasi impossible figure du vide ontologique 
et le désir d’éternité. Il s’agit ainsi de la dynamique poïétique 
de l’irreprésentable qui, comme le dit R. Passeron « livré au 
vertige du vide » (EP p. 49) tente de forger des signes « non 
pas de l’Etre mais du Devant être », ce vide vertigineux qui 
préside à la création p. 52. Ici, on peut se demander si ce « de-
vant être » qui concerne l’amont de toute création artistique 
ne touche pas aussi cette zone préréflexive de la création (on 
peut même dire qu’émotion et penser sont ici, les deux faces 
d’une même situation). L’émotion a une charge ontologique 
autant que le concept est chargé d’affect. Le « devant être » 
de la création advient souvent lorsque de la cruauté naît une 
préréflexion qui rend proche affect et concept ; « C’est dans 
l’intolérable que s’accomplit la naissance de l’esprit » (p. 72)
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Cruaute, affect et concept
La cruauté qui vient du vide ontologique est celle là 
même de l’expérience nue de la réalité avec sa souffrance et 
sa laideur, celle concrète et ultime des massacres et des géno-
cides. C’est par cet élément non artistique qu’est la cruauté que 
l’art récuse l’adéquation et la réconciliation devant la perte de 
sens face à la mort et devient par la même un « devant penser 
être qui est aussi » marqué d’affect. Ici on pouvait revenir à 
la théorie adornienne de la vérité de l’art. Il développe l’idée 
que devant la deshumanisation de l’homme et de la nature, il 
y a, par et dans l’art, un contenu de vérité qui est l’anamnèse 
d’un possible à travers les stigmates de la réalité sociale et de sa 
contre vérité.
C’est en prenant en charge la souffrance en ce qu’elle 
contient de laideur, d’élément non artistique, en se faisant le 
cryptogramme de la « souffrance accumulée » et en la trans-
formant artistiquement que l’art fait apparaître la contre vérité 
de la situation sociale.
L’opération cathartique de l’art s’inscrit dans ce rapport 
de la réalité cruelle et de sa mise en forme artistique qui la 
réfléchit esthétiquement dans une œuvre : « par le seul fait 
qu’elles existent, les œuvres postulent l’existence d’une réalité 
inexistante et entrent de ce fait, en conflit avec l’inexistence 
de celle-ci » Théorie esthétique, p. 92. La vérité de l’art réside 
dans cette critique exercée par son existence même contre 
l’intolérable. C’est en sens qu’il faut comprendre que « l’art 
objectif est un oxymoron », il maintient à la fois l’apparence 
esthétique qu’Adorno appelle le rudiment magique (qui fait 
le charme de l’œuvre) et le caractère mimétique du monde 
désenchanté. Le rudiment magique de l’œuvre est ce qui 
sauve l’œuvre en créant « l’apparence esthétique ». On peut 
avancer que cette dimension de l’art est rendue possible par la 
dynamique « du devant être » qui est aussi un devant penser 
d’une pensée affectée par la l’expérience de la cruauté du réel et 
deshumanisation dans les épreuves tragiques.
Dans Paralipomena, p. 32, Adorno parle d’une cer-
taine réception des mouvements musicaux comme d’une 
« promesse liée à la sensualité d’une réalité de contenu qui 
est aussi contenu de vérité ». A. Marie Trivier dans un article 
intitulée « Adorno : La douleur ou l’ouverture écorchée du 
philosopher » va jusqu’à dire qu’Adorno déconstruit « le 
mythe de la pure conceptualité du concept, en relevant sa 
teneur somatique, base a posteriori sur laquelle la pensée peut 
être affecté à penser quelque chose comme à recevoir ». Cette 
teneur somatique du concept nous la trouvons dans l’intensité 
aphoristique et poétique du « plaidoyer ontologique » pour 
l’amour-révolte (chapitre 4 in E.Ph où il est dit que le cogito 
de la phronésis créatrice n’est autre que l’adage de l’amour 
révolte) Car, qu’est ce que penser si l’idée est détachée de la 
vie et de l’amour qui nous y inscrit ? L’obscénité de la vie et 
ses corollaires d’obscénité sociale pourraient nous éloigner 
de l’effort créateur. C’est pourquoi R. Passeron préfère parler 
de « l’amour révolte et de la colère qui constitue le tissu de 
l’esprit ». Lorsqu’à la pensée du génocide, Adorno semble dés-
espérer d’une possibilité de créer encore, il savait très bien que 
cela signifie aussi abandonner de penser et d’être. Il a continué 
jusqu’au bout de refuser l’idée d’une fin de l’art. 
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1.  Introduction
According to Arnheim [1], “space is experienced as given 
preceding all objects found in it, as the environment in which ev-
erything takes place and he continues: To hoping understand the 
nature of Architecture as an arrangement of buildings in a given 
continuous space, is impossible without accepting this intuitive 
and ecumenical way of observation”. Arnheim begins his thesis 
from the visual perception of an architectural creation already 
existing, a result of a composition process. But it is also true 
that nothing can be experienced before it exists at least noth-
ing related to Architecture. The Architect is the active creator 
of space.
Kant’s most original contribution to philosophy is his 
“Copernican Revolution,” stating that “it is the appearance (An-
schaung) that makes the object possible rather than the object that 
makes the appearance possible”. Kant looks at the problem that 
often Architects face during the design phase. Kant describes 
this problem as follows [2, p8]: “If the appearance depends on 
the state of the objects, then I cannot see how one may have knowl-
edge about it (the appearance)”. Kant solved this problem by 
saying: But if the objects depend on the state of our capability 
to create appearances, then I can imagine this possibility. Ex-
actly this dilemma constitutes the foundation of the proposed 
design method. Bergson sets on, where Kant ends when he 
states that Ideas are coming from experience [3, p314] and 
continues that experience confronts us with becoming: that 
is sensible reality. Appearances are in the case of architecture 
materialized Ideas and the objective of the architect is to create 
finally sensible reality.
The creation of architectural space consists in the endea-
vour to realising an architectural idea which, however, can 
rarely be foreseen as to whether and to what the, the outcome 
will embody the power of the initial vision. Since the compo-
sitional process is an evolutionary process in the sense of its 
realisation, it is important that the way from the capture of the 
idea until its transmutation to the sensible reality, be also evo-
lutionary and continuous especially in the initial steps of the 
compositional act. It is important to see that even the original 
idea of the architect could be revised in the light of experience 
that is gained in the first steps of the evolutionary process. 
From the capture of the idea to the creation of the sensual 
reality it is a mix of ideas with experience in a form of continu-
ous “becoming”. Becoming is continuous evolution that also 
creates ideas. This process is “interrupted” by the architect at 
the point where he or she is satisfied with the results achieved 
and where conscious order has been reached.
2.  The approach
Kant establishes the human mind as an active originator 
of experience rather than just a passive recipient of perception 
[7, p190]. Bergson argues that reality is the becoming of Ideas 
into experience [2, p 313]. Combining the theses of the two 
thinkers, one may discover that ideas and experience are in-
terdependent and mutually related. Also Arnheim in [1, p.61] 
reaches the conclusion that: the perception consists in the forma-
tion of tangible ideas. This is true especially in Architecture and 
this is exhibited during the development of an architectural 
composition. It is therefore necessary to provide an environ-
ment for achieving both: allow ideas to come from experience 
and experiences to come from ideas, an environment for con-
tinuous evolution. The transmutation of ideas to experience 
and of the experience to ideas is the essence of architectural 
composition. This continuous creation process is terminated 
and not finished when the willed order in terms of Bergson [3] 
and/or the structural order in terms of Arheim [8] has been 
achieved at the free will of the Architect. This is the basic prin-
ciple of the approach. 
Creation of experience as a state of senses and creation 
of ideas as a state of mind that reflects experience is the ob-
jective to be achieved in creating space in architecture. This 
experience is to be understood as a derivative of the deep 
character of the architectural object to be composed led by 
the basic theme and a set of time dependant state charac-
teristics, described here as the eigenvalues of the space. The 
eternal creation of ideas through experience and vice versa 
through continuous evolution in architecture leads to the 
creation of an environment that has as objective to spatial-
ize or materialize time. Time is a kind of moving force that 
produces energy. This energy can be gradually stored so 
that it can be expended through canalization into different 
directions for producing experiences and further ideas that 
recommence the evolutionary cycle of the architectural com-
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position. Kant considers the spatial relationships rather like 
mutual influences and interactions among the bodies and not 
simply reflections of qualitative information that are given in 
the context of a coexisting arrangement [7, p186]. Einstein 
goes in the similar direction when he insists that there is no 
space without a field, meaning of course field of forces [7]. 
Modern Physics goes so far as to assert that material shape 
is nothing but the man´s way of seeing the effects of action 
of forces [5]. From the beginning, the cosmic architecture 
is viewed as being brought about by action [5]. All shapes 
are experienced as patterns of forces. In practical life a wall 
counts not only as a geometrical plane but as a boundary 
that contains, keeps out and covers. The dynamic view of 
the world corresponds to what is known about the objective 
state of the nature [5]. This is also true in the case of the 
architect relating to his or her subjective view.
Arnheim looks at the deduction principles when 
analysing existing architectural objects, but does not give a 
way or a method of how through the use of these principles 
the architect could arrive at creating objects creating targeted 
experiences. Even if he/she did, his/her way of thinking is 
based on the existence visually perceived elements and not in 
the mind (Gemüt) as an originator of this experience. A way to 
accomplish this would be to try in solving the problem of how 
to create experience a priori, i.e. experience before the final 
experience. Starting off the point of defining forces interrela-
tionships, the architect will finally have to go through a series 
of steps that will allow him/her to gradually substitute the field 
of forces and their interrelationships through architectural 
elements that reconstruct the original sense of experience as 
a kind of an architectural becoming of an idea into experience 
in space. This process starts in practice of a mind activity (idea 
or είδος in Greek) about the architectural object to be cre-
ated, as something outside of ourselves, continues as a fuzzy 
knowledge creation process, outside of any kind of sensing the 
transformation from the original idea and basic theme through 
to the final architectural object. 
The process of gradual and methodical creation of a 
priori knowledge is based on the assumption that pure geom-
etry alone cannot create experience unless is sensed as a pat-
tern of forces [1] as accumulation and canalization of energy 
[3, p255]. Geometry may complement the design process 
for the final decision on the form of objects. For example the 
need to create the state of tension in a certain space, cannot 
be experienced singularly through the appearance or form of 
a certain architectural object. This could be achieved through 
conducting simple or more complex experiments in a phys-
ics lab, for example, for simulating situations where tension 
can undertake the build up of the a priori knowledge needed 
in the course of becoming the basic theme from the original 
idea to the final architectural object. It is described through a 
series of compositional steps, with the purpose to build up a 
priori knowledge on types of experiences and states that can 
be used for taking decisions in the designing process towards 
completing the architectural object. It is imaginable that 
states in space can be designed into new architectural objects 
by emulating objects in order to achieve specific dynamic 
effects in the space. From the results of such experiments, 
designers can be driven to perceive various ways in translat-
ing experience gained through experiments into architectural 
objects. Tools from the field of Systems Dynamics could be 
used in order to emulate objects interdependencies with 
energy storage and flow elements [6]. The discussion and use 
of these tools in architectural composition is the theme of 
further research.
Creating a priori knowledge with respect to the final expe-
rience, it is realized that composition would have to produce, 
not just a structure of thought that is normally the architec-
tural process of design, but the entire structure of conscious-
ness within which perception also occurs. What is first given is 
appearance, when combined with consciousness [Bewußtsein] 
through experiment is called perception [Wahrnehmung]. It is 
the structure of consciousness, through synthesis, that turns 
“appearances” into architectural objects and perceptions. The 
process of architectural synthesis therefore brings in this way 
things into consciousness.
It is notable that for Kant, space is a condition for the pos-
sibility of experience itself [7, p190]. This holds also for space 
in architecture. Architectural space does not originate from the 
senses, but it is composed and created through the architect 
therefore enabling certain experience or in general a state of 
experience. Although not originated itself from the senses, the 
concept of space is a pure appearance, nor objective, neither 
real, but it is substantiated through a subjective design process 
of the architect who entails his identity, personality and maybe 
roots to his or her own creation. The “end- product” is a result 
of a creative evolutionary process, following an approach, 
through the gradual acquisition of knowledge (energy) of the 
type “learning by a priori” through experiments in order to 
emulate various types of space states. These space states will 
relate to the objectives of experience pursued by the architect. 
Below there is a brief description of the design steps: 1. a pos-
teriori analytic, 2. a priori analytic, 3. a priori synthetic and 4. a 
posteriori synthetic.
Fig. 1. From state space to architectural space
3.  The method
The method distinguishes 4 phases: conceive, perceive, 
model and realise that are interconnected to form a whole of 
individual parts. Chronologically the method is characterised 
through the passage from the state space to the architectural 
space. The distinction in phases is only made only for method-
ological purposes.
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The a posteriori analytic phase: 
Conceive – It concerns the definition, and the analysis of 
the deep character of the object to be designed and how this 
deep character has to be substantiated. Based on this analysis 
the states of the space should be defined that the space itself 
should be mediating to the environment. The concern here is 
the psychological order and not so much the chronological. 
The psychological order is of major concern here that leads 
from elementary to more complex conceptions as the mind 
becomes more differentiated and observation more refined 
[1]. The mind passes from the individual to the whole. This 
step is called “a posteriori” with respect to experience and it 
constitutes the expected (a posteriori) essence of the object 
under design up front.
The a priori analytic phase: 
Perceive – It concerns the gaining of knowledge through 
experimentation with forces in action and how these actions 
can be translated into shapes or forms based on the analysis of 
the previous step. Such experiments should be conducted in 
order to excite the imagination of the creator or the student. 
Here concepts take shape and are turned into percepts [1]. A 
percept is the resultant of perceiving. It is the representation of 
an external event that affected the senses and which - by per-
ceptual processing - caused the activation of a certain category 
in the mind, i.e., the percept. Elements of the state space are 
formed so that these later in the next design phase to consti-
tute the parts to form the whole. Arnheim´s work, for example 
[1, 4] are important in the built up of the experiments. It is an 
area of further research to pursue such experiments in labora-
tories that can be built especially for the needs of architectural 
design. Such environments would probably be multidisci-
plinary, with architects, artists, art psychologists, physicists 
and mathematician with expertise in geometry.
The a priori synthetic phase: 
Model – It concerns the synthesis of a 3-dimensional 
model of the object incorporating all the knowledge gained 
in the previous design phase. Here is the step where state 
space is substantiated into architectural space in the form of a 
model. During the modelling phase further experiments can 
be conducted if needed for further refinement of the model 
and perceptual assistance at the elementary level. The parts are 
composed into a whole. The whole is characterised from its 
parts and every part has its character belonging to the whole. 
It is a system.
The a posteriori synthetic phase: 
Realise – It concerns the actual building of the object. It 
is expected that all objectives set in first phase of the design 
process have been met and it is only in this case that the design 
cycle has arrived at the end-point. 
4.  Summary
In this paper an approach of gradual gaining of a priori 
knowledge for sensing „a posteriori“ reality is proposed. The 
“end product” is a result of a deduction process, following a 
synthetic approach, through the gradual acquisition of knowl-
edge of the type “learning a priori” through experiments in 
order to emulate various types of states. These states will relate 
to the final objectives of experience pursued by the architect. 
Moreover the “becoming” character of design is exhibited that 
leads into a more systematic way for composing architectural 
space.
5.  Further research
Design and execution of experiments can be conducted 
for gaining “a priori” knowledge on sensing “a posteriori” 
reality. Arnheim´s work, for example [1, 4] are of great im-
portance in the built up of the experiments proposed in this 
paper. It is definitely an area of further research to pursue such 
experiments in laboratories that can be built especially for the 
needs of architectural design. Furthermore, tools from the field 
of Systems Dynamics can be used in order to emulate objects 
interdependencies with energy storage and flow elements. 
Such environments would probably be multidisciplinary, with 
architects, artists, art psychologists, physicists and mathemati-
cian with expertise in geometry.
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Methods and goals
This research examines how the rise of global capitalism 
and the history of the Asian diaspora have shaped the political, 
economical, social and cultural interflows between Japan and 
other parts of the world (here Slovenia). A research focuses on 
the transnational influence of Japanese butō performance in 
contemporary Slovenian theatre, and looks at the significance 
of interculturalism between Japan and Slovenia that produces 
the paradigm-shifting means for understanding the political 
and cultural identity of contemporary Slovenia. 
Butō performances in Slovenia displayed a dark ensemble 
of visions and movements of the sublime, but simultaneously 
exposed the political questions derived from intercultural 
arts exchanges: what, if any, are the limits and purposes to a 
culture-specific, Japanese stylized art form, such as butō, re-
staging in Slovenia? What, if anything, is left or transformed of 
that intercultural exchange between Japan and Slovenia when 
Japanese culture is embodied and transposed upon the disci-
plined foreign body of white Slovene actors? In response to the 
above questions, this paper presents the ethnographic research 
that investigates the dynamics of the butō workshop and per-
formance processes. The research deals with the transforma-
tion of Slovene performers, their perception of space and body 
in dance, the aesthetics and reception of butō performance by 
audience. By doing so, this research wishes to comprehend 
how that displaced and ready-made butō practice in Slovenia 
posits continual political struggle and cultural anxiety of and 
for national identities in the contemporary Slovene context.
To answer above questions it also necessary to explore 
what butō actually represents. For this reason I tried to find 
answers to the questions about the origins, development and 
essence of butō. The investigation of dance has been combined 
with the attempt to understand the perception of body and 
space in dance world. Spatial aspects of style may, however go 
along with modes of organization of dance, document charac-
teristics of wider social organization. As dance exists in relation 
to space, we can consider some reflection on questions such as 
“What is the relation of dancing to the spatial environment in 
which it is performed?”, “How might attention to spatial and 
body relationships between people inform our understand-
ing?”, “How might cultural conceptions of space and body differ 
from those of the researcher and be revealed through dancing?” 
As a dancer who danced butō on seminar in Slovenia 
some years ago, I did use dance as an ethnographic method 
to research my theme. As an anthropologist and japonolo-
gist I have started my fieldwork with questioning Slovenian 
dancers, actors, choreographers performing butō and also 
Japanese dancer working and performing in Slovenia. I 
continued and developed my research with exploring some 
available literature on body, space and butō. With this kind 
of methodological approach I was looking for the relation 
between a dancer’s personal understanding of body, space, 
dance technique and the perception of butō in society, where 
they work and perform. 
Body in space
The most significant change for anthropology in recent 
years is found in the acknowledgment that space is an essential 
component of socio-cultural theory. But spatial analyses have 
often neglected the body because of difficulties in resolving the 
dualism of the subjective and objective body, and distinctions 
between the material and representational aspects of body 
space. The concept of “embodied space”, however, draws these 
disparate notions together, underscoring the importance of the 
body as a physical and biological entity, as lived experience, 
and as a centre of agency, a location for speaking and acting on 
the world. We use the term “body” to refer to its biological and 
social characteristics, and “embodiment” as an “indeterminate 
methodological field defined by perceptual experience and 
mode of presence and engagement in the world”. Embodied 
space is the location where human experience and conscious-
ness take on material and spatial form. Embodied space is 
presented as a model of understanding the creation of place 
through spatial orientation, movement, and language. (Low 
and Lawrence-Zúñiga 2003: 1-2)
The space occupied by the body and the perception and 
experience of that space, contracts and expands in relationship 
to a person’s emotions and state of mind, sense of self, social 
relations, and cultural predispositions. In Western culture we 
perceive the self as “naturally” placed in the body, as a kind 
of precultural given. We imagine ourselves experiencing the 
world through our “social skin”, the surface of the body rep-
resenting “a kind of common frontier”. (Low and Lawrence-
Zúñiga 2003: 3)
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The different view on the body shows Japanese phi-
losopher Tetsurō Watsuji, when he argues that in the West 
mind ‘I’ is more important than ‘body’, and ‘time’ is more 
important than ‘space’. But his view of the person emphasis 
the space as the basho of human existence, thereby stressing 
the spatial existence of the body. (Yuasa 1987: 42) So spatial-
consciousness had been regarded as more primary in the East, 
and the fundamental state of consciousness is the juxtaposi-
tion of momentary space-experience, temporally cut off from 
before and after, and in this view we may find the backdrop of 
a traditionally Japanese, or more generally Eastern, mode of 
thinking about the relationship between humanity and nature. 
(Yuasa 1987: 45) 
Initially, the body’s movements do not follow the dictates 
of the mind. The body is heavy, resistant to the mind’s move-
ment; in this sense, the body is an object opposing the living 
subject’s mode of being. That is, the mind (or consciousness) 
and the body exhibit an ambiguous subjective-objective di-
chotomy within the self ’s mode of being. (Yuasa 1987: 105) 
By disrupting the binary mind/body by positionality and 
focusing on the situated and colonized body, states of mind 
become loosened from the location of social and spatial rela-
tionship. Pierre Bourdieu explains how body habits generate 
cultural features and social structure by employing the term 
habitus to characterize the way body, mind, and emotions are 
simultaneously trained. He uses this concept to understand 
how social status, moral values, and class position become 
embodied in everyday life. (Low and Lawrence-Zúñiga 2003: 
3–4)
The process of accepting habitus into the body is uncon-
sciousness process. It can be said that the reason for that is that 
people in the West forget that they/we are living in the body. 
With this statement agrees Tanja Zgonc, Slovenian dancer and 
choreographer, when she is saying “that we are lacking the 
basic knowledge for living in our body: an awareness of body 
movements and breathing. The main problem of the Western 
thought is that we are too much concern of how the body 
looks outside; we are frustrated about our bodies”. She then 
suggests that there are many ways of getting conscious of our 
body and she sees one of these methods in dancing, or more 
specifically in buto. (Puncer in Brumen 2003: 73) 
For this reason it is very important to study the physi-
cal, sensuous experience of dancing, which can provide us 
with knowledge as unmistakable as that is provided by the 
more conventional study and analysis of cultural beliefs and 
concepts and of other aspects of emotional life. (Thomas 
2003: 93). The interpretation of the ‘act of dancing’ from the 
performers’ or the observers’ points of view are not simply 
the product of personal preferences, but are constituted in 
and through our lived experiences in a variety of contexts 
and events, ‘social and theatrical’ (Thomas 2003: 94). The 
task of the dance analyst is to find ‘ways to reveal and under-
stand the webs of meaning created through the dance event’ 
(ibid.). 
Because dance does not exist in a cultural vacuum, but 
rather is a situated embodied aesthetic practice, it can also 
highlight and reflect the presence of this very dualism in the 
cultural domain. In addition, dance provides a rich set of 
resources for exploring the ‘history of bodies’, by examining 
technical shifts and transformations of dance styles in relation 
to the dancing bodies that perform them over a period of time 
and moving around the world. Furthermore, it provides a site 
for examine the limitations and extraordinary possibilities of 
‘the physical body’. (Thomas 2003: 93)
Butō 
Japanese society cultivates a special attitude to the body 
and they use body language much more than verbal language. 
The body is therefore a frequent theme in contemporary theo-
retical and philosophical discussions in Japan, a theme that 
emerged in the context of social and technological changes. 
The special attitude to the body in Japanese society can be 
seen in many phenomena: wrapping the body in a kimono 
as a way of exchanging information with other people, in the 
philosophy of martial arts, which developed a special regime 
for the body with emphasis on the body’s non-verbal training, 
thought and spiritual power. This special attitude to the body 
is also evident in the theatre and dance techniques, which 
developed in Japan, for instance in ritual dances, folk dances, 
ballet and modern dances. As part of modern dance, butō 
represents modern body expression; it is neither dance nor 
theatre, but a special technique of blending body and mind 
into a uniform entity in motion.
Butō dance is a performing art that originated in Post 
World-War Japan and was first performed in 1959. As an avant-
garde dance form, butō has its origins in the dancers Hijikata 
Tatsumi and Ōno Kazuo, who collaborated and developed 
distinct styles of butō. In contrast to the rhythm and balance 
of ballet, butō emphasizes discontinuity and imbalance, bends 
the body into strange and awkward postures, and avoids the 
imposition of fixed technique. Yet butō demonstrates certain 
continuities with classical Japanese dance: slowly flowing 
ground-related movement, asymmetry of poses and avoidance 
of strict rhythm. It is a contemporary form of dance that has 
little to do with either traditional Japanese dances or most 
western forms of dance, although it does borrow elements 
from some of each.
Butō presents challenges to rationality, conventional aes-
thetics and social norms: it portrays eroticism and violence, 
the embarrassing and the ugly, wasteland and alien worlds. 
Some butō performers work with disabled people and in 
mental hospitals, appropriating unconventional movements 
for the dance. The white face paint used in kabuki is often used 
over almost naked body in butō. Visual images are paramount, 
typically portraying agony and ecstasy, distortion and the 
grotesque. There is exploration of the boundaries between life 
and death, human and animal, male and female. Dwelling on 
boundaries, however, confirms their significance: the juxtapo-
sition of multiple transgressions may ironically, in Durkheim 
style, reinforce the normality operative beyond the compart-
mentalized sphere of art. (Valentine 1998: 273)
It is not only performance, but also the embodiment of 
one of the most precise critical spirits in the history of the 
consciousness of the body, with strength of thought, which 
impinges deeply on the history of human spirit. Still, there are 
certain ideas that constellate around butō. One is the concept 
of the empty body. This refers to an opening up of space in the 
body to allow yourself room to be moved. For some artists, the 
result is a very depersonalised form of butō. One of them, Min 
Tanaka says, “I do not dance in the space; I dance the space,” 
suggesting that the impulse for his dance is not coming from 
ego or self. (Hermon 2003)
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The most unconventional aspect of butō is its movement 
and the preparation that the dancer undergoes to prepare for 
the dance. It is a dance that has as much to do with meditation 
or martial art training as it does to dance in the conventional 
sense. It derives its power from what the individual who danc-
es it brings to it in a very mental as well as physical sense. It is a 
directing of energy to the audience from the surroundings, the 
environment and the audience themselves as much as from the 
mind. (Hermon 2003) 
The causes for the origin of butō may be found in the 
social and political environment of post-war Japan, and it was 
above all an expression of opposition to the fast modernisa-
tion and rigid traditions of Japanese society. Butō at first saw 
the body as a raw matter, freed completely of society’s regula-
tions and rules that hold the modern body captive. Gradually, 
this raw bodiness was replaced by symbolical and idealised 
presentations and performances of the human body as we can 
see them today. From its initial rebellious phase, butō passed 
to a phase of searching for symbols of the Japanese body, its 
pristine nature, rituality and today it has become a global 
dance technique that no longer represents subversive states 
nor radicalism. Though butō wanted to revolt and move away 
from traditionalism, it can be best described as a mixture of 
elements from the traditional Japanese theatres no and kabuki 
and modern expressive dance and mimics. It departs from 
established dance rules and leaves the body a lot of leeway for 
improvisation. As such it has become a postmodern art form 
that stages the story of a society in its own way.
Butō in Slovenia; Performances as cultural 
documents, cultural anxiety
The political, economical and cultural status and condi-
tion of Slovenia change in early 1990 with independence from 
Yugoslavia. A result of that was extensive cultural exchange 
with other world, West and East. Because of the drastic chang-
es in world economy and capitalism, consequences of migra-
tion of the people and mixing of the cultures are something 
that we see in our everyday life. For this reason we can not 
make clear distinguish between East and West in contempo-
rary world anymore. Therefore we should consider about this 
phenomenon more as distinguished hybrid representations, 
and in this group of representation I would put buto. Although 
we try to avoid a discourse between ‘us’ and ‘them’, the ideo-
logical reality invades also in the field of dance art (Puncer 
2003: 69). 
The early 90ies were also the time when butō was brought 
in Slovenia by dancer and choreographer Tanja Zgonc, who 
has encountered it in Vienna in 1987. From 1989 she is a 
member of European dance group ‘Ko Murobushi Dance 
Company’. She studied the butō method with leading Japanese 
teachers like Kazuo Ōno, Min Tanaka, Ko Murobushi, Tadashi 
Endo and Carlotta Ikeda. She teaches Scene movement at the 
Theater Academy (AGRFT) in Ljubljana. She dances many 
modern dance techniques, but Japanese butō is method, on 
which her working processes and choreographies are leaned. 
Tanja Zgonc has in last 15 or 16 years created about thirteen1 
1 Performances: choreographer Tanja Zgonc: V pot vpet (1989), Pot (1991), 
Iiza Iiza, haiku (Sem, kar sem, nič več, nič manj) (1994), Haus (1995), 
Manover 95 (1995), Mankind 3 (1996), Hiša (1997/98), Kagami odsev 
(2000), Koora (2002), Koan Kensho (2005); choreographer: Stefan Maria 
Marb: Golem III (2005).
independent performances and was awarded with the Na-
tional Slovenian award for culture, the Prešern award, for 
her performance Koora in 2002. (Puncer and Brumen 2003: 
70–72) 
She explains the situation like that: “Since the first butō 
performance in Ljubljana (Slovenia) in 1990, the perception 
of dancers and spectators’ has change noticeable. A method 
of butō was integrated in Slovenian theatre for the first time, 
when the Slovenian actor Radko Polič used butō in the play 
Don Huan na psu2, directed by Dušan Jovanovič, in Ljubljan-
ska drama. Since that time the interest for butō performances 
has grown among Slovenian audience and also between 
dancers and actors, and one of the results is also shown in 
increase number of performances and participants in butō 
workshops.” 
Although it is more than 15 years that butō is present 
in Slovenia, it is still a dance technique strange to our per-
ception, it was not a part of our habitus before. As it uses 
techniques of movements which derive from other cultural 
and philosophical background, it acquires wider range of 
understanding of cultural phenomena from the dancer and 
the spectators. But it is also true, that butō in Slovenia is not 
just something that came from Japan anymore. It became in-
dependent method, which is developing in Europe and other 
places of the world. Butō method itself was first just dance-
theatre method, but in the foreign countries it is placing itself 
in psycho-social therapeutic work with people. (Puncer and 
Brumen 2003: 73)
The people who are interested in buto are mostly danc-
ers and actors. As actress Mojca Funkl says: “This method 
is very useful also in other non-buto performances, you can 
use the perception of the body and self in the theatrical plays, 
it helps to understand better the way you move and act. It is 
clear that butō gives our culture philosophy of Zen and con-
sciousness of body and mind. For this reason it is sometimes 
difficult to understand it, especially if you practice it only for 
a short time.” In this quotation we can see one more differ-
ence between butō outside the Japan and its origin. In some 
places of Japan people still lives in traditional butō way: that 
is they live, eat and dance together, and not only go on prac-
tice or workshop for four hours a day and only a definite pe-
riod. Merely imitating the physical movement that one sees 
on a videotape or from a seat in a theatre will most likely lead 
to a dance that may seem different, unusual and interesting 
to someone who has never seen the dance before, but which 
is hollow and uninteresting to one who has experienced butō 
performance up close or has gone through the process of pre-
paring for and carrying out a performance of butō. The learn-
ing of butō is never ending process, a task for a whole life. But 
Mojca Funkl here ads: “with our different way of creating and 
living we give butō new dimensions and new themes.” 
Within European modern dance this method is like 
mental process, through which individual would be con-
fronted with his/her ‘otherness’. But butō is about the human 
experience, not the Japanese experience. Butō is rather a part 
of one’s understandings of the spiritual and intellectual inspi-
ration to those who brought it to the stage. From this points 
out we can say that to perform butō in Slovenia is something 
different than to perform it in Japan or in other countries 
2 Translation: Don Huan on his beam-ends (N.V.)
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around the world. Each butō dance is unique to the person 
who dances it. For no one can create the same dance feeling 
inside that any other dancer has already felt. The ‘magic’ of 
this dance then is in the ability of the individual to push away 
all that is unnecessary to the expression of the feeling in the 
dance. This shows other issue, that is: the audience cannot 
usually discern what this internal image is - nor they should. 
The spectators read their own story in the actions, what 
butō dancers feel, when they are dancing before different 
audience. I assume that as a person lives in one society and 
embody it, butō expresses the relation between perceptions 
of space and body in certain society. 
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W e live in the era of imagination, in which all past “reality”, technically-conceptually mediated up to the limits of possible experience, and almost totally vanished in imaginative sensual phenomena, has been 
transformed into illusion as existence. The principle of reality 
coherence, which even Descartes, in his Meditationes de prima 
philosophia accepted as relevant evidence for differentiating 
realities (i.e. state of wake and consciousness) from the sphere of 
dreams, in the contemporary world – both in science, technique, 
arts, and common sense observations and atrophied, basically 
by senses disoriented thinking – has been seriously shaken by 
new aesthetics and erotic experiences available at the Internet, 
mobile phones and global entertainment industry. That neo-
mystical, collective experience gathered on new aesthetic-erotic 
territories, electronic zones of senses and sensitivity, almost at 
the edge of delirium, represents the imaginary as pure imma-
nence, late internalization of views, in which the era of fullness 
and emptiness are pulsing parallely and alternately like mere 
echoes of only and one world of general elation, trance and illu-
sion produced by the media.
Similar to cultural forms characteristic for societies preceding capitalistic production, and for which, as Jameson put it, 
myths and rituals present some kind of “magical narratives” in 
post capitalist production formations, former civil individualism, 
with its immanent “autonomy” and psychology of subjectivity, 
is more and more replaced by practice of some fragmented, 
totally objected togetherness, which is seen as daily synthesis of 
knowing and acting. In the introductory chapter of the article 
“Marxism as a critic” (that deals with Jameson’s contribution 
to modern critic theories of society), it is stressed out a special 
role in adaptation of traditional Marxist theories to challenges of 
modern times, and it is underscored possibility of applying critic 
to so-called “media based capitalism“1, while “dialectical critic” 
is always, regarded from a phenomenological point of view, as 
Jameson in Marxism and form claims, “holistic” and “totalizing”.2
1 Nick Heffernan, Fredrik Jameson, in: Contemporary Critical Theorists, From Lacan to 
Said, edited by Jon Simons, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2004, p. 252.
2 See chapter “Towards dialectic critic”, in: Fredrik Jameson, Marxism and Form, Dia-
lectic theories of the XX century literature, Nolit, Belgrade, 1974, especially p. 310. 
Related to this, it could be posed a question – on which kind of magic is founded this “media based capitalism”? It seems 
that one of the answers is hidden in effective role of marketing 
nowadays. Brands, which are products of mass (re)production of 
“real” illusions in the fields of marketing, through actions of mass 
media communication, take on magical features of consumption 
and goods, making an “aura” of trade mark attractive to the extend 
which in the past possessed an authentic piece of art. In this way, 
a controversial phenomenon of desauratization of modern art, 
which in the essay “Work of Art in the Era of Technical Reproduc-
tion” anticipated Walter Benjamin, today coincides with Bodriar-
ian chained hyper reality of illusion, and also with “mechanical” 
(media) processes of “sacralisation of commercialism”, which is 
described in detail in the text “On the Aura, Illusion, Escape and 
Hope in Apocalyptic Consumption”3 in the compilation Apoca-
lypse and Marketing. 
Department stores, modern shopping malls, mega markets-cinemas and teleshop programs, for a modern consumer 
represent former worlds of fairy tales, desires and dreams, the 
worlds of miracles of Alice and Pinocchio, some sort of a “cathe-
dral of consumption” with characteristic “grandiose stage set” in 
whose luminous windows is exposed seductive goods. “Those se-
ductions with goods represent“, claims Belk, “concentrated power 
of marketing in new and magnificent department store windows”,4 
which coupled with mass advertising makes actual processes of 
“modernization of magic”.5 Referring to Raymond Williams, who 
advertising labeled as magic system of attributing power to goods, 
Belk points out: “At the beginning of nineteenth century branded 
goods was not common (...). Like a bagman goods and presenta-
tion of miraculous remedies which preceded it, branded goods 
has been developed in miraculous elixir the moment it was suc-
cessfully mystified and mythologized with help of advertising (...). 
That’s why transcendent power, that long before was attributed to 
religion and first rate art, now we find alive and healthy in branded, 
advertised, exposed consumer’s products. Aura, for which Benja-
min feared that was lost, instead of vanishing, it made significant 
3 Rasel W. Belk, “On aura, illusion, escape and hope in apocalyptic consumption”, 
in: Apocalypse and marketing: Eschatology, escapology and illusion of the end (edi-
tors: Stephen Brown, Jim Bell, David Carson), Clio, Beograd, 2003, pp. 107-130.
4 Ibid, pp. 114, 115.
5 Ibid, p. 115.
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turn towards mass produced, mass marketed, mass meditated con-
sumer culture.”6 Transcendental imagination in this way becomes 
used as prerequisite of opportunity of entire empirical reality (i.e. 
its media reflection), to put it in Kantian terminology, if this con-
clusion can be applied to today’s world of media culture. 
Simultaneously with losing the aura, generally speaking, from the world of culture vanishes all that in former times was 
unique and unrepeatable and it is replaced by cliché standards of 
goods and actual planetary brandocratia. It is unquestionable that 
this process of deaurisation (and following “denarratisation” that, 
technically speaking, acting in the realm of visual art as an actual 
process was prepared in the époque of Renaissance and today 
taken and developed by the Internet, is treated as “discontinue nar-
rative space”) have made possible former market globalization and 
total acting of media images that are systematically spread over 
the modern world. Antiglobalisation and anticorporate resistance 
spirit strive to oppose such processes through forms of acting 
that are revolutionary, guerilla in the traditional senses (from Che 
Guevara7 to Naomi Klein, for example), and through using new 
forms of fight in virtual contexts of acting (movements of Mexican 
Zapatists and other aspects of media practice that constituted new 
resistance identities). 
However, it appears that nowadays, culture, arts, aesthetics and erotic, that substitute fetishism of goods, brandomania 
and entirely totalitarian pornography, by losing its former magic 
features, or auraticity, dwell in some other realms taken out from 
boundaries of traditional polarities of villages and cities, the poor 
and the rich, the Third World and postindustrial civilization of the 
West (North America and the European Union). More and more 
frequently time is spent in so-called chat rooms, various virtual 
communities based on interests, even cyber towns, become more 
and more present forms of modern existence that is no longer 
(critically) question, this is an obvious fact. To this especially con-
tribute the “nature” of the Internet as a media, which is, according 
to views of some modern theoretician of culture and media (Taylor 
and Saarinen, for example), structurally closed to the nature of 
female erotism and its “soft” and dislocated expression along “hori-
zontales“ of endless cyber space while, according to other opinions 
(Baudrillard), this space, according to its “qualities”, is transsexually 
and erotically indifferent (“cyber indifference of sex“) although 
intentionally seductive, and eventually based on the paradigm of 
the ¨fragile subject” (female body) and its surface erogenous zones.
Descartes’ cogitatio, as past (self)confirmation of existence (¨male“ and transcendent/al/lly) subject, with its possibility 
to yet, at the end, verify something beyond it (res cogitans), in these 
cases loses some of immediate self seeing through – penetration 
and base. Media mediated, dependent from the Other / Others, a-
6 Ibid, p. 115.
7 It has passed over 40 years since Ernesto Che Guevara, in his speech at the con-
ference in Punta del Este (1961), attempted to unmask the American plan of 
implementation of certain (desirable and “progressive”) cultural model for all Latin 
American countries. In that speech he made the following point: “... they are at-
tempting, distinguished delegates, to establish a cultural common market, organized, 
managed, paid for and domesticated. All the culture of (Latin) America will be at 
the service of imperialism’s propaganda plans, to demonstrate that hunger of our 
peoples isn’t hunger at all, but laziness. Magnificent!... Confronted with this, we reply 
(with)... total and absolute condemnation... (This is) an attempt by imperialism to 
domesticate the one thing that our peoples had saved from disaster: our national 
culture.” U: Che Guevara, Global Justice, Liberation and Socialism (Edited by Maria 
del Carmen Ariet Garcia), Ocean Press, Melbourne, New York , 2004, str. 13. 
rational and technically reproductive, cogitatio becomes, colloqui-
ally said, pure ego-trip, phantasmagoria free from self-characteristic 
subjective powers as well as possibility of continual process of self 
founding. On the other hand, it is important to stress out that in 
works that treat themes of “outer world” in the speculative way, 
dealing with general problems of the visual8 Descartes in his later 
research introduces discussion about natural phenomena such as 
light, rainbow and other optical phenomena that belong to the field 
of empirical visions generated from the domain of possibilities of 
¨natural geometry“ or, as is later on renamed, intelligible text”9. 
Since natural phenomena, taken over from modern technology and dragged through filters of mass media aesthetic culture, in 
speculative visage stay the same while empirically they become a 
foundation of illusion production, it can be concluded that already 
from Descartes and beginning of the modern age rationalism it 
was settled a theoretical condition for transcendence of subject, 
through reality that is expressed as hyper real, in the empirical 
realm of interpretation. That’s why no wonder that every question 
concerning fundaments for establishing a modern media ontology 
ends up either in radical social critique (Frankfurt school, Anders, 
Debord, etc.) or in theological speculations on existence of God as 
a media phenomenon, that were postulated in Leibniz’ Monadolo-
gie and Berkeley’s principle of perception as existential foundation. 
Autonomy of visual form and omnipresent “madness of vision” (la 
folie de la vision) about which later on wrote Merleau-Ponty and 
other French commentators who therapeutically act in the filed of 
perception phenomenology, from there on become substitute for 
modern views on subjectivity and its per se schizoid auto reflection. 
On capitalism and pathologically split subjectivity of the mechanical world of desires, thought in modern psycho-
analytical code, enough was said in Deleuze-Guattari’s Anti-Edip. 
If we add to this how matters look like with reflection of external, 
so-called permeable things (synthesized in continual res extensa) 
that represent an old, entirely recognizable Descartesian think-
ing matrix. Referring to Leeman’s differentiation between mirror 
metaphor used by Rationalism and compatible reflective perspec-
tivism, Martin Jay, in his comments and allusions to Descartes, 
underlies acting effects of common and so called “anamorphous“ 
baroque mirrors in which distortions of visual images are deliber-
ate and obvious, resulting in particular visual practice significant 
for both baroque and illusionism of our age.10 
Global complexity of the phenomenon which, on one side is represented by media capitalism and on the other by new 
“global mess“ (in one, baroquely constructed, irregular paradigm of 
moving of these processes), whether we consider radical resistance 
of Zapatists or terrorism of Al Qaeda, in the era of late capitalism 
development and activation of various social movements that 
also strive to act through global media networks, new forms of 
(aesthetic) existence are emerging, as well as understanding former 
nature of subjectivity. Forming one’s own identity today is real-
ized simultaneously with involving in network communication. 
8 It is known that Descartes wrote his Tractate on Method as some kind of an 
epistemological introduction in his later works on optics, meteorology and ge-
ometry. See, for example, Descartes, “La Dioptrique” in: Discours de la Méthode, 
Garnier-Flamarion, Paris, 1966. 
9 Martin Jay, “The Noblest of the Senses: Vision from Plato to Descartes” (Chapter 
one), in: Downcast Eyes, The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French 
Thought, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1994, p. 51. 
10 Compare. ibid, p. 48.
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Messages that derive from the act of writing itself (e-mail or chat) 
construct both identity of the Network user and space in which are 
formed different virtual online communities that constitute special 
net worlds. That is, digitally produced personas, potentially immortal 
virtual avatars, moving of “souls” from one to other media existence, 
and all other cyber phenomena that occupy today’s electronic and 
net world present some kind of technologically constructed meta-
physic doubles (cyber-replica of act of in vitro insemination, cloning 
and the like) or multiple individualities (“borderline personas”, 
metamorphosis of humanoid beings into monsters according to the 
model of Ovidius’s and Bosch’s ideas that hardly preserve within 
itself remnants of former paradigm of both subjective and intersub-
jective acting. Actual cybernetic engineering and various opportuni-
ties for software creations in “reality” of nonexistent personas and 
identities, contributed to making of virtual characters of artists like 
computer images, models and promoters of new cosmetic products, 
and movie silicones, popular TV stars and journalists, etc.
This implies that such attempts of constructing identities ac-company and turn over subject – object relation, where media 
mediated intersubjectivity becomes entirely constitutive for ana-
logue of empirical subject defined as unknown in cyber space and 
time. Coinciding of subject and object, their failing into one during 
structuring process of interactive computer networks occurs in a 
technologically described space as reduced communicative inter-
action. To be perceived as communicative act in the context of a 
totally “democratized” communication process, displaced in regions 
of so called “collective identities”, presents a necessary precondition 
for articulating all kinds of subjectivities, thought in contemporary 
time. This is also an empirical confirmation of Habermas’s idea of 
subjectivity as communicative acting which is established through 
processes of affirmation of “self consciousness” that takes place in an 
empirical space and is displayed as significantly different communi-
cative aesthetics or media practice of postindustrial age. 
This process could be also viewed from other, transcendental angle, assuming that new technologies or, above all, electron-
ic media and Internet which comes logically before and indepen-
dently of experience, are therefore possibility of experience itself. 
In this way in our time the media would become self-centered 
carriers of sphere of subjectivity, i.e. subjectivity as it is, as Adorno 
and Horkheimer in Dialektik der Aufklärung anticipated to be true 
for all industry of culture. Objective sphere of mind would be 
presented, in this regard, as a complex world of interactions be-
tween individuals and machines or machines themselves, as well 
as transitory forms between human beings and machines, about 
what often wrote Virilio, claiming in his essays that our (possible) 
experience is, in fact, teleobjective, not given objectively. 
And while social psychologists, philosophers and aestheti-cians, theoreticians of media and culture, and other analytics 
of modern time identified this phenomenon, that was remark-
ably manifested in the second half of XX century in its various 
phenomenal forms (fashion, new life styles, redesigning socio-
cultural, art and religious movements, and mediated by expansion 
of media culture and its consumers derivates), as “individualism” 
with collective omen, describing in that way prevalence of ¨narcis-
sistic” culture over others (Christopher Lasch, Pierre Bourdieu, 
Gilles Lipovetsky and other authors), individualism, read in the 
code of interactive collectivities, suffered further changes, viewed 
in the exploring media context.
Dialectic process of individualization, which in this mo-ment of Otherness and alienation ends up in anonymous 
drawing of individuals in some institutional discourse estab-
lished earlier, and most often callous, followed by a more or less 
obvious aura transformation ranging from former institutions 
of sociality par excellence to simple media “harismaticality” 
where former “subject” post festum became mere predicate of 
media-consumers aura), almost completely assimilated by poor 
universe of magic consumerism. Referring to Gauchet’s views of 
modern relations of individuals and society, Lipovetsky states: 
“When individual is no longer means of some external purpose, 
he is rather considered and he considers himself as ultimate 
purpose, social institutions lose their divine aura, which all stem 
from some unquestioned transcendence (...)”11. Transcendence 
in that way becomes immanence, while its magic aura vanishes, 
transforming itself into sheer representation of true individuality, 
authenticity and unrepeatability, which in that way is both real-
ized and annulled. 
Therefore, the phenomenon of post individualism, and the world of media programmed illusion matrix which belongs 
to it, presents the last consequence of individualization work 
process, or pseudo-individualization of civil society, which its 
dialectic motion and fulfillment finishes in hibernated state of 
abstract network-electronic collectives. But, “motion” of these 
collectives, in its entire dialectical changeability and ambivalence, 
becomes part of general simulative processes of desalination, 
which is lately manifested through acting of different social and 
art movements as well as the whole media counter culture. For 
some theoreticians of information culture, process of individu-
alization, considered within the zone of collectivity, cannot be 
completed until community utopian ideas are realized, in which 
alternative worlds, organized in different cyber movements and 
entities, will be possible or realized. 
Manuel Castells, in his views stated in the second part of his extensive trilogy on information age, refers to Giddens’s 
characterization of social processes related to identity building 
in late phase of modernity, which results in forming a new sort of 
network society that processes of identity construction bring to 
challenges of “new forms of social change”.12 Moreover, Castells, 
in his observations on individualism, constructed and realized 
in network constituted communities of the modern age, estab-
lish a new theoretical paradigm contemplated in the context of 
preparatory actions for accomplishing concrete social changes. 
Comprehensive elaboration of various sources that indicate pos-
sibilities of articulating resistance to techno-economically global-
ized world should, in Castells’s case, demonstrate all differences 
of alternative projects of social organization, as well as more or 
less network structured resistance movements, which in its spe-
cific way demonstrates that “different world is possible”.13 In final 
remarks of the second tome the author states that actual “project 
identities “, differing from earlier times, this term associated with 
civil society and industrial era, developed in “resistance identities 
which affects formation of so called new historical subjects .14 
11 Gilles Lipovetsky, Age of emptiness, Essays on modern individualism, Književna 
zajednica Novog Sada, 1987, pp. 186,187.
12 See: Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture Volume 
II, The Power of Identity, Second Edition, Blackwell Publishing, UK, 2004, p. 11. 
13 Comp. Manuel Castells, “Preface and Acknowledgments 2003”, ibid, p. Xvii.
14 See: Manuel Castells, “Conclusion”, ibid, p. 422.
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Thus, the term individuality, as understood in the civil society of the XX century, lost its importance in regard 
to power of an individual, because real historical space is 
substituted by virtual space while the framework for historical 
acting is spread on virtual movements and communities that 
all together mask a heterogeneous resistance scene, a radically 
subjective, empirical action plan. Nevertheless, this specific 
communicative practice is possible only due to sphere of tran-
scendental subjectivity which is, in this case, the entire media 
space. Empirical acting in virtual space, in reverse, may affect 
and be effective in so called “real” space, as an application and 
realistic extension of virtual (inter)action. But, here also action 
tactics are different and vary from theory to theory and from 
one case to other.
Apart from hacker’s activism and attempts of radical acting both in media and modern social practice (and these two 
practices often are compatible), whether virtual anarchism or 
terrorism, individuals or organized groups and movements are 
taken into consideration, new media, and Internet in particular, 
make possible another form of resistance which engage indi-
viduals, who can confirm civil duties in virtual space as truth 
with their own bodies. Model for civil protest, articulated in this 
sense of word, presents Gandian method of peaceful resistance, 
which is promoted in the book about cyborg-citizens by K. H. 
Gray, who claims that it is possible to give evidence on truth 
through one’s own body.15 Logic of protest should be presented 
in a way that it makes sense to the public, whether it is regarded 
use of theatre, some other form of spectacle or media for this 
purpose. That makes, at the same time, the essence of the 
author’s argumentation that supports non violent approach to 
social changes. 
Combination of old and new technologies of citizens’ will protests and demonstrations, from Czechoslovakia’s “vel-
vet revolution”, supported from outside by computers and net-
work interactions, through continual critical acting of the Bread 
and Puppets Theater,16 to formation of so called “flash mobs” 
– most often this means “activism” of youth or, more precisely, 
student population – lately, they prepare their mass perfor-
mances illegally and perform throughout the world, questioning 
the civil world in which prevails consumerism and existentially 
colored boredom17, supporting the substitution that has already 
happened. That is to say, in all these cases, direct communica-
tion face to face is replaced by particular live bodily exhibitions 
(action: “love carpet”, etc.), or body circulation on line. In this 
latter example, however, need for returning into primal sensual 
immediacy of communication is obvious, it is prepared by the 
media and fully perform in “real” time and space. 
15 See: Chris Hables Gray, Cyborg Citizen, Politics in the Posthuman Age, Rout-
ledge, New York and London, 2001, p. 44.
16 Ibid.
17 “Flash Mobs” phenomenon appeared as a cyber-replica to global corporative 
world of entertainment, although without primary intention to act politically or 
have some commercial purpose. Mobbers’ Movement was officially established 
in New York in mid 2003, and first actions were inspired by an twenty-eight-year 
old American who comes from the world of “industry of culture”. Principles of 
movement’s acting are based on the Internet surfers gatherings throughout the 
planet who, by transmitting e-mail messages “from hand to hand” or spread-
ing information through sending messages via mobile phone (SMS), organize 
various social (artistic) actions in real surroundings (America and Europe), with 
basic purpose to establish direct communication within performance group, i.e. 
“intelligent mob”. For more information on this, visit http://www.flashmob.com.
Anonymous mob of citizens that participate in protest orga-nized through Internet and cellular phones (SMS), doesn’t 
present any historical subject of change nor individual resistance 
action of (self conscious) citizens, or civil movements in the for-
mer sense of the word. This cyber-mob, made of mere Internet 
acquaintances, is neither subject nor object of possible changes, 
but it doesn’t present any collectivity without features (such as 
communicability, creativity, specific group dynamics and giv-
ing some kind of articulated resistance to consumers society of 
boredom). Basically, it is characterized, which on the first sight 
seems contradictory, by almost total absence of self conscience 
defined in the former sense of the term (if our interpretation 
excludes leaders and creators of events as well as programmers 
of introductory media activities, and their confrontation with 
police, in specific cyber-actions that preceded street and square 
events, here and now). 
Thus, collective awareness (or self awareness) gives up its place to acting of one kind of networked body (self)aware-
ness, which is acquired in new conceptual phrase of “intelligent 
mob” that uses this movement as its implicit, performance ideol-
ogy. Collectivity in this way loses self awareness but acquires 
“intelligence” as particular bodily characteristic immanent to the 
media world. This, at the same time, could be a response/rebel-
lion of modern time in regard to the world of interactive events 
and technologies, by subversive usage of their own potential for 
tactic acting or resisting modern corporative slavery and long 
ago established mass-media control (of unconscious). However, 
as we are talking about that, we are already beyond “humane” 
values that are, as Virilio claims, entirely destroyed during mass 
ethnic and ecological catastrophes such as Ausvic and Hiro-
shima18, technological production of mass mortality, surely the 
most monstrous patent of the XX century. Moreover, it could be 
said that this trend continues in acting of radical youth move-
ments such as skinheads, that today appear within mass media 
matrix of pop culture or are activated in the Internet space on 
exhibitions promo-sites or deliberately sent direct mail that end-
lessly circulates and “supervises” reality itself.19
Interaction of “intelligent bodies” in imaginary space – this is a brief description of new practice of emerging civil cyber soci-
ety. Self awareness is here connected with entities of flash mobs, 
tautologies of plural personas as well as bodily intelligibility and 
aestheticism of network world which makes one with its collective 
unconsciousness, while medium of realization presents ahistorical, 
transhumane horizon of techno-imagination in the game of bizarre 
objects. Media existences, therefore, are nothing else than self-
awareness as coordinated message; old regime in a new matrix; 
circulation of loneliness, madness and unfreedom; brand as it is.
18 See: Paul Virilio, Sajbersvet, politika na najlošoto: conversation with Filip Peti, 
Alef, Skopje, 2003. p. 80.
19 It is indicative, in this sense, an example of transformed space for acting of B.S.S. 
members (Bevara Sverige Svenskt / Leave Sweden to Swedish People) which is 
founded in the eighties with characteristic racial sign of their political acting. It is 
interesting that one of the members of this movement was Ulf, ex member of at 
time well known Swedish pop group “Ace of Base”. Since the movement was al-
legedly crushed and their political actions in Sweden were stopped, its destructive 
acting continued in cyber space through sending threatening e-mail messages from 
nonexistent addresses to people ( Jewish, Roma, Russians, Serbs and others) who 
applied for longer stay in the country. Content of the message indicate terminology 
mixture of radical political discourse and marketing slogans characteristic for the 
end of the last century: “We are happy you will never receive permission to stay 
forever in Sweden. So, let Sweden be your enemy, and your enemy will be Sweden”. 
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VERNACULAR ARCHITECTURE  
IN THE MEDITERraNEAN
dionysis A. ZIvAS
National Technical University, Athens, Greece
W hen I spoke at the 2nd Mediterranean Conference on Aesthetics, held at Carthage in Tunisia, in March 2003, I had argued that in the house types that have developed in circum-
Mediterranean lands, from Classical Antiquity – Greek and 
Roman – to the present day, a common architectural element 
is frequently encountered, the atrium.1 That is, the centrally 
placed courtyard, around which the main and the ancillary 
spaces of the house are arranged. Many examples of this 
type have been identified in Classical Athens and in ancient 
Greek cities of Asia Minor, as well as in Roman cities. What 
is particularly important, however, is that the atrium occurs 
in Athens in Christian and much more recent times, as for 
example in vernacular houses in the neighbourhood of Plaka 
in the nineteenth century, just as it is found in houses at 
Medina in Tunis or even in Morocco and Andalusia.
I believe that it is clear that the mild climatic conditions 
prevailing in the Mediterranean allow people to live outdoors 
for large parts of the year. I also believe that it is equally clear 
that the organization of social and family life must have led 
to this house type, which was invented by Mediterranean 
peoples, whether pagans, Christians or Muslims.
In addition to this particular house type, study of ver-
nacular settlements mainly of later times, has revealed the 
existence of several other common elements.2 For example, 
similar ways of organization of such settlements and/or their 
incorporation in the natural environment can be ascertained, 
primarily in the Aegean islands, where these settlements 
develop on the slopes of a hill topped by a castle or a fortified 
monastery. Reasons of security obviously led the inhabitants 
to build their houses around the fortress, which could offer 
them protection from enemy attack. And striking to my mind 
is the similarity between the Chora (main village) of Astyp-
alaia, island in the Dodecanese (fig. 1α), and the settlement 
of Almunecar (fig. 1β) or of Casares in Spain.
In all three cases a mighty castle protects the settle-
1 Dionysis A. Zivas, The atrium, a common living space for the peoples of the 
Mediterranean, in Espaces et Memoires, ATEP and Maghreb Diffusion, Tunis 
2005, p. 21-25.
2 V.I. Atroshenko and Milton Grundy, Mediterranean Vernacular, A vanishing 
architectural tradition, Anness Publishing, London 1991.
ment that spreads around it on the hillsides. The Chora of 
Patmos, another island in the Dodecanese, is a comparable 
example, protected by the fortified monastery of St John the 
Theologian.
Of interest in all these cases is the great difference in 
scale between the walls of the fortress, which dominates the 
general picture of the settlement, and the surrounding small 
cuboid houses, which indeed seem to follow a common 
type. A difference that is accentuated further by the different 
texture and the different colour of the haughty walls of the 
fortress, in contrast to the humble whitewashed homes of the 
inhabitants. These are the elements that express most directly 
the different functions and the dialogue that is developed 
between them, while simultaneously leading to an extremely 
beautiful result.
Another interesting element is the way in which settle-
ments that grow freely – that is without need of protection 
from hostile assaults – are organized either side of a central 
thoroughfare of a settlement, which ends at the most impor-
tant building – landmark, that is the church, whose presence 
is further emphasized by its size and tall bell-tower.
The examples of Artallo (fig. 2α) in Liguria, Italy, and of 
Apollonia (fig. 2β) on the island of Siphnos in the Cyclades, 
are characteristic and very interesting.3 Of course, depending 
in each case on local circumstances, the terrain, the orienta-
tion or the accesses, the vernacular settlements of the Medi-
terranean are also constituted in different ways. Mountain 
settlements develop differently from lowland settlements or 
island ones, as those we have seen attest. Nevertheless, in 
each case there is an obvious tendency towards high-density 
building and the creation of a cohesive whole.
Thus, one house is “stuck” – we could say – to the next 
or is built very close to the neighbouring house, creating 
a picture of propinquity, of intentional contact that tends 
to obliterate or at least to limit the differences between the 
individual units, which in any case have many common ele-
ments, and probably to emphasize the end result. Indeed, I 
would say that some social dimension must also exist here. 
That is, something akin to egalitarianism between the in-
3 E. Guidoni, L’ architettura popolare Italiana, Editori Laterza, Roma – Bari, 1980 
and A. Tzakou, The central settlements of Siphnos, Athens 1970.
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habitants is expressed; there is no disposition for someone 
to appear stronger than his neighbour. This is observable in 
the examples cited already, as well as in many more in all the 
circum-Mediterranean countries.
A third noteworthy point is the formation of public 
places –streets and squares – and the relationship of these to 
private free space, as well as the way in which the two differ-
ent spaces are interconnected.
It should be noted firstly that the building materials 
usually available are stones, natural slabs – of marble or schist 
– and pebbles. Thus it is to be expected that similar solutions 
emerge and the final picture of the street, whether this is at 
Pyrgos on Tinos in the Cyclades (fig. 3α), or at Santillana in 
Spain (fig. 3β) bespeaks the common logic behind the end 
result, equally functional and aesthetically excellent in both 
cases.4
However, beyond whatever form the street takes, it is 
first and foremost that public space which secures access to 
the houses surrounding it. This communication is achieved 
either through, usually, a tiny courtyard interposed between 
4 N.F. Carver Jr., Iberian villages, Portugal and Spain, Michigan 1981 and O. 
Doumanis and P. Oliver, Shelter in Greece, Athens 1974.
the street and the house, or via a small stairway set parallel to 
the street, as in Siphnos (fig. 4α) or at Barbarano Romano in 
Lazio (fig. 4β). In other words, the open private space, such 
as the stairway in our example, is articulated and collaborates 
with the likewise free public space, so as to achieve com-
munication between them. At the same time, this synthesis 
creates an especially interesting result in terms of formal 
plasticity.
Another point that merits consideration is the use of 
whitewash. In countless cases whitewash coats all the con-
structions, in small or larger houses (fig. 1α and 1β) inside or 
even outside the settlements, in the countryside (fig. 5α and 
5β). It coats the churches and the belfries too, and is used 
thus as a unifying element, while at the same time creating 
the appropriate backdrop to receive the limited splashes of 
colour, red, green or blue, which pick out particular features, 
endowing the final effect with that special joy and aesthetic 
value that so often astounds us. The same whitewash is used 
to demarcate the edges of the street, to cover the joints in the 
pavement, creating surprising shapes, an almost dreamlike 
picture.
Aim of this brief introductory text is not an exhaustive 
presentation and comparative analysis and study of all the 
Fig. 1α: The settlement of Chora, on Astypalaia,  
in the Dodecanese
Fig. 1β: The settlement of Almunecar, in Spain
Fig. 2α: The settlement of Artallo, in Liguria, Italy
Fig. 2β: The settlement of Apollonia, on Siphnos
Fig. 3α: A street in the settlement of Pyrgos,  
on Tinos, Cyclades
Fig. 3β: A street in the settlement of Santillana, Spain
Fig. 4α: A street in the settlement of Kastro,  
on Siphnos
Fig. 4β: A street in the settlement of Barbarano 
Romano, in Lazio, Italy
Fig. 5α: A vernacular house in Djerba, Tunisia
Fig. 5β: A vernacular house in Mykonos
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architectural forms that have appeared in the vernacular 
architecture of circum-Mediterranean countries, which are 
in any case many and diverse. Such an enterprise would de-
mand the combined effort of several researchers and would 
lead to a more extensive text of another kind.
My aim is simply to point out certain common elements 
that exist in Mediterranean vernacular architecture, regard-
less of precisely where they are found.
I should also like to stress that these are forms that re-
spond to common direct and daily needs of the people who 
built them and lived in them. They are constructions of an 
unpretentious architecture, absolutely functional, following 
the same logic, with the same or similar building methods 
and similar building materials.
They are constructions, however, which in the end and 
unintentionally teach us valuable lessons in aesthetics, which 
I fear we are sometimes in danger of forgetting.
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A PROPOS DE L’ART ‘SACRé’.
QUELQUES CONSIDÈraTIONS À PARTIR  
DE L’EXPéRIENCE ESTHéTIQUE
davide ZOrdAn
Fondazione Bruno Kessler, Trento, Italy
L orsque l’on parle d’art, l’usage du qualificatif ‘sacré’ est habituellement motivé par un ensemble de con-sidérations assez immédiates, qui concernent le sujet de la représentation, l’intention de l’artiste et les can-ons établis par le contexte socio-culturel. Ce genre 
de détermination se comprend immédiatement et ne pose pas de 
problème, ni dans le parler courant ni dans la lexique de l’histoire 
et de la critique d’art. D’autant plus que, pendant la presque to-
talité de son histoire, l’art s’est développé principalement comme 
moyen d’incarnation des sentiments et des idées religieuses.
Mais lorsque nous considérons la chose d’art en tant 
qu’objet esthétique, a-t-il encore un sens parler d’art ‘sacré’ ? 
L’esthéticien sera porté à répondre aussitôt par la négative, tan-
dis que l’adepte des sciences religieuses essayera peut-être de 
garder une place pour ce qualificatif dont le passé est si illustre. 
Au-delà des points de vue, la question peut mériter quelque 
attention. Autrement posée, elle est de savoir quelles sont – si 
elles existent – les conditions esthétiquement recevables qui 
nous suggèrent de considérer ‘sacré’ l’art dont certaines œuvres 
sont l’expression. Une telle interrogation revêt une importance 
non négligeable dans le contexte de la région méditerranéenne, 
où partout des vestiges artistiques plurimillénaires nous trans-
mettent le témoignage de traditions religieuses qui n’ont jamais 
cessé de se confronter et qui ont toujours stimulé une réflexion 
esthétique. La même question remet en cause à la fois notre 
perception du fait artistique et notre relation actuelle, souvent 
problématique, avec les traditions religieuses gravées au sein 
de l’histoire. Elle nous renvoie, par la même occasion, aux 
sources de notre tradition de pensée sur l’art.
Précisons d’amblé que notre tentative de réponse se fonde 
sur la conviction que, malgré le pessimisme postmoderne sur 
la possibilité de définir l’art et d’établir des critères de goût, la 
notion d’expérience esthétique garde encore un sens et que 
celui-ci, de quelque manière qu’on l’entende, soit indissociable 
d’une dimension éthique, au sens le plus large du terme1. 
1 Autrement dit : notre expérience esthétique représente cet espace privilégié 
de l’expérience qui nous communique une conscience de l’unité sensée de 
la vie humaine, malgré et à travers toutes les fragmentations que nous éprou-
vons. Une telle conscience semble aménager les conditions favorables au 
développement d’une théorie du sentir et d’une éthique de la perception, sans 
aucunement impliquer l’institution de ‘canons’ artistiques, mais au contraire en 
assumant la dissonance et l’irréconciliation qui se manifestent dans l’art.
1.  Du spirituel dans l’œuvre d’art 
La réflexion esthétique, entendue comme évaluation des 
phénomènes artistiques, a porté à une reconsidération critique 
du concept d’œuvre d’art, concept qui renvoie à une pratique 
d’appréciation articulée et complexe, bâtie sur des présup-
posés externes, en bonne part, à l’art elle-même. L’esthétique 
contemporaine dénonce, notamment, l’intention commune à 
toute la tradition philosophique occidentale, de Platon à Hegel 
et jusqu’à Heidegger, de reconduire l’art à sa propre vision des 
choses, à partir d’une idée philosophique de la ‘vérité de l’art’ 
qui a souvent produit une classification des arts à l’intérieur 
d’un système donné de pensée. Le fait de contester une telle 
détermination philosophique de l’espace de l’art a favorisé un 
vaste procès de normalisation des productions artistiques, 
devenues à nous yeux objets culturels pris en charge par les 
institutions tels les musées ou la critique. A cette sorte de 
désenchantement s’ajoute encore la considération de la repro-
ductibilité technique, qui bouleverse notre perception des œu-
vres du passé. Les concepts classiques de la théorie esthétique 
(le génie créateur, la transcendance et la valeur d’éternité de 
l’œuvre) sont rejetés en bloc parce qu’on les considère comme 
les vecteurs d’une artificialité idéologique qui fait écran à une 
appréhension personnelle et appropriée.
Dans une perspective phénoménologique apparaît 
clairement l’impossibilité de comprendre la nature de l’objet 
esthétique en dehors de l’expérience que l’on en fait et de 
l’attention qu’on lui prête. L’attention fonde et précède le juge-
ment esthétique, si bien que, sans l’hommage d’une perception 
adéquate, l’œuvre d’art demeure un objet ordinaire et n’atteint 
pas le statut d’objet esthétique. La même chose vaut évidem-
ment dans le cas d’œuvres d’art (considéré) ‘sacré’. Pouvons-
nous dire, dans ce cas, qu’une perception inadéquate relègue le 
caractère sacré exclusivement aux aspects extérieurs de l’œuvre 
– aspects qui n’ont, en soi, aucun rapport avec sa valeur esthé-
tique ni avec la pratique d’appréhension ?
Mais d’abord, quel est l’appréhension requise, par ex-
emple, par un tableau d’autel du XVIe siècle ? Celle que lui 
vouait la foule en prière, chapelet à la main, dans une église de 
l’époque baroque ou celle des touristes peuplant aujourd’hui 
les musées ? Le déplacement survenu – de l’autel à la salle 
d’exposition – manifeste une plus vaste mutation des condi-
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tions qui régissent le fonctionnement de certains groupes, le 
déroulement de certaines pratiques d’appréhension, la mise en 
œuvre de certains jeux de langage. L’appréhension de l’œuvre, 
et l’expérience esthétique qu’elle suscite, sont profondément 
marquées par ces conditions culturelles et politiques, qui sou-
tiennent l’accord des sensibilités à une époque donnée.
Evidemment nous ne pouvons pas faire abstraction de cet 
encadrement qui caractérise l’appréhension, pas plus que nous 
ne pouvons sortir de nous-mêmes pour gagner un regard plus 
distancié. Cela veut-il dire que le fameux tableau d’autel relève 
de l’art sacré pour le spectateur pieux d’antan et non pas pour 
nos contemporains visiteurs de musées ? Non, dans la mesure 
où nous croyons que les énoncés d’évaluation esthétique 
dépendent aussi des caractères de l’objet et gardent des ‘valeurs 
de vérité’ qui ne sont pas totalement soumis aux conditions 
d’appréhensions. Nous y reviendrons d’ici peu.
Pour sortir de l’impasse, on pourrait se résilier à parler 
plus modestement d’œuvres d’art à sujet religieux, et non 
pas d’art sacré. Titus Burckhardt, il y a un demi-siècle déjà, 
réclamait une telle distinction – bien que pour lui, elle devait 
conduire à la détermination de la ‘forme’ ou de l’‘essence’ de 
l’art sacré. En s’appuyant sur une métaphysique établie, Burck-
hardt reconnaissait l’existence d’œuvres d’art ‘essentiellement’ 
profanes à sujet sacré, mais niait résolument, par contre, la 
possibilité inverse, à savoir la possibilité d’œuvres d’art sacré en 
forme profane2.
Aujourd’hui nous sommes délivrés de l’obsession pour 
la forme qui animait Burckhardt, et davantage sensibles à la 
diversité des objets culturels et à la pluralité des expériences 
esthétiques. Notre perspective est complètement différente, 
même si la distinction entre art sacré et art à sujet religieux 
semble garder son sens immédiat. Faut-il donc s’en contenter ? 
Il est vrai que la distinction sous-citée est utile pour parer à 
toute confusion, mais elle ne résout pas le problème. Parler 
d’un art à sujet religieux évite tout simplement de porter le 
discours sur le plan de l’expérience esthétique, en adoptant 
une classification reçue sur la base restreinte du thème de la 
représentation. Or le régime représentatif aménage un face-
à-face figé entre l’œuvre et le spectateur, selon un schème de 
la vision construit sur le modèle d’une fenêtre sur le monde 
naturel, offerte au regard souverain du spectateur. Mais c’est 
justement une telle configuration qui, dans une perspective 
postmoderne, trahit ses intentions idéologiques et exclut la 
possibilité même d’une évocation du sacré.
La sécularisation achevée, personne ne pourrait nier 
que le spirituel ait bien encore une place dans la production 
d’art, mais celle-ci se trouve au-delà de toute distinction (car-
tésienne et rassurante) entre le sacré et le profane. L’absolu 
dont l’art témoigne encore est disséminé dans des traces 
controverses et chaotiques (desquelles on ne saurait aucune-
ment tirer une figure distincte) qui engagent le spectateur à 
changer sa posture et sa sensibilité, à réformer ses références. 
Les arts se révèlent ainsi comme le lieu (vicaire) du désir 
d’accomplissement et d’une quête d’authenticité contre la 
menace d’une perte de réalité, caractéristique de la société 
virtuelle. Ces configurations nouvelles du spirituel habitent 
l’art contemporain. Ils suscitent des expériences esthétiques 
qui interrogent le théologien autant que l’esthéticien.
Mené par ces considérations, nous pourrions en conclure 
2 Cf. Principes et méthodes de l’art sacré, Paul Derain, Lyon, 1958.
à une vision libérale et relativiste : chacun est en droit de voir 
l’empreinte du sacré où bon lui semble, du moment qu’il ne 
prétende pas l’attribuer à l’intentionnalité de l’œuvre ou de 
l’artiste. A nouveau, une telle conclusion serait partielle, et 
un retour prudent vers une esthétique de la représentation 
s’impose. En tant qu’objet esthétique, en effet, l’œuvre d’art à la 
fois représente et exprime quelque chose. Ce double mouve-
ment lui est fondamental et justifie la richesse et la complexité 
de l’expérience esthétique.
Il faut assurément écarter une idée de la représentation 
comme un événement qui aurait lieu dans l’intériorité de la 
conscience, « comme un spectacle privé », selon le mot de 
Mikel Dufrenne3. Loin que l’œuvre soit en nous, nous som-
mes présents à elle. La représentation ne doit pas être une 
construction du sujet qui fait écran à la présence de l’œuvre, 
autrement on ne pourrait simplement pas parler d’expérience 
esthétique dans le sens qui nous intéresse ici. Pourtant 
l’expérience esthétique inclut toujours un moment de recon-
naissance, un passage de la présence à la représentation qui 
évoque l’ancien concept de mimesis – souvent vitupéré, mais 
si difficile à vraiment saisir4. Non pas que l’œuvre ait sa vérité 
dans sa vraisemblance : elle ne renvoie pas à quelque chose en 
dehors d’elle dont l’évocation produirait l’expérience esthé-
tique. Mais, alors même que nous apprécions une œuvre d’art 
abstrait, une dynamique de reconnaissance est inhérente au 
sentiment esthétique que nous éprouvons, ne fut-ce que sous 
la forme d’un rejet de tout sens accompli. Bien sur, ce qu’il y 
a à reconnaitre, dans l’art moderne déjà, n’était plus de l’ordre 
des narrations significatives mais plutôt des gestes éparses et 
fragmentés. Il n’en reste pas moins, pour nous, que la valeur 
esthétique d’une œuvre se soustrait à un conventionnalisme 
intégral et garde quelque chose d’objectif, justement parce 
qu’il y a en elle expression et représentation, parce qu’elle 
nous émeut et nous fait signe tout à la fois. Nous pouvons en 
conclure que la valeur proprement esthétique de l’œuvre se 
découvre à l’intersection de la dimension objectuelle et de la 
construction intentionnelle, dans un territoire d’osmose entre 
l’objectif et le subjectif. 
Si l’on revient maintenant à notre question du départ, 
on constate que l’œuvre d’art considérée en tant qu’objet 
esthétique ne laisse aucune place à l’évocation d’un horizon 
sacré au-delà de l’œuvre. En effet, cet horizon est une sorte 
de voile qui a longtemps empêché la perception de l’objet 
esthétique en tant que tel. L’œuvre d’art perçue comme objet 
esthétique n’est ni un symbole ni une évocation, mais plutôt 
une connexion de représentations qui suscite un sentiment 
de plaisir esthétique pour le fait même de sa manifestation 
sensible. La sécularisation a fait son œuvre et nous admirons 
les icônes byzantines anciennes ou le polyptique de l’Agneau 
mystique de Van Eyck sans nécessairement participer à la foi 
qui les fit naitre, comme nous regardons certains portraits de 
Botticelli ou de Memling sans en évoquer le modèle – qui nous 
reste souvent inconnu sans gâcher notre plaisir. Un tel défaut 
d’évocation, aboutissement de notre histoire culturelle, est 
3 Phénoménologie de l’expérience esthétique, vol. II, PUF, Paris, 1953, p. 423. Nous 
lisons par ailleurs aussi, dans le même ouvrage : « c’est l’œuvre qui exprime, 
mais l’œuvre, c’est d’abord ce qu’elle représente. Et c’est pourquoi l’unité de 
l’expression dépend aussi des objets représentés… » Ibidem, vol. I, p. 244.
4 Voir pour cela la recherche méticuleuse de H. Koller, Die Mimesis in der Antike, 
Francke, Berna, 1954 et l’application originale qu’en fait H. Gadamer dans 
l’article Kunst und Nachahmung (Kleine Schriften II. Interpretationen, Mohr, 
Tübingen, 1967, pp. 16-26).
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exactement ce qui rend possible l’appréhension esthétique de 
l’œuvre, dispensée du soin de reproduire et signifier. Dufrenne 
y insiste beaucoup : « Alors que la perception ordinaire cher-
che le sens du donné au-delà du donné, l’objet esthétique ne 
livre son sens qu’à la condition qu’au lieu de traverser le donné, 
la perception s’arrête à lui ; il ne tolère pas qu’elle décolle. »5
La sacralité de l’art, s’il en est une, est précisément dans ce 
renversement de la perception ordinaire qui porte notre atten-
tion sur l’être-là authentique de l’objet, sur sa présence où le 
signifié est immanent au signifiant et pour cela éveille en nous 
une participation affective.
2.  Esthétique et théologie
L’analyse menée jusqu’ici a laissé émerger, comme on était 
en droit de se l’attendre, l’irrecevabilité de la détermination d’art 
‘sacré’ dans le contexte d’une réflexion esthétique. Mais elle a 
paradoxalement mis en évidence le caractère quasi sacrale de 
l’œuvre d’art en tant qu’objet esthétique, offert à notre regard plus 
laïque et attentionné dans sa pure manifestation, dans sa présence 
affranchie de conditionnements culturels ou idéologiques.
Comment la réflexion théologique contemporaine juge-t-
elle ces résultats ? Est elle sensible aux raisons de l’esthétique et 
assez hardie pour remettre en discussion des notions et des 
jugements aussi profondément ancrés dans l’histoire chré-
tienne ? La réponse doit tenir compte de la différenciation 
croissante des constructions théologiques, évidente désormais 
même en contexte catholique.
Dans l’optique du christianisme, l’art a toujours eu un rôle 
reconnu mais subsidiaire. Il a été considéré d’autant plus sacré 
que l’œuvre renvoie le récepteur vers le mystère dont elle offre 
la représentation. L’œuvre est un moyen pour élever l’esprit vers 
un ‘ailleurs’ qu’elle ne peut qu’évoquer. Ce qui demeure sacré, 
à proprement parler, est cet ailleurs, et non pas le moyen de s’y 
acheminer. Dans ce cadre de pensée, qui demeure platonicien, la 
dimension de l’apparaitre est dépréciée à l’avantage exclusif d’un 
‘beau’ idéal et suprasensible. L’art chrétien, en toute cohérence, 
n’a pas une valeur sacramentelle, mais instrumentale.
Le monde vrai, le monde beau, s’avère inaccessible ici-bas, 
et promis dans l’au-delà à l’homme capable de pénitence et 
de détachement. S’il existe une anticipation terrestre de cet 
idéal de beauté/vérité, elle est à chercher dans toute mani-
festation concrète d’amour pour l’autre et dans l’économie 
des sacrements qui certifient la présence du divin, mais non 
pas dans l’art, dont la disposition symbolique va de pair avec 
le pouvoir séducteur. Ainsi, à force de renvoyer à un horizon 
de transcendance, l’esthétique chrétienne a contribué à une 
vaste dévalorisation du sensible que la théologie patristique 
5 Phénoménologie de l’expérience esthétique, cit., vol. I, p. 171.
de l’incarnation n’a pas efficacement tempéré6. De nos jours, 
les théologiens sont généralement prêts à reconnaitre une 
telle dévalorisation du sensible et de l’apparaitre comme un 
effet secondaire (non délibéré ?) du régime chrétien, qui a eu 
pour conséquence l’effacement de la condition corporelle de 
la subjectivité. En effet, le sujet ne possède pas la transparence 
d’une pure conscience, mais il est marqué par l’opacité d’un 
corps, avec son poids et son histoire, ses inclinations et ses 
fragilités singulières.
Comme l’on peut facilement se l’imaginer, une telle 
admission de la part des théologiens, bien que nuancée, a des 
effets très profonds pour la compréhension de la foi et de la 
morale. Pour ce qui nous importe ici, elle contribue aussi à 
une nouvelle considération de l’art – en tant qu’inscrit dans la 
matière – et de notre perception, qui doit habiter les choses au 
lieu de planer au dessus d’elles. Ainsi de nouveaux domaines 
s’ouvrent aux explorations de la théologie, avec la possibilité 
d’acquérir une plus grande lucidité sur le fait de la foi et de 
renouer un contact avec d’autres disciplines dans l’espace du 
débat public. Pour ne faire qu’un exemple, reconnaitre que la 
Parole de Dieu ne nous est accessible qu’en langage humain – 
et donc seulement à travers les représentations que nous de-
vons à notre appartenance au monde – est un acte théologique 
désormais consensuel qui implique l’assomption d’une esthé-
tique, entendue comme théorie de la perception.
Plus en général, on peut aisément reconnaitre, dans la 
réflexion théologique contemporaine, un effort pour dépasser 
ou du moins pour compenser cet intellectualisme moderne 
qui tendait è exclure non seulement la question de la beauté, 
mais tout ce qui touche à la spiritualité, la sainteté, le culte, la 
liturgie, en aboutissant de la sorte à une dissociation irrévo-
cable entre théologie et expérience7.
Influencés par la fréquentation des œuvres d’arts, des 
théologiens tendent aussi à substituer aux stratégies apologé-
tiques du passé une approche esthétique du mystère du monde 
et de la révélation divine. Ils concordent sur le fait qu’on ne 
peut pas vraiment comprendre l’univers de la foi sans référence 
à un ‘sentir’ entendu non pas comme un pur élan émotion-
nel mais comme la résonnance auprès de la conscience de 
l’univers des relations et des affects. Une telle conviction, sou-
vent malaisément ou partiellement exprimée, est à l’origine des 
diverses formes de ‘théologie de la beauté’, qui revendiquent 
une valorisation de l’expérience et de la sensibilité artistiques 
dans les diverses confessions chrétiennes ainsi que dans le 
dialogue interreligieux. Les ‘théologies de la beauté’ recon-
naissent que l’unité symbolique d’hier est perdue et pointent 
6 Au contraire, d’après certains, la théologie de l’incarnation aurait fourni un 
alibi des plus solides à une dépréciation systématique du sensible et du cor-
porel. Mais la question est complexe et ne peut être abordée ici que de façon 
très vague et indéterminée. Les Pères de l’Eglise sont passionnément sincères 
lorsqu’ils attestent, sur la base des Ecritures, que le salut de l’homme se joue 
dans la chair. Dieu qui s’incarne, nous disent-ils, assume la condition sensible 
en vue de la glorifier. Pour l’homme et la femme, image de Dieu, l’incarnation 
est une dimension essentielle du mode d’être au monde qui les caractérise. Le 
mode humain d’existence, décrit par la Bible comme ‘chair’, union de matière 
et d’esprit en un corps vivant et sexué, est déclaré être très bon (cf. Gn 1,31). 
C’est par contre la réflexion morale qui pousse les mêmes Pères à mettre en 
garde contre les tentations de la chair, qui rendent sourd aux exigences de 
l’esprit. Mais dans leur perspective, il n’y a pas de contradiction entre une 
affirmation et l’autre. Elles sont même inséparables.
7 Un discours à part devrait être fait à propos de la théologie orientale ortho-
doxe, qui a toujours gardé un enracinement dans la dimension cultuelle de 
l’expérience religieuse, au prix d’une certaine méfiance à l’égard des construc-
tions rationnelles.
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sur les conséquences d’une telle perte : l’aliénation du sens, 
l’incapacité de plus unifier, de plus saisir l’ensemble complexe 
de la matière et de l’esprit, du terrestre et du divin. Faute de 
pouvoir récréer artificiellement l’unité symbolique perdue, les 
théologiens invitent à la retrouver non pas tant dans les vestig-
es du passé, mais plutôt dans la pratique religieuse elle-même, 
qui apparait à leur analyse comme un ensemble d’espaces de 
sensibilité, de postures, de gestes et de rites. Bref : une manière 
de ‘sentir’ le monde et d’y vivre dans la foi.
Cette orientation ‘esthétique’ de la recherche 
théologique rencontre bien sur des résistances et des incom-
préhensions, mais elle ouvre sans doute des possibilités dont 
tout le système des sciences religieuses peut globalement 
bénéficier. La question ultérieure – qui nous reconduit à 
notre point de départ – est de savoir dans quelle mesure les 
théologiens sensibles à l’esthétique perçoivent l’autonomie 
et la différenciation de l’art contemporain comme une invita-
tion à entrer, en théologien, dans le pluralisme de la postmo-
dernité8.
L’œuvre d’art comme objet esthétique réclame une at-
tention qui soit aussi indifférence aux significations, pour 
réagir à la domination des images et des symboles qui ali-
mentent nos codes moraux et nos systèmes théologiques9. 
Le pluralisme irréductible des œuvres d’art représente une 
occasion pour voir et entendre autrement les autres et le 
monde parce qu’il nous oblige à renouveler notre perception. 
En même temps, la complexité des pratiques artistiques nous 
invite à déployer la question du sens dans toutes ses dimen-
sions – aussi bien comme sensation renvoyant à la matéri-
alité du signe et à l’expérience de sa présence, que comme 
signifiance/signification et enfin comme direction, finalité, 
intérêt – pour retrouver ainsi la place du théologique dans le 
concours des savoirs spécialisés.
Ce sont là autant de provocations très positives, pour 
une théologie soucieuse de parler aux hommes d’aujourd’hui 
en assumant les fractures d’un monde complexe mais aussi 
en réagissant contre l’anesthésie de nos sens par l’excès de 
stimuli. Le soin de la conscience esthétique représente une 
tâche non négociable de l’élaboration théologique, parce 
qu’une telle conscience est toujours opérante lorsque l’être 
humain perçoit quelque chose comme un bien digne d’être 
accueilli dans l’espace de son expérience.
8 Il s’agit, nous parait-il, d’une interrogation cruciale, que Ch. Theobald a 
exprimée en ces termes : « Si le contact avec la peinture, la musique et la 
littérature peut aider le théologien à percevoir et à discerner la beauté propre 
du monde de la vie des chrétiens, est-il conduit par là jusqu’à penser théologi-
quement l’autonomisation moderne des beaux-arts ? » Le christianisme comme 
“style”. Relecture du thème “Esthétique et théologie”, dans « Recherches de science 
religieuse », 85 (1997), pp. 589-600, ici p. 600.
9 Cf. D. Freedberg, The Power of Images: Studies in the History and Theory of 
Response, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1989 (voir notamment le 
deuxième chapitre : « The God in the Image »). 
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L a production littéraire d’André Gide c’était étalée de la dernière partie du dix-neuvième siècle jusqu’à la moitié du vingtième siècle. Il a traversé plusieurs époques littéraires ainsi qu’il a vécu pas mal d’événements de l’importance 
(guerres mondiales, révolutions communistes, chutes des 
monarchies, établissement d’indépendances des colonies en 
Afrique du Nord et ailleurs). En quatre-vingts ans de vie il a 
publié une grande quantité d’ouvrages, à des années de dis-
tance, crées d’une patience et presque toujours d’un labeur 
épuisant. L’inspiration créatrice de Paludes1 est le fruit d’un 
travail pénible et lent, l’explosion des Nourritures2 n’est rien 
moins que spontanée: il la présente au monde après trois ans 
d’efforts. Il a souvent dit que, dès ses premiers pas d’écrivain, 
il s’était engagé à la rédaction de ses œuvres complètes, que le 
plan en était tout formé dans son esprit, que la direction dans 
laquelle tirait un ouvrage était immédiatement et au même 
temps compensée par la direction contraire dans laquelle 
tirait un autre, et qu’il se désolait de n’avoir pu écrire tous ses 
livres en même temps.
C’est un fait, pourtant, qu’après la transformation dif-
ficile3 qui l’a conduit aux Nourritures, Gide connaît sa direc-
tion et ce qu’il veut faire. Tous les ouvrages auxquels il pense 
ne seront pas écrits et, d’après les esquisses qu’il en donne 
dans son Journal4, on regrette que beaucoup d’entre eux 
n’aient pas été écrits.
Les Nourritures terrestres, au titre plutôt agressif (car y 
a-t-il d’autres nourritures, pour un protestant, que spiritu-
elles!), expriment le dépassement lyrique des limites en cé-
lèbrent la vie, l’instant, la joie des sens, et seront considérées 
par les lecteurs de l’époque (publiées en 1897) pour autre 
chose qu’une « apologie du dénuement »5. Elles chantent la 
libération que Gide a connue pendant son premier séjour en 
1 Paludes, Romans, récits et soties, œuvres lyriques, NRF, Gallimard, Bibliothè-
que de la Pléiade.
2 Les Nourritures terrestres, Romans, récits et soties, œuvres lyriques, NRF, 
Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade.
3 Gide était éduquée dans un protestantisme strict qui lui a causé beaucoup de 
souffrance mentale et physique pendant son adolescence. Apres son séjour en 
Afrique, il embrasse sa homosexualité, mais pas sans troubles qui lui viennent 
de sa famille et du public. 
4 Journal, 1889-1939, NRF, Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade.
5 Journal, 24.mars 1935, p.1222.
Tunisie d’octobre 1893 au juillet 1895. Il est guéri de sa mala-
die physique, car il croyait depuis longtemps sa vie menacée, 
ainsi que de ses troubles mentales qui le hantaient avec le 
postulat d’être chaste et plein de l’effroi du péché, fidèle à son 
amour pur pour sa cousine et fiancée M.R.
Dans cette conversion héroïque la volonté a joué le 
plus grand rôle. Elle apparaît moins comme une libéra-
tion de forces longtemps et impatiemment contenues que 
comme une remise en question du monde et de soi à partir 
de l’étrange sentiment qu’on éprouve de ne pas tout à fait 
exister, de voir le monde comme une scène où s’agitent des 
acteurs. Se situer dans la réalité et dans sa propre existence, 
André Gide ne le pouvait faire autrement que par un coup 
de force, en repartant à zéro. Jusqu’à ce temps-là, il avait vécu 
dans les nuages, une âme promise à Dieu. Descendant sur 
terre, il découvre le fait d’exister dans le monde à travers le 
« fait de conscience » élémentaire qui joint dans un unique 
phénomène le sujet et l’objet : la sensation. C’est à partir de 
la sensation qu’on éprouve toute vie, qu’on s’élabore la con-
science propre à soi. C’est à partir d’une analyse de la sensa-
tion qu’on se construit une philosophie nouvelle. D’instinct, 
André Gide est allé à l’essentiel. 
Contre ses critiques ardents - Massis6, qui déplore que « 
ce qui est mise en cause ici, c’est la notion même de l’homme 
sur laquelle nous vivons », Clouard, Ghéon et plusieurs au-
tres, Gide prend le parti de la littérature qui se libère de tout 
modèle déterminé ainsi comme de toute justification externe 
à elle. Il inclut, dès ses premières œuvres et grâce à la pra-
tique de la création réflexive et de l’autonymie, le lecteur et le 
critique dans l’ordre diégétique lui-même. La beauté de son 
œuvre s’exprime surtout dans le jaillissement de cet équilibre 
où se fondent sans se détruire, pour le plaisir de sensibilité 
du lecteur et l’excitation de son intelligence, la voix de la 
représentation et celle de l’interrogation, de l’ironie. Ce jail-
lissement de clarté et de sens délimite ce que Gide appelle le 
« point de vue esthétique ».
L’œuvre de Gide, et davantage les Nourritures terrestres, 
dénonce tout effort de la critique pour la délimiter dans 
un apriorisme, qu’il soit moral, politique ou même esthé-
6 Cité dans la lettre de Gide à Massis, dans Œuvres complètes, tome XII, 1937,  
p. 555.
234
Imaginacija, čutnost in umetnost / Zbornik referatov III. sredozemskega kongresa za estetiko
Paula ZUPANC: POÉTIQUE MÉDITERRANÉENNE D’ANDRÉ GIDE : LES NOURRITURES TERRESTRES, 233-235
tique, ou dans la pure représentation d’événements autobi-
ographiques. Elle est rupture, et son classicisme est plutôt 
création7 au lieu d’être imitation. Elle témoigne sa poétique 
à lui : son objet est l’écriture productrice d’un univers lit-
téraire parfaitement neuf, avec son ordre, son intelligence 
clairvoyante, sa sensibilité particulière, son prométhéisme.
Sa démarche poétique, la recherche d’une forme, est 
surtout une entreprise de faire convenir le langage choisi 
à la structure des émotions ressenties, car l’œuvre produit 
une émotion proprement esthétique. Elle n’est plus tout 
à fait celle vécue dans l’instant qui l’avait inspirée. Gide 
construit son œuvre en concordant ainsi la maîtrise d’une 
forme singulière qui est à la fois sens et esprit. Il s’agit chez 
lui de la représentation d’une problématique complexe 
du soi qui ne doit pas se formuler ou se présenter d’une 
manière ou forme différente. Elle cependant exige une élab-
oration précise qui tend à se masquer pour pouvoir produ-
ire des images concurrentes ou filtrantes. Il y représente, 
soit dans la douleur, soit dans la ferveur, une volonté et une 
sensibilité qui permettent au soi de dépasser des limitations 
étouffantes et de s’installer dans la jouissance d’une émo-
tion affirmée dans sa forme pure, celle du langage esthé-
tique de la création littéraire.
Comme l’exprime le titre des Nourritures terrestres, sa 
conversion est matérialiste. Pour Gide le néophyte le monde 
existe surtout par les sens, par la sensation, il est compréhen-
sible, connaissable à travers un rapport de participation. 
L’excitation appelle la réaction qui, à son tour, suscite de nou-
veaux stimuli. L’individu est emporté dans une ronde (il y a 
beaucoup de « rondes » dans les Nourritures) et il se décou-
vre en même temps qu’il découvre l’objet : ils s’établissent du 
même mouvement. 
Gide présente le chant des cinq sens et trouve un 
contentement éperdu à « nommer » les choses : «  Il y a 
déjà un grand plaisir, Nathanaël, à déjà tout simplement 
affirmer : le fruit du palmier s’appelle datte et c’est un mets 
délicieux.8 « Ce « grand plaisir » équivaut à une nou-
velle naissance qui offre à Gide une nouvelle possibilité 
d’exister dans ce monde désormais pourvu de formes, de 
couleurs, d’odeurs, de saveurs, de densité. C’est sur le mode 
de l’expression lyrique qu’il exprime sa reconnaissance. 
Les dieux de son adolescence, ceux de Virgile et d’Homère, 
contribuent à le lui découvrir le monde que le Dieu de son 
enfance lui avait caché. Mais c’est le christianisme qui lui 
avait contribué cet autre sens qu’on appelle ‘intérieur’. C’est 
par lui que la joie se transforme en bonheur, se réfléchit en 
conscience d’être, se métamorphose en ferveur. Cette joie 
éblouissante, comme il décrit dans son Journal, n’est pas 
tout à fait une évasion sans limites, une dissolution. Cette 
joie lui revient pour s’éprouver et sans cesse aller demander 
7 Gide dit ce-ci dans Feuillets, l’hiver 1911. (Journal, 1889-1939, NRF, Gallimard, 
Bibliothèque de la Pléiade) : 
 « Mon esprit profondément créateur se nourrissait surtout de la beauté encore 
informe des choses. L’œuvre d’art, épurée (épuisée de laideurs), ne m’intéressait 
que par ce que l’on sent de durable dans la fixation d’une plus parfaite har-
monie. La vie m’intéressait davantage ; plus dramatique et talonnant à cause 
même de sa fugacité. L’harmonie parfaite toujours imaginable me plaisait 
moins que la déformation hargneuse de cette harmonie selon une personnalité. 
La volonté artistique ne m’apparaissait point tant un choix de lignes, de tons, 
ou de sonorités, en vue d’une œuvre harmonieuse, qu’un travail en pleine har-
monie pour dévier (déformer) cette harmonie selon soi. La trace de l’homme 
était ce que je cherchais dans toute œuvre.), p. 343-344.
8 Les Nourritures terrestres, p. 172.
à être renouvelée, fortifiée. « Le petit garçon qui s’amuse » 
est constamment « doublé d’un pasteur protestant qui 
l’ennuie », ce qui donne à son œuvre l’impression d’un 
prêche pour la libération, la joie de vivre, le bonheur. Mais 
cette joie il faut mériter et conquérir, difficilement, en con-
science et dans la responsabilité. Pour Gide c’est un devoir 
que d’être heureux, le plus grand des devoirs.
Sa conversion s’également effectue par le langage. C’est 
par le langage et à travers lui qu’il a fait naître le monde qui, 
autrement, échappait à sa prise. Il s’est appuyé sur le langage 
pour prendre ses propres mesures. Il se tient à ce langage 
comme à un roc, voyant en lui les preuves de ses moments 
d’existence. S’il se détache si facilement de l’œuvre qu’il 
vient d’écrire, c’est que pour lui elle a joué son rôle, qui 
était expérience de vie par le langage. A travers l’expérience 
vécue, morte, puis renaissant de ses cendres, le langage lui 
offre de nouvelles possibilités et de nouvelles expériences. 
En faisant confiance à l’art, il lui a voué sa vie. Son œuvre est 
une manière d’exister pour lui, dans son entièreté. 
Les Nourritures terrestres consiste de huit livres dont 
la composition est complexe et multiple - des hymnes, des 
rondes, des chants, des dialogues, une symphonie entière 
des sons et des mots reflétant la nature des endroits de son 
séjour. Ce sont des pays encerclant la Méditerranée - Italie, 
Sud de France, Tunisie, Algérie, Maroc…qui lui offrent une 
possibilité pour une vie nouvelle, une vie différente, riche 
de symboles vivants. L’Afrique du Nord surtout devient sa 
patrie mythique où il fait l’expérience de la re-naissance de 
soi. Elle engendre son goût du nomadisme, de la guette des 
plaisirs sensuels et de la liberté sexuelle, de la nudité enfan-
tine, à l’inclusion de sa propre nudité, de l’authenticité. Elle 
engendre la joie de ce qui existe, avec toute la générosité 
qui en résulte, et forme une complicité intime avec de la 
clarté de l’aube et du soleil levant. Cette renaissance, qui 
est acceptation de sa différence, passe par la rencontre avec 
l’Autre.
Le monde des Nourritures terrestres est peuplé par un 
grand nombre de personnes, mais il y a surtout deux qui 
présentent la structure narrative de mise en abîme chère à 
Gide, le créateur d’un monde littéraire et autobiographique 
à lui: Nathanaël9, un disciple, un jeune homme à qui le nar-
rateur, un philosophe aimable et fervent, s’adresse tout au 
long de huit livres, et Ménalque, une personnage de Virgile 
(Bucoliques III et V. Dans les dialogues avec son camarade, 
berger Mopsus - une personnage qui apparaît dans le qua-
trième livre et chante la Ballade des biens immeubles - dit à 
Ménalque : « Tu es le plus âgé de nous deux, Ménalque, il 
est juste que je t’obéisse.. »), qui joue le rôle de l’éducateur 
et le guide au narrateur, ainsi qu’au Nathanaël. Les diverses 
autres personnes sont des porte-parole pour les différents 
aspects des idées ménalesques rendues à travers les odes, les 
ballades, les rondes, les cantiques à l’occasion des soirées et 
des nuits qu’elles ont passées ensemble, chantant, parlant, 
discutant à la manière du symposium. 
9 Nathanaël, c’est le cinquième home appelé à suivre Jésus, sur le conseil de son 
ami Philippe (Nouveau testament, l’Evangile de Jean, chapitre I., verset 48 et 
suivants). Jésus fera de lui un très beau compliment (véritable israélite, en lui 
point d’artifice). Aussi, à Nathanaël s’adresse cette promesse inouïe : « Vous 
verrez le ciel ouvert et les anges de Dieu montant et descendant sur le Fils de 
l’Homme » ( Jean 1,51). 
 Le nom signifie « don de Dieu ». 
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Dans le premier livre le narrateur-poète offre à Na-
thanaël des maximes pour vivre:
»Ne souhaite pas, Nathanaël, trouver Dieu ailleurs 
que partout. Chaque créature indique Dieu, aucune 
ne le révèle. Dès que notre regard s’arrête à elle, 
chaque créature nous détourne de Dieu….Dieu, disait 
Ménalque: c’est ce qui est devant nous.
Que l’importance soit dans ton regard, non dans la chose 
regardée«, (p.156).
»Non point la sympathie, Nathanaël, -l’amour….
Nathanaël, je t’enseignerai la ferveur. 
Une existence pathétique plutôt que la tranquillité.« 
(p.156).
Il célèbre dans le second livre les nourritures  et les instants.
»Je m’attends à vous, nourritures!
Ma faim ne se posera pas à mi-route;
Elle ne se taira que satisfaite;
Satisfactions! Je vous cherche.
Vous êtes belles que les aurores d’été.« (p. 167) 
Dans le troisième, le narrateur décrit des endroits, des villes et des temps différents qui influencent sa prise de 
conscience de beauté des phénomènes de la nature. 
»Volupté! Ce mot, je voudrais le redire sans cesse: je le 
voudrais le synonyme de bien-être, et même qu’il suffit de 
dire être, simplement.« (p. 174)
Villa Borghèse, Adriatique, Colline de Fiesole, Rome, Monte Picino, Amalfi, Syracuse, Tunis, Malte, Blidah, la 
navire expriment l’émotion de plus en plus ardente et précipi-
tée. Aussi, un rencontre nocturne avec un enfant qui est du 
même parti avec cette exaltation.
»Et les corps délicats épousés sous les branches.
J’ai touché d’un doigt délicat sa peau nacrée.
Je voyais ses pieds délicats qui posaient bruit sur le 
sable.« (p. 176)
Dans le quatrième livre c’est Ménalque lui-même qui reprend le parole en s’adressant à Nathanaël et aux amis 
réunis un soir dans un jardin sur la colline de Florence.
»Je traversais des villes, et ne voulus m’arrêter nulle part. 
Heureux, pensai-je, qui ne s’attache à rien sur la terre 
et promène une éternelle ferveur à travers les constants 
mobilités. Je haïssais les familles, les foyers, tous lieux où 
l’homme pense trouver un repos…je disais que chaque 
nouveauté doit nous trouver tout entiers disponibles…« 
(p. 184)
Réunis, les amis de Ménalque – Angaire, Ydier, Tityre, Al-cide, Hylas, Moelibée, Mopsus, Simiane et quelques autres 
- chantent les fruits, les voluptés, les désirs: Ronde de la grenade, 
Ballade des plus célèbres amants (Bethsabée et David, Ammon et 
Tamar, Sulamite, Ariane et Thésée, Eurydice et Orphée), Ballade 
des biens immeubles, Ronde des maladies, Ronde de tous mes désirs.
»Hélas! Hélas! je sais comment prolonger ma souffrance;
Mais mon plaisir je ne sais comment l’apprivoiser.
Entre le désir et l’ennuie notre inquiétude balance.«  
(p. 202)
Suit le livre de la ferme, »Pluvieuse terre de Normandie; campagne domestiquée« (p. 205), le voyage en diligence, 
les auberges; le poète chante toutes les portes de la ferme, les 
granges, les greniers, la laiterie, l’étable, le fruitier, le pressoir, 
la distillerie, les remises… »La dernière porte ouvrait sur la 
plaine.« (p. 214) 
Dans le livre six de Lyncéus, citant Goethe, Faust, II, au 
commencement
»Zum sehen geboren 
Zum schauen bestellt.« (p. 215),
André Gide célèbre les sources, les soifs étanchées, les sommeils, les couches, les demeures, il parle des villes, 
des cafés, il note l’émotion d’une minute, produit de tant 
d’impressions confuses et coordonnées.
Dans les deux derniers livres, ce sont encore des notes 
de voyage, des fragments sur Alger, Biskra, Chetma, Blidah, 
Touggourt. Il peint les oasis, les caravanes, le désert, les insom-
nies. Enfin, dans l’Envoie qui clôt les Nourritures, il s’adresse 
avec son avis à Nathanaël à s’émanciper de son livre.
»Jette mon livre…Quite-moi; Je suis las de faindre 
d’éduquer quelqu’un. Quand ai-je dit que je te voulais 
pareil à moi? – C’est parce que tu diffêre de moi que 
je t’aime…Ne t’attache en toi qu’à ce que tu sens qui 
n’est nulle part ailleurs qu’en toi-même, et crée de toi, 
impatiemment ou patiemment, ah! le plus irremplaçable 
des êtres.« (p. 248)
Sa haine du romantisme le rétorque contre la métaphore et le raffermi dans l’élaboration de son propre classicisme es-
thétique, entrelacé de l’ironie et d’imagisme mimétique. Néan-
moins, son œuvre cesse de représenter purement son regard-
reflet narcissique exprimé dans ses œuvres débutantes et mis 
en place un champ poétique ouvert à la pluralité des sens pour 
préciser son identité littéraire idiosyncrasique. Gide utilise 
l’exemple de la peinture naturaliste, mais d’une forme particu-
lière qu’anticipe la préciosité artificielle de post-moderne. 
